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Foreword
To those who are unaware of the importance of rice as a food 
item and as an industry and source o f livelihood for the teeming 
millions of Asia and other parts of the world, A ll in a Grain o f Rice 
may look like much ado about a little  thing. To others who are 
conscious of such importance and who respect scientific research as a 
tedious, challenging but imperative approach to problems affecting 
the well-being of the human race, this book makes quite an 
impression for it is a unique and interesting presentation of the issues 
and the knowledge that is available, inadequate, or absent relative to 
the social and economic implications of the new rice technology 
turned out by research institutions in the nineteen sixties and 
seventies.
Written by Gelia T. Castillo, a leading rural sociologist, under a 
study grant from the Ford Foundation, this book in itially takes off 
on the problems associated w ith the Green Revolution and its new 
rice technology as perceived by a number of international stalwarts 
in the socio-economic field, including Clifton R. Wharton, William M. 
Harding, Wolfe Ladejinsky, Walter P. Falcon, M. L. Dantwala, and 
Elizabeth Whitcombe, and then it focuses on the Philippine 
experience, ferrets out the issues and synthesizes the research 
findings.
Wharton et a i pointed up the constraints on the diffusion of 
the new high yielding rice varieties and anticipated problems 
that could be generated by efforts to spread these varieties. The 
problem areas they emphasized involved questions on risk manage­
ment; the need to expand other industries related to rice production 
and marketing; pricing policy; consumer reaction, intra-regional 
consequences of self-sufficiency; manpower requirements for im­
proving the technology on a continuing basis and effects on farm 
costs, land reform, the quality of life of people, the relative
positions of the rich and poor, and the long range viability of the
soil itself. , , , ,
With these problems as an introductory framework, the author
plunges into the Philippine scene by reviewing more than two 
hundred articles on the history of the rice industry, the introduction, 
diffusion and adoption o f the new rice technology, the agricultural 
extension services and the rice farmer, income and distribution 
aspects of the new technology, the Philippine land reform program 
and the credit and organizational components of rice production.
The questions covered are wide-ranging!
How does a farmer respond to the new technology? What are 
the factors that explain the farmer's acceptance of new technology?
What was the rationale behind the new plant type of the miracle 
rice? How fast has been the diffusion and adoption of the high 
yielding varieties? What are the adoption patterns in the spread of 
the new technology? Have cropping patterns changed?
What is the role o f the extension service? What is its impact in 
spreading the new technology? What are the sources of information 
of the farmer? Which of these is most effective in reaching the 
farmer? How does the farmer obtain needed information? What 
qualities does the farmer look for in a farm management technician? 
What is the effect of the presence or absence of an extension service
aoent?
Has the farmer changed? What is the influence of technology 
changes on the levels and quality of living of farmers? How have 
farmers regarded the irrigation service? What is the farmer's own 
perception of the impact of the high yielding varieties? What is the 
farmer's reaction to disease outbreaks?
How has the new rice technology affected tractor use? How has 
tractorization affected employment? Has credit influenced tractori- 
zation? What is the trend in tractorization -  toward bigger or
smaller tractors?
What are the effects o f the new technology on tenure and 
farming status? Have farm labor patterns changed? How far have 
income ceilings been raised? What is the equity relationship between 
irrigated and non-irrigated areas? Is there evidence that farmers w ill 
return to traditional technology?
How profitable is the new technology? What are its income 
distribution implications? Has it  affected off-farm and on-farm 
employment? How has the land reform program been affected by 
the new technology? Are there conflicts between land reform
objectives and productivity? What are the characteristics of land­
lords and tenants? How have they responded to land reform? Who 
benefit more from the new technology, the large or small farmers?
What is the role of credit in the spread of the new technology? 
How have farmers responded to credit availability? What are the 
effects of credit on tenure status? What has been the experience 
with farm organization? What are the perceived constraints on 
efforts to obtain high yields?
The answers to all these questions and many more are not just 
listed nor merely compiled in this book. They are presented in an 
organized, analytical form and in a fashion that translates what 
otherwise might be a boring enumeration of facts and figures into 
an interesting series o f discoveries and disclosures.
Although the book dwells mainly on the Philippine experience, 
it suggests lessons that could be useful to any one interested in rice 
problems or, more generally, in the use of new technology as a 
development instrument to prod an agricultural economy.
Policy-makers, researchers, teachers and students in the rice 
countries should find this book an absorbing contribution to the ever 
expanding world of knowledge that is of great value in government 
planning and program implementation, in agricultural business, or in 
the classrooms.
J. D. DRILON, JR.
Director
Southeast Asian Regional Center 
for Graduate Study and Research 
in Agriculture 
College, Laguna 3720, Philippines 
March, 1974
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Preface
Long before "miracle rice" was born and before international 
development experts saw the "evils" which they suspected lurk 
behind this innocent grain, I have been interested in the rice farmer. 
He has always been described as traditional and resistant to change 
and yet simultaneously glorified as the "backbone of the nation." 
Therefore, when he was dubbed as a "miracle man" for having 
responded quickly and positively to the new rice varieties and 
whatever else went with them, I followed the events enthusiastically.
A total of about 186 items have been reviewed for this volume. I 
have been involved directly or indirectly in a big or small way in a 
majority of the studies cited here. Almost all of the original authors 
are known to me personally and I have had the good fortune of 
having visited most of the study sites. Furthermore, it has been a 
great privilege on my part to be in close touch w ith the rice 
scientists of both the International Rice Research Institute and the 
University of the Philippines at Los Banos. As a rural sociologist I 
found it essential to understand the nature of the technology in order 
not to misinterpret or distort its impact. A t any rate, enough data 
from the original works have been included in order to provide the 
readers ample opportunity to weigh the evidences for themselves 
and to arrive at their own conclusions.
What really made me work intensively on this volume is the 
continuous stream of "visiting firemen" (journalists, economists, 
sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, international devel­
opment agency representatives, etc.) who came to Los Banos, in 
search of the " tru th "  as far as the social and economic consequences 
° f the new rice technology are concerned. Inevitably, I suppose, they 
found the " tru th "  they came to look for. Otherwise, we would not 
have as much literature on the subject as we now have.
But more important than the demands of international develop­
ment experts, I found in this subject an avenue for contributing 
research-based teaching materials badly needed in this country. All 
the seven chapters contain relevant materials for courses in land 
reform, agricultural economics, rural sociology, social change, agri­
cultural extension, communication, community development, etc. 
For researchers, the existing research results have already been 
synthesized and gaps in knowledge indicated. For policy makers, the 
research findings themselves suggest where policies and assumptions 
need to be re-examined. To the scientists who contribute to the 
never-ending development of suitable technology, it must be quite a 
revelation to see how much their "grain of rice" has generated 
optimism, pessimism, skepticism, cynicism, and how much it is being 
held responsible positively or negatively for many of the world's 
blessings as well as misfortunes.
For the opportunity to participate in the documentation of the 
rice story in the Philippines, I have to thank the Ford Foundation 
who supported the study. The University of the Philippines at Los 
Bafios allowed me a one-year Special Research Detail w ithout pay so 
that I could devote most o f my time in writing. The SEARCA took 
the risk o f funding this publication and appointed Prof. Melanio A. 
Gapud to edit it. Miss Perla D. Yfiiguez and her colleagues in the 
Department of Agricultural Education patiently typed the original 
manuscript from my handwritten notes.
My husband, Pol, and my three children allowed me all the time 
to do this writing because they know Mommy enjoyed it. And 
finally, I wish to remember my father who w ill never see the finished 
product whose influence on my academic pursuits w ill always be felt.
GELIA T. CASTILLO
University of the Philippines 
at Los Bafios 
March 1974
Introduction: The Issues
As far as one could tell from the available literature, it was 
Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. who opened the Pandora's Box of the Green 
Revolution in his Foreign Affairs  article of April, 19691. From then 
on, the temporary euphoria about the glorious victory in the "war on 
hunger" has suffered some depression. New pangs of pessimism and 
dark forebodings started to becloud the rosy picture of the future. 
Because of the near-spectacle and rapidity at which these new grains 
have swept into the international scene in agriculture and the equally 
dramatic manner in which they have been written and talked about, 
•t is only to be expected that many unhappy phenomena emerging in 
this world would also be attributed to these developments. If the 
number of conferences, experts and publications on the subject were 
a relevant criterion, the Green Revolution would easily qualify as 
The Event of This Decade." Unfortunately, in the midst of all the 
grim warnings and prognostications, rhetoric seems to come in 
greater measure than hard data. Therefore, protagonists (fire-eaters, 
they say) tend to be lined up on either side of the fence hurling 
stones rather than examining evidences. As one international 
development agency representative said: "Do we have to wait for the 
evidences to know the consequences of these technological develop­
ments? We all know what the implications are! "  The question is:
Do we really know what is happening?
In the search for some answers to this question, this review 
attempts to do two things:
(1) Present the issues as they had been raised by different 
people from different vantage points.
(2) Analyze and synthesize relevant information from Phil-
1Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., "The Green Revolution: Cornucopia or Pandora's Box " 
Foreign A ffa irs. April 1969, pp. 464-476.
ippine studies which have a direct or indirect bearing on 
such issues.
The choice o f the Philippines as a setting for this review is not 
only expedient but also logical because it  is the birthplace of miracle 
rice varieties. Furthermore, the country was supposed to have 
attained even if  short-lived, a state of self-sufficiency in rice after 
more than half a century of rice importation. However, the rice 
pendulum seems to be back where it was before. Nowhere else can 
one therefore find a livelier, more dynamic, more intriguing setting 
for the analysis of the socio-economic implications of the new 
high-yielding rice varieties than in the Philippines.
The purpose of this study is not only to bring into focus 
whatever information or empirical evidences have to say on the 
burning issues but also to define areas where there is little  or no 
indication at all reasearch-wise, as to what is happening. Hopefully, 
the synthesis of what is available would shed some light for 
policy-makers.
A. What is in Pandora's Box?
Despite the "unparalleled opportunity" offered by the Green 
Revolution to "break the chains of rural poverty in important parts 
of the w orld ," Wharton believes that the further spread of new 
varieties w ill not be as early successes might suggest for the following 
reasons:
(1) The availability of irrigated land imposes at least a 
short-run lim it to the spread of the new high-yielding 
varieties.
(2) There are doubts about the ability of existing markets to 
handle the increased product.
(3) The adoption of the new technology is likely to be much 
slower where the crop is s basic food staple grown by a 
farmer for family consumption.
 (4) Farmers must learn new farming skills and expertise of a
higher order than was needed in traditional methods of 
cultivation.
(5) Many of the new varieties are non-photosensitive and the 
shorter term will allow two or three crops per year instead 
of one. Multiple cropping is good but there may be 
difficulties if  the new harvest comes during the wet season 
w ithout provision . .  . for mechanical drying of the crop to
replace the traditional sun drying.
(6) Failure to make significant institutional reforms may well 
be a handicap . . . The first or early adopters of the new 
technology w ill be in regions which are already more 
advanced, literate, responsive and progressive. . . in sum, 
the wealthier, more modern farmers. . .As a result of 
different rates in the diffusion of the new technology, the 
richer farmers will become richer.
On the other hand, if the new varieties spread rapidly and 
widely, Wharton thinks that the increased production w ill lead to a 
new set o f difficulties:
(1) Large tracts planted to one of the new varieties may be 
susceptible to disease and infestation which could cause 
massive losses.
(2) It is vitally important to expand the entire complex of 
services and industries required to achieve the higher 
production.
(3) Much more attention must be devoted to marketing the 
increased output.
(4) The slowness w ith which the food-deficit psychology dies 
also has an important consequence in terms of government 
pricing policies.
(5) The goals of increased food production are frequently 
couched in terms of some desirable, minimal standards of 
nutrition. . . If the increased production leads to lower 
costs and prices, then consumers w ill be able to increase 
their food purchases and hopefully to raise their levels of 
nutrition.
(6) One of the major avowed aims of most nations which are 
eagerly promoting the Green Revolution is to  achieve 
self-sufficiency in food production. . . Self-sufficiency w ill 
not only be detrimental to the rice-exporting nations but 
w ill also reduce one of the few areas of economic inter­
dependence in the region.
(7) A critical question is whether these technological develop­
ments are a "once-and-for-all”  phenomenon. How likely is 
it that new technological improvement w ill continue to be 
made? . . . The target should be not a new technology but 
ever-new technology and this requires skilled manpower.
From another point of view, Harding argues that although the
growth of high-yielding varieties should be encouraged to the 
maximum because of the millions of hungry people in the world, he 
hopes that the other aspects of science and technology which must 
go along with that revolution would not be overlooked, such as: "the 
effects of change on farm income and farm costs; the dislocation of 
rural people; the demands for education; the need for industrial 
development; the requirements of urbanized society; the rigidities of 
world trade, etc." Philosophically he finds that a good deal could be 
said for not harnessing science and technology for the "the values of 
the traditional rural society are d ifficu lt to surpass." He recalls how 
the mechanization of agriculture in Saskatchewan had affected the 
entire social fabric of society but "neither the individual farmer nor 
the machinery dealer involved in the transaction of buying and 
selling a tractor had any conception of the effects of their action 
when it was multiplied one hundred thousand times. Neither realized 
the social costs which would ensue. Neither could foresee the 
denudation of the countryside, the new cost structure of agriculture, 
the movement of people, the unemployment, the erosion of friendly, 
comfortable communities, the general dislocation in the countryside 
and the urban centers. Nor could they foretell that the relative net 
income situation of the farmer would not improve." Insofar as 
agricultural productivity is concerned, the question posed is: 
"Agricultural production for whom? Who receives the benefit? The 
farmer? which farmer? . . . does it reinforce the present farming 
community. . . or destroy it? — and who pays the cost of 
destruction? "  Harding further stresses the need to consider the goals 
of the farmer whom he describes as a cautious person who, in 
assessing the potential of a new variety of grains w ill not accept 
anyone's word as to how well it w ill produce. The farmer must not 
only see for himself but w ill also want to know if the product w ill 
sell as well as other varieties; what additional inputs are required and 
what will happen to the price of inputs after he makes the change and 
becomes dependent on them. Finally, he argues that progress will be 
judged on the quality o f life  and social stability o f the nation.2
Ladejinsky, a long-time stanch supporter of agrarian reform, has 
this to say: ". . .while the green revolution is the most promising 
portent for a sharp rise in agricultural productivity, at the moment it
■^William M. Harding, Toward Harnessing Science and Technology for Agricultural 
Productivity and Community Development. Paper presented at the Third International 
Seminar on Communications Strategies in Community Development, UNESCO, U.P. 
Institute of Mass Communication, Diliman, Quezon City, December 17, 1970.
is anything but a boon for the unfinished business of agrarian reform 
in Asia. A t this stage of technological changes taking place in India, 
f or example, there are ample signs that the burden of the change falls 
squarely on the tenants; numbers of them have already been 
separated' from the land before the advent of the green revolution 
and more are in danger of facing the same process in consequence of 
the green revolution. . . The most encouraging aspect of the shift 
from traditional to modern farming is not so much the physicai 
output as the increasing use of output or the willingness of the 
farmers to invest and take risk — and to be well-rewarded for it as is 
indeed the case. Aside from this and further improvements in store, 
the new widespread psychological attitude about the effectiveness of 
the new farm practices is of unquestioned importance. The desire for 
better farming and a better standard of living is evident not only 
among the relatively few 'revolutionaries' but also among a great 
many farmers who for a variety of reasons are still only onlookers of 
the new package of practices. To those concerned with purely 
Physical indicators of economic growth, a psychological change of 
this sort is not subject to numerology and is probably of no account 
to them as a development factor. But it cannot be denied that a new, 
•f unquantified factor of growth has been introduced." On the seamy 
S|de, Ladejinsky argues "that the drive for higher productivity does 
not necessarily alleviate the condition of the rural have-nots, leaving 
many by the wayside. The propitious circumstances in which the 
new technology thrives, like adequate resources to begin with, are 
not easily obtainable for multitudes of the smaller farmer-owners, 
Hot to speak of tenants w ith additional problems of their own. 
Hence, the inevitable constraints on its scope and the limited 
mvolvement of these groups of farmers. . . In the absence of 
aPpropriate counter measures the benefits of development, whether 
9overnmentally sponsored or not, often result in the law of 
mcreasing returns to the rich or the rich getting the most and the 
poor the least. In India, the new agricultural strategy is beginning to 
demonstrate that in the form of rising violence in the countryside 
between the haves and have-nots. . . There is manifested concern that 
° r all the green revolution's technological feasibility it might fall 
short in affecting positively and, in effect, adding to the crucial 
Problems of unemployment, inequalities in income distribution -  
°th relatively and absolutely -  rising sense of social injustice and, as 
a Part of all this, the apparent perpetuation of an outmoded and 
e*ploitative tenurial structure." Citing the case of Punjab, Ladejinsky
points to making money as a new way of life which is characterized 
by more and more tubewells, more of all other inputs and bigger 
crops but laments the absence from the process of a majority of the 
cultivators, thus leading to income polarization on a widening scale. 
The assumption that the new technology is neutral to scale, 
according to him, breaks down in the sense that a large number of 
cultivators lack resources or are institutionally precluded from taking 
advantage of the new agricultural trends. As far as tenancy is 
concerned, the green revolution has pushed up land values and 
consequently, land rents. Security of tenure is also threatened 
because "the owners would like to complete the enclosure process of 
reducing the tenants to the lowly status of agricultural laborers." The 
other issues relate to labor and mechanization. "The new type of 
farming w ith its land-saving and labor-demanding practices and 
double-cropping is labor intensive on primary, secondary, and 
tertiary levels. . . The very same practices, however, also give rise to 
labor-saving devices such as tractors, rotary ploughs, harrows and 
tillers to go with them, electrically operated tubewells, sprayers and 
threshers — to mention modern equipment already on the farms of 
many of the new practitioners of modern farming." Although there 
are both labor-absorbing and labor-displacing practice, "the employ­
ment outlook gets darker as the technology and farm practices grow 
in sophistication and as the entree into the labor market rises which 
is of course the case." Finally, if the efficacy of the new technology 
does not find the company of agrarian and other related reforms long 
overdue, "the green revolution might turn red."3
In a slightly different packaging but w ith essentially the same 
ingredients, Walter Falcon writes about the generations o f problems 
associated with the green revolution such as: the first generation of 
great production successes but important limitations; the second 
generation problems of marketing, markets and resources allocation; 
and the third generation problems of social forces and uncertain 
consequences. Although his assessment of the green revolution is 
hardly one of wild enthusiasm, his purpose has not been to  argue 
that it should not have happened or to  deny its great production 
successes in certain regions. His intent is to point out how limited a 
solution the revolution is given the broader development problems of 
South and Southeast Asia. The four themes which stand out in his
•^Wolfe Ladejinsky, Agrarian Reform in Asia, The Green Revolution and its Reform 
Effects. Paper presented at the 28th International Congress of Orientalists, Canberra, 
Australia, Jan. 6-12, 1971.
analysis are: (1) Despite the impressive gains to date, the term 
revolution can only be used correctly to describe about 10 to 15 per 
cent of Asia and one of the greatest second-generation obstacles are 
the individuals who believe that the first-generation solutions have 
been found. (2) The sudden increases in agricultural output have 
already or will soon necessitate basic pricing decisions on the part of 
governments. (3) Although the limited technological revolution in 
agriculture has permitted an easing of one critical development 
constraint, it has not provided a panacea for solving the employment 
and equity problems and might have been destabilizing in terms of 
widened income disparities within and between regions. (4) The great 
challenge of the future w ill be to forge institutions that can deal 
s|multaneously with the demographic explosion, rapid economic 
9rowth and equality of income distribution.4
M. L. Dantwala, in his analysis of the relative roles of 
technology, economic policy and agrarian institutions in explaining 
stagnation of growth suggests that: "In  the absence of a technological 
breakthrough the many otherwise highly relevant policies — land 
reform, economic incentives and institutional changes, jo in tly  and 
severally could not have lifted agriculture above its stagnation 
threshold. Land reforms and other institutional changes were not 
successfully carried out, but a thought occurs that perhaps the very 
stagnation of agriculture inhibited their success. When yields were 
miserably low, it was d ifficu lt to get enthusiastic about lowering the 
ceiling on holding or drastically reducing the rents. Speaking about 
India extremes apart, if there is injustice or exploitation, it is, by and 
'arge, of the poor by the less poor. Sure enough, even after the 
abolition of the intermediary tenures — from over 170 million acres 
of land — there are several pockets of absentee landlordism. Yet, the 
bulk of the India agricultural sector is poor and depressed even by 
India's urban standards. Under such circumstances, how much scope 
was there for divesting or expropriation of the 'rich'? Now that the 
Possibilities of making a fortune in agriculture have opened up, land 
reforms can play a vigilant corrective role.
"As for agricultural prices, when yields were in the neighborhood 
° f one (1) ton per hectare, it was a mockery to talk of incentives 
through higher prices. But if new technology is to be adopted, it is 
ggential to assure the innovating farmers that their efforts to adopt
at . Water P. Falcon, The Green Revolution: Generations of Problems. Paper presented 
Mi. 6 Surnrner Meeting of the American Agricultural Economists' Association, Columbia
Missouri, Aug. 9-12, 1970.
it w ill not be allowed to be frustrated by unremunerative prices.
" I t  may be argued that the discovery of high-yielding varieties 
was not a gift from heaven, and but for appropriate policies, they 
would not have seen the light of the day! Whose policies? Probably 
of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundation whose generous grants made 
it possible for the scientists in Mexico and the Philippines to evolve the 
high-yielding varieties. The revolution was the reward of scientific 
research and not of the wisdom of economists; few even dreamt of it 
and many even do not believe it. It is our professional privilege and 
duty to question its occurence or its consequences — Palace Revolt, 
Pandora's Box, Seeds of Disaster, Dualism — but let us not get into 
a stance that nothing good can ever happen in this country 
(India).” 5
On the technical problems posed by the Green Revolution, the 
most stern warnings come from Elizabeth Whitcombe, in her analysis 
of the New Agricultural Strategy in Uttar Pradesh. Her apprehension 
arises from the prominent role which fertilizer plays in the growth of 
the new high-yielding varieties and its long-term consequences on 
soils in high temperature zones which have a chronic incapacity to 
store nitrogen. She asks: "How are the mechanical properties of 
alluvium to be sustained and their water retentiveness strength­
ened? "  Furthermore, she points out that the new grains have a 
water-demand which is at least double that of indigenous and locally 
improved cereals, hence making irrigation areas to be measured not 
only in terms of "patchy soil-water deterioration by water logging 
and salinity or in the depletion of aquifers by excessive tubewell 
demand”  but also in relation to significant water losses from 
irrigation installations which lack lined distribution channels. In 
addition, she has doubts as to whether the performance of the 
high-yielding varieties would continue over a period of years 
considering genetic instability, hence the need for constantly 
renewed seeds to maintain yield levels. Then too, "the high-yielding 
varieties have a notoriously low threshold of resistance to disease." 
Finally, in her eloquent presentation at the 28th International 
Congress o f  Orientalists, January 1971, she called for a moratorium 
on the tubewells.6
5 m . L. Dantwala. "From Stagnation to Growth: Relative Roles of Technology, 
Economic Policy, and Agrarian Institution." Presidential Address, Indian Economic 
Association, Fifty-third Annual Conference, Gauhati December 1970.
^Elizabeth Whitcombe, The New Agricultural Strategy in Uttar Pradesh. Paper 
presented at the 28th International Congress of Orientalists, Canberra, Australia, Jan. 6-12 
1971.
The political scientists have certainly not been silent by­
standers in the quest for Pandora's Box. Besides dwelling on the 
usual issues which are the bread and butter of the economists, 
Francine Frankel brings to the fore the so-called political costs of the 
new agricultural strategy in India. She is concerned that "a t the least, 
efforts to ensure the essential conditions of success for the new 
agricultural approach seem bound to commit India more closely to 
an entrepreneurial or capitalist strategy of development in all sectors 
of the economy with the attendant political risks of intensifying 
economic inequalities and social conflict. They also appear certain to 
involve her in closer economic dependence on American and other 
foreign private investors and to increase the constraints on an 
•ndependent foreign policy. It even seems likely that the new 
agricultural strategy will weaken the very foundations of central 
Planning by concentrating an even greater proportion of the 
agricultural surplus in the hands of large landowners — the very 
group all state governments in India, regardless of party identifica- 
hon, have found politically impossible to tax."
The journalists, far from being insensitive to the issues, have 
certainly contributed their share to the vita lity of the forum. For 
example, one writer said that the Green Revolution has brought "a 
new style o f living" and has shown a vast potential for good. William 
P. Bundy recognizes that "although only a fraction of Asia's arable 
land can at this stage be adapted to the new techniques, the gains 
rnade and in prospect have deferred the threat of widespread 
famine - visible for the late 1970's only five years ago — for twenty 
years or more. And this fundamental change ignores ideological 
boundaries, for there is evidence that North Vietnam and probably 
Communist China have acquired large quantities of the new seeds. A t 
the very least, Asia has been given time to find new economic and 
social structures to get on — much too slowly — with control of 
Population. Only if one prefers starvation as a goad to social 
Progress can one offer serious argument against the Green Revolution 
as a whole. Yet no one is more aware than the men who have 
Participated in it that the revolution has created a host of special 
Problems for the 1970's." He suggests that if small holders are to 
Participate on equal terms with medium and large holders, there 
must be cooperatives. Citing the case of West Pakistan, where the 
9°vernment is said to have encouraged and even catered to the 
advantage of the latter groups by, for example, subsidizing tractor 
Sa es, he sees added strain to an already skewed rural social structure.
"Some think this helped the extremist politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
in the West Pakistan election of last year. The immensely d ifficu lt 
trick is to minimize dislocation, improve equity and keep people on 
the farms, at a time when already advanced trends to bloated cities 
and vast unemployment loom as the central problems of the 1970's." 
In a most elegant concluding paragraph, Bundy says: "L ike  all true 
revolutions, the green one has now acquired its own dynamics. It 
cannot stop and can probably only go faster — for example, as the 
vital protein content of basic food grains is increased by plant 
breeding now in advanced stages. As new methods spread and 
m ultiply so inevitably will the accompanying problems of organization 
and equity. No part of Man's whole condition at the moment is more
laden with drama."7
Although most of the writers mentioned issues w ith reference 
to India, it is equally relevant to ask the same questions of other 
countries participating in the Green Revolution. As a matter of fact, 
it would be extremely valuable to find out how much of what has 
been said is indeed occurring in different places and how these 
phenomena manifest themselves w ithin and between countries. With 
systematic probing into what is known, there should be no shortage 
of materials for further drama -  but perhaps more tied to  reality 
than to rhetoric.
B. What's with Cornucopia?
In a way the situation of the Green Revolution is akin to 
that of Uncle Sam with respect to the granting of foreign aid -  
"damned if  he does and damned if  he doesn't.”  The two major 
concerns have to do with constraints on the further spread of the 
technology and if such bottlenecks were overcome, one worries 
about the "evils" which come with such "success." A t least as far as 
the literature is concerned, the Green Revolution is a born loser 
because whatever happens or does not happen is accompanied by a 
host of problems associated w ith either scarcity or abundance or 
both. It is more objective, therefore, to view the phenomenon in this 
context and from this perspective proceed to examine the nature, 
trends, and if possible, magnitude of the problems which it  brings. 
Whether the consequences are positive or negative depends very much 
on who is evaluating and the values he holds. Given an indication as
^William P. Bundy, "How fares the ugly American?" Newsweek, Aug. 23, 1971, p.
to what is happening, a policy-maker should be able to choose a 
course of action congruent w ith his scale of preferences and the 
corresponding consequences, both anticipated and unanticipated.
In this spirit and using the issues in Pandora's Box as a take-off 
Point, as a framework, an analysis and synthesis of available 
empirical evidence is attempted. The entire study includes seven 
chapters:
1. The Philippine Rice Situation Through the Years
2. The Introduction, Diffusion and Adoption of the New Rice 
Technology.
3. Agricultural Extension Services and the Rice Farmers
4. The Changing Filipino Rice Farmer
5. Employment and Income Distribution Aspects of the New 
Rice Technology
6. The Philippine Land Reform and the New Rice Technology
7. Credit, Cooperatives and Other Organizational Components of 
Rice Production
The Philippine Rice Situation 
Through the Years
It is impossible for anyone to comprehend the meaning of the 
new rice technology to rice production in the Philippines, unless he 
has some idea about the general rice situation in the country through 
the years. Table 1.1 shows that rice production data (total volume 
and hectarage devoted to production and yields per hectarage) from 
1902-03 to 1970-72.1 An examination of yields per hectare shows 
certain identifiable periods:
(a) 1902-1916, w ith yields below 20 cavans per hectare;
(b) 1910-1925, yields climbed to about 24 cavans;
(c) 1925-1934, stable yields of 26 to 28 cavans;
(d) 1934-1948, decline from the previous period to about 23
to  25 again;
(e) 1948-1965, a stable period of 26 to 28 cavans;
(f) 1966-1972, a new period starting w ith more than 30 cavans
per hectare level.
The area devoted to  rice production increased continuously 
from 593,000 hectares in 1902-03 to 1,965,480 in 1938-39. From 
1939, the area expanded from 2 m illion to almost 3 m illion hectares 
in 1957. The rice area rose to more than 3 million from 1957 and had 
remained between 3.1 and 3.2 million hectares since then to 1972. 
Expansion of rice area has probably reached its lim it by now. Rice 
production in the Philippines can be described quite accurately as 
continuously low, stable yields per hectare for about ha lf a century. 
In 1965, Ruttan et at. in a comprehensive analysis of the inhibitory 
effects of environment on the response to modern agricultural tech­
nology in the Philippines and Thailand, concluded that both the yield 
increases in the last decade and the yield differences among major rice- 
producing regions in the Philippines and Thailand primarily reflect
1E. C. Venegas and V. W. Ruttan, An Analysis of Rice Production in the Philippines, 
Econom ic Research Journal, Vol. II, No 3, Dec. 1964, pp. 159-180.
Table 1.1. Rice production in the Philippines in cavans, 
hectares and yield per hectare.
Year
Yield per
Cavans Hectares hectare ii 
cavans
11,466,000 593,000 19.34
17,394,016 1,156,105 15.05
18,859,090 1,192,140 15.82
20,530,100 1,043,760 19.67
11,622,470 1,078,890 10.77
24,498,860 1,141,240 21.47
22,736,810 1,244,940 18.26
17,818,490 1,130,710 15.76
20,878,860 1,140,830 18.30
28,276,720 1,225,690 23.07
35,795,050 1,368,140 26.16
33,781,650 1,391,340 24.28
36,343,810 1,484,890 24.48
41,478,540 1,673,580 24.78
43,436,830 1,661,430 26.14
43,790,500 1,765,370 26.14
41,570,700 1,757,910 23.65
45,652,600 1,725,500 26.46
47,780,000 1,755,920 27.21
49,496,400 1,807,060 27.39
49,921,200 1,786,690 27.94
49,786,400 1,775,460 28.04
51,586,900 1,812,800 28.46
49,640,300 1,790,610 27.72
47,290,200 1,781,630 26.54
47,843,000 1,853,720 25.81
53,001,200 2,004,030 26.45
45,825,100 1,964,070 23.33
42,219,600 2,048,700 20.61
55,015,730 2,060,960 26.69
52,345,210 1,912,050 27.38
52,193,430 1,965,480 26.56
53,698,780 2,080,380 25.81
54,129,940 2,289,190 23.65
55,494,000 2,318,560 23.94
36,893,940 1,649,960 22.36
47 ,460 ,000^ 1,879,600 25.25
50,928,480 2,026,380 25.13
56,620,200 2,164,100 26.16
59,118,600 2,244,000 26.75
59,463,400 2,251,800 26.41
64,335,120 2,466,040 26.09
902-03
908-09
909-10
910-11
911-12
912-13
913-14
914-15
915-16
916-17
917-18
918-19
919-20
920-21
921-22
922-23
923-24
924-25
925-26
926-27
927-28
928-29
929-30
930-31
931-32
932-33
933-34
934-35
935-36
936-37
937-38
938-39
939-40
940-41
941-42
942-43
943-44
944-45
945-46
946-47
947-48
948-49
949-50
950-51
951-52
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Table 1.1 (Continuation)
Year Cavans Hectares
Yield per 
hectare in 
cavans
1952-53 71,458,060 2,655,000 26.92
1953-54 72,328,000 2,645,440 27.34
1954-55 72,793,300 2,655,540 27.41
1955-56 74,393,900 2,742,480 27.13
1956-57 76,044,200 2,768,120 27.47
1957-58 72,806,300 3,154,100 23.08
1958-59 83,738,700 3,329,410 25.15
1959-60 84,988,800 3,306,460 25.70
1960-61 84,199,000 3,196,750 26.33
1961-62 88,863,800 3,179,190 27.95
1962-63 9 0 ,1 5 8 ,7 0 0 / 3,161,320 28.52
1963-65 89,301,800 3,150,000 28.38 X
1965-66 9 2 ,5 5 9 ,9 0 0 / 3,109.180 29.8
1966-67 94,660,500 3,081,170 30.8
1967-68 103,700,000 3,304,000 31.4
1968-69 101,000,000 3,332,000 30.3
1969-70 118,900,000 3,113,000 38.2
1970-71 121,400,000 3,112,000 39.0
1971-72 115,900,000 3,246,000 35.7
1972-73
(Forecast)
113,000,000 3,229,000
NFAC -  APC National Average Yields 
for Programmed Areas*
Cavans
per
hectare
1967-68 43
1968-69 43
1969-70 49
1970-71 52
33.9
Source: Data were obtained from E. C. Venegas and V. W. Ruttan, An Analysis of 
Rice Production in the Philippines, Econom ic Research Journal, (University of the East), 
Vol. 11, No. 3, 1964, pp. 159-180; C. Crisostomo and R. Barker, IRRI Saturday Seminar, 
Nov. 27, 1971; and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture and 
Natural Resources.
*R. Feuer and P. W. Resma, "Progress in the Adoption of H YV of Rice in the 
Philippines." IRRI Thursday Seminar, Jan. 27, 1972.
variations in the environmental factors under which rice is grown 
rather than differences in variety planted or cultural practices. After 
the effects of the environmental factors are taken into account, there 
is little yield increase or yield differential left to be explained by such 
factors as new varieties, better cultural practices or more intensive 
use of technical inputs such as fertilizer and insecticides or by 
economic and social differences among regions and between Thailand 
and the Philippines.
One major implication drawn by the authors is that the factors 
which permit a region to increase its yields to the levels currently 
being achieved in the higher yielding areas of each country are 
primarily outside the control of the individual farmer in the major 
rice-producing areas such as Central Luzon or Central Thailand. 
The modifications in the environment necessary to achieve effective 
water control (irrigation and drainage) and effective pest control w ill 
have to come primarily from public or semi-public agencies capable 
of organizing resources in a manner not available to the individual 
tenant or farm owner.
A second major implication is that the same lim itation on environ­
mental control which prevents farmers from achieving the yield 
potentials inherent in existing varieties w ill represent an equally 
severe lim itation on achievement of the yield potentials inherent 
ln the new varieties which are being designed to be ever more 
sensitive to effective environmental control, technical inputs and 
management than existing varieties.2 It should be pointed out that 
data for this analysis included up to 1963. New varieties referred to 
m the study were those developed by the Bureau of Plant Industry 
ar>d the University of the Philippines College of Agriculture before 
the advent of short, stiff-strawed, nitrogen-responsive, non-photo 
period sensitive varieties developed by the IRRI and comparable 
varieties released by the U.P. College of Agriculture. In Table 1.2, 
the new yield period at the 30 cavans per hectare level occurred also 
at the time when the new HYV's have been diffused, irrigation rates 
have increased, but hectarage has remained stable. Barker shows in 
Table 1.3 that the Philippines with 50 percent of crop area in HYV 
hy 1970-71 had experienced an annual output growth rate of 3.1 
Percent with 91 percent of the growth rate explained by increased
and 2 V. W. Ruttan, A. Soothipan and E. C. Venegas, Changes in Rice Production, Area 
h Yield in the Philippines and Thailand. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
ailand Agricultural Economics Society, Bangkok, Thailand, July 10-12, 1965.
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Table 1.2. Philippine rice yields and irrigation rates, 
1948/1970, three-year averages.
Yield in Percent o f
Period cavans per crop area
hectare irrigated
1948/50 26.11 19
1951/53 26.56 n.a.
1954/56 27.24 22
1957/59 25.20 24
1960/62 26.56 28
1963/65 28.38 31
1966/68 30.42 38
1968/70 33.14 42
Source: R. Barker, e t a!.. Employment and Technological Change in Philippine Agri-
culture. Paper prepared for ILO, Oct. 1971, Table 2.
yield. In another paper, Crisostomo and Barker3 recognize the fact 
that it is impossible to consider the effects of expansion o f irrigated 
areas and decline in non-irrigated ones independently and, therefore, 
find it impossible to say precisely how much of the growth rate 
should be attributed to HYV. They likewise acknowledge that "the 
yield gains have not come up to the expectations of scientists and 
policy-makers."
Table 1.3. Proportion of output growth explained by increased 
crop yield among 4 Asian countries.
O utpu t G rowth in Percent
Country Crop
crop area 
in  H Y V  
1970-71
A nnual 
1960-64 to 
1968-70
Proportion  
explained by  
increased yie ld
India Rice 15 2.0 57
Wheat 33 7.9 70
Philippines Rice 50 3.1 91
Burma Rice 4 1.2 39
Thailand Rice 2 5.3 47
Source: Randolph Barker, "The Economic Consequences of the Green Revolution in 
Asia," Rice, Science and Man, IR R I, Los Bafios, Philippines, 1972, pp. 127-142.
3C. Crisostomo and R. Barker, Growth in Philippine Agricultural and Rice Produc­
tivity: The Impact of the HYV's, IR R I Saturday Seminar, Nov. 27, 1971.
Efferson, in his analysis of world rice production, was much 
less willing to attribute production increases to either HYV's or 
irrigation. As he puts it:
“ Some observers have attributed the increase in rice production in 
recent years largely to the introduction of the new improved varieties plus 
the additional inputs and intensified extension work supplied with these 
varieties. A closer look at the timing of the increases and at the areas in 
which they occurred leads to the conclusion, however, that much of the 
increased production was due to factors other than the new varieties and 
the additional inputs. Data on rice production from major rice-producing 
areas in Asia indicate that the most substantial increase in production from 
1966 to 1967 occurred before HYV's were widely planted. Between 1969 
and 1970 when planting of HYV expanded greatly, total production 
increased only slightly and it declined in 1971. Much, if not most of the 
nee production increase that has occurred in Asia in the last six years 
should be credited to favorable weather during the latter years of the 
Period along with the one percent annual increase m crop area. The rest of 
the increase can be credited to the HYV, the additional volume of 
fertilizer, pesticides, and other inputs used, the intensified extension 
education program and the development of improved irrigation systems to 
Provide more stable water supplies in the wet season and occasionally a 
second crop in the dry season."
He added further that " in  Asia, variable weather is likely to
continue to be the most important influence on the production of
nee. Low production years will occur occasionally just as they have
ln the past. Also in any given rice area in monsoon Asia, the
maximum impact of the improved varieties, added inputs and new
methods can be obtained only when more and more of the region is
provided with effective water control and irrigation. This w ill take 
time."4
Efferson cites the following rice production figures for the 
•Iippines: From 1964, it  was 4.0 million tons; in 1965 and 1966 it 
was 4.1; in 1967 and 1968 it was 4.4. and 5.2 in 1969; 5.3 in 1970 
^n<lE -2  in 1971. If one were to take Efferson's argument in relation 
°  hi|ippine rice production figures cited in Table 1.1 from 1902 to 
it would lead to the conclusion that low rice production 
for°ugh the years has been due mainly to continuous bad weather 
r more than half a century, w ith good weather effects reflected 
° n Y in the 1966 to 1971 production figures. But even in the
4 i
Scienr N ° rrrian Efferson, "Outlook for World Rice Production and Trade," Rice, 
a n d Man. I R R I ,  Los Bafios, Philippines, 1972, pp. 127-142.
statistics he mentioned for 1969 to 1970, the production was much 
higher than in 1964 and in 1971 it went down slightly but not to the 
1964 level despite the very unfavorable weather experienced by the 
country in 1971 and despite the relatively stable hectarage planted to 
rice during the period. It would seem that a long-term production 
trend provides a better basis for arriving at some explanation rather 
than confining the analysis to the 1964 figures.
The story of rice in the Philippines is a history of recurring 
shortages. To illustrate this dramatically, a news item dated March 
10, 1872 had the caption Rice Shortage Feared and went on with the 
following description:
"The problem of rice shortage was feared to upset the economic 
conditions in the islands during the next several months. Government 
authorities made this observation in view of the destruction caused by the 
gusano, a black and yellow maggot ravaging all the ricelands in the 
province of Central Luzon. . . .  In Cagayan and Camarines Norte, floods 
brought about by continuous heavy downpour place all the rice plants 
underwater. In Camarines Sur, the local authorities were compelled to pass 
ordinances forcing the farmers to plant other crops such as corn, sweet 
potatoes, gabi, and other tuber plants as substitute to rice."5
On about the same date but only a century later, March 11, 
1972, the caption of the news item was NEC Certifies Rice Shortage 
and went on to say:
"The National Economic Council yesterday certified an additional rice 
shortage of 200,000 metric tons. . . NEC Chairman Gerardo Sicat said that 
the 300,000 metric tons rice import the government recently contracted 
from Thailand was not sufficient to meet consumption requirements up to 
September 30. The total importation is the biggest in the country's 
history, exceeding even that of last year's which totaled 460,000 metric 
tons."6
The circumstances obtaining before the advent of HYV's and 
the nature and magnitude of the existing pressures for increasing rice 
production need to be underscored, because one must never forget 
the setting in which the new rice technology was introduced. Since 
technocrats determine to a large degree what policies the government 
eventually pursues, their definition of the problem is indicative of 
their concerns. Umali, in his discussion of the rice dilemma in 1961, 
started with a picturesque introduction. He said:
^Renato R. Perdon, "A  Century Ago Rice Shortage Feared, “ Philippines Herald, 
March 10, 1972, p. 5.
^Philippines Herald, NEC Certifies Rice Shortage, March 11, 1972, pp. 1-2.
"Last September, threatened by hunger, our country was a frightened 
nation. The President of the Philippines acted promptly by declaring a 
state of national calamity and by ordering the Philippine Constabulary to 
seize all hoarded rice. This dramatic move and the glaring newspaper 
headlines about the rice crisis caused a mad scramble for the already lean 
supply of rice, and the absence of rice at most corner stores almost 
resulted in riots. That was a calamity for the country and we do not wish 
it to happen again. Rice underproduction has always been a recurrent 
problem in our country. It is a multiple paradox. We have the technical 
know-how which we have lavishly shared with other rice-producing coun­
tries and yet our national average production is one o f the lowest in the 
world. " 7
This preoccupation with low production was also shared by 
another group of technocrats in a memo to the President in 1963:
"On the basis of production efficiency, the case of our rice industry 
presents a very pathetic picture. The Philippines is not in a stable position 
to provide the consumption requirements of the rapidly growing pop­
ulation. Low rice yields are generally held to be the cause of the situation. 
While there is urgent need to increase overall agricultural production in the 
country, this note of urgency is particularly acute in the case of rice 
because of the pressure of population."8
In this same memo, Roxas, et al. outlined a new approach to the 
Perennial food problem. They proposed that prime lowland areas 
suitable for rice cultivation be selected and utilized to produce the 
tice requirements. This means growing rice in 1.7 rather than in 3.2 
mill ion hectares. The usual ingredients of the program were: 
irrigation, improved varieties, fertilizers, credit, extension, milling, 
storage, transportation, and marketing services. The projected period 
° f  development of the area was 10 to 15 years and at the rate of 60
cavans per hectare yield, by 1976 the production was expected to
exceed requirements.9
Such programs are, of course, always simpler on paper (the 
Proponents described the new approach as "startling in its sim- 
p lic ity") than in practice. Somehow no one includes in his
Projections the fact of typhoons, droughts and floods, diseases, 
rats, etc., not to mention the infinite variety of problems en­
7D. L. Umali, The Rice Dilemma: Its Causes, Effects and Suggested Remedies. Paper 
read at the National Science and Technology Week, National Science Development Board, 
N°v. 21, 1961.
8S. K. Roxas, Benjamin Gozon and J. Y. Feliciano, Memo to the President, Subject: 
R'ce and Corn Authority, July 31, 1963.
9 Roxas, et al., op. c/'f.
countered in getting things done. There is no question that self- 
sufficiency in rice has been the goal of every administration regard­
less of which political party is in power.10
On February 20, 1968, on the occasion of the Second 
International Conference on War on Hunger which was called by the 
Committee on the World Food Crisis, Inc., the Philippines received 
an award for its efforts toward self-sufficiency. Umali, who as 
Undersecretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources received the award, displayed an outburst of national 
pride when he gave credit to the Filipino farmers whose “ accomplish­
ment has exceeded everybody's expectations." He said that "under 
similar circumstances of scarce and costly production materials, 
stringent working conditions and lack of incentives as had existed in 
the past, other people might find it  d ifficu lt to beat the Filipino's 
record." Umali's report to the conference mentioned that the 1968 
rice production was estimated to exceed our requirements for food 
for the same period. He likewise indicated that w ith the carry-over 
stocks plus some late-arrival imports ordered prior to July 1967, 
surplus rice stocks of about 475,800 metric tons were expected by 
June 30, 1968.11 In other quarters, the role of the Philippines in the 
world rice output was lauded. This represented a rare opportunity in 
a century to celebrate "self-sufficiency in rice." But the reason for 
this celebration was rather short-lived. By 1971 the old story of 
shortage and importation returned despite reports from the National 
Food and Agriculture Council about bumper harvest and efforts of 
dealers and millers to create an artificial rice shortage.12
By August 1971, the rice shortage was acknowledged and 
attributed to 21 typhoons, the Muslim-Christian conflict in Cotabato 
which had cut heavily into the production of rice and corn, lack of 
agricultural credit, inability of the Rice and Corn Administration to 
guarantee a floor support price for rice, and damage brought about 
by tungro disease.13
10G. T. Castillo, Miracle Rice as Produced by the Press. Presented at the International 
Seminar on Communications, U.P., Quezon City, Nov. 13-Dec. 2, 1967
11D. L. Umali, "The Philippine War on Hunger," Second International Conference 
on War on Hunger called by the Committee on the World Food Crisis, Inc., Feb. 20, 1968, 
Washington, D.C.
12
Amado P. Macasaet, NFAC reports bumper harvest: Shortage blamed on millers, 
Sunday Times, Mar. 7, 1971, p. 16.
'^A rturo  R. Tanco, Rice Report: Harvests Way Below Targets, Aug. 20, 1971, 
Manila Times, pp. 1 and 8. A. R. Tanco, Rice Report: Shortage Blamed on Typnoons, 
Aug. 21, 1971, Manila Times, pp. 1 and 8.
If the Filipino could play God in order to intervene in the rice 
situation, he would want a high price for the rice producer and a low 
price for the consumer. One of the most important studies done on 
farmer's response to price change was reported in 1965 by Mangahas, 
Recto and Ruttan who concluded that:
“ Philippine rice and corn farmers are reasonably responsive to 
changes in the price of rice and corn relative to each other and 
to other commodities even in the short run. This implies that 
changes in relative prices are effective in determining the allocation 
of land among the several agricultural commodities. It seems quite 
clear, for example, that the declining price of rice relative to corn 
during the period prior to 1959-60 was associated w ith the more 
rapid increase in the hectarage devoted to both rice and corn and 
the rise in commercial crop area is clearly related to the rapid 
increase in the price of sugar and copra relative to rice and corn.
“ It also indicates that price support, subsidy or import programs 
undertaken with other objectives, to reduce prices to consumers, for 
example, are rather rapidly reflected in shifts in production. The 
analysis of marketing margins indicates that price changes at one 
level of the marketing system are typically reflected rather rapidly, 
and with little changes in the marketing margin at other levels.
“ While prices of rice and corn in the Philippines have apparently 
been fairly efficient in their resource allocation function, there is 
little evidence to indicate that price changes represent an effective 
device for influencing aggregate agricultural output. In spite of 
nticro-economic evidence that prices represent an important incen­
tive for the purchase of yield-increasing technical inputs (fertilizers, 
lr>secticides,etc.), no measurable yield response to price was 
°btained. Thus while a 10 percent rise in the price of rice w ill result 
,r> at least a 5 percent rise in the marketable surplus of rice, most of 
the increase in output is a result of shifting land from other crops to 
nee or bringing new land into production. This implies a much less 
optimistic role for price as a development tool than if price changes 
•nduced yield as well as hectarage changes."14
At about the same time, a study of 57 rice farmers in one village 
after the passage of the bill for the price support program of the 
Philippine government revealed that only one-half or 29 of them had
^M ahar Mangahas, Aida E. Recto and V. W. Ruttan, Market Relationships for 
lce and Corn in the Philippines. Paper presented at the First World Congress of the 
Economic Society. Rome, Sept. 9-14, 1966.
heard about price support and 27 of them planned to increase their 
yield in order to increase income. When asked in what ways they 
plan to increase yield, 19 respondents mentioned the adoption of 
modern rice-growing practices, 2 said increase of hectarage and 7 
planned to do both.15 Although this is a very small study, it points 
out that response to price may not necessarily mean response to 
price support and, therefore, the use of the latter in order to induce 
productivity increases may not bring expected results. It is likewise 
important to mention that in all of the village-level studies of the rice 
farmer, price has never been cited as an important problem they are 
faced with. Majority of the problems enumerated centered on 
production. A number of explanations for the lack of preoccupation 
with price as a problem may be offered: (a) the farmer's disposal of 
rice is tied up very much to credit arrangements; (b) much of the 
farmer's rice supply is used for consumption; (c) the Philippines has 
never really experienced an oversupply of rice so as to really depress 
prices due to overproduction; (d) rice farmers have never been 
effectively organized as a significant lobbying force, and therefore 
agitation for price support has not come from them; and (e) rice 
farmers have perhaps not been the real recipient of whatever benefits 
were supposed to be derived from price support or high rice prices 
because their crop is more often than not, pledged to their source of 
credit who usually dictates the price. So far, the only situation where 
price has been mentioned as one of the considerations is in the choice 
of rice variety to plant. However, yield potential outweighs all other 
reasons for variety preference.
Unlike the rice farmer, the consumer (and more specifically the 
urban consumer) has always been able to make his preference for low 
rice price effectively known. This effectiveness is considerably 
enhanced around election time. As a matter of fact, the panic 
associated w ith rice shortage and the pressure for importation is 
almost always dictated by the demands of this particular sector of 
our population. As Mangahas describes it:
"In  1971 we experienced another rice crisis. Like our previous crisis, 
the retail price of rice had risen to a very high level and the urban 
consumer complained. The urban newspapers, radio, and TV played their 
usual role and complained too with more or less eloquence. Of course all 
factions of the political opposition whether conservative, reformist or
15Unpublished data from C M. Dimaano and A.M. de Guzman gathered in connec­
tion with a study of rice farmers’ response to a change in cropping pattern. Farm and 
Home Development Office, University of the Phil., College of Agriculture, 1965.
radical complained also through speeches, telecasts and writing. They aired 
their complaints where they fe lt they would be most appreciated and most 
effective: in Metropolitan Manila and other urban centers. It seems clear 
from this that the long-range objective of the Philippines with respect to 
rice is a level of security and contentment, somehow defined, for the rice 
consumer, especially the urban rice consumer. This holds fo r past and 
present leadership and in all likelihood w ill hold fo r future leadership -  
whatever political leaning may be the source — as w ell.".
Contrary to the urban consumer's complaint, Mangahas, taking 
to account the effect of inflation, presents evidence that from 1967 
to 1970, "the price of rice has risen much more slowly than have 
Prices of other commodities so that the real price of rice or its cost in 
terms of other commodities has indeed fallen over 1967-1970 and 
risen again only in 1971" (Table 1.4).
As Mangahas explains, "the real or deflated price of rice is 
determined by real supply and demand conditions. If there were no 
growth in supply from either production or imports, then the annual 
growth in demand mainly population based, would push the real 
price upwards; the annual growth in production counteracts this. The 
decline in the real rice price over 1967-1970 followed by the increase 
in 1971, thus reflects a net improvement in supplies available over 
the past 5 years except for the last year." Among the causes of the 
real supply problem in 1971 cited were: (a) Typhoon "Yo ling"
Table 1.4. The mean price of rice in Greater Manila, 
nominal and deflated, 1967-1971.
Price o f  rice 
in  Greater Manila 
(Macan ordinario) 
Ipesos per gantal
Price o f  rice 
deflated by consu­
m er price index, 
Greater Manila 
(pesos per ganta)
1967 Simple Mean 1.71 1.272
1968 1.74 1.266
1969 1.65 1.189
1970 1.96 1.185
1971 2.71 1.406
Source: M. Mangahas, op. c i t
which came Nov. 1970 in the midst of the main harvest; (b) the 
tungro virus disease which affected the 1970 and 1971 crops as a 
consequence of which the Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
estimated the production in Central Luzon for crop-year 1971/72 to 
drop by 10 million cavans or 30 percent from the 1970-71 
production; (c) unfavorable peace and order conditions in Cotabato 
which is a large rice-producing province in Mindanao; (d) slow down 
of the flow of credit to the rice sector such that production loans for 
rice from commercial, rural and development banks which were at 
their peak in 1967 (about P651 million) declined to P550 million per 
year during 1968-1970 and then showed some recovery in 1971 
(P605 m illion); and (e) the peso devaluation which resulted in the 
increase of prices of fertilizers and chemicals as illustrated by the 
cost of nitrogen from ammonium sulphate and urea which rose by 
about 40 to 50 percent. Despite these setbacks, Mangahas sees two 
encouraging notes in the rapid adoption of HYV's and the shift from 
tungro-susceptible to tungro-resistant HYV's and the progress of 
irrigation from 31 percent in 1963-65 to 42 percent in 1968-70.16
Contrary to the Mangahas and Tanco explanations for the rice 
shortage in 1971, Feuer and Resma attempted to put forth a new 
angle to the rice situation. As they explained it: ''Although losses 
from typhoons, peace and order, tungro (late 1971) and decreased 
use of fertilizers and chemicals have slowed the increase in production, 
yet the increase in production of 1970-71 was 9 percent greater than 
that of 1969-70 (124 million cavans against 113 million). In contrast 
during the same period, the consumption of rice per capita increased 
by about 24 percent, 87 kilos to an average of 108 kg. In view of the 
foregoing, it appears that the sharp increase in consumption of rice 
because of changing economic conditions is the major reason for the 
current rice shortage in the Philippines and not the lack of 
production which has been increasing at a satisfactory rate con­
sistent with population increase."17
Among the evidences cited by the authors to support their 
conclusion were: the 1969 average rice consumption figures per 
capita released by the National Economic Council which was 87 
kilos; and an article from November 7, 1971 issue of the Manila
16|Vlahar Mangahas, Philippine Rice Policy Reconsidered in Terms of Urban 
Bias, Proceedings of the symposium Toward More Progressive Barrios, University o f the 
Philippines at Los Banos, April 17 and 18,1972, pp. 2-35.
17R. Feuer and P. W. Resma, Progress in the Adoption of High-Yielding Varieties 
of Rice in the Philippines. IRRI Thursday Seminar, Jan. 27, 1972.
Chronicle which set the approximate consumption figure at 90 kilos. 
The most important evidences cited were the results of two cereal 
consumption surveys reported by Aragon and Darrah.18 These two 
surveys which were conducted in October-November, 1970 and in 
May-June, 1971 showed that the average annual per capita rice 
consumption was about 10 percent larger in the second period 
(increase was from 102 kg to 113 kg) when the rice and corn price 
ratio was about 10 percent lower. The authors underscored the fact 
that the first survey was conducted before the increase in the retail 
price of rice which took place during the December 1970 and 
January 1971 period. The second survey was taken after the retail 
price of rice had risen considerably. In the interval between surveys, 
the price of corn which is ordinarily half the price of rice increased 
considerably such that in 1971 rice cost only 40 percent instead of 
50 percent more than corn and, therefore, Feuer and Resma 
speculated that this substitution of rice for corn must have partially 
contributed to the increase in rice consumption. Because corn-eaters 
comprise only 20 percent of the country's population,19 whatever 
shifts took place would not be of such magnitude as to substantially 
contribute to the 1971 crisis. But of greater significance is the 
reported increase in consumption20 on the basis of the Aragon- 
Darrah survey results and the validity of the conclusion that the 
rnajor reason for the 1971 rice shortage was increase in consumption 
and not lack of production. For two major reasons, the validity of 
this conclusion is open to question:
(1) It assumes accuracy of rice production figures which were 
cited by Feuer and Resma. Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show discrepancies in 
the statistics coming from two different sources. In both tables, 
whether in terms of regional yield averages or yields by specific rice 
varieties, the figures coming from the National Food and Agriculture 
Council were considerably higher than those from the Bureau of
18C. T. Aragon and L. B. Darrah, "Cereal Concumption Patterns," Dept, of 
Sncultural Economics, U.P. College of Agriculture. Staff Paper Series 115, Nov., 1971.
1^lnter-Univereity Steering Committee for Agribusiness Programs. Project Cornelius: 
ases and Notes on the Corn Industry in the Philippines, Manila, May 1970.
20F. H. Golay and M. E. Goodstein in their Philipp ine Rice Needs to 1990: 
in°thUf and ln p u t Requirements'  A ID ' Manila,Summer 1967, say that their "confidence 
c Projections of rice requirements in 1990 derives from the remarkable stability in per 
abPlta direqt  consumption  of milled rice by Filipinos since 1910 . . . Annual per capita 
evipTPtion of milled rice has fluctuated rather closely around 83 kg. since 1910 with some 
ann er,|Ce ° f 3 dec,ininfl trend." Leon Mears, cited by Mangahas, op. c i t .  estimated that 
1960 7 P6r capita availability from 1954-55 to 1969-70 have a peak of 96.2 kg. in 
a -'0  and in 12 out or 15 years it was less than 90 kg.
Table 1.5. Yield per hectare figures from two data sources 
irrigated-HYV, 1970-71.
N ationa l Food and 
Agric. Council 
Data 
A ll  H Y V
Bureau o f  Agric. 
Economics, D AN R  
Data
IR-Series CSeries
Region I :  I  locos
llocos Norte 
llocos Sur 
La Union 
Pangasinan
Region I I :  Cagayan Valley
Cagayan
Isabela
Nueva Vizcaya
Region I I I :  Southern Tagalog
Batangas 
Cavite 
Laguna 
Mindoro Occ.
Mindoro Or.
Rizal
Quezon
Region IV : B ico l 
AI bay
Camarines Norte 
Camarines Sur
Region V: Western Visayas
Aklan
Antique
Capiz
Iloilo
Negros Occ.
Region V I: Eastern Visayas
Bohol
Leyte
Leyte del Sur 
Negros Or.
Region V II: Northern and 
Eastern Mindanao
Misamis Occ.
Zamboanga del Norte
45.80 56.03
87.07
96.60
73.87
63.11
47.74
75.85
68.86
73.90
70.68
71.70
71.39
60.83
57.34
70.32
64.73
46.68
37.38
47.87
61.00
66.38
72.79
76.30
70.73
74.22
71.48
52.59
71.39
43.33
42.25
48.91
49.40
57.90
52.56
47.00
48.04
34.40
35.50 47.65
V
N ational Food and Bureau o f  Agric.
Agric. Council Economics, DAN R
_______ Data_________________  Data________
A l l  H Y V  IRSeries C-Series
Zamboanga del Sur 64.54
Region V II I :  Southern and
Western Mindanao 44.60 39.40
South Cotabato 98.49
Cotabato 85.29
Davao del Norte 45.58
Davao del Sur 78.38
Region IX :
Lanao del Sur 76.25
Misamis Or. 88.06
Bukidnon 100.15
Surigao del Sur 41.44
Region X : Central Luzon  59.48 50.80
Bataan 59.03
Bulacan 66.09
Nueva Ecija 58.82
Pampanga 62.08
Tarlac 76.71
Zambales 65.17
NFAC data were obtained from D.F. Panganiban, op. c i t
Agricultural Economics. The latter employs a system which uses 
statistical sampling procedures w ith some changes in percentage of 
sampling from one year to another. The NFAC system is a monthly 
compilation of data by each Agricultural Productivity Commission 
extension worker from the area of his assignment which is 
summarized by municipality and province and the provincial 
summaries are then sent to the national office for compiling a 
national summary which is then transmitted to NFAC.21 From the 
NpAC data on 1970-71 a total of 1,050,040 hectares were planted to 
HVV of which 926,039 were irrigated. In these programmed areas, 
there were 1,858 farm management technicians (FMT) assigned.22
O 4
R. Feuer and P.W. Resma, op. cit.
22° '  F- Panganiban, Rice Production Programme. Paper presented at the First 
atA N  Seminar on Food Production, Oct. 20-22, 1971, Manila.
Table 1.6. National average yields of HYV's from NFAC-APC 
programmed areas.*
Crop Year
IR
Series
BPI
Series 
cavans pe r hectare
C
Series
Total average 
yie ld
1967-68 81 62 82 75
1968-69 75 61 72 72
1969-70 72 58 69 69
1970-71 67 59 66 66
July-Dee. 1971 69 61 63 67
Yield figures from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
IR  Series 
Irrig. Non-irrig.
BPI Series 
ir r ig  N o n -lrr ig Ir r ig
C Series
N o n -lrr ig
1970-71 48.92 34.86 52.87 31.35 48.67 31.08
Percent of 
area devoted 
to HYV 49 27 3 7 10 5
*From: R. Feuer and P. W. Resma, op. c i t
This means an average of 565 per FMT for the entire HYV area and an 
average of 493 hectares if they were concentrating on the irrigated 
areas. If no systematic sampling is applied, the task of collecting and 
compiling production figures is a formidable one, not to mention the 
other responsibilities of the FMT.
Crisostomo and Barker remarked in their paper that a separate 
set of government statistics on rice released by NFAC is at variance 
with the findings they have. In October 1971, NFAC reported that 
yields of HYV continue to average about double that of the tradi­
tional varieties. If these estimates were accurate, Crisostomo and 
Barker th ink the Philippines would be exporting large surpluses of 
rice instead of importing in 1971.
(2) It assumes that rice consumption figures reported in the 
consumption surveys represent actual consumption. An examination
° f  the interview scheduie used in the survey indicated that the 
Question asked of the respondent was amount of rice bought and not 
amount actually consumed or used although the research report 
mentioned rate o f use or rate of cereal consumption throughout. The 
assumption is that what is purchased is consumed fo r the week in 
question. For perishables, this assumption may be warranted but for 
rice which can be stored, this assumption that what is purchased is 
also consumed for the week is not necessarily valid. This is more 
questionable under conditions of increasing rice prices and knowing 
fully well how Filipinos respond to such a situation involving the 
supply of our most important staple food. Furthermore, their 1,000 
respondents came from cities and municipalities with average family 
incomes of P6,882 in 1970 and f*7,551 in 1971. These urban and 
urbanizing respondents are the people most exposed to news about 
'mpending rice shortages and their effects on rice prices. They are 
also the people capable o f increased purchases for the purpose of 
hoarding rice for the household.
In the light of the question asked of the respondent which was 
amount bought and not amount actually used or consumed and in 
view of the circumstances obtaining at the time of the survey, the 
reported increase in rice consumption from 1970 to 1971 is a "hoard- 
lng reaction" to the threat of rice shortage and rising prices. A few 
captions of the news items preceding the second survey w ill give us 
an idea of the prevailing atmosphere during that period:
March 14, 1971 Manila Times
"FM halts rice import moves”
"Price Control Council urged to enforce rice price"
April 13, 1971, Manila Times
NEC assesses rice shortage. May reach 5.5 m illion cavans" 
"The reality of a rice shortage must be faced"
April 14, 1971 Manila Times
"Jap aid due tomorrow -  50,000 tons from Taiwan and 
10,000 from Japan 
April 17, 1971 Manila Times
"Shortage certifies in NEC resolution, 110,000 MT"
April 29, 1971 Manila Times
"No more stocks after June 7? By the administration's 
most conservative estimate, the country has only about 34 
days supply in its rice bin as of March 31. With the 
importation of 110,000 MT the rice bin would be filled
with 12 more days supply. This means the country will 
run out of rice by June 7, 1971.”
With constant bombardment of these news from all the media 
added to the reality of increasing rice prices, how many housewives 
can afford to ignore the desire to purchase more rice in order to 
insure the household supply?
To illustrate the effect of all the adverse publicity on hoarding 
propensity and rising price, 52 percent of the imported rice which 
arrived during the pre-election period of 1971 was distributed in the 
Greater Manila area and yet the price in the city continued to rise in 
October and declined only slightly in November. Considering that 
the Rice and Corn Administration distributed in the area 12,000 tons 
in September, 33,000 tons in October, 30,000 tons in the first half of 
November and that Greater Manila consumes roughly about 30,000 
MT per month, and that this requirement was already matched by 
the RCA alone, excluding rice supply from other sources, a decline in 
price would have been expected. During that very same period there 
seemed to be an extraordinary increase in demand for rice.23 It is 
unlikely that people eat more rice around election time. It seems 
much more plausible that the increase in amounts purchased was due 
to a desire to hoard supply as a cushion against further shortage and 
rising prices. Ironically, the very act of hoarding triggers the rise in 
prices.
In summary, the Philippine rice situation can be characterized 
as a century, of very low productivity levels and of recurring 
shortages, importations and annual crises except for the years 
1962-1970 when there was no rice crises, no imports and, hence, 
"self-sufficiency”  was supposed to have been attained. However, 
"some left-over stocks from the 1967 importations were used up 
during this period." Mangahas points out that "the presence of 
imports during a year does not necessarily imply that the country is 
not self-sufficient in rice for the year. It simply implies that the 
government thinks we are n o t . . .  The crux of the matter is that we 
have never allowed the market to indicate how much in imports the 
country needs. The government by law monopolizes the inter­
national trade in rice and is forced to decide whether or not to 
import or export, and if so, by how much." What needs to be 
emphasized is Mangahas' assessment of Philippine society's con­
ception o f self-sufficiency -  i.e., the absence o f imported rice under
23m. Mangahas, op. cit.
conditions o f  " reasonably"  low prices. And the pressure for low rice 
prices comes mainly from the urban sector.
Just like that of Mangahas, the projections made by Golay and 
Goodstein on the ability of the Philippines to meet future rice 
requirements are based on the potentials offered by the new 
high-yielding varieties in conjunction with improvements in ir r i­
gation. The other factors identified as "going fo r"  the Philippines are 
the farmers' rapid adoption of the new rice technology and the 
vigorous private sector" which Golay and Goodstein think can be 
depended upon " to  bring into existence the marketing, milling, 
warehousing and transportation facilities at rates which w ill not 
•mpede the necessary expansion in aggregate rice availability." 
Mangahas likewise feels that a rice subsidy is not needed at this time 
ln order to enable rice farmers to modernize faster. Their fast rate of 
acceptance o f HYV gives us some confidence that farmer con­
servatism is not going to be an obstacle. He also believes that the 
real test of self-sufficiency w ill be prices that urban consumers 
consider reasonable, w ithout imports, and w ithout restrictions on 
lrr>ports by the private sector." He, too, has confidence in the private 
sector's ability to respond to the country's export and import needs 
for rice.
The Introduction, Diffusion and 
Adoption of the  
New Rice Technology
A. An Introduction to the Rice Farmer as a Potential Recipient of
New Technology
To the Pilipino, rice is not just a cereal grain. It is life three 
times a day; it  is politics every lean month of the year; it means 
security for those who have it and for those who do not, much of 
livelihood is aimed at it. Those who do not produce it, earn money 
to purchase it. When the common tao (common man) or the 
magsasaka (farmer) is mentioned, this has reference to the rice 
farmer standing behind the carabao and his plow, with a dilapidated 
nipa hut in the background. The picture is always one of poverty and 
hard manual work written all over his face and his hands. This 
stereotype o f the Filipino farmer as a rice farmer has a factual basis. 
Whether it is reckoned in terms of hectares devoted to the crop or in 
terms of number of people employed in specific agricultural 
industries, rice (3.1 million hectares) and corn farming (2.1 million 
hectares) leads all other types of farming (Tables 2.1 and 2.2). The 
1968 data on hectares devoted to coconuts show 1.8 m illion hectares; 
as of 1971, the sugar area is 406,137 hectares. Of the total number of 
persons employed in agriculture, hunting and fishing, 68 percent of 
the 7.2 m illion are in rice and corn farming. Of the total males in 
agriculture (5,339,000) as of 1968, about 66.3 percent are engaged 
in rice and corn farming and of the total females (1,863,000) in 
agriculture, 73.1 percent are in the same category.
Despite the importance which rice farming occupies in the 
economic and political life of the country, it has never been a 
glamorous occupation. On the contrary, it has always been associated 
w ith poverty and backbreaking work. As the old Filipino folk song 
goes:
"Planting rice is never fun 
Bent from morn till the set of sun 
Cannot stand and cannot sit,
Cannot rest for a little bit."
Table 2.1. Land utilization by kind of crops (in thousand 
hectares, crop-year 1966.
Food crops Hectares
(in  thousand)
1- Rice .........................................................................................................................................3,109.2
2 - Corn ........................................................................................................................................ 2,106.1
3. Fruits and nuts, except citrus ...............................................................................................353.0
4 Citrus ............................................................................................................................................28.5
5. Root crops ................................................................................................................................ 262.8
6. Vegetables, except onions and potatoes ............................................................................. 47.0
7 - Onions ............................................................................................................................................5.2
8. Irish potatoes ...............................................................................................................................2.5
8- Beans and peas ........................................................................................................................... 54.9
10. Coffee ......................................................................................................................................... 43.7
11 ■ Peanuts......................................................................................................................................... 25.8
12. Cacao ..............................................................................................................................................9.4
13. All other food crops ...................................................................................................................11.7
Total .........................................................................................................................6,061.83
Source: Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Bureau of Agricultural
Economics.
Table 2.2. Percent distribution of employed persons in 
specific industries of agriculture.
(May 1968 Bureau of Census and Statistics 
Survey of Households)
Industries
Total employed in agriculture, forestry,
hunting and fishing .........................................................................................................7,202,000
Percent
1 ■ Rice and com farming ............................................................................................................68.1
2- Coconut farming ..........................................................................................................................8.5
3. Sugar-cane farming ....................................................................................................................... 4.1
4 - Abaca and other fibers farming ................................................................................................. 1.1
5- Tobacco farming ..........................................................................................................................1.9
8- Other crops, horticulture, poultry......................................................................................................
livestock p roduction .....................................................................................................................7 .5
7- Products, not specified ..............................................................................................................0.2
8- Agricultural services (on fee or contract.......................................................................................
basis) — pest control, irrigation system.......................................................................................
operation, renting of farm machinery ........................................................................................0.1
3- Hunting and fishing ..................................................................................................................... 7 .0
Forestry, including logging and foresty service ......................................................................1.7
Side by side with poverty, the rice farmers (particularly tenants) have 
also been considered as "the non-emerging class of farmers who have 
been the object of apparently futile efforts aimed at improving their 
conditions" although admittedly, if Philippine agriculture is to 
modernize, rice culture and the rice cultivator have a critical role to 
play.1
A number of other social scientists looking at the traditional 
world o f the rice farmer provide us with descriptive accounts of what 
we might expect from this farmer by way of response to new 
technology. Covar's study of the Masagana/Margate system of rice 
cultivation gives us an excellent start, particularly because it  was 
conducted more than 12 years ago in the province of Laguna. The 
rice cultivation system includes the nine steps usually followed by 
Filipino farmers but carried out in the more careful and intensive 
operations. Covar's prognosis o f the system's prospect for adoption is 
as follows:
"The Masagana / Margate system is a product of specialists or 
experts in agriculture. The older method, on the other hand, has 
been polished and hallowed by tradition and experience. The gap between 
the new and the traditional is large enough to create a situation whereby 
the new can be misunderstood. Furthermore, the relationship between 
those who are introducing and those who are going to  accept the innova­
tion is not on an equal plane in terms of age, education, and other socio­
cultural factors. It may be assumed that there are socio-cultural barriers, 
such as respect fo r old age and farming experience, which very much 
affect acceptance.
"The farmers accept only w ith in  the framework o f their viewpoint as 
conditioned by their experience. Thus their readiness to accept is 
definitely limited. In connection with this, there should be an iden­
tification of a need, and the meeting of such a fe lt need should be the basis 
of any program of community development. Do the farmers feel a need 
fo r the Masagana/Margate system? Again the farmers respond only w ithin 
the limits of their training, experience and understanding . . .  A case which 
seems to be relevant is cited as an analogy. If, fo r instance, a beautiful 
pamphlet is given to a primary grader, and his response is recorded, one 
would notice that the pupil w ill only scan the pages and then put it  aside. 
The case is identical to that of the farmers. They have been given 
pamphlets with instructions fo r a new way o f planting rice. However, they
1 Louis H. Douglas, Fifty Farmers of Gapan: The Propensity To Develop in One 
Rural Philippine Stuation. Kansas State University, Spring 1966 (mimeo 46 pp.)
only become interested in looking at the pictures, never applying what 
they have seen and read."2
Covar's prognosis is worth remembering in view of later 
developments in the same area where his study was conducted. 
Jocano's study of economic development and cultural change in a 
Visayas barrio which describes the rice farmer in his own world is 
prefaced by a note of caution:
" . . .  To talk about acceptance of modern technology in terms of 
demonstrating its economic advantages is to be naive about the dynamics 
of human study. One needs to view acceptance in terms o f the meanings 
people have o f economic advantages "
Jocano then describes the Malitbog farmer's reaction to 
ieasehold arrangement, cooperative labor and scientific farming 
practices:
". . . The rental is fixed and risks are borne by the lessee alone. 
When farming is dependent only on the vagaries of an uncontrolled natural 
environment, these risks are indeed great. This unpredictability o f nature is 
one of the major elements in Malitbog's general ecology that wields an 
overriding influence on local agricultural activities. . .  In a word, lack of 
technological control over nature, like irrigation, makes farming a gamble, 
h is thus understandable why the farmers do not appreciate the value of 
risk in agricultural management or on-the-spot decision-making in any 
agricultural activity. On the other hand, they have learned to be slow in 
their actions and have developed elaborate planting, caring, and harvesting 
rituals to help them determine and control the behavior o f nature. One 
miscalculation means dislocation of the annual economic income which is 
m any event very small. Moreover, credit is d ifficu lt to obtain, and if it is 
available the interest is indeed exorb itant. . .
. . Farming is a nuclear family affair w ith members as the basic 
working unit. This does not mean that other forms of cooperative labor 
are ruled out in the process but that fu ll cooperation of an extended 
household in the production of stable food or of any crop is relatively 
rare. They help one another in many agricultural endeavors -  like plowing 
and transplanting, but they cultivate different fields and feel solely 
responsible only for their own fields. There are cooperative labor patterns 
ln the barrio which involve the participation o f non-kin .. .
. .  Other factors which need to be considered in talking about land 
Use and production in Malitbog are the financial resources of the people
Aqrir |2prospero R - c °var. The Masagana/Margate System of Planting Rice: A Study of An 
Dew*. ral lnn°vation. Study Series No. 5. University of the Philippines, Community 
'opment Research Council, 1960.
and the market prices of crops they produce. Given the chance, farmers 
would prefer scientific farming over the traditional because they are aware 
that i t  would bring better harvests. However, they are also aware that 
acceptance of modern technology would entail more expense than they 
could afford. Fertilizer and insecticides are needed. Measured spacing 
during transplanting is time-consuming and labor-demanding. The seeds 
have to be selected. A ll of these have to  be purchased in addition to labor 
expenses which have also to be met. Thus the limited financial resources of 
the farmers at the beginning of the planting season prevent them from ac­
cepting modern farming as the means of resolving their economic problem 
this pressure of limited economic opportunities has led to  conservation 
in outlook and preferences for traditional methods in farming in that tried 
ways are more assuring and more predictable than new alternatives which 
have greater elements of risk that the farmers are not quite prepared to 
take.
"N o t only do financial resources but also the possible market price 
of the crops enter into this pattern of decision-making at the beginning of 
the planting season. Prices o f crops planted, harvested and sold during the 
previous years are reviewed and the lower-priced crops are avoided. For 
example, when the wholesaler in the town in 1964 lowered the price of 
new varieties of rice -  Manila rice, BE-3, etc. because of poor milling 
return, the farmers did not plant these varieties in 1965. In the nearby 
barrio of Igsuli, there was a rush o f sugar-cane cropping in 1963-64 because 
the price of sugar went up in 1962. In fact, many ricefields were converted 
into cane fields . . .
"Rituals, prayers and other ceremonies are performed during the 
planting and harvesting seasons in order to  hasten the growth of rice, 
to ward o ff evil spirits from the field and to  insure a good harvest. The 
observance of these rituals follows the agricultural cycle.
"In  emphasizing the significance of rituals and sympathetic magic on 
the economic activities and social behavior o f the people, I do not imply 
that they are not aware of scientific, tested methods of farming. They 
know that when commercial fertilizers are used, their crops w ill give them 
a rewarding yield. They also know that they have to  take good care of 
their fields if they expect to have a good harvest. It is only w ithin the 
realm of recurrent events in which their technological knowledge cannot 
effectively operate that rituals are used. The farmers are aware that there 
are certain culturally sanctioned ways of reinforcing their agricultural 
knowledge. The use of sympathetic magic is an important one. As one of 
the farmers reasoned: 'I lose nothing if it does not work; I have every­
thing to gain if it does! ' " 3
3 F. Landa Jocano, The Traditional World of Malitbog: An Anthropological Study of 
Economic Development and Cultural Change in a Philippine Barrio. University of the 
Philippines, Community Development Research Council, 1967.
What is particularly noticeable about the preceding description 
is that it appears to contradict the very caution the author prefaced 
the description with. From the details cited, it is quite evident that 
the rice farmers were behaving rationally in response to the economic 
resources and institutions surrounding them . . . Even magic and 
rituals were resorted to as a form of additional insurance under 
conditions of greater uncertainty.
Another social scientist writes a short story to illustrate how 
“ cultural set" affects response to new rice technology:
"The manager of a large commercial farm in Mindanao 
explained to his workers how he wished to plant and cultivate rice 
through the use of modern techniques. After two days of this kind of 
work all the men came to his office and tried to quit.
"Why? "  he asked.
"Because we are ashamed to plant rice this way. We feel slow 
and awkward. People are watching us and laughing at us behind our 
backs. We have always been considered good workers up to now. We 
have good reputations to protect! "
By strenuous argumentation and promises of certain fringe 
benefits, the manager persuaded most to continue. They went 
reluctantly back to work. But a few weeks later they returned to 
draw their pay and quit.
"Now what's the trouble? "  inquired the manager.
"The new way of weeding, sir, w ill not be successful. The rice 
will fail. We do not wish to be connected with the project."
Again, the manager was able to persuade most to continue and 
they went reluctantly back to work. After five months, the harvest 
came and the manager reaped approximately 100 cavans of rice per 
hectare, more than three times the usual crop. But if a development 
team had been working with individual small-scale farmers, it would 
have been d ifficu lt to persuade these farmers to begin, and even more 
d ifficu lt to get them to continue to plant and cultivate their rice 
through this technique.4
These preceding three accounts, although attempting to show 
Potential socio-cultural sources of resistance to or rejection of new 
dee technology, w ittingly illustrate how such resistance might be 
overcome. Almost a century of recurring rice shortages and low levels 
° f  productivity and not too optimistic assessments of the rice
^Francis C. Madigar, Comment on "Some Missing Variables in Diffusion Research 
®°d Innovation Strategy'/ ADC Reprint, March, 1968, The Agricultural Development 
Council, Inc. N. Y.
farmer's capacity to innovate have been presented. This chapter now 
discusses the introduction, communication and adoption of the new 
rice technology.
B. The Introduction of New High-Yielding Varieties
Although improved rice varieties were previously developed and 
introduced in the Philippines, there had not been any significant 
change in yield potential and no general widespread adoption of any 
of these varieties. As a matter of fact, in tropical Asia, the average 
rice yields were about 1.5 metric tons (34 cavans) per hectare — and 
have been so for a long, long time. On the other hand, Japan's national 
rice yields were two, three or four times higher. For a while low 
yields were attributed to low levels of fertilizer application by the 
tropical rice farmer. But unfortunately, increasing the rate of 
fertilizer use did not increase yields. They even depressed yields. The 
rice scientists subsequently identified the problem as one of a 
tropical rice plant which is tall and has droopy leaves — very 
susceptible to falling over in heavy rain or high winds. This 
propensity to fall over or lodge prevents the rice plants from 
effectively utilizing sunlight in order to f ill up its grains, hence yields 
tend to be low; when this traditional rice plant is treated w ith high 
rates of nitrogen, it grows taller and droops even more, hence further 
yield reduction results.5
The search for and development of a new plant type for tropical 
Asia became, therefore, one of the most important missions of a 
highly specialized rice research institute.
When in 1961 the ultra-modern facilities of the International 
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) rose from Higamot H ill which was 
once a rustic area planted to  coconuts, citrus, banana and pineapples, 
a well-known Filipino educator said: "Somehow I find it  d ifficu lt to 
see the connection between this 20th century Institute and the man 
who plants rice.”  While everyone appreciated the air conditioning, the 
wooden panels, the murals on the wall, the automatic icemakerand 
even the petite bearers of pulchritude who walk around its spotless 
corridors, there was at that time some skepticism as to what IRRI 
could do about the traditional problems of a traditional crop.
Bearing in mind the architecture of the new rice plant tailored 
for the tropics, the IRRI rice breeders found in Taiwan a tropical 
semi-dwarf variety called Taichung Native I whose short stature came
^Steve A. Breth, IR-8 and Beyond. IRR I, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines.
from a variety called Dee-geo-woo-gen. In 1962, there were 38
crosses made, one-third of which involved Dee-geo-woo-gen or its
close relative l-geo-tze. One of these crosses was between Peta, a
traditional Indonesian variety with good insect and disease resistance,
and Dee-geo-woo-gen. A fter three years, an experimental variety
selected from this cross produced a computed yield of 6.6 metric tons
(about 150 cavans) per hectare. This variety which was named IR-8 a
year later is short (about 100 cm. compared to the typical 160 cm.),
stiff-strawed, has upright leaves, is high tillering, non-photoperiod
sensitive, resistant to several insects and diseases and short-maturing
(120 days as against 140 to 160 for traditional varieties). There was a
rationale for all of these "tra its”  which were built into the new rice 
plant.
"Breeders selected and propagated plants that had upright 
eaves because IRRI's plant physiologists told them that upright 
■eaves would intercept sunlight more efficiently than droopy leaves. 
High tillering capacity is a biological form of yield insurance. It means 
that the plant has the ability to put out extra shoots if  the field is 
transplanted too sparsely or if neighboring plants die. Insensitivity to 
Photoperiod means that the variety w ill mature in the same number 
° f  weeks regardless of the length of day. Sensitive varieties may not 
mature, or even flower, if grown in an area or season with a 
long-day-length. Insect and disease resistance reduces the amount of 
Pesticides necessary to get good yields."6 The reduction in the length 
° f  the growing period of the rice plant w ill enable the farmer to 
mcrease the cropping intensity in the same piece of land. Fur­
thermore, it w ill reduce by 20 to 40 days the period when the rice 
Plant would be subjected to pests, diseases, and vagaries of the 
weather.
With the production of its initial seeds, the IRRI turned over to 
the Philippine government 50 tons of IR-8 seed. This represents the 
lrst available supply of such seeds outside of experimental plots. In 
addition to the 50 tons, IRRI itself distributed the remaining 5 tons 
,n two-kilogram packages to the first 2,359 farmers to request such 
seed in person at the Institute. The IRRI-distributed seed was suf- 
'cient only for 700 square meters per farmer 7
Because of the limited supply of IR-8 seeds at the start, seed
6 Breth, op. cit.
Baf'os, La^na1 E ' ^  JameS Duncan' Spatial Aspects of H Y V Diffusion, IR R I, Los
multiplication for rapid and widespread distribution was considered 
urgent. In 1966 the Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council 
(RCPCC) set up a special seed multiplication program for IR-8.8 The 
50 tons of seeds were sold by IRRI to  the Rice and Corn 
Administration at P25 per cavan for distribution to selected farmers 
in the areas designated for IR-8 multiplication. Eighty percent of 
these seeds went to the multiplication areas and 20 percent were 
planted in the test plots of the Agricultural Productivity Commission 
and the Bureau of Plant Industry. RCA sold the seeds at cost to 
authorized seed multipliers. The farmers selected by RCPCC to be its 
seed cooperators were those who had at least 10 accessible hectares 
of riceland which were located in the designated areas of m ulti­
plication and irrigation facilities. The farmer should also have 
temporary storage facilities to keep seeds produced before delivery 
to RCA or to other farmers. In addition, farmer-cooperators signed 
an agreement w ith the Council that (1) he w ill grow the seeds in 
accordance with recommended cultural practices for seed m ulti­
plication; (2) he w ill allow his farm to  be inspected by technicians of 
the IRRI and the government; (3) he w ill sell as much of his seed 
harvest to the Council or the RCA provided the seeds meet 
prescribed specifications; and (4) he will sell all of his harvest only as 
seed rice and not for commercial purposes or for human con­
sumption. Ninety-two cooperators were selected for this seed 
multiplication program.
A study of these cooperators found that following the wet 
season of 1967 less than 50 percent of the initial crop was sold as 
seed. Although cooperators expanded their planting of IR-8 during 
the dry season, an even smaller portion was sold as seed in this 
season. This suggests that with competition from other sources the 
seed market was already saturated by the end of 1967 dry season. 
Thus, w ithin exactly a year of the release of IR-8 seeds from the 
IRRI, adequate supplies were available to meet local demand. 9
This would seem to indicate that supply of HYV seeds is not 
likely to be a bottleneck except during the first season of its 
production. The available seeds at the local level, however, are not 
likely to be the so-called certified seeds which are supposed to have
®T. V . Mina and F. A. Tiongson, Patterns of Rice Seed Distribution in the 
Philippines, Philipp ine Economic J o u r n a lNo. 14, Second Semester, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1968, 
pp. 213-223.
^Department of Agricultural Economics, Annual Report 1967, IR R I.
been approved by the seedboard w ith the Bureau of Plant Industry 
(BPI) as the seed-certifying agency. In order to  qualify for 
certification, several factors are considered: high yield, resistance to 
(°dging, good milling recovery, disease resistance and good eating 
qualities. On the average, the selection was from 3 to 4 seasons of 
preliminary yield tests, 2 to 3 seasons of general yield trials and 2 to 
3 seasons of regional adaptability tests conducted in different parts 
°f the country. However, for certain varieties that show unusual 
potential, the time could be greatly reduced. IR-8 was approved in 
April 1967 after only three seasons of testing in different stations. 
The government decided that rapid multiplication and distribution 
was essential if the potential benefits of IR-8 were to be achieved 
without delay. The RCPCC took a calculated risk in circumventing 
many of the requirements of the seed certification system in favor of 
a speedier system of multiplication.10
In the light of experiences since 1957 In the production and 
distribution of certified seeds, this short-cut is not of much 
consequence. Data on distribution of certified seeds by the BPI from 
1960-61 to 1965-66 show that only a very small percent of all seeds 
required came from certified seeds. The lowest was 0.14 percent in 
1960-61; the highest were 0.81 percent in 1962-63 and 0.65 percent 
•n 1965-66.11 This means that farmers were using all kinds of seeds 
from their own fields, their neighbors, local seed producers, etc. but 
hardly from certified sources. A study of 102 farmer-cooperators in 
Nueva Ecija and 438 in Laguna during the February-June 1966 crop 
season before IR - 8 ,  found that 97 percent of the former and 89 
Percent o f the latter did not use certified seeds despite the fact that 
they were participants o f the intensified rice production program at 
that time. It is also noteworthy that 38 percent of the Nueva Ecija 
farmer-cooperators studied and 27 percent of those in Laguna never 
heard o f certified seeds. Furthermore, more than half of them said 
that certified seeds were not locally available. 12 Lu's study of 395 
farmers from 15 barrios of 13 municipalities in 6 provinces of 
Central and Southern Luzon have essentially the same findings with 
°nly 9 percent reporting use of certified seeds. Unawareness of its 
e*istence and local unavailability were the two most important
^Departm ent of Agricultural Economics, Annual Report, IR R I, op. c i t
11T. V . Mina and F. A. Tiongson, op. c i t
12Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Survey of the Pilot Program on Intensified Rice
Production, 1966.
reasons for non-use.13
Considering that the BPI seed certification and distribution 
program had been in existence for more than 10 years and yet less than 
one percent o f the total seed requirements of the country as of 1966 
was supplied from certified seeds, an assessment of "ineffective" is 
rather obvious. However, the seedboard performs the legitimizing 
function as far as which varieties w ill be multiplied and distributed. 
So far the HYV's which have been approved and recommended since 
1966 are: IR-8 and IR-5 in 1967; and IR-22 and IR-20 in 1969- 
IR-24 in 1971; BPI-76, C4-137; C4-63 and C4-63G in 1972. The IR 
varieties were developed by IRRI; BPI by the Bureau of Plant 
Industry and the C-series by the University of the Philippines College 
of Agriculture. Because these varieties undergo field trials in different 
parts o f the country before they are officia lly released, someone 
always has access to the seeds. Therefore, as long as new seeds are 
considered desirable from actual or heard of performance, any 
available supply w ill be obtained through purchase, barter, request, 
stealing, etc. whether or not they are certified by the seedboard. This 
has its dangers, o f course, but HYV's are reproducible w ithin four 
months, hence its spread is impossible to control when news about its 
desirable qualities leak out. In the advent of problems associated 
with the seeds such as disease, low price, poor eating quality, low 
yield, etc., the use o f the seeds declines as fast if not faster than its 
original spread. This has happened with IR-8 whose peak of adoption 
was reached in 1968 and disappeared soon after that and so did IR-5 
mainly because of bad experiences with diseases. The rice scientists 
are, therefore, constantly on the drawing board trying to design the 
near-perfect seed — the variety which has almost all the positive 
qualities at least until a new set of problems arise. It is not only the 
farmers who take risks in trying the new seeds; the scientists, 
policy-makers, extension workers, and the seedboard all assume 
calculated risks when they recommend the planting o f certain rice 
varieties.
For a five-year trend in the diffusion and adoption of HYV 
starting from IR-8, the case study of Gapan, Nueva Ecija14 is 
illustrative of the rapidity w ith which rice farmers have taken to  the 
new technology. Table 2.3 shows that from the 16 original adopters in
13Hsueh-Yi Lu, Some Socio-Economic Factors Affecting the Implementation of a 
Rice Production Program in the Philippines. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of the 
Philippines, College of Agriculture, 1968.
1^R. E. Huke and J. Duncan, op. c i t
1966, the new seeds spread to 1,300 farmers w ith 50 percent o f the 
area and about 59 percent of the farms planted to them by 1969. 
The ten barrios in the municipality of Gapan differed, however, in 
the percentage o f farms with HYV by 1969. In the three barrios 
where major portions of the rice land were rainfed, the rates of 
adoption in 1969 were 41%, 28% and 11% for the remotest and 
almost completely rainfed barrio. This latter barrio, however, 
achieved 76 percent adoption by 1971 as reported in Herrera's 
study.15 The three barrios where ricelands were almost fu lly  irrigated 
attained practically 100 percent adoption by 1969, four years after 
introduction. Other irrigated barrios had more than 80 percent 
adoption by then. Of the five factors tested for their relationship to 
the rate of adoption, the most important was percent of farm 
irrigated. The second factor was continuous settlement or neighbor 
with the location of the 16 original planters having considerable 
impact on the patterns of adoption. Percent of farmers who were 
landowners and percent who were on leasehold were not significantly 
related to rates of adoption, indicating that tenure status has neither 
enhanced nor hindered the spread of HYV. Rather, the presence of 
irrigation and exposure to the HYV experience are better ex­
planations for the rapid spread.
Table 2.3. Adoption rates of H YV in 10 barrios of Gapan, 
Nueva Ecija, 1966 to 1969.
1966 1967 1968 1969
Percent of farms planting H YV  
Total No. of farmers (2217)
0.7 4.2 31.7 58.7
Number of new adoptions 16 78 609 597
Grand total of adoptions 
Percent of farms with H YV  
Percent of area in H YV  
Total farm area 
6910 hectares 
Area in H YV  
3510 hectares
16 94 703 1300
58.6
50.9
Data from R. E. Huke and Duncan, op. cit.
15R. T. Herrera, Changes in Rice Farming in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. IRRI-U.P. College 
° f  Agriculture Research Project, 1972.
Table 2.4. Varieties grown on irrigated two-crop and rainfed 
farms, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, wet season,
1966 to 1970.
Year
IR -8 IR -5 IR -20
N um ber o f  farms planting  
C4-63 Binato In tan Tjeremas Others
1966 2 0 0
— Irrigated 
0
Two-Crop
290 0 0 14
1967 19 2 0 2 288 0 0 7
1968 94 18 0 20 204 0 0 8
1969 58 127 8 88 67 0 0 22
1970 3 67 190 75 8 0 0 26
1966 0 0 0
— Rainfed paddy — 
0 0 89 33 2
1967 0 0 0 0 0 96 34 2
1968 0 2 0 0 0 99 34 7
1969 9 21 0 11 0 98 36 9
1970 0 47 12 21 0 88 29 17
Source: Agricultural Economics 1971 Annual Report, . . .  op. cit.
Table 2.4, with data also from Gapan, shows three major trends:
(1) The continuous and rapid decline in the use of traditional 
varieties like Binato which by 1970 had practically dis­
appeared in the irrigated areas.
(2) The rise and decline of different HYV's. IR-8 had made its 
exit by 1969 while IR-5 h it its peak then and declined by 
1970. IR-5's susceptibility to tungro practically led to its 
demise by 1972. IR-20 and C4-63 have taken over because 
of better tungro-resistance.
(3) The improved local varieties like Intan and Tjeremas 
decreased slightly from 1966 to 1970. As was expected, 
the rainfed areas were later adopters of HYV's. They 
started w ith IR-5 and C4 only in 1969 and picked up in 
1970.
In general, the life of an HYV in the rice paddy may be bright 
and active but relatively brief. Permanence in prominence is not one 
of its special virtues. Certainly, the time spent in the search, 
development, and testing of each variety seems much longer than its 
profitable life in the paddy field. The one variety which seems to 
have outlasted many others is Intan which is still around despite the
fact that it was introduced from Indonesia by the Bureau of Plant 
Industry soon after the World War II. Although not a very high 
yielding variety it has acceptable eating quality and performs well 
during the dry season when its predisposition to lodge is reduced. In 
the market it is usually priced as a fine variety.
Rice varieties, unlike human beings, are bred deliberately to 
incorporate as much as possible whatever qualities are deemed desir­
able. Each comes out with some degree of individuality, depending 
upon which of its qualities stand out. In reviewing the IR varieties, 
IR-8 started a new generation of dwarf, stiff-straw, nitrogen-res­
ponsive, high-yielding rice plants although its grain was not as pala­
table to Asian consumers. IR-5 which followed was not as responsive 
to nitrogen but was more resistant to drought than IR-8, hence it was 
also known as the "best upland variety" at the IRRI. Unfortunately, 
it proved susceptible to the tungro virus. IR-22 and IR-20 have better 
grain quality than either I R-8 or IR-5 but IR-24 is even better because 
the grain cooks soft. I R-22 is also susceptible to tungro. IR-20 is re­
sistant to  stem borers, blast disease and tungro virus. Moreover, it has 
a high degree of tolerance to soil disorders such as phosphorus and 
zinc deficiency and iron tox ic ity .16 C4 varieties are noted for their 
eating quality which is very acceptable to the Filipino taste. They are 
also resistant to the tungro virus although susceptible to some other 
diseases. C12, a College variety which was introduced in 1972, is 
blessed with good eating quality, less shattering, less empty grains 
and similarly disease and insect resistant as the C4 varieties. Because of 
all these different characteristics, their life span as favored rice 
varieties is d ifficu lt to predict. There is no one perfect or even near 
perfect variety for all places and all seasons. The rice scientist is, 
therefore, the most enduring of all inputs.
Although specific HYV's may come and go, as a category they 
have very rapidly found their place in the ricefield whether or not it  
is irrigated. From 22 percent in 1967, the lowland rice area devoted 
to HYV's increased to 57 percent in 1970-71 with 67 percent 
irrigated and 45 percent rainfed (Table 2.5). Despite social 
scientists' prognosis to the contrary, the rate of adoption of the new 
seeds exceeds the experience reported in the U.S. where it  took 8 
years fo r hybrid seed corn to be adopted by 59 percent of Iowa 
farmers.17 The pessimism earlier expressed by social scientists
16S. A. Breth, op, c i t
17Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, The Free Press, N .Y. 1962, p. 141.
regarding the acceptability of the HYV's was premised on what was 
considered as the "Cadillac”  nature o f the innovation:
"While miracle rice offers tremendous potentiality to our rice 
crop, to the subsistence farmer it w ill probably remain a potentiality 
at least for the immediate future. I believe this to be so because 
miracle rice requires much input, skills and environmental controls to 
enable it to perform its miracles and the subsistence farmer has little  
of these requisites."18
Another skeptical note came from the President of the Rice and 
Corn Producers' Association, who on April 26, 1967 said:
"N o miracle seed is necessary, only an honest-to-goodness 
working irrigation program. Without water, even miracle seeds will 
not grow. Furthermore, IR-8 needs fertilizers and insecticides which 
are a burden to the farmer who has no money to  invest on these 
modern aids to  agriculture." On August 9, 1967 this very same man 
said the Philippines would be exporting rice in 3 to 4 years w ith the 
introduction of miracle rice. On August 24,1967, he debunked claims 
that the bumper harvests reported in Central Luzon were mere 
publicity stunts. He said: "What was not anticipated was the farmers' 
response to a wide-scale planting of rice."19 Although his prediction 
that the Philippines would be exporting rice in 3 to 4 years from 
1967 has not come true and is nowhere in sight, it  is a fact that
Table 2.5. Percentages of lowland rice planted to H YV on 
irrigated and non-irrigated lands in the 
Philippines, 1967-68 to 1970-71.
(Data from Bureau of Agricultural Economics,
Department of Agricultur and Natural Resources)
Percent of Lowland Rice Area in H YV  
Crop Year Tota l Irrigated Non-lrrigated
1967-68 22 33 13
1968-69 41 61.6 28
1969-70 50 61 39
1970-71 57 67 45
Source: Agricultural Economics Annual Report, 1971, IR R I.
1®Gelia T. Castillo, "A  New Look at Old Concepts in Development," S o lida rity  Vol 
3, No. 5, May, 1968, p. 14.
19Gelia T. Castillo, Miracle Rice as "Produced" by the Press, op. c i t
HYV's have spread not only quickly but also widely. Furthermore, 
there was a misconception that IR-8 grown under less than ideal 
conditions would result in being worse-off than traditional varieties. 
As the IRRI reported:
"The existing tall tropical varieties are inherently incapable of high 
yields even when carefully tended; experimental yields exceeding 5 
tons/ha are rare. It so happens, however, that even under normal rough 
management practices, IR -8 produces at least as well as, and usually 
considerably better than, the traditional tall and late local varieties. There 
is no scientific basis fo r the claim, sometimes made, that farmers who are 
unable to  afford more advanced cultural techniques are better o ff w ith the 
old varieties. What evidence there is seems to indicate that such farmers are 
at least no worse o ff w ith rough farming methods.
" In  six dry-season experiments conducted by the Institute -  
admittedly on a fertile soil -  the average yields o f IR -8 grown w ithout any 
fertilizer was 5,300 kg/ha. In the same experiments, the average yield of 
the highest yielding tall variety from each experiment was 4,500 kg/ha. 
From similar experiments conducted in the wet season, the mean yields 
were 4,400 kg/ha for IR -8 and 3,900 kg/ha for the tall varieties. Thus at 
least in these experiments, IR -8 remained superior even in the absence of 
fertilizer. The claim that 'IR -8 needs more fertilizer' is therefore false. It 
needs no more than any other variety but, as we shall see later, it is much 
more capable of using high levels of fertilizer nitrogen.
"Similarly, in Institute experiments there have been no indications 
that, in the absence of insect control, IR-8 produces any less than con­
ventional tall varieties. Observations of IR-8 growing on commercial farms, 
often under conditions far from ideal, support the contention that this 
variety w ill yield at least as well as local varieties under imperfect systems 
of culture. It is not denied that under some conditions, IR-8 w ill be 
outyielded. Floating rice areas are one obvious example. Furthermore, a 
local variety that is highly resistant to a disease or insect pest w ill be at an 
advantage in a season of high incidence of such a disease or pest. But, in 
general, it is wrong to assume that the farmer who adheres to unimproved 
methods is better o ff if he continues to  use tall local varieties. " 20
A more comprehensive indication of modern variety per­
formance w ithout fertilizer is shown in trials at four locations over a 
5-year period in the Philippines (Table 2.6). The results confirm the 
earlier observation made that "modern varieties do as well as 
traditional varieties w ithout fertilizer."
^ T h e  IR R I Reporter. The Economics of IR-8 . IR R I, July 1967, Vol. 3, No. 4.
1. The A wareness-A dop tion Gap
In contrast to the old notion of the farmer as a traditional 
creature, resistant to change and unwilling to take risks, Benno 
Galjart proposes a new model farmer whose most important tra it is 
his readiness to consider and accept change in general. If the farmer 
does not respond positively to change, his behavior might be ex­
plained by (a) ignorance — the farmer does not know what he can do 
other than what he is currently doing; (b) inability  — the farmer 
knows what he could do but is unable to do it for financial or other 
reasons; and (c) unwillingness — the farmer knows what he should do 
and can do it, objectively speaking, but he does not want to. Certain 
values and attitudes prevent him. Another way of putting it is that he 
prefers to achieve some other values.21 Based on the Philippine 
experience, Galjart's new model of the farmer seems to offer so 
much more explanation of his behavior than the concept of the 
subculture of peasantry popularized earlier by Rogers. This sub­
culture contains ten interrelated elements: lack of innovativeness, 
low aspirational levels, fatalism, familism, lack of empathy, de­
pendence upon government authority, perceived limited good, lack of 
deferred gratification, traditionalism, and mutual distrust of inter­
personal relations.22
Before the advent of the IR's and the C-4's, Lu studied the farm 
level implementation of a rice production program.23 Of 395 
farmers interviewed, 178 were aware of the existence of certified
fable 2.6. Yields of a traditional variety and two modern varieties 
grown without nitrogen fertilizer
Wet
Season
Peta*
IR R I
IR -8 IR -20 Peta
Maligaya
Station
IR -8
Y I E L D  (t/ha.)
Bicol Station 
IR -2 0  Peta IR -8  IR -20 Peta
Visayas
Station
IR -8 IR -20 Peta
A ll Stations 
IR S  IR-20
1968 3.9 4.1 3.7 4.1 3.7 4.0 3.8 5.1 4.5 2.4 3.8 3.1 3.6 4.0 3.8
1969 2.9 5.6 5.2 3.8 5.2 4.4 3.4 4.6 4.0 4.1 4.0 5.2 3.6 4.8 4.7
1970 2.8 4.9 4.6 2.8 4.0 4.3 0.0 2.8 2.4 3.5 2.2 3.5 2.3 3.5 3.7
1971 1.3 3.6 3.8 2.9 2.5 3.2 3.1 3.2 2.9 4.6 3.9 3.8 3.0 3.3 3.4
1972 2.9 3.3 4.0 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.7
Ave. 2.8 4.3 4.3 3.4 3.8 2.8 2.8 4.0 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.8 3.2 3.8 3.9
*Peta is a typical traditional variety — tall and droopy leaved. 
From: The IR R I Reporter, 3/73.
21 Benno Galjart, "Rural Development and Sociological Concepts, A Critique," Rural 
Sociology, Vol. 36, Mar. 1971, No. 1,pp. 31-41.
22e . M. Rogers, Motivations, Values and Attitudes of Subsistence Farmers: Towards 
a Subculture for Peasantry. Paper presented at the Seminar on Subsistence and Peasant
Economies, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, Feb. 22-March 6, 1965.
seeds; 127 were aware o f the source; 41 were able to obtain the seeds; 
but only 36 actually used the seeds. The 359 non-users gave a total 
of 609 reasons for not using certified seeds. The reasons are 
distributed as follows:
Reasons Given % o f Farmers
(1) Never heard about it 46
(2) Not available locally, limited supply and stocks
arrive late 30
(3) Prohibitive price and no money g
(4) Not interested; not applicable; haven't tried it yet 6
(5) Planting seeds provided by landlord or overseer 3
(6) Poor germination 1
Commercial fertilizer was not used by 156 farmers for the 
following reasons:
Reasons Given % o f Farmers
(1) Not available locally, stock arrive late and in limited
supply 43
(2) Not interested because farms are fertile 19
(3) No m oney to buy and proh ib itive  price 22
(4) Unavailability o f irrigation water and belief that fertilizers
produce no good effects on the farm 10
(5) Landlord or overseer does not allow the use of fertilizer 3
(6 ) No reasons given 3
In the first example, the difference between 359 farmers 
interviewed and the 217 found to be unaware of the certified seeds 
represents the communication or information gap. The difference 
between the 178 farmers aware of the certified seeds and the 36 
users represents the awareness-adoption gap. This gap is probably 
best described as an inverted pyramid, in which the number of 
farmers participating declines from awareness of the innovation to its 
actual use. Table 2.7 shows the gap between awareness and actual use 
° f  recommended rice production practices in 1966. It w ill be noted 
that certified seeds were the least known and least used o f the ten 
Practices. Insecticides and fertilizers were the most popularly used. 
Seed selection before harvesting was an old practice, since tradi­
tionally their own rice fields were the only source of seeds for the 
next planting season. Although 96 percent of the farmers were aware 
of seedboard varieties, only 57 percent actually used them despite 
the fact that many different varieties have been approved by the 
National Seedboard since the mid-1950's.
Table 2.7. Awareness and actual use of recommended rice production practices 
by 395 farmers from Central and Southern Luzon, 1966.
Rice p roduction  practice
Percent o t farmers' 
awareness A ctua l use
1 . Fertilizer use 78 61
2 . Certified seeds 45 9
3. Insecticides 97 67
4. Rodenticides 93 44
5. Seedboard varieties 94 57
6 . Raised seedbed 78 25
7. Straight-row planting 98 42
8 . Rotary weeder 95 32
9. Seed selection before harvesting 96 61
10 . Germination test 82 37
Source: Hsueh-Yi Lu, op. c i t
2. The Demonstration Effect
This relative lack of farmers' enthusiasm for certified seeds and 
seedboard varieties changed remarkably w ith the advent of HYV's. 
The gap between awareness and adoption was very quickly bridged 
within one year in certain places. Table 2.8 illustrates this phenome­
non which has been made possible by positive demonstration effects. 
As Pal puts it, "IR-8's highly visible yield potential legitimized itself.''
Of the 22 farmers who planted I R-8 for the first time during the 
third season after its introduction in the village, 19 planted IR-8 on 
their entire rice farm and 3 planted it only on a portion of their 
farm. Of the 19 full adopters, 9 knew one to three very good farmers 
who had satisfying experience with IR-8. The rest (10) knew 4 to 11 
or more such farmers.24
Table 2.8. Awareness and adoption of IR -8 in Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
1966
Wet
1967
D ry
1967
Wet
% who knew about IR -8 62 100 100
% who grew IR -8 26 62 88
% who did not grow IR -8 74 38 12
Source: Aurora G. Pal, The Adoption of a New Rice Variety
(IR-8) in a Philippine Community. Unpublished M.S. Thesis, 
U.P. College of Agriculture, 1969.
Further illustrations of this dramatic response are shown in 
studies at the village small-farmer level. From the first planting season 
to the next, the number of farmers who planted IR-8 showed the 
following trends: 1 to 10 to 16 to 60; 6 to 77; 3 to 44; 5 to 56; 8 to 
42;25 7 to 49 to 70; 9 to 50; 15 to 113;26 70 to 96 to 132 to 
121.27 In May 1966 in Rizal province, 47 cooperators scattered in 
18 towns planted IR-8 for seed purposes. By October 1967, six of 
the eight barrios in the town of Morong had planted a dry-season 
crop of IR-8. Two did not because of their inaccessibility to irrigation 
water. In the six barrios, 194 out of 645 farmers, or 30 percent, 
planted the variety for the first time.28
The influence of "seeing is believing" on this pattern of res­
ponse cannot be discounted. Follow-up studies for six seasons (three
Plantings of Traditional or Non-Recommended Varieties
D ry  Season 1964 1965-66 1966-67
No. of farmers planting 163 151 84
Hectares planted 304.66 272.36 116.20
Wet Season
No. of farmers planting 155 96 29
Hectares planted 242.04 148.81 39.5
Plantings of Recommended Varieties
D ry  Season 1965 1966 1967
No. of farmers planting 29 41 142
Hectares planted 30.41 54.23 172.84
Wet Season
No. of farmers planting 25 81 220
Hectares planted 46.91 144.83 257.10
^^Semi-Annual Reports 1966-67, for the project on alternative extension ap­
proaches. Farm and Home Development Office, College of Agriculture, University of the 
Philippines.
26
Preliminary data from USAID and Asia Research Organization, Survey Data Farm 
Statistics for 1965 and 1967 from Four Villages.
27Blanda R. Sumayao, The Bicolano Farmers' Response to an Improved Rice Variety 
IR-8-208-3. University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture, 1969.
28Antonio S. Frio, Leadership Preference, IR -8 Adoption and Communication 
Among Dry-Season Farmers of Morong, Rizal. Unpublished B. S. Agriculture Thesis 
University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture, April 1968.
dry and three wet seasons) in seven villages from 1964 to 1967 
picture the rise of the new varieties and the fall of the traditional, 
not only in terms of number of farmers but also in area planted.29
Although eight varieties were recommended, the most cons­
picuous change involved IR-8. In the 1966 wet season, only one 
farmer planted it in an area of 0.75 hectare. In the dry season of 
1967, sixty farmers planted a total of 68.85 hectares. Trial plantings 
of IR-8 were made extensively,usually w ith technical supervision by 
knowledgeable persons. Its performance, therefore, was its own 
advertisement. The adaptability of the variety to different areas was 
still another advantage. The supportive function of this widespread 
success is illustrated in one village where the planting o f IR-8 was 
considered a failure because the yield was only 70 cavans per 
hectare. While such yields had rarely been experienced before, the 
farmers' point of reference was not the traditional yield but the 
reputed and expected yield of IR-8 which was 100+. In spite of this 
"defined" failure, more farmers planted IR-8 in the following season. 
Any doubts they might have had about adopting the innovation 
were dispelled by the demonstrably higher yields of other farmers 
who had planted I R-8 under similar situations.30
Of course, as of 1973, IR-8 has disappeared almost completely 
from the Philippine scene, but this is more a manifestation of 
change-orientation than retrogression. In other words, those who 
dropped IR-8 picked up the newer varieties rather than reverting to 
the traditional ones. Early maturity of the HYV's doubtless contri­
butes to their faster diffusion because the "w a it and see" period is 
reduced from 140 to 160 days for the traditional varieties to 120 
days or less for the HYV's.
3. The Miracle Rice Package Pattern
When IR-8-288-3 (more popularly known as "miracle rice") was 
introduced, it was emphasized that full yield potentials could be 
attained only if everything was "done right." IR-8 is referred to here 
not for itself alone but because it  is the prototype of the HYV's, 
several variations of which have been developed and will be 
developed. In adopting IR-8 farmers not only adopted a new seed 
but also accepted a more general concept of modernization of other
29Soledad L. Pahud, Some Factors Associated with the Adoption and Rejection of 
Recommended Rice Practices. Unpublished M. S. Thesis, University of the Philippines, 
College of Agriculture, 1969.
30Semi-Annual Report for 1966-77, op. c i t
Table 2.9. Practices adopted for IR -8 and for other varieties 
planted before and after the release of IR-8 .
Before A fte r  IR -8 (Season)
Practice IR -8 F irs t Second Third  Fourth
(1 ) Seed treatment Percent
IR -8
Other varieties 43
56
43
70
39
63
35
69
41
(2 ) Spraying or soaking
seedlings in chemicals
before transplanting
IR -8 80 79 73 68Other varieties 61 66 47 49 54
(3) Dapog method
IR -8 41 38 38 35Other varieties 7 8 10 8 13
(4) Application of fertili­
zer before transplanting
IR -8 30 43 38 37Other varieties 14 14 13 15 16
5) Application of ferti­
lizer anytime after
transplanting
IR -8 39 67 55 54Other varieties 41 29 24 26 23
(6) Making and applica­
tion of compost
IR -8 15 4 3 3
Other varieties 7 10 5 3 3
(7) Straight-row planting
IR -8 93 93 91 89Other varieties 60 61 58 54 54
(8) Hand weeding
IR -8 62 69 75 70Other varieties 43 37 43 39 44
(9) Rotary weeders
IR -8 32 70 63 64
Other varieties 49 49 42 43 44
(10 ) Weedicides
IR -8 31 38 39 40Other varieties 41 37 25 27 27
(11) Spraying against rice
insect pests
IR -8 89 81 80 76Other varieties 76 69 62 57 59
(12) Rat control
IR -8 39 77 72 80Other varieties 75 77 72 66 73N = IR -8 
— Other varieties 72
70
65
96
104
132
89
121
70
Table 2.9 (Continued)
Summary of adoption scores (Percent of farmers!
Before
IR-8 IR -8 Others IR -8 Others IR -8 Others IR -8 Othi
0 4 14 _ 10 _ 11 _ 11
1 - 4  practices 30 9 35 10 35 15 41 17 34
5 - 8 practices 47 63 40 59 47 60 44 58 49
9 -1 2  practices 19 28 11 31 8 25 4 25 6
Source: Blanda R. Sumayao, "The Bicolano Farmers' Response to an Improved Rice 
Variety, IR-8-288-3," University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture, 1969,
rice production practices such as seedbed preparation, fertilization, 
spraying against pests and diseases, straight-row planting, weeding, 
etc. In Sumayao's study of 161 IR-8 seed recipients from two cities 
and four provinces in the Bicol Region,31 the phenomenon of 
“ special variety deserves special treatment" was very much displayed. 
The percentage of farmers adopting 12 recommended practices for 
IR-8 and for other varieties was analyzed over four cropping seasons 
(Table 2.9). It was found that the same farmers growing both IR-8 
and traditional varieties gave the former preferential treatment. For 
all four cropping seasons, IR-8 adopters registered no zero scores, 
while 10 to 14 percent of those growing other varieties applied none 
of the other recommended practices in rice production.
Unpublished data on 75 IR-8 adopters and 115 non-adopters 
from seven villages similarly indicate greater adoption of the 12 
cultivation practices among the former than the latter. IR-8 was 
more pampered even in comparison w ith other relatively recent
improved varieties (Table 2.10).
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 as reported in IRRI studies also show the 
difference in inputs of fertilizer, insecticides, weedicides and labor in 
man-days per hectare w ith respect to local varieties and HYV. The 
yield differences are likewise obvious. Again, the partial adopters or 
those who planted both local and HYV gave different treatments to
the two types of varieties.
On the other hand, Barker reported what appears to be a 
spill-over effect from the successful experience with the new package 
of practices associated with IR-8, when the yield of certain premium
Table 2.10. Adoption scores of adopters and non-adopters of 
IR -8 during dry season, 1967.
Barrio
Number
Reporting
Adopters
Total
A dop tion
Scores
Average
A dop tion
Scores
Num ber
Reporting
Non-Adopters
Total
A dop tion
Scores
Average 
A dop tion  
Scores
(1) Bagumbayan 14 92 6.57 12 50 4.16
(2) Talangka 12 92 7.66 5 12 2.4
(3) Coralan 27 190 7.03 25 136 5.44
(4) Paagahan 2 11 5.5 26 100 3.84
(5) Cambuja 14 101 7.21 19 104 5.47
(6) San Antonio 2 7 2.5 8 20 2.5
(7) Nanguma 4 18 4.5 19 47 2.47
TOTAL 75 511 6.81 114 469 4.11
Source: Unpublished data from pilot study of a cooperative approach to rural 
development, University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture.
varieties increased. Malagkit, a glutinous rice used in preparing 
native delicacies, is grown only in a few areas. This variety commands 
a price approximately double that of IR-8. The high price is an 
incentive to farmers not only to plant Malagkit but to give it  more 
care and inputs than are customarily given to local varieties. Table 
2.13 shows that glutinous rice continued to be planted despite the
Table 2.11. Percent users of input among full adopters of HYV. 
1966 and 1969, Laguna.
Biflan
1966 1969
Cabuyao 
1966 1969
Calamba 
1966 1969
Fertilizer Users 72 100 65 86 83 95
Kg. Nitrogen/ha. 8 52 15 44 21 49
Yield MT/ha. 2.0 2.9 2.1 4.6 2.9 4.3
Herbicides Users 70 100 70 97 83 78
Pesos/ha. 2 6 7 9 5 8
Insecticide Users 41 97 52 93 69 78
Pesos/ha. 2 10 3 9 7 8
Adapted from: Randolph Barker and Violeta Cordova, The Impact of New 
Technology on Rice Production: A Study of Change in Three Philippine Municipalities from 
1966 to 1969. Paper presented at the 28th International Congress of Orientalists, Canberra, 
Australia, Jan. 6-12, 1971.
Table 2.12. Adoption patterns of 155 tenant farmers in Laguna, 
1966 and 1967 wet seasons.
F u ll Adopters  
Local to  IR -8  
Variety  
1966 1967
Non-Adopters  
Local 
Varieties 
1966 1967
Partial Adopters  
Local to  IR -8 and  
Local Varieties 
1966 19671967  
Loca l I  R-8 Local
No. of Farmers 59 59 44 44 46 46 46
Inputs
Nitrogen kg /ha 16 75 15 20 19 76 24
Fertilizer p/ha 28 99 24 30 31 106 38
Weedicides P/ha 5 8 4 9 4 7 2
Insecticides P/ha 3 19 2 5 3 18 5
Labor-man days/ha 54 76 52 50 53 79 51
Yield
Cavans/ha 55 98 52 48 59 109 57
Ave. area of variety
per farm 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 1 .1 1 .
Data from: IR R I Agricultural Economics Annual Report, 1967.
inroads made by HYV's. The areas where Malagkit was planted had a 
special use fo r the variety as a major ingredient in connection w ith a 
home industry.
Early in the life of the HYV's, it was established that 
production cost would be higher than that for traditional varieties. 
Although this was a negative factor for its adoption, the demonstrated 
profitab ility  despite higher investments was such that it overcame the 
farmer's objections on this score. Otherwise, the HYV's would have 
never spread as quickly as they have. Table 2.14 illustrates this 
profitability because high yields more than compensate for the high 
costs. With the increasing area and number of farmers adopting 
HYV's, the yields have tended to decline but so have the costs 
because the later adopters planting larger areas were not using as 
much inputs anymore. This tendency is evident in Table 2.14 where 
four farmers planted IR-8 in 1966 and 200 in 1967. The reduction 
in yield was from 165 to 133 cavans per hectare and the
corresponding drop in cash costs was from P I ,141 to ^779. The 
net return per hectare decline by PI 50.
Even in very small rice plots (less than a hectare) found in an
area which is not a major rice grower, the modernization in
Table 2.13. Percentage of area planted to HYV, glutinous, and 
other local rice varieties, 3 municipalities 
of Laguna, 1966 to 1969.
Wet Season D ry  Season
1966 1967 1968 1969 1967 1968 1969
- Percent of Area —
Biflan
H YV 0 39.2 92 80.2 3.8 58.0 96.7
Glutinous 0 2.3 4.8 1.8 3.0 0 0
Other local 100 58.5 3.2 18.0 93.2 42.0 3.3
T o t a l 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Cabuyao
H YV 1.9 63.6 69.8 68.0 18.0 57.8 42.5
Glutinous 26.6 27.7 30.2 28.0 9.5 3.1 4.5
Other local 71.5 8.7 - 4.0 72.5 39.1 53.0
T o t a l 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Calamba
H YV 1.2 59.6 50 60.7 65.0 55.3 58.1
Glutinous 92.7 28.2 48.5 38.7 5.0 8.2 10.0
Other local 6.1 12.2 1.5 0.6 30.0 36.5 31.9
T o t a l 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: R. Barker and V . Cordova, op. cit.
Table 2.14. Comparative costs and returns per hectare on farms
using IR -8 and traditional varieties, Rizal,
_
1966 and 1967 dry season.
1966 1967
IR -8 Binato IR -8 Binato
No. of farms 4 143 200 127
Costs:
Fertilizers IP) 270 50 146 39
Chemicals IP) 45 10 61 4
Other cash costs (P) 287 210 193 83
Costs in kind (P) 539 176 379 249
Total cash cost
and in kind (P) 1141 446 779 375
Yield cav. per ha 165 75 133 72
Gross returns (P) 2640 1200 2128 1151
Net returns (P) 1499 754 1349 777
Source: IRRI Agricultural tconomics Annual Report for 1967.
production practices has accompanied the introduction of HYV's 
(Table 2.15). The installation of irrigation pump has also made a great 
difference in the village of Canipa, Baybay, Leyte. Before HYV and 
irrigation, this barrio registered the lowest adoption of practices like 
fertilization, straight-row planting, insecticides, etc. The change from 
pre-HYV to 1971 is more pronounced than in the two other villages 
of Marcos and Tab-ang where about three-fourths of the farmers 
were using such practices even before HYV because they had 
irrigation. By 1971 and with HYV's, the adoption rates for the 
practices had gone up to almost 100 percent.
Table 2.15. Adoption of farming practices before and after HYV's 
(3 barrios of Baybay, Leyte), 171 farmers.
Canipa Marcos Tab-ang
Pre-HYV 1971 Pre-HYV 1971 Pre-HYV 1971
Ave. size of rice area (ha) 0.77 0.40 0.71
% of rice area irrigated 90 99 99
% of rice area double-cropped 100 100 100
% using straight row planting 39 98 79 100 83 98
% using mechanical weeder 34 98 79 98 83 98
% using herbicides 3 16 4 5 2 21
% using insecticides 21 94 66 98 97 98
% using own sprayer 0 23 0 14 0 34
% using 2 -wheel tractor 0 0 0 2 0 2
% farms irrigated by gravity 0 0 96 98 100 98
% farms irrigated by pump 35 86 . — — _ __
% using chemical fertilizer 21 88 68 98 66 98
Ave. application of NPK
kg/ha N 16.77 26.51 24.58 28.64 24.25 39.28
P 8.82 10.15 15.75 10.75 7.29 31.17
K 8.82 10.15 15.75 10.75 7.29 31.17
Source: T. E. Contado and R. Jaime, A Study of Changes in Rice Farming in 
Baybay, Leyte, U. P. College of Agriculture, 1972.
4. The Risk-Distribution Pattern
When accepting anything new, the farmer assumes certain risks, 
and he responds to change in ways which w ill enable him to reduce 
these risks. Some farmers, however, are more prepared to take risks 
than others.
Gradual adoption. Liao's study categorized 155 farmers accord­
ing to two criteria: the percent o f their farm planted to new varieties, 
and time of adoption. On the basis of the first criterion, three
categories were defined:
(a) Full adopter — any farmer who planted 100 percent of his 
area to the new varieties (39 percent of all farmers in the 
study).
(b) Partial adopter — any farmer who planted only a portion 
of his farm to the new varieties (31 percent).
(c) Non-adopter — any farmer who continued to plant the old 
varieties (30 percent).
Liao then classified farmers as earliest, relatively early, relatively 
late, and latest adopters, according to the span of time taken 
between awareness and adoption. The earliest adopter took 4 
months; the relatively early, 7 months; the relatively late, 13 months; 
and the latest, 19 months. The average percentage of farm area 
planted to new rice varieties for the first time gradually increased 
from 42 percent to 66 percent for the earliest adopters, to 74 
percent, and then to 83 percent for the latest adopters. This 
indicates that the first adopters, although more immediately res­
ponsive to the change, were faced w ith greater risks and were there­
fore less inclined to go all the way than the latest adopters who 
were able to benefit from the experience of others.
Multiple-Variety Planting
There are evidences that even during the pre-HYV era, rice 
farmers had already been on a constant search for suitable varieties. 
As Molster observed in a Laguna village in 1964:
"Certified seed was not used in the barrio, probably as a result 
of its higher price combined with unawareness of its advantages. The 
farmers were keen to use the best varieties they knew and could get, 
which was illustrated by the unceasing changes of the planted 
acreages with different varieties in successive years. There was a large 
choice of local and 'approved' varieties available. The types used 
differ from barrio to barrio, depending not only on environmental 
conditions but also on personal preferences and on the interaction 
with the cultivation methods used locally. During the wet season of 
1964-65, 68 percent of the rice fields of San Antonio 11 were planted 
with the recommended BPI-76 and 27 percent with the popular 
Quezon variety.
"The newer FB-121 variety was tried by a few farmers in two 
preceding years, but the results were not convincing. In the dry 
season the area was divided equally between a local variety and a 
variety which was recommended until a few years ago.
Because of the prevailing rat infestation, a new variety must 
ripen at the same date as the varieties already in use. Even if  the 
introduction were to cover the whole area, the 'rat-balance' with the 
nearby barrios may be upset. If the rice is late, all the rats from the 
neighborhood will move to the fields which have not yet been 
harvested."32
Multiple-variety planting over four seasons was observed in 
1967 by Dimaano and de Guzman.33 Only 15 out of 45 farmers 
using recommended varieties for the first time planted their 
fields to one variety alone; 24 planted one recommended variety in 
combination w ith local varieties. For four seasons the trend was for 
the number of farmers planting one recommended variety to increase 
and then decline because they switched to two or more recom­
mended varieties and did not return to the local types. The reason 
most frequently given for the multiple-variety planting was the desire 
of planters to find out which would give more yield. In the earlier 
stage, the farmers planted as many as six varieties, including the 
old ones. This was done for insurance purposes just in case the new 
ones failed. In the later stage, when confidence in the new plant type 
had been established, multiple-variety planting was more of an 
experiment to test which one performed better. Such farmers had 
moved up one more step toward modernization.
With the introduction of HYV's, the identifiable trends could be 
seen (Table 2.16). Single HYV plantings on the entire farm is the most 
predominant pattern now. The combination of improved and HYV 
comes next and then the combination of HYV's. In the dry season 
when water supply is less dependable, there is a higher proportion 
planting Intan (an improved variety) because it is less susceptible to 
lodging during the dry season. The tendency to plant the whole farm 
to only one HYV is based on previous successful experiences w ith the 
variety. The danger, however, lies in the total exposure of the whole 
farm to all the risks a single variety is heir to. In the event of disease 
and pest infestation a single variety which proves susceptible would 
lead to a total wipe-out of the crop. However, in the event of good 
harvests associated with certain HYV's the fu ll benefits would also be 
reaped by the entire farm.
32 H. C. Molster, Notes on Rice Farming and Extension in a Philippine Village, 
Aspects o f  Rice G rowing in Asia and the Americas. Miscellaneous Papers 7 (1970) 
Landbouwhogeschool, Wageningen, The Netherlands.
33A.M. de Guzman and C. M. Dimaano, Coralan Rice Farmers' Response to Change 
in Cropping Pattern: A Case Study. The Seminar-Workshop on the Economics of Rice 
Production, IR R I, Dec. 8-9, 1967.
Table 2.16. Percent of fatmers planting different varietal 
types for wet and dry seasons, 1970-71 
(3 barrios of Gapan, Nueva Ecija).
W e t D r y
1970 1971 1970 1971
Local only 1.1
— P e r c e n t  —
Improved* only 5.2 0.5 28.4 5.4
HYV only 74.0 76.0 64.6 77.0
Local and improved 1.1 .5 — _
Local and HYV 2.6 3.5 _ 2.6
Improved and HYV 9.8 7.0 3.5 _
Improved and improved 1.5 - — _
HYV and HYV 3.6 12.0 3.5 14.2
Local-improved and HYV 1.1 .5 — _
HYV, improved and HYV - - - .8
Total N 193 193 116 113
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. cit.
'Improved varieties are those earlier recommended by the Seedboard. These 
mclude Intan, Peta, Bengawa, Raminad, etc.
A seasonal pattern. A seasonal pattern for the adoption of 
recommended rice varieties has been reported by Pahud in studies 
carried out among 179 farmers in seven villages from 1965 to 
1967.34 The number of farmers adopting new varieties was found to 
be higher for the wet than for the dry season. Barker observed the 
same trend:
"This strategy of choosing separate wet and dry season varieties 
seems particularly appropriate on those farms with uncertain or 
limited dry season water resources. Farm operators in this situation 
can ill-afford the risk associated w ith the high levels of fertilizer 
input needed to maximize profits for IR-8 during the dry season. On 
the other hand, local varieties respond to medium input levels of 
nitrogen during the dry season w ithout lodging."35
34S. L. Pahud, op. c i t
35Randolph Barker, Ecenomic Aspects pf High-Yielding Varieties of Rice with Special 
Reference to National Price Policies: IRRI Report. Paper prepared for the 13th Session of 
FAO Study on Rice, Manila, February 20-27, 1969.
Farmers make a distinction between varieties and their suit­
ability for dry or wet seasons. Groot's study done in 1969 
showed that 77 percent of 142 farmer-respondents perceived these 
differences and therefore their varietal preferences were influenced 
accordingly. However, preference was not always actualized in planting 
because of availability, decision-making shared with other persons, 
price, etc.36 However, w ith the development of non-seasonal HYV's 
and if irrigation water is available for both seasons, the same varieties 
could be planted for both seasons and from one season to the next. 
Since varieties are being developed more and more along these lines, 
seasonal distinctions with respect to varietal suitability may become 
more blurred.
Rainfed its. Irrigated Response Pattern
Closely related to the seasonal pattern is the differential response 
of the irrigated and rainfed areas to the HYV's with the former 
adopting them more quickly than the latter. Tables 2.17 and 2.18 
show this very distinctly from 1966 to 1970. Barker,et al. 'sanalysis
Table 2.17. Pattern of varietal adoption on irrigated two- 
crop and rainfed farms, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, 
wet season, 1966 to 1970.
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Irrigated 2-Crop
IR -20 0 0 0 8 190
IR -8 2 19 94 58 3
IR-5 0 2 18 127 67
C4-63 0 2 20 88 75
Binato) _T raditional 290
288 204 67 8
Others) 14 7 8 22 26
Rainfed
IR -20 0 0 0 0 12
IR-5 0 0 2 21 47
C4-63 0 0 0 11 21
Intan 89 96 99 98 88
Tjeremas 33 34 34 36 29
Others 2 2 7 9 17
Source: Randolph Barker, et at. rThe Changing Pattern of Rice Production in Gapan, 
Nueva Ecija, 1965 to 1970. IRRI Saturday Seminar, December 11, 1971.
36Hans C. Groot, Co-orientation and Technological Change: Communication 
Variables in Perceptions of Miracle Rice in the Philippines. Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 
University of Wisconsin, 1970.
Table 2.18. Percent of farmers planting HYV's in three barrios 
of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, 1966-1972.
1966 1967 1968 1969
1970-
1971
1971-
1972
Mahipon (rainfed) - 0.5 0.5 11.4 75.5 96
Malimba (2-crop 
irrigated bu t water 
supply has problems) 4.7 35.3 100 100 100
San Nicholas (2-crop 
irrigated. Good 
irrigation system) 2.9 9.5 66.7 98.1 99 100
Source: R. Huke and J. Duncan, op.cit. and R. T. Herrera, op. cit.
of yields and input level in three categories of farms, namely, 
irrigated two-crop, partially irrigated and rainfed, revealed higher 
yields and higher inputs where water supply was more available and 
dependable. On the irrigated farms, the shift from local to HYV's 
appeared to have improved yields from 2.2 to 3 tons per hectare. On 
the rainfed farms, the yield advantage for HYV's did not become 
manifest t ill 1970. IR-5 was found to be more drought-resistant and 
therefore readily gained acceptance. By 1971-72 the tungro virus had 
attacked this variety, leading to its near demise in the succeeding 
seasons.
In the early days of IR-8 nearly 100 percent of the farms of 
early adopters were fu lly irrigated. This level dropped to 50 percent 
for the later adopters. Because of the uncertainties involved, poor 
irrigation facilities are associated with lower input levels, lower yields 
and lower farm profits.37 This phenomenon is shown again in Table 
2.19 where the villages of Mahipon, Malimba, and San Nicolas differ 
in quality and quantity of water supply. Mahipon is rainfed while 
Malimba has irrigation facilities which are not functioning as 
effectively as the system in San Nicolas. The rather small yield 
differences between Malimba and rainfed Mahipon probably reflect 
the water problem as much as any other factor of production. More 
than 50 percent of the farmers in Malimba complained of low water 
level in the dry season, irregular flow of water and inability of water 
to reach farms at the end of the canal. Among the farmers in San
37 IR R I, Agricultural Economics Annual Report, 1967
Table 2.19. Average yield and NPK applied in three 
barrios of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.
Yield
(cavans/ha) N  P K  (kg/ha)
Wet
Pre-
H Y V
Season
1970-71
Pre-
H Y V
1970-
1971
Pre-
H Y V
1970-
1971
Pre-
H Y V
1970-
1971
Mahipon 36 43.1 15 25 15 27 12 24
Malimba 46 48.0 27 52 17 23 8 10
San Nicolas 53.8 78.6 25 70 22 24 16 18
Nicolas only about a third registered these complaints.
5. Change in Cropping Pattern
Cropping patterns, comprising all stages of rice production from 
planting to harvesting and the time and place of planting, are 
established in every village. They are usually pursued from year to 
year w ith little  or no deviation. Now and then, however, certain 
occurrences — either induced deliberately or through a force majeure 
such as floods, typhoons and drought — disturb these routines.
A change in cropping pattern takes the form of a structural 
change; it  is not just a change in technique. Availability of water 
during the growing period of the rice plant has been a basic element 
of the cropping pattern. With the development of HYV's which 
mature earlier than local varieties, a fundamental readjustment had 
to take place. In some cases, the change in cropping pattern has been 
strategic for the introduction of a whole package of practices. In 
other instances, the new variety, in combination with the develop­
ment of irrigation systems, has encouraged and brought about a 
change from one to two or even two and a half crops a year. Prepara­
tion of the land for the next crop has become urgent; hand tractors, 
either bought or hired, have been employed to speed up the work. A 
flood avoidance strategy has also been effected in certain areas by 
changing the planting season from June-July to November-December. 
(Farmers are amenable to the change, since they grow only one 
crop a year w ithout irrigation anyway.) Changes in time of planting
have been possible because of the non-seasonal nature of the HYV's.
Recognition of the need to change cropping pattern has often 
come about through technical advice from outside the village. In case 
studies described by Pahud, de Guzman and Dimaano in 1967, 
change was brought about in the following manner:38 First, 
although change in the cropping calendar meant missing almost one 
crop, the extension worker was able to convince the farmer to do this 
because the previous season had produced very low yields. Severe 
virus infestation was primarily responsible. Another related factor was 
insufficient water supply which made straight-row planting, use of 
rotary weeders and application of fertilizers virtually impossible. 
Weeds which had grown taller than the crop became a favorable 
environment for leafhoppers transmitting the virus. An examination 
of the rainfall distribution and irrigation water readings for two 
previous seasons revealed that farmers had been planting when the 
supply of irrigation water was inadequate. Because of the water 
problem, only nine of the 20 initial farmer-cooperators during the 
previous season were able to follow some of the recommended 
practices the next season. All told, a measure of receptivity to new 
varieties in this case resulted from desperation rather than from a 
positive attraction to it.
Second, the crop technician's proposal to change planting time 
to take advantage of periods with more abundant water supply was 
presented to the farmers on a majority or not-at-all adoption. 
Although the nature of the problem and the prospect of a solution 
were explained to the farmers individually, commitment to the 
change was sought in a group meeting, and social pressure to 
conform was brought to bear on the reluctant ones by the farmers 
themselves, particularly when they were cultivating adjacent fields. 
Fifteen were willing to go along with the plan, although the farmer 
with the largest acreage was critical of this approach because change 
could be initiated on his farm w ithout the agreement of other 
farmers.
Third, planting at about the same time required planting similar 
or identical varieties over a wide area. Small, scattered changes would 
not accomplish the objective. This system became a perfect entree 
for new varieties. Mass planting of varieties with similar maturity 
became a must because differences in maturity period would expose 
a particular sector at a particular time to the concentrated attack of
3®S. L. Pahud, op. c i t  and A. M. de Guzman and C. M. Dimaano, op. cit.
birds, rodents, pests and diseases.
Fourth, initial agreement among most, though not all, farmers 
led to intensive lessons through a barrio rice school and a new 
calendar of farm activities prepared and followed up by the
extension worker.
The effects of the change in cropping pattern could be seen in the
increase of new farm practices adopted. Almost twice as many 
farmers adopted new practices along w ith the change in cropping 
pattern as those who did not. The practices which decreased after the 
new cropping pattern was inaugurated were seed selection, because 
seeds of the new varieties were obtained from outside the village, 
compost-making, because more commercial fertilizers were used; and 
rat control, because mass planting and clean culture reduced 
infestation. Initially, farmers who refused to follow the new cropping 
pattern had higher yields; those who followed either caught up 
with or even outyielded them. In one village the yield doubled. After 
adopting the new cropping pattern, farmers also claimed they 
visited the farms more often than those who did not follow 
the change. As the farmers themselves remarked then: "We be­
came more industrious."
However, the combination of HYV's and water availability has
resulted in some peculiar patterns and problems in other places. 
Stewart describes the phenomenon of "staggered planting in Hago-
noy, Davao del.Sur:39
"There is no pronounced wet and dry season in Davao del Sur, so the
agricultural calendar is not strongly influenced by climatic factors. The 
entire area studied is irrigated and there is usually no shortage of water, so 
at least potentially water is always available to the farmer. This fact, 
combined with the short maturation period of the HYV's,leads many 
farmers to replant their land as quickly as possible after harvest. They are 
probably encouraged to do this by the availability of hand tractors to 
assist them in land preparation. The speed of this 'hurry-uo' land 
preparation, as they term it, varies from farmer to farmer -  even between 
neighbors. This is particularly true where some farmers have money to 
hire tractors while others must rely on their carabaos, or where only a 
limited number of tractors are available to service a large number of 
farmers.
"The result, particularly evident after several seasons, is that in a simple 
contiguous area one can find rice plants in virtually all stages of 
development. Farmers only short distances apart may be preparing land.
39James Stewart, Immigrant Rice Farmers: Rice Cultivation in Hagonoy, Davao del 
Sur, Philippines. Ateneo de Davao, 1972.
transplanting, weeding or spraying their half-grown plants or harvesting all 
at the same time. Naturally this makes for a devilish problem of water 
management and may lead to conflicts between neighboring farmers. It 
also greatly increases the problems of pest and disease control, and it may 
affect the availability of additional manpower during the critical periods of 
transplanting and harvesting. The farmers themselves recognize staggered 
planting as one of their most serious problems, but the solution so far has 
been difficult.
"For example, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) decided to 
cut o ff the water supply from May 1 to 31, reopening on June 1, 1972. 
Many farmers expressed favor with the plan. However, when May 1 drew 
near, it turned out that some farmers encouraged by rains a month or so 
earlier — had gone ahead and planted despite the pending closure. NIA was 
petitioned by some farmers to continue the supply of water and political 
pressure was brought to bear by a top provincial official. The closure date 
was moved to May 16 and the system was finally closed down for two 
weeks during a period of heavy rains. The effect on the planting schedule 
is not yet certain, but it is expected to  be minimal.
"While N IA officials express concern over staggered planting in 
Hagonoy, one of their own policies seems to have encouraged the practice.
It is a NIA policy to waive irrigation charges for any farmer who can plant 
a th ird rice crop w ithin a one-year period, F60.00/year, paid by the tenant. 
Understandably, the incentive of this waiver leads farmers to replant as 
quickly as possible — often with the result that some plant well ahead of 
others. The NIA policy obviously seeks to maximize productivity per 
irrigated hectare per year, but it is questionable whether or not it 
accomplishes this objective. It is true that some farmers produce five crops 
in two years under this arrangement. However, given the staggered planting 
and its results, combined with the very limited use of fertilizer and the 
hasty land preparation involved, it is doubtful that the NIA incentive 
contributes to the overall productivitv o f farms on the irrigation system."
Pigcawayan, Cotabato presents another case of this undefined 
period for planting and harvesting in its three barrios. As Kimpo 
describes it:
" In  Capayuran, for instance, the planting period tor the wet season starts 
in June. One month after the start of the planting, 20 percent of the 25 
farmers interviewed have not yet harvested and 36 percent have already 
planted. A t the start of the dry season planting in December, 36 percent 
have not yet harvested while 12 percent are already engaged in planting. 
The same holds true in Bulacan. A t the planting season in June, 28 percent 
are harvesting while 40 percent of the farmers have already planted. In the 
dry season planting in December, 28 percent have already planted while 48 
percent were still harvesting. One month later, 32 percent have planted 
while 16 percent were still harvesting.
" In  Maluao fo r the wet season 1971, it was reported that the planting
season ends at the start of the next planting season. The planting season 
covers a long period ranging from 4 to 5 months. A t the start of the 
planting in December, 20 percent had planted while 32 percent were 
harvesting. In February, 40 percent were planting while 32 percent of the 
farmers were still harvesting. About 24 percent o f farmers interviewed in 
Maluao were reported not to have farmed in the wet season 1971 due to 
the floods and 12 percent had not harvested at the end of the dry season.
As a result even with the use of HYV, a considerably low yield is 
obtained."
Among the factors contributing to this undefined' cropping 
pattern are water scheduling and flooding. Run-offs from the higher 
areas which go to nearby creeks and cause an overflow of water in the 
lowland make farmers hesitant to plant on time. For farms irrigated 
by the National Irrigation Administration, farmers hasten land 
preparation by using rented tractors. Those who cannot afford the 
tractor rental use the carabao. Limited credit sources and shortage of 
capital to purchase fertilizer and chemicals and to hire labor affect 
the planting activities of farmers.40
The phenomenon of staggered planting demonstrates the inter­
acting relationship between and among technological, environmental, 
employment, institutional and organizational factors. Obviously, the 
farmer cannot continue to function individually within this context.
Another illustration of the combined effects of irrigation and 
HYV on cropping pattern was reported from Baybay, Leyte by 
Jaime and Contado. In two of the three villages studied (Marcos and 
Tab-ang) two crops a year was usual practice because they had a 
communal gravity irrigation system for as long as farmers could 
remember. However in 1968, farmers in Marcos learned from the 
Visayas Agricultural College nearby that continuous rice cropping 
(or 5 crops every 2 years) throughout the year was possible because 
of the early maturing HYV's which have no dormancy. The new 5- 
crop cycle every two years started in Tab-ang in 1969 using IR-8 
and in Canipa in 1971 using IR-8, IR-5, and BPI-76. This continuous 
cropping made disease and pest control a real problem and was 
blamed for the tungro epidemic in 1970-71 which resulted in a 
substantial crop loss. After that experience, farmers started going 
back to the two-crop a year system and efforts were exerted to syn­
chronize planting and harvesting in order to break the disease and
40Eva Kimpo, Factors influencing Productivity in the Three Barrios of Pigcawayari 
Cotabato. Notre Dame University, 1972.
41 R. Jaime and T. E. Contado, A Special Report on Irrigation as an Aspect of 
Changes in Rice Farming in Baybay, Leyte. U.P. College of Agriculture, 1973.
pest cycle. Furthermore, the continuous cropping led to the neglect 
of other farm enterprises, lack of pasture area for the carabaos and 
productivity of the land using the same variety tended to decline.41
The ecological implications of HYV, continuous cropping, 
irrigation, pest and disease incidence clearly need to be given 
attention.
6. Acceptance, Rejection and Discontinuities in Adoption
In spite of all the exciting developments in rice production over 
the past 5 or 6 years, the adoption process nas not been a uniformly 
linear climb. Observations to this effect were made by Sumayao42 
who classified IR-8 adopters as in itia l planters who received and 
planted the seeds wnen they were first distributed; persistent 
planters who planted IR-8 for the first time after the first IR-8 crop; 
dropouts who stopped planting IR-8 the following season; and 
replanters who planted IR-8 for the first season, dropped it the 
second season and picked it up again during the third season. As 
previously mentioned, the adoption of HYV's has been a persistent 
process but the adoption of a specific HYV has been rather 
short-lived so far. As they say: “ Exit IR-8, enter IR-5. Exit IR-5, enter 
IR-20." While the new plant type has been widely accepted the 
adoption of a specific variety depends very much on its merits and 
proven performance. An HYV is dropped in favor of another or a 
newer one the moment its weaknesses begin to show up.
Adoption graphs for 12 practices studied for 4 seasons show 
zigzag steps rather than a smooth upward increase. Pahud43 observed 
the same trend over 6 cropping seasons. She classified as early 
persistent adopters those farmers who adopted 50 percent of all the 
recommended rice practices during the first three seasons and 
continued to do so for the latter three consecutive seasons; late 
persistent adopters, those who adopted 50 to 60 percent of all the 
practices during the latter three consecutive seasons; later adopters, 
those who adopted 60 to 70 percent of the practices during the latter 
two seasons; readopters, those who adopted, dropped, and picked up 
practices irregularly during the six seasons (the largest group of 
farmers in Pahud's study belonged to this category); and dropouts, 
farmers who adopted 40 percent or more of the practices during the 
first three seasons but adopted only 10 to 20 percent for the latter 
three seasons.
42B. R. Sumayao, op. c i t
43S. L. Pahud, op. cit.
Only a season-by-season analysis would indicate these discon­
tinuities; a long-term trend would not reveal this zigzag. Long-term 
trends are described in Liao's comparison of farm practices between 
1954-55 and 1965-66. In 1954, land preparation — the tillage, 
harrowing and levelling — had been done by carabao and man-labor; 
by 1965, 32 of 87 farmers studied were using hand tractors. 
Similarly, transplanting had been carried out by the ordinary and 
broadcast method; ten years later, 49 out of 87 farmers were 
practicing straight-row planting. The number of farmers applying 
fertilizer increased from 61 to 78; and average per hectare ap­
plication increased 43 percent. Chemical weeding which was un­
known in 1954 was used by 75 farmers in 1965.44 Follidol, Dol 
granule, BHC, Basudin, and Furadan have become part of the farmers' 
vocabulary.
To better understand the patterns of acceptance, rejection, and 
discontinuities in the adoption of HYV's and other recommended 
production practices, farmers' reasons as found in several studies 
were analyzed. The most often cited reasons for adoption were the 
demonstrated superiority or effectiveness of the new practices, 
expected high yield, the consequent minimization of loss, increased 
efficiency of farming operations, and the relative advantage of the 
new over the old practices. Besides the general expectation of high 
yields from HYV's, specific varietal characteristics were mentioned 
such as early maturity, disease resistance, drought resistance and 
eating quality. One study done in 1969 also found what farmers 
dislike in rice varieties: very tall plants with late maturity  and 
low tillering ability.45 Such dislike was crystallized only after about 
two years of the HYV's. Before that, the varieties farmers were used 
to were characterized by all the qualities presently disliked.
Specific institutional, personal or group pressures for adoption 
such as desire to follow neighbors and to comply with landlord's 
wishes or with the change agent's recommendations were reported 
by some farmers.
Non-adoption of innovations or dropping them after they have 
been tried is very much conditioned by the perceived incompatibility 
or ineffectiveness of the practice with existing situations on the farm 
and in the village, — anticipation of or actual experience with
44Oavid S. H. Liao, Factors Affecting Productivity and Adoption of Improved 
Practices in Rice Farms. Unpublished M. S. Thesis, University of the Philippines College of 
Agriculture, 1968.
4^Hans C. Groot, op. c i t
undesirable results, lack of resources, limited comprehension of 
cause-effect relationships, ignorance of new practices and how to 
apply them. They stated that fertilizers could not be used where 
fields were always flooded; rat control measures were of limited 
usefulness unless neighboring farmers adopted similar measures; 
straight-row planting could not be done as long as skilled planters 
were not available; rotary weeders could not be used because of lack 
of water; and there was no capital to buy fertilizers. Earlier, the 
objection to fertilizer application was the fear that constant use 
would lead to "fertilizer addictedness" of the soil; hesitation in 
spraying insecticides was due to fear of killing the chickens, pigs and 
carabaos. Wilting of rice plants was sometimes attributed to the 
rotary weeder's agitation of the soil; empty grains were blamed on 
the use of highly concentrated chemical solution. In general, a lack 
of understanding o f cause-effect relationships contributes to slow or 
hesitant response. A major reason for discontinuing a practice is 
failure of the innovation to demonstrate its superiority or ef­
fectiveness. For example, a farmer might say: " I  sprayed my field 
with 2-4-D but it did not control the weeds in my fie ld ." Quite 
often, complaints about ineffectiveness are a result of improper 
application of the innovation. Disease and pest susceptibility of a rice 
variety is a very potent and immediate reason for switching to a new 
or different one. Despite floods, typhoon and tungro, the willingness 
to plant HYV's and to use fertilizer and insecticides remains extremely 
high. Although the farmers from Hagonoy, Davao del Sur46 cut 
down on fertilizer use, they seemed to have continued on w ith other 
practices.
From the socio-cultural point of view, a more intriguing 
innovation than HYV is the practice of straight-row planting and the 
accompanying rotary weeder and/or the application of herbicides. In 
1964, a Dutch agricultural economist who lived in a rice-growing 
village in San Pablo City, Laguna made the following observations on 
transplanting and weeding:47
''Traditionally, seedlings are planted at random in groups of 3 or 4 
per hill. A guitar player may sit on one of the levees bordering the rice 
field, and the rhythm of his music then determines the rhythm of planting. 
Recently, rotary weeders were introduced from Japan, and the farmers 
who used this implement had to plant in one-row-straight system. How­
ever, working with the familiar guitar is impossible w ith this system,
4 6 j. Stewart, op. cit.
4?H. C. Molster, op. c i t
which does not make its introduction very popular. The fact that planting 
in straight rows gives a more even distribution of the plants over the field, 
is not considered by the farmers to be an advantage.
"In  barrio San Antonio II (San Pablo), 14 out of 23 rice farmers 
used the one-row-straight system, although two of them did not use the 
rotary weeder. Straight rows were considered anyhow an advantage in 
weeding. An interesting item was that since the skill of planting in straight 
rows was not yet mastered by the barrio people, transplanting had to be 
done by people from outside the barrio. The new system also took slightly 
more time than the old system. These two reasons made the one- 
row-straight system somewhat more expensive than the traditional 
method.
"The farmers were clearly not interested in planting in real squares. 
They expected this to cost twice as much time and money fo r the
disputable advantage that the rotary weeder could then also be used 
crosswise. Lopally, several devices were developed to use the two-row- 
straight system, the simplest being the use of an ordinary rope line.
Weeding
"Weeding takes about 35 percent of the labor involved in growing 
and harvesting a rice crop, and is carried out solely t»y the farmer and his 
family. The work is spread over a rather long period of time. To measure 
the time devoted to handweeding is d ifficu lt, since it is often done while 
passing by the field or in addition to other jobs.
"One farmer stated that he considered it an entertainment, o f which 
the time it took him was of no importance to him. It seems, however, that 
the introduction of labor-saving techniques w ill be relatively easy in this 
field, since two techniques, the use of the Japanese rotary weeder and the 
use of herbicides, have both gained considerable ground.
"The rotary weeders were of an all-metal type, costing P20. Some 
farmers mentioned as a reason fo r not using the rotary weeder that it 
damaged rice plants in the wet season. The technician, however, found out 
that the damage was actually caused by cutworms.
"The three available sprayers (one from the technician, and two 
from the farmers) were lent w ithout charge, but with the obligation to 
provide fo r any repair. One farmer remarked that under this system his 
sprayer had less than half its normal lifetime, but he accepted it as it was.
"The available data did not indicate that the new techniques reduced 
the weeding labor. On the contrary, in the dry season the average weeding 
time fo r the farmers who practiced handweeding only, was lower than for 
the others. In the wet season the reverse was true with, on the average, the 
shortest weeding time fo r those who used the sprayer and the rotary 
weeder."
De Guzman's report from farmers of Binan, Lagun^ in 1963 
found that less than 50 percent of farms along the highway did not
use straight-row planting. The objections to the practice were that it 
is laborious, expensive, involves hiring transplanters who have the 
required skill and there are no yield advantages anyway.48
As 1973, in Laguna province where Molster and de Guzman 
made their observations, straight-row planting and the use of rotary 
weeders were common in almost all lowland rice-growing areas in the 
province.49 As a consequence, the use of guitar music which 
provided rhythm for rice transplanting has completely disappeared.
While straight-row planting and use of the rotary weeder have 
been firm ly established in Laguna and Leyte, the situation in Gapan, 
Nueva Ecija, Davao del Sur and Cotabato is quite different. 
Herbicides and sprayers are the chosen means for weed control in the 
latter three places. Anyone who has seen their rice fields can readily 
make the observation that weeds remain a competitor of their rice 
plants. In Laguna and Leyte, besides the use of family labor in 
weeding, there is a prevailing custom locally known as kamkam in 
Laguna and ambo in Leyte whereby neighbors, relatives or friends 
can have the option to harvest a portion of the farmer's field by 
performing the weeding operation during the rice-growing period. 
Besides a one-sixth or one-seventh share, the weeder-harvesters 
usually receive their shares in tightly packed cans, hence farmers are 
beginning to realize that the traditional custom might be more 
expensive than hiring weeders and harvesters for a wage. However, 
the lack of cash and social pressures to provide other members of the 
community a chance to participate in the harvest militates against the 
shift. The popularity of herbicides and sprayers in Davao del Sur and 
Cotabato is related to seasonal labor shortages due to continuous 
cropping £nd other wage labor opportunities offered by sugar cane 
and coconut plantations in Davao. In Cotabato, larger operating farm 
units and the problem of staggered planting probably aggravate the 
situation and make the use of herbicides more practical than the use 
of labor for weeding.
What is d ifficu lt to understand in the case of Gapan is the 
failure of straight-row planting to gain a foothold except in one 
barrio where a rural reconstruction worker who was in residence for 
sometime had introduced the practice. The reasons cited for 
non-adoption of this particular innovation are lack of skilled planters
4 8 L. p. de Guzman, The Rice Farmers’ Response to Technological Change, (Paper 
presented at the IRRI Seminar, Jan. 30, 1964).
^Sociology Research Department: An Evaluation Research of the Philippine Rural 
Reconstruction Movements' Barrio Development Program in Laguna: Baseline Study. Asian 
Social Institute, Manila, Jan. 1973.
and hence much higher costs involved. Although these are very 
profound reasons, they were the same objections raised by Laguna 
farmers in the early 1960's. Somehow, when skilled planters from 
the outside were brought into a village where straight-row planting 
was not practiced, the local transplanters learned and acquired the 
skills within one planting season. Skills, therefore, were no longer 
scarce after two seasons. Why has not the same thing occurred in 
Nueva Ecija despite the fact that it has been the recipient of 
considerable extension services? The argument of high transplanting 
costs is not a very convincing one because an increase in the number 
of available skilled planters would doubtless bring about reduced 
wage rates. Meanwhile, their rice fields are full of weeds despite 
herbicide applications which appear to be inadequate.
Another interesting phenomenon in the modernization of rice 
production is the increasing use and ownership of modern farm 
equipment and the corresponding decline in the possession of 
traditional farm implements such as the plow, harrow, cart, and sled 
(Table 2.20). Over a 5-year period there is a dramatic rise in the num­
ber of new equipment such as hand tractors, weeders, sprayers and 
even irrigation pumps.
Table 2.20. Ownership of farm tools and equipment (780 Laguna 
farmers), 1963-1968.
Tool/equipment owned 1963 1968
Four-wheel tractor - 2
Hand tractor 9 61
Weeder 149 392
Sprayer 42 160
Irrigation pump 2 26
Plow 921 111
Harrow 657 634
Traditional cultivator 141 119
Sled 339 319
Cart 83 59
Source: FHDO, Rural Change in a Philippine Setting -  A General Report on the 
Five-Year Project, a Study on Alternative Extension Approaches. University of the 
Philippines, College of Agriculture, 1971.
7. Adoption Behavior as Farmer Expertise
In practically all of the studies on adoption of farm innovations
here and abroad, adoption behavior is conceptualized as a dependent 
variable. The nature and rate of adoption are influenced by a number 
of factors, some of which are more important than others. Mangahas, 
in his study of the diffusion of HYV's among 866 farmers in Central 
Luzon, conceptualized adoption behavior as farmer expertise (a 
substitute variable for schooling). This farmer expertise variable was 
measured in terms of the proportion of recommended rice pro­
duction practices adopted by the farmers. These practices include 
mechanical land preparation, seed selection, dapog method of 
seedbed preparation, straight-row planting, herbicides or rotary 
weeder, fertilizer application and use of insecticides. Having thus 
arrived at a measure of farmer expertise which is known as adoption 
behavior elsewhere, he tried to relate this and five other independent 
variables to the adoption of HYV's (Table 2.21). The other in­
dependent variables were farm size, owner-operatorship, interest 
rate, marketed surplus ratio and irrigation by pump. Farms were 
stratified into rainfed lowland, irrigated wet, and irrigated dry and 
then classified further in relation to participation or being a 
cooperator or non-cooperator with the government in the extension 
program on rice production, Mangahas' findings show that owner- 
operatorship and large farm size were not of great importance to the 
diffusion of HYV's. Conversely, tenancy and small farm size have not
Table 2.21. Linear probability functions for use of HYV's on specified 
farm types in Central Luzon, 1967-68.
Independent
variables
Rainfed Irrigated wet season Irrigated d ry  season
Non-
Cooperator Cooperator
Non-
Cooperator Cooperator
Non-
Cooperator Cooperator
Expertise 0.114 0.469 0.689 0.720 0.780 0.985
Interest -0 .0 9 6 0.370 - 0.001 -0 .4 7 2 -0 .531 -0 .5 2 2
Tenure 0.013 -0 .1 6 0 0.060 0.042 0.109 0.028
Size 0.005 0.074 - 0.022 0.048 -0 .0 8 3 -0 .0 0 3
Pump - - 0.124 0.123 -0 .0 0 8 -0 .1 0 3
Sample size 343 69 236 218 89 117
Source: Mahar Mangahas, A Cross-Sectional Study of the Diffusion of New Rice 
Varieties in Central Luzon. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1970
been impediments to adoption; neither have non-commercialization 
or low marketed surplus ratios. Interest rate and adoption of HYV 
was in most cases negative and of fair size, suggesting that a decline 
in the cost of financing operating expenses contributed to the 
diffusion of HYV and the size of this contribution was related to 
initial favorability brought about by the presence of irrigation and 
participation in extension. Pump irrigation in contrast to gravity 
irrigation was a favorable factor to adoption. Age and years of 
schooling were not significantly related to farmer expertise or to 
the adoption of HYV. The most important variable explaining adop­
tion was farmer expertise which showed a high degree of com- 
plimentarity with irrigation and participation in the government 
extension program. The "expertise" coefficient was highest fo r  
farmers who were cooperators and who grew rice in irrigated areas 
during the dry season (0.985). This implies that knowledge of one 
additional recommended practice out of seven contributes 13 
percent to the probability of adoption.
Mangahas' major finding that farmer expertise is the most sig­
nificant variable explaining adoption means that the adopters o f 
recommended practices are also the adopters o f  HYV's. While 
farmer expertise in this sense is a good predictor o f HYV adoption, 
it does not explain the findings of Sumayao and Pahud that the 
same farmers who planted both HYV and traditional varieties 
adopted more of the recommended practices for HYV than for 
the traditional. Under these circumstances, it is not logical to say 
that the same farmer has two different levels of expertise at the same 
time. It also seems very self-evident that the adopters would adopt 
and, therefore, the explanation for adoption behavior remains to be 
found elsewhere. For the question still is: How did farmer expertise 
come about or how does one explain the adoption of recommended 
practices (which is the operational definition of farmer expertise)?
8. Correlates o f Ethnic Group as a Factor in Adoption
Data on ethnic group difference in adoption behavior are hard 
to come by. Fortunately, Battad's 1972 study of 213 rice farmers 
in Cotabato provides us interesting comparisons across ethnic 
groups. His respondents were composed of 62 Muslims, 50 Visayans, 
51 Tagalogs and 50 llocanos residing in ten barrios of ten 
municipalities in Cotabato. Five respondents were chosen from each 
ethnic group from each barrio which was selected as to have all four 
ethnic groups present in sufficient numbers. The barrios and their
respective municipalities included are: Upper Paatan, Kabacan; 
Mulamote, Matalam; Dugong, Mlang; Amas, Kidapawan; Sina- 
lukay, Buluan; Gansin, Tacurong; Tubon, Pigcawayan; Sindwingan, 
Libungan;Salunayan, Midasayap; and Tunggol, Pagalungan. Table 2.22 
shows the comparative characteristics of the four groups of farmers.
Table 2.22. Cotabato rice farmers'personal, family and farm 
characteristics by ethnic group (213 farmers 
from 10 barrios in 10. municipalities), 1972,
Muslim Visayan Tagalog llocano
1 . Years o f  schooling 
None
Primary grades 
Intermediate grades 
High school 
College
70
6
11
8
5
— P e r c e n t  —
12
36
28
24
12
27
35
20
6
4
18
44
20
14
Mean years 2.07 4.5 5.01 6.33
2. Age
Mean years 40.09 42.40 45.65 40.60
3. Average years o f  farming
experience 14.00 13.70 13.34 13.25
4. A verage years o f  residence
in the barrio 14.27 12.98 13.68 14.80
5. Tenure status
Owner 97 38 66 52
Part-owner - - - -
Share tenant 3 38 34 44
Lessee - 4 - 4
6. Religion
Islam 100 - - -
Catholic - 82 76 64
Protestant and others - 18 24 36
7. Size o f  household
1 -  3 24 4 23 22
4 - 6 53 70 51 36
7 - 9 18 24 22 30
10+ 4 2 4 12
Mean 5.05 5.7 5.2 5.4
8 . No. o f  household members 
in  farm operations
None 4 16 - -
1 - 3 68 64 41 28
Table 2.22 (Continuation)
Muslim Visayan Tagaiog llocano
4 - 6 26 20 55 60
7 - 9 - — 4 10
10+ 2 - - 2
Mean 2.85 2.44 3.88 4.56
9. Size o f  farm in hectares
0 .2 5 -1 42 52 45 18
1 . 2 5 - 2 38 30 35 56
2.25+ 20 18 20 26
Mean 1.64 1.63 1.62 1.75
10. Gross income
P2500 and below 63 32 26 14
2501 -  5000 32 50 55 38
5001 + 5 18 19 48
Mean income P2500 P3400 P3116 P4869
Source: Fortunato A. Battad, Factors Associated with the Adoption of Rice 
Technology in Cotabato. Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of the Philippines College 
of Agriculture, 1973.
The llocanos had the highest educational attainment, followed by 
the Tagalogs and the Visayans. The Muslims have had the least 
amount of formal schooling. In age, years of residence in the barrio 
and farming experience the four groups did not differ significantly 
despite the fact that the three groups were migrants. Landownership 
was highest (almost 100 percent) among the Muslims and the 
Visayans had the highest rate of tenancy. In household size, number 
of household members involved in farming operations, farm size and 
gross income, the llocanos reported the largest household, the largest 
farm and the highest gross income. In terms of irrigation, feeder roads 
and transportation facilities, the Muslims were less favored than the 
three Christian groups. The former had more farmers reporting 
unavailability of irrigation and feeder roads, poorer quality roads and 
unsatisfactory transportation (Table 2.23).
As far as exposure to new rice technology is concerned, the 
Muslims are well exposed as the three other groups to such things as 
use of HYV's, seed selection, seed treatment, use of farm machinery 
pest control and use of weedicides. They are less aware of 
germination test, straight-row planting and use of fertilizer (Table 
2.24). In the trial and adoption stages, the proportion of Muslim
Table 2.23. Availability of irrigation and transportation to 213 
Cotabato rice farmers by ethnic group.
Muslim Visayan Tagalog llocano
1. Irriga tion
Available 68
Not available 32
2. Sources o f  irrigation  
water
Pump 13
Gravity 45
Rain 32
Creek 10
3. Feeder roads and 
transportation
Available 81
Not available 19
4. Q uality  o f  roads
Poor 20
Fair 71
Good 9
5. Q uality  o f  trans­
po rta tion
Unsatisfactory 20
Satisfactory 70
Very satisfactory 10
— P e r c e n t  —
78 78 80
22 22 20
2 16 10
68 63 70
22 21 20
8
100 I00 100
2 6 
48 90 86
52 8 8
-  2 6
52 94 90
48 4 4
Source: F.A. Battad, op. cit.
Table 2.24. Cotabato rice farmers' exposure to and adoption of 
new rice technology by ethnic group.
Awareness Trial Adoption
Muslim Visayan Tagalog llocano Muslim Visayan Tagalog llocano Muslim Visayan Tagalog llocano
A. Rice Practices 
Use o f HYV 100 100 100 100 65
— P e r c e n t  — 
72 92 40 89 98 100 100
Seed selection 97 98 94 74 5 54 51 12 41 82 49 58
Germination test 39 88 67 64 3 46 25 8 3 78 29 48
Seed treatment 52 64 69 50 2 36 25 8 24 64 14 28
Use o f farm 
machinery 98 100 100 92 11 20 43 24 50 20 71 70
Controlling
pests 100 100 94 100 19 42 76 28 93 98 94 100
Straight-row
planting 11 100 100 82 _ 38 27 30 _ 10 9 2
Use of ferti­
lizer 62 100 100 94 9 52 49 35 8 88 78 94
Use o f weedicides 100 100 100 94 11 54 69 34 94 94 82 94
B. Farmers' Evaluation o f  H Y V  Compared to Local Varieties
1. More marketable
Muslim
90
Visayan
90
Tagalog
P e r c e n t —
41
llocano
80
Less marketable - - - 4
No difference 10 10 59 16
2. More productive 100 100 100 100
Less productive - - - -
No difference — — — -
3. More adaptable 42 82 40 92
Less adaptable 4 - - 2
No difference 44 18 60 6
4. Easy to secure 70 100 90 98
Difficult to secure 30 — 10 2
5. Require more costly 
inputs 100 100 63 100
Require less costly 
inputs - - 37 -
Source: F. A. Battad, op. c i t
farmers who have tried and adopted new practices is also lower than 
for the Christians. In general, however, for all the four groups, the 
proportion of adopters is lower than those who are aware. It is 
likewise evident that farmers do not always pass through the trial 
stage before adoption. The proportions adopting directly w ithout prior 
trial are quite high for eight of the nine practices. It is only in 
straight-row planting where there are more trials than adoptions. This 
practice is also the least popular among all four groups. None of the 
Muslim farmers used it and only 8 percent of them applied fertilizer 
despite the fact that 89 percent planted HYV's. The farmers are 
unanimous in their evaluation of HYV's being more productive than 
local varieties although they also recognize that more inputs are 
required. The Tagalogs more than any other group think that HYV's 
and local varieties do not differ in marketability and adaptability. 
Thirty-seven percent of them also say that HYV's require less costly 
inputs. More o f the Muslims reported d ifficu lty  of securing seeds.
Since modern technology has to come from institutional 
sources through change agents, it is important to know the extent to 
which the four ethnic groups are exposed to such change agents. 
Table 2.25 very clearly shows that the Muslim farmers have minimal 
knowledge about and actual contact with change agents concerned
Table 2.25. Cotabato rice farmers' exposure to, knowledge of 
and contact with change agents concerned 
with rice production by ethnic group.
Muslim Visayan Tagalog llocano
N  % N  % N  % N  9,
1. Farmers aware of presence
of change agents in the area 52 84 21 42 39 76 47 94
. Those who are aware and 
have contact with change 
agent 7 13 18 80 37 95 46 98
• Num ber o f  change agents 
farmers know  
None 84 60
P e r c e n t
74 6
1 - 4 16 40 26 88
5+ — _ _ 6
■ Frequency o f  contact 
w ith  change agents 
Never 90 64 29 2
Very seldom 6 18 31 60
Often 4 18 40 38
Had contact with rice 
expert within last 3 years 3 38 30 90
Had attended gatherings 
related to rice production 
information 16 28 43 42
Farmers who know names of 
change agents and change 
agencies 10 36 70 92
Farmers who know religion 
of change agent 5 16 61 56
Farmers who know tribe of 
change agent 8 38 73 88
Farmers who know the change 
agent who resides in the 
barrio 13 36 61 92
Source: F. A. Battad, op. c i t
with rice production. This is so even if more Muslims than Visayans 
and Tagalogs are aware of their presence in the area. The llocanos 
lead the three other groups in terms of change agents known to them 
and frequency of contact. The Tagalogs come next to the llocanos. 
Both groups have higher proportions attending informational gather­
ings concerned with rice production. They also know more about the 
change agents, the agencies they belong to, their names, religion and 
tribal or regional identity. More of them know the change agent
who resides in the barrio. The inevitable conclusion is that the 
llocanos have the greatest exposure to, knowledge about, and 
contact with, change agents concerned with rice production. The 
Muslims have the least exposure.
Predictably, therefore, the Muslims have the highest proportion 
of low adopters, i.e., they have the least number of farmers adopting 
new production practices. Tagalogs and llocanos are the highest 
adopters (Table 2.26). The other variables reported in the same table 
w ill help explain the differentials in adoption behavior. The factors 
positively related to adoption are education, use of credit, higher
Table 2.26. Factors associated with adoption of rice practices 
by Cotabato farmers.
1. Ethnic Group Muslim Visayan Tagalog llocano
— P e r c e n t  —
Low Adoption 66 27 10 20
High adoption 34 73 90 80
2. Education No. schooling 1-4 yrs. 5-6 yrs. High school College
Low 58 22 26 19 9
High 42 78 74 81 91
3. Tenure status Owner Share tenant Lessee
Low 40 19 40
High 60 81 60
4. Size of farm 0.25 to 1.25 to 2.25 to 3.25 to 4.25+
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
Low 35 34 21 25 44
High 65 66 79 75 56
5. Number of other
Household Members
Participating in
Farm operations None 1 ■- 3 4 - 6 7 - 1 0
Low 75 41 13 0
High 25 59 87 100
6. Credit D id  no t borrow Borrowed
Low 40 19
High 60 81
7. Availability of
Irrigation N o t available A  vail able
Low 63 23
High 37 77
8. Quality of Roads Poor Fair Good
Low 53 35 18
High 47 65 82
9. Quality of Transportation
Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Very satisfactory
Low 50 36 16
High 50 64 84
10 . Gross Income TO500 and below TO501 -1*6000 1*5001 and above
Low 55 30 2
High 45 70 98
1 1 . Organizational Membership
None One Two o r more
Low 43 23 5
High 57 77 95
12 . Contact with Rice Specialists
No contact Seldom Often Very often
Low 39 35 21 8
13.
High 61 65 79 92
Attendance in Informational Gatherings on Rice Production
N o t attended A ttended
Low 45 7
14.
High 55 93
Use of Printed Media Relevant to Rice Production
Non-user User
Low 34 _
High 66 100
Source: F.A . Battad, op. cit.
gross income, availability o f irrigation, better quality roads and 
transportation, membership in organizations, contact w ith rice 
specialists, attendance in informational gatherings and use of printed 
media on rice production and more household members helping in 
farm operations. Contrary to usual expectations but confirmatory to 
other findings previously cited, share tenants show higher adoption 
than owner-operators. Farm size has a positive relationship to 
adoption w ith bigger farms showing higher adoption up to a point. 
Beyond 4 hectares, adoption declines.
Looking back at previous tables, one can see that ethnic group 
per se is a very misleading explanation for differential adoption. For 
example, Muslims as shown in Table 2.26 have lower education, 
minimal contact with change agents concerned with rice production, 
•ess favorable irrigation, roads and transportation, and fewer members 
of their household involved in rice production. Among the Muslim 
farmers only 8 percent reported use of fertilizer. Since fertilizer 
requires a sizeable cash outlay, its low adoption is probably tied to 
the credit problem. Table 2.27 definitely points to the fact that 
although all Muslim farmers (98 percent) knew about credit 
sources, particularly the institutional ones, only 6 percent or four of 
them were actually able to borrow money compared to 40 to 60
A ll in a Grain o f Rice 
Table 2.27. Cotabato rice farmers' awareness and use of credit.
Muslim Visayan Tagalog llocano
P e r c e n t
1 . Farmers aware of credit
facilities 98 100 98 86
2. Farmers able to borrow
money 6 40 60 46
3. Farmers who think they can
obtain loan on time, if needed 18 28 57 70
4. Known source of credit
A ctua l Sources
Tota l Number Tota l Number
Rural bank 77 21
Middlemen 6 4
Neighbors 26 12
Agric. Credit Adm. 20 15
Farmers' Cooperative
Marketing Assoc. 28 5
Philippine National Bank 20 5
Development Bank of the
Philippines 12 3
Government Service
Insurance System 1 1
Landlord and/or Datu 15 6
Credit Union 1 1
Total mentioning Total who
known source actually
of credit 206 borrowed 73
Source: B.A. Battad, op. cit.
percent of the three Christian groups. When asked if they thought 
they could obtain a loan on time if needed, the Muslims were most 
pessimistic. Only 18 percent of them thought it could be done, com­
pared with 70 percent of the llocanos, 57 percent of the Tagalogs 
and 28 percent o f the Visayans. Of the 77 farmers from four groups 
who were actually able to borrow money, 87 percent said the loan 
procedures were simple but three out of the four Muslim farmers 
who obtained credit considered the procedures complicated and too 
much paper work was required. Half of those who borrowed did so at 
8 percent or lower rate of interest. The other half paid 10 percent or 
higher. However, it is very significant that ease of obtaining loan is
the reason given by 62 percent of the borrowers for their choice of
ender. Only 2 percent mentioned low interest as a consideration.
One-fourth of them were recommended by the extension workers to
the credit agency. Since Muslim farmers had minimal contact with
change agents, this avenue to credit was certainly not available to 
them.
If recommended rice production practices were adopted, they are 
supposed to contribute to increased productivity. In Table 2 28 the 
Mushms show the lowest yield per hectare among the four groups.
heir yields for both the high adopters and low adopters are lower 
than those of the three other groups. In general, they have the lowest 
adoption scores. What is intriguing in Table 2.28 is the farmers' 
evaluation of their 1970-71 crop compared with that of 1969-70 
Although the Muslims have the lowest yields of the four groups they 
have the highest proportion (76 percent) of farmers who said their 
production increased. The llocanos who have the highest actual 
yields have only 62 percent reporting increased production. Ap­
parently the base year for comparison was much lower for the 
Muslims than for the llocanos. Increased production was attributed 
by the Muslims mostly to the shift to HYV and use of chemicals. On 
the other hand, the three Christian groups gave the credit mostly to 
the fertilizers used. As mentioned earlier, very few Muslims used 
fertilizer but 89 percent of them planted HYV's. Decrease in
Production was blamed on tungro and rat infestation and lack of 
water.
Regardless of reported increase or decrease in production, the 
farmers from all groups were unanimous in ranking rice as the most 
Profitable enterprise compared to corn, vegetables or livestock. The 
Muslims have the lowest proportion of farmers who sell rice, 82 
Percent as against 100 percent, 94 percent and 86 percent7 for 
bocanos, Tagalogs and Visayans, respectively. Surprisingly, howevtr, 
they seem to be able to obtain the highest price for their rice, 
followed by the Tagalogs, llocanos and Visayans. Their satisfaction 
with the price o f rice relates closely with the actual price they have 
obtained from selling their rice, w ith the Muslims and Tagalogs being 
the most satisfied. One wonders why the Muslims and Tagalogs obtain 
better price for their rice when they have the same ways of 
marketing through purchasers who come to the barrio. Despite 
ownership of land for practically all the Muslim farmers and the 
better price they have been able to obtain for the rice they sell, their 
9foss income is the lowest of the four groups.
Table 2.28. Cotabato rice farmers' production performance and 
marketing practices by ethnic group.
Muslim Visayan Tagalog llocano
1. Average yield in cavans per 
hectare, 1970-71 
High adopters 51.58 60.99 67.52 70.21
Low adopters 45.00 52.49 47.78 59.60
2. Farmers' evaluation of 1970-71 
production compared to 1969-70
Increased 76 70
— P e r c e n t  — 
65 62
Decreased 21 30 27 28
Same 3 — 8 10
3. Ranked rice crop as most 
profitable compared to corn, 
vegetables, livestock 100 100 100 100
4. Percent of farmers 
who sell rice 82 86 94 100
5. Price of rice per cavan 
P70 and below 3 44
—P e r c e n t —
15 18
P21 -  m 8 24 20 24
P23+ 89 32 65 58
6. Farmers' evaluation of rice price 
Satisfactory 90 79 94 72
28Unsatisfactory 10 21 6
7. Ways of marketing rice 
Public market 8 5 - 6
Someone comes to the 
barrio to buy 92 95 100 94
Source: F A. Battad, op. cit.
Another study which was conducted by Derongongan supports 
Battad's findings with respect to adoption behavior among 
Maranao farmers in Lanao del Sur. Adoption of recommended rice 
production practices was positively associated w ith level of education 
whether in English or Arabic, tenure status, number of family 
members working on the farm, leadership position, income level, 
membership in farmers' association, attendance in seminars, parti­
cipation in extension activities, contact with extension workers, yield 
per hectare, and availability of irrigation. As in Battad s study, 
adoption was negatively associated with farm size. Unlike findings
elsewhere, owner-operators among Maranaos showed higher adoption 
scores than part owner-lessees and share tenants. This is the only study 
where evidences about ownership-operatorship and innovativeness f it  
nicely the hypothesis (Table 2.29). It is important to point out that 
except for ownership of land which was about 61 percent, including
Table 2.29, Factors associated with the adoption of recommended 
rice production practices among 160 Maranao 
farmers in Lanao del Sur (1972).
A dop tion  Scores
Level o f  Education in English
None 1 — 6  years
Low (0 -2 ) 90 42
High (3 -5 ) 10 58
100 100
N 115 45
Level o f  Education in Arabic
None 1 — 4  years 5-10
Low 90 80 43
High 10 20 57
100 100 100
Tenure Status
Share Part- Owner
tenant Lessee owner operator
Low 92 80 79 63
High 8 20 21 37--------------- — ■
100 100 100 100
No. o f  F am ily  Members Working on the Farm
One Two Three o r more
Low 64 78 55
High 36 22 45
100 100 100
A dop tion  Score
Size o f  Farm
Below 1 ha. 1 -  1.99 2  o r more
Low 72 73 85
High 28 27 15
100 100 100
Leadership Position
Non-Leader Leader
Low 81 60
High 19 40
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Table 2.29 (Continuation)
Income Level Ipesos)
100 -  500 500 -  2000
Low 96 76
High 4 _24_
100 100
Membership in Farmers' Association
Non-member Member
Low 82 60
High J 8_ _40_
100 100
A ttendance in  Seminars
No Yes
Low 77 60
High _23 _40_
100 100
Participation in  Extension A ctiv ities
No Yes
Low 88 36
High 1 2_  64
100 100
Contact w ith  Extension Workers 
1 — 3  times 
a m onth  
67 
33
100 100
Yield in Cavans per Hectare
3 1 - 4 5
80 
20
100
A va ila b ility  o f  Irrigation
N o t available A  vaitable
Low 84 27
High 16 73
100 100
Low
High
1 5 - 3 0
97
3
100
Never
Low 83
WinH 17
2000 & more 
42 
58
100
4 — 6  times 
a m onth  
33 
67
100
46 and above
49
51
100
Source: Macaurog B. Derongongan, The Rice Production Programs in the Maranao 
Community. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of the Philippines, College of Agricul­
ture, 1973.
part-owners, few of the Maranao rice farmers possessed the positive 
factors related to adoption. Only 14 percent had irrigated farms; 73 
percent rated their roads as unsatisfactory; average education even in 
Arabic was 2 years; only 28 percent were aware of and used credit; 6 
percent attended seminars; 23 percent participated in extension 
activities; but 82 percent never had contact with extension workers. 
About 76 percent used only two or less of the recommended 
practices and only 22 percent used HYV. Even less than in Battad's 
study, the Maranao farmers had only 1.7 average number of family 
members working on the farm although the average household size 
was 6.2. On the plus side, somehow the Muslim farmers seemed to 
obtain satisfactory price for their rice. This was reported in both of 
the studies.
In summary, ethnic group as a factor in adoption is not really 
ethnic group per se but a complex set of interrelated components 
which include differentials in infrastructure, availability of and access 
to resources, sources of information which influence adoption be­
havior, productivity and income. How these differentials come about 
is another question. One can ask, for example, why Muslims have less 
favorable irrigation, roads and transportation, lower educational 
attainment, less contact with change agents and minimal use of credit 
despite a high degree of awareness of such institutions. Why do 
llocanos have more household members helping in farm operations? 
Why do they have larger farms and greater access to rice production 
information? In other words, Battad's study tells us the correlates of 
ethnic groups as a factor in adoption but it  does not explain how the 
four ethnic groups happened to differ in these correlates in the first 
place. One has to go much further and deeper, but definitely ethnic 
group identify per se is a misleading explanation of differential 
adoption behavior. Muslims are not low adopters of rice technology 
because they are Muslims but because of other correlates discussed 
above.
D. The National and Regional Patterns of Adoption of HYV's 
(1967-72)
Mangahas and Librero have summarized comprehensively the 
national and regional picture w ith respect to the adoption of 
HYV's.50
50Mahar Mangahas and Aida R. Librero, The High-Yielding Varieties of Rice in the 
Philippines: A Perspective. Discussion Paper No. 73-11, June 1973, Institute of Economic 
Development and Research, School of Economics, University of the Philippines.
Table 2.30. Area, production and yield per hectare of H Y V  (1967-1972) by region 
(Data from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics).
Philip­
pines
/ I I
R e g i o n s  
I I I  I V V VI VI I V I I I I X
Area (thousand hectares)
Total area harvested 
(all rice)
1967-68 3,304 140.9 296 .8 628 .0 529.7 314 .6 350 .0 376.2 207 .6 460 .0
1968-69 3,332 129.2 272 .0 608 .8 538.1 300 .3 382.9 384 .9 248 .6 467 .2
1969-70 3,113 144.8 314 .0 634 .8 345 .4 358 .0 256 .6 397.8 194.3 467 .8
1970-71 3,112 127.4 361 .2 641.5 387 .0 298 .5 253 .0 420 .6 213 .0 410 .6
1971-72 3 ,246 145.6 383.9 671.1 408.8 273 .6 270 .7 4 2 5 .0 229 .9 437 .9
Percent o f total area for H Y V
1967-68 21.2 29.8 9.9 16.9 25.1 27.3 19.2 14.2 14.1 33.7
1968-69 40.6 30.0 35.0 37.0 47.8 64.3 29.8 30.9 29.9 51.1
1969-7.0 43.5 29.4 39.1 36.8 43.1 57.7 44.4 40.7 28.1 57.5
1970-71 50.3 37.8 47.1 45.6 51.1 63.5 49.5 43.6 51.7 60.5
1971-72 56.3 47.4 41.6 62.0 57.2 73.4 50.0 60.6 59.3 49.6
Total area irrigated
1967-68 1,309 75.8 130.9 360.3 238.5 134.6 101.8 80.7 41.1 145.3
1968-69 1,483 57.7 128.2 371 .6 276.4 174.0 105.3 105.2 86.5 177.8
1969-70 1,346 76.5 211.9 237 .3 153.5 164.0 64.0 72.4 56.1 220.1
1970-71 1,471 82.4 212 .6 354 .3 180.9 154.8 74.6 135.1 101.8 174.0
1971-72 1,332 82.7 198.6 289 .3 175.1 137.4 73.7 100.0 95.6 179.5
Percent of irrigated area to . 
1967-68
.ota I
39.6 53.8 44.1 57.4 45.0 42.8 29.1 21.4 19.8 31.6
1968-69 44.5 44.6 47.1 61.0 51.4 58.0 27.5 27.3 34.8 38.0
1969-70 43.2 52.8 67.5 51.6 44.4 45.8 24.9 18.2 28.9 47.0
1970-71 47.3 64.7 58.8 55.2 46.7 51.8 29.5 32.1 47.8 42.4
1971-72 41.0 56.8 51.7 43.1 42.8 50.2 27.2 23.5 41.6 40.9
Percent o f irrigated area for H Y V  
1967-68 34.0 36.5 20.3 26.0 39.0 36.1 35.8 25.4 52.3 53.1
1968-69 61.6 41.1 40.1 46.4 65.7 84.8 70.8 46.6 65.5 87 .6
1969-70 61.4 34.6 52.4 46.0 67.5 82.4 67.3 51.1 53.8 86.1
1970-71 67.0 42 .0 67.9 53.4 68.2 84.5 68.6 65.0 71.8 86.6
1971-72 73.4 51.1 64.8 70.4 83.4 86.0 69.5 79.0 77.6 74.2
Total production of all rice
1967-68 103,700 5,715 10,930 26.370 15,230 9,861 6,756 12,530 4,222 12,401
1968-69 101 ,000 5,750 8,112 25 ,670 14,100 10,220 7,543 11,480 5,629 12,520
1969-70 118,900 5,217 11,670 32,100 13,980 12,620 6,358 13,660 6,345 17,010
1970-71 121,400 4,572 15,920 33,290 14,570 8,587 7,596 15,040 7,742 14,100
1971-72 115 ,900 5,381 15,410 24,470 13,210 12,390 7,299 13,630 7,641 16,480
H Y V
1967-68 27 ,550 2,408 1,538 5,275 4,727 8,386 1,714 1,964 682 .9 5,404
1968-69 48,130 1,063 3,542 11,200 6,636 8,152 2,692 4,296 2,176 7,375
1969-70 58,330 1,938 5,186 12,910 6,866 9,188 3,153 5,557 2,056 11,470
1970-71 66 ,600 2,322 8,022 16,490 7,770 6,444 4,767 6,536 4,134 10,100
1971-72 73,460 3,240 7,169 15,960 8 ,624 9,941 4,018 9,170 5,054 10,280
Table 2 .30  (Continuation) 
Production (thousand cavans)
Percent of H Y V  to total production
1967-68 26.6 42.1 14.1 20.0 31.1 38.9 25.4 15.7 16.2 44.9
1968-69 4 0 .6 35.9 43.7 43.6 47.1 79.8 35.7 37.4 38.6 58.9
1969-70 49.1 37.1 44.1 40.2 49.1 72.8 49.6 40.7 32.4 67.4
1970-71 54.8 50.8 50.4 49.5 53.3 75.0 62.8 43.4 53.4 71.7
1971-72 63.4 60.2 46.5 65.2 65.3 80.2 55.01 67.3 66.1 62.4
Yield per hectare (cavan/ha.) 
All rice
1967-68 31.4 40.5 36.8 4 2 .0 28.8 31.3 19.3 33 .3 20.3 26.2
1968-69 30.3 44.5 29.8 42.2 26.2 34.0 19.7 29.8 22.8 26.8
1969-70 38.2 36.0 37.2 50.5 40 .5 35.3 24.8 34.3 32.6 36.4
1970-71 39.0 35.9 44.1 51.9 37.7 28.8 30.0 35.8 36.4 34.4
1971-72 35.7 37.0 40.1 36.5 32 .3 45 .3 27.0 32.1 33.2 37.6
H Y V
1967-68 39.3 52.3 52.2 49.6 35.6 44.7 25.5 36.7 23.4 34.8
1968-69 35.6 53.3 37.1 47.7 26.3 42.2 23.6 36.1 29.2 30.9
1969-70 43.1 45.4 42.2 55.4 46.1 44.5 27.7 34.3 37.6 42 .6
1970-71 42.5 48.3 47.2 56.3 39.3 34.0 38.1 35.7 35.7 40.7
1971-72 40.2 47 .0 44.0 38.3 36.9 49.5 29.7 35.6 37.1 47.4
Other varieties
1967-68 29.2 33.4 35.1 40.4 26.5 26.3 17.8 32.7 19.8 21.8
1968-69 26.7 40.7 25.9 37.7 26.1 19.3 18.0 27.0 19.8 22.5
1969-70 34.5 32.1 33.9 47.8 36.2 22.7 22.5 34.4 30.7 27.9
1970-71 35.4 28.4 4 1 .3 48.2 36 .0 19.7 22.2 35.8 35.1 24.6
1971-72 29.9 28.0 36.8 33.2 26.2 33.7 24.2 26.7 27.7 28.1
Proportion of H Y V  to O V
1967-68 1.35 1.72 1.49 1.23 1.34 1.70 1.43 1.12 1.18 1.60
1968-69 1.33 1.31 1.43 1.32 1.01 2.19 1.31 1.34 1.47 1.37
1969-70 1.25 1.41 1.24 1.16 1.27 1.96 1.23 0.997 1.22 1.53
1970-71 1.20 1.70 1.14 1.17 1.09 1.73 1.72 0.997 1.07 1.65
1971-72 1.34 1.68 1.22 1.15 1.41 1.47 1.26 1.33 1.34 1.69
Increase in production 
attributable to H Y V  
(In percent)*
1967-68 7.42 21.34 4.87 3.89 8.53 19.11 8.26 1.70 2.54 20.22
1968-69 13.40 9 .3 0 15.05 11.84 0.47 76.52 9.24 10.51 14.05 18.91
1969-70 10.88 12.17 9.38 5.89 11.64 55.39 10.21 0.12 6.18 30.48
1970-71 10.06 26.50 6.59 7.75 4 .60 46.36 35.64 0 .13 3.62 39.33
1971-72 19.42 32.23 9.15 9 .30 23.45 34.50 11.50 20.00 20.16 34.22
Region I — llocos, (Abra, Batanes, Benguet, M t. Province, llocos. La union) M t.
Region II — Cagayan Valley (Cagayan, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Nueva Vizcaya)
Region I I I  — Central Luzon (Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, Zambales)
Region IV  — Southern Tagalog (Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Mindoro, Palawan, Quezon, Rizal)
Region V  — Bicol (Albay, Camarines, Catanduanes, Masbate, Sorsogon)
Region V I — Eastern Visayas (Bohol, Leyte, Spmar)
Region V II  — Western Visayas (Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros, Romblon)
Region V I I I  — North and East Mindanao (Agusan, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Lanao, Misamis, Surigao)
Region IX  — South and West Mindanao (Cotabato, Davao, Sulu, Zamboanga)
"Computed as the proportion of area in H Y V  multiplied by the proportionate yield differential of H Y V  to  other 
varieties.
Source: M. Mangahas and A .R . Librero, op. c i t .  Tab les 1 .2 . to  1 . 13 .
Table 2.30 shows the following patterns:
(1) The total rice area harvested for the country has not 
changed for the five-year period, 1967-1972. If at all, it  has declined 
slightly. However, the total area devoted to HYV increased by more 
than two and a half times, from 21 to 56 percent. This was accom­
panied by almost 8 percent increase in irrigated area relative to the 
total rice area from 39.6 in 1967-68 to 47.3 percent in 1971. The 
irrigated area declined to 41 percent in 1971-72 but the proportion 
of irrigated land planted to HYV doubled from 34 to 73.4 percent. 
The total production coming from HYV increased 2.4 times during 
the five-year period. Although the yield per hectare of HYV's was 
higher than that of other varieties, the HYV's themselves did not 
show any appreciable improvement in yield. The proportion of the 
increase in production which is attributable to HYV increased from 
7.42 to 19.42 percent, but this can be interpreted as due to 
expansion o f area devoted to HYV rather to  yield improvements of 
HYV. Since the average yield of HYV is only about 40 cavans per 
hectare, there is considerable room for upward movement. Because 
average yields hide quite a bit of information, it would be important 
to obtain a picture of yield distribution, nationally and regionally. 
We need to know what proportion of the farms are in the low, 
medium or high yield levels as far as HYV's are concerned. The virtual 
plateau on national average yield for HYV must find some explana­
tion in the light of potentials which the new rice seeds are supposed 
to possess.
(2) In order to make a more meaningful comparison of regional 
performance, average figures for the five-year period were computed 
for area, production and yield (Table 2.31). The initial adoption rate 
as proportion of total rice area was highest in Region IX (South and 
West Mindanao), followed by Region I (llocos); then Region V 
(Bicol); Region IV (Southern Luzon); and Region III (Central Luzon). 
By the fifth  year, the two leading Regions IX and II had run out of 
steam with 47 and 49 percent of the total area, while Regions V, 
III and VII (West Visayas) outstripped them with 73, 62 and 60 
percent, respectively, by 1971-72. Considering their starting adop­
tion rate, Regions VII and V III (North and East Mindanao) expanded 
the most in terms of proportion of total area planted to HYV. On 
the average, however, Table 2.31 shows that six of the nine regions 
did not differ much in rate of adoption. Region V (Bicol) led them 
all, followed by Region IX and then Region IV. It is also noteworthy
that the two regions in Mindanao (V III and IX) registered the highest 
percentage of irrigated area (more than 50%) for HYV during the 
first year of adoption. The regional adoption patterns are contrary 
to what would be expected because the highest initial rates were re­
ported for regions farthest from the center of innovation, which is 
Los Banos, Laguna in Southern Luzon (Region IV).
(3) The proportion of irrigated land to total area harvested did 
not change very much for the different regions except for Region VII 
where the irrigated area doubled from 19.8 to 41.6 percent. The least 
irrigated Regions are VI and VII (East and West Visayas) and they 
remained so during the years under study. These are mostly corn and 
sugar areas though.
(4) Table 2.32 shows that regions w ith the highest proportion of 
irrigated area are not those with the highest percent of irrigated 
area devoted to HYV. As a matter of fact, it is the reverse tor 
Regions I, II and III. They were the three highest ranking regions 
for the former but lowest ranking for the latter. However, their 
rankings on percent irrigated area correspond o the rankings on 
yield per hectare for all rice, for HYV and fo r other varieties. 
Because Regions I, II and III obtained higher yields from other 
varieties than the other regions, the differential between HYV and 
other varieties was not great. This probably explains their relatively 
low rate of initial HYV adoption in 1967-68, their low ranking on 
the percent of irrigated area devoted to HYV and consequently, the 
lower percent of production increase which is attributable to HYV.
(5) Region V (Bicol) seems to have responded most to HYV's 
as indicated by the fact that it has the highest over-all adoption rate 
for the five-year period. It ranks second in average percentage of 
irrigated area devoted to HYV and first in the proportion of HYV 
to total production. It also exhibited the greatest yield differential be­
tween HYV and other varieties, hence it is also the region which 
showed the greatest increase in production attributed to HYV. Fur­
thermore, although it started with a fairly high rate o f adoption (third 
in rank), the expansion continued so as to attain a second rank in terms 
of increase in proportion of area devoted to HYV from 1967 to 1972. 
Region IX is likewise interesting for having topped in the initial 
adoption rate and for achieving second rank in productivity increase 
attributable to HYV. Although the average HYV yield for Region IX 
is only fifth , the difference between the HYV yield and that of other 
varieties is second to that of Bicol. If one were to go by press releases
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and stated priorities, he would expect Central Luzon and Southern 
Luzon (Regions III and IV) to  lead all other places in adoption rates.
(6) In general, no one region enjoyed any special advantage by 
way of adopting the new seeds. For example, Region VI, which is 
more of a corn than a rice-growing area, had an average of 62 percent 
of its irrigated area devoted to HYV and even its percent of total area 
in HYV is almost the same as that of Region III (Central Luzon). 
As a matter of fact, Region V i's irrigated area planted to HYV 
(65%) is higher than that of Central Luzon, which had only 48 
percent. The diffusion of HYV again gave no special advantage to 
Southern Luzon, the region of its origin.
Agricultural  Extension Services 
and the Rice Farmer
Agricultural modernization depends to a large extent on the 
introduction of ingredients from outside the traditional world of the 
farmer. These include new and improved varieties of crops or 
livestock; better cultural practices which enhance and make the 
production processes more profitable; different ways of organizing 
for production; use of purchased rather than traditional inputs; an 
increasing reliance on production credit from formal institutional 
sources; more effective marketing channels; and in general, a greater 
interdependence with the outside world. This means that someone or 
some ways have to be found to bring these outside factors into the 
decision-making frame of the farmer so that they would become 
actual alternatives for him. Agricultural extension is one organi­
zational device which has been set up to perform this function. For 
one reason or another, however, farmers in different parts of the 
country have varying degrees of exposure to agricultural extension 
services and they also tend to have different perceptions of 
agricultural extension agents. This chapter presents (a) a nation-wide 
as well as a regional picture of Filipino rice farmers' exposure to 
extension services and other sources of information; (b) farmers' 
perceptions of extension workers; and (c) some indications of the 
direct and indirect impact of agricultural extension on rice farming.
A. Rice Farmers' Exposure to Extension Services and Other 
Sources of Information
The first comprehensive data available on farmers' exposure to 
extension are provided by the June 1972 Integrated Agricultural 
Survey of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Tables 3.1 to 3.5 
show the following trends:
(1) For the country as a whole, only 22 percent of the farms in 
the first cropping season and 25 percent in the second season had
97
been visited by the extension agents in the year 1971-72. The higher 
percentage of farms visited in the latter season may be explained by 
the fact that the number of farms cultivated is only more than half 
of those in the first season. Lack of irrigation facilities does not make 
it  possible to grow two crops in many places. Considering the 
reduction in farms, one should expect a doubled coverage but the 
data show only a 3- percent increase in the number of farms visited. 
Since one visit per farm does not mean very much, we should look at 
the proportion of farms receiving three or more visits (Table 3.1). On­
ly 9 and 11 percent received such frequency of visits for the first and 
second seasons, respectively. Although these figures are low, the 
effect of radiation from the farm of initial contact to those who have 
no direct exposure could offset this rather scanty coverage. 
Obviously, this has happened in the diffusion of the new seeds, the 
performance of which powered its own spread or its own demise, as 
in the case o f varieties which proved susceptible to certain diseases 
and pests. The Bureau of Agricultural Extension's rough estimate is 
that they have one extension worker for every thousand farmers.
(2) Since rice farms are unevenly distributed in the different 
regions, there is an equity problem in terms of exposure to extension 
services in relation to  concentration of farms in each region. Central 
Luzon, for example, which had almost 21 percent of the country's 
rice farms (the highest of all regions) in 1971 had less than 20 
percent of the farms visited by extension agents. This rather scanty 
exposure of Central Luzon farms to extension is surprising in the 
light of the land reform program's concentration in the area and the 
highest priority which has always been placed on the region as far as 
rice production programs are concerned. On the other hand, 
Northern and Eastern Mindanao which had the smallest share of the 
country's rice farms (6 percent) reported that 45 percent of their 
farms had been visited. The situation with respect to llocos is similar. 
Bicol seems to have a fair share of extension exposure relative to its 
share of the country's rice farms.
(3) Visits by extension workers tended to be either once (41 
percent) or three or more times (39 percent). Those visited twice 
make up only about 20 percent. Apparently, the mode of operation 
is either one cursory visit or a more intensive work w ith farmers. 
Because of his work load, the extension agent is probably forced to 
narrow down his efforts to fewer farmers. Almost 60 percent of his 
farm visits are to provide technical advice, which is usually defined as 
his major function.
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(4) For an extension agent it  would be ideal if the 
farmers visited his office to consult w ith him regarding their 
problems rather than for him to go to each farm. In practice, 
only about 12  percent of the rice farmers took the initiative of 
visiting the extension worker's office (Table 3.2). Their major reason 
for doing so was to seek advice on pest control. This implies that the 
visit was prompted by the occurrence of pest and disease as was the 
case of the tungro virus infestation in 1971-72. Those who did not 
visit the extension agent's office had quite revealing reasons (Table 
3.3). About one-fourth said it was not necessary and more than 40 
percent indicated they were too busy with farm work to make the 
visit. Almost 20 percent gave no local office as their reason. The first 
two reasons cited can be interpreted in two ways: either the farmers 
do not feel the need to consult the extension worker because they 
know what to do with their farm or they do not see much value in 
going to the extension office at the expense of taking time out from 
their farm work. A t any rate, what is suggested is a need to "sell" 
extension service to the farmers. They must perceive something 
worth-while before they would consider it necessary and worth the 
sacrifice of time. Of course, if it is the extension worker who visits 
the farm, there is no expenditure of time and effort on the part of 
the farmer.
(5) Table 3.4 provides data which offer another explanation for 
farmers' feeling that it  is not necessary to visit the extension office. 
More than 80 percent of the total rice farmers cited information 
sources other than the extension worker. The most frequently cited 
other sources was radio (about 40 percent), followed by neighbors 
(about 25 percent). Cooperatives and rural banks played a very 
minor role, while other sources were mentioned by more than 15 
percent. Western Visayas, Southern and Western Mindanao led the 
other regions in the use of the radio as a source of information. 
Mindanao and llocos Regions also showed more reliance than other 
regions on information from neighbors.
The high percentage of rice farmers reporting use of the radio as 
source of information is indeed encouraging. Its potential is further 
substantiated by another nation-wide study which focused on farmers' 
sources of market price information (Table 3.5). About one-fourth of 
the farmers reported radio as their source. Newspapers and magazines 
were hardly used for this purpose. Southern Tagalog showed the 
highest use, although only 5 percent. This region also indicated the 
highest proportion using other sources such as merchants, buyers.
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etc. Eastern Visayas topped all regions in terms of no report, 
followed by Cagayan Valley. This means that farmers in these two 
regions were the least exposed to market price information or were 
the least informed on this matter. Southern Tagalog had only 2 
percent of "no report" which probably means greatest proxim ity to 
all centers of information and therefore greatest exposure.
Farmers were most interested in the prices of three commodities, 
rice, corn and coconut. Other encouraging notes on the use of the 
radio are evident in the decline of non-listeners to radio market price 
reports from 65 percent in 1969 to 28 percent in 1970. In genera^ 
there was a growing interest as indicated by all respondents in 1970 
expressing a desire for market price information. In 1969, about 38 
percent of them did not care for such information. The importance of 
interpersonal communication in combination w ith mass media was 
emphasized by the authors of the study, since there is a prior need to 
"educate" farmers on the usefulness of timely market price 
information before they would find a reason for turning to the media 
for this information. The Sta. Iglesia and Getubig study provides 
some indication of the extent to which listeners of farm price 
broadcasts use the information .1 Of the 143 farmers interviewed m 
Misamis Oriental, 59 percent used the information and 41 percent 
did not. The respondents used the information by selling elsewhere it 
the price offered was lower, haggling with buyers and waiting for a 
better price. Confidence in the accuracy of the price broadcast 
affected farmers' listening to and subsequent use of the information. 
About 56 percent thought it was accurate, 25 percent said
inaccurate, and the rest did not know.
Although personal sources such as extension workers an 
neighbors remain to be important, the radio seemed to have assumed 
greater significance. This is an improvement over the ear ler 
indications on the minimal role of mass media in the dissemination 
of information on new technology. For example, Frio found that in 
spite of broadcasts of IR -8 information over two radio stations and 
placement of posters and billboards at strategic points, only 2.5 
percent of the 80 farmers in the community under study reported 
hearing about IR -8 through these channels. This was so despite a high 
percentage of radio ownership and listenership. Pablico s study o 
the adoption of the hand tractor also revealed that in spite of mass
U  C. Sta. Iglesia and I. P. Getubig, Jr.. Radio Broadcast of Farm PresetPrice..and  
Its Farmer Listeners, Philippine Agricu ltu ra l S ituation, o . , pn u
^Antonio S. Frio. op. c i t
media publicity, neighbors, tractor renters, salesmen, and dealers 
were the major sources of information .3
Other studies likewise showed that information on agricultural 
innovations -  regardless of state in the adoption process -  was 
obtained predominantly from personal sources and to a more limited 
extent through institutional and extension sources.4 Bueno classified 
personal sources into personal cosmopolite (extension workers, agri­
cultural storeowners, landlords, other farmers) all o f whom come 
from outside the barrio, and personal localite (co-farmers, neighbors, 
relatives, other people from within the barrio). Early adopters tend 
to obtain information from cosmopolite personal sources. Once the 
innovation has entered the barrio, localites become the predominant 
sources. In a more economically advanced area, for example, most 
farmers heard of new rice varieties from neighbors although the 
earliest adopters obtained their information from an extension 
worker or from a managing landlord.5 Dealers provided more 
information for insecticides, rodenticides, rotary weeders and fe rtili­
zers than on other practices.6
Longitudinal studies show a definite trend toward extension 
workers and other technically trained persons as sources of farming 
information. Conversely, there was a decline in the number of farmers 
depending on their own expertise or of their co-farmers.7 As has 
been previously cited, the radio seems to be gaining ground as a 
source of agricultural information. This may be explained by the 
increased input of agriculturally relevant programs from radio 
stations and the relative unavailability of extension workers in the 
face of high-level awareness through demonstration effects of 
potentials offered by new agricultural technology. This latter 
explanation is corroborated in Feliciano's study of traditional 
barrios. Where there existed 'change-readiness" among farmers, that
3Sosimo Ma. Pablico, The Process of Adoption of the Hand Tractor and the Role of 
Communicating Agents in a Philippine Rural Setting. Unpublished B.S. Agriculture Thesis 
U P. College of Agriculture, April, 1968.
o /I 4|Hsueh Yi Lu' °P- c i t ' Pedr0 B. Bueno, The Role of Mass Media in the Adoption of 
4-D, in Two Laguna Barrios. Unpublished B.S. Agriculture Thesis U P Colleoe of 
Agriculture, 1966. ' ^
5David S. H. Liao, Studies on Adoption of New Rice Varieties. Paper presented at 
the International Rice Research Institute Seminar, November 9, 1968.
Pahud opS c/f Y ' tU ’ °P Cit' !  A M d8 Guzman and C- M Dimaan°, op. c it.; and S. L.
. „  7!lar!r an,d Home Development Office, Rural Change in a Philippine Setting, op. c it.; 
c? h o °- e t a/- The Green Revolution at the Village Level: A Philippine Case
, ^o-TfPer presented at the International Congress of Orientalists. Canberra, Australia. a n  1(h71 *
is to say, when there was a keenly felt need for a specific new practice, 
mass media were able to trigger trial and/or adoption. Thus 18 out of 
198 respondents adopted a new practice after reading or hearing 
about it. One farmer who long wanted to own a knapsack sprayer 
decided to buy one after having heard its merits proclaimed over the 
radio; another farmer who had accepted the idea of fertilizing for 
greater crop yield bought Atlas fertilizer right away after reading its 
advertisement in Liwayway magazine.8 Mass media, in other 
words, tend to function more as reinforcers or triggers for action 
after personal sources have made potential adopters aware of or 
interested in the innovation.
This phenomenon was further observed in Mercado's intensive 
analysis of communication strategies in the diffusion of the new rice 
varieties. His conclusions are as follows:
"A fte r knowing but before planting IR-8, farmers who were more 
exposed to extension officers showed significantly greater increase in 
information-seeking from personal sources than the less exposed to the 
same sources of information.
"Likewise, farmers who were more exposed to extension officers 
showed significantly greater increase in information-seeking from their 
change agent than the less exposed farmers.
"The farmers who were more exposed to extension officers also 
showed a greater increase in information-seeking from group sources than 
the less exposed farmers.
"Also, the higher the level of exposure to extension officers, the greater 
the increase in information-seeking from farmers' meetings.
"Information-seeking from mass media sources was also higher among 
the highly exposed than the farmers less exposed to extension officers.
"Information-seeking from radio increased with exposure to extension 
officers.
"Even information-giving was higher among the highly exposed than 
the less exposed farmers to extension officers.
"The study also revealed that farmers who were more exposed to 
extension officers followed more cultural practices needed by IR-8 than 
the less exposed farmers.
"F inally, the study showed the higher the level of exposure to 
extension officers, the faster the rate of adoption of IR-8.
^Gloria D. Feliciano, The Flow of Information: Some Emerging Patterns in Selected 
philippjne Barrios. Seminar paper presented at the International Rice Research Institute, 
June 10, 1965, Communications Studies Series 2, U P. Institute of Mass Communications, 
Diliman, Quezon City, 1965-67.
"A ll told, the data indicated that after knowing but before plant­
ing IR-8, the higher the level of exposure to extension officers, the faster 
the rate of adoption of IR-8 and the adoption of the rice variety and the 
cultural practices that go with it . " 9
Mercado's findings on the positive relationship between 
information-giving to other farmers and exposure to extension 
officers are quite encouraging because other studies showed evidence 
of information hoarding among recipients or bearers of new 
information. For a variety of reasons, farmers may wish to have a 
monopoly of innovation. For example, of 199 farmers interviewed 
in Feliciano's study, 56 did not as a general rule shared agricultural 
news with their wives because they believed that "the woman has no 
secrets." Nor did they tell their fellow farmers. The motive for this 
"hoarding" of newly obtained information seems to derive from the 
fact that the farmer
"cannot take the risk of being embarrassed or ridiculed if the new 
practice fails. The farmer is a doubting Thomas; he is not sure it is really 
good until he has tried it; further, the farmer is not sure it is important 
enough to others until he tries it and succeeds, and sees the other farmers' 
favorable reactions to his success. Also, being a recipient of new 
technological information bolsters the farmer's ego; he's got an edge over 
the other farmers now, so why tell them? Furthermore, it is the farmer's 
suwerte or good fortune. His neighbors w ill have it too, fo r life is a wheel 
of fortune anyway, so why not let them wait? They w ill have their 
tu rn ."10
A more general communication pattern is the tendency of 
farmers to seek or receive information rather than to give it  as shown 
among farmers in seven villages where improved rice varieties were 
being introduced in 1965. Of the 187 farmers interviewed who 
adopted the improved seeds primarily from extension workers, only 
2 2  percent discussed the innovation w ith neighbors or with other 
farmers. And even in this discussion, the data do not distinguish 
whether the initiative came from other farmers or from the recipient 
of the seeds.11 In other words, was the innovation shared voluntarily 
by the recipient or was it discussed only because the other farmers 
deliberately sought it?
9Cesar M. Mercado, Communication Strategies, Exposure to Extension Officer, and 
Their Impact on Launching the 1967 'Green Revolution' in the Philippines, Philippine  
Journal o f  Communication Studies, Vol. II No. 1, June 1972, pp. 37-58.
19G. D. Feliciano, op. cit.
11  Unpublished data from the pilot study of a cooperative approach to rural 
development. Farm and Home Development Office, U.P. College of Agriculture.
Being secretive about agricultural news can be compared to the 
"businessman's trade secret" in the competitive market. The desire 
to receive the earliest releases of the most recent rice varieties is 
directly related to the opportunity to plant it for seed which will 
then command a premium price in the community. The farmer who 
succeeds in getting even a handful of these early seeds is not about to 
part with any of it. Of course, after the first harvest, his secret is 
automatically shared. Concealing agricultural information is usually a 
temporary situation and when practiced by the same individuals, it  is 
liable to retaliatory measures. After all, who knows whether the 
farmer presently denied the information may in the future be the 
bearer or pioneer recipient of something new? He, too, can "hoard" 
the innovation.
Mercado's findings on tendency to share information among 
those more exposed to the extension worker may be explained in a 
number of ways:
(1) Extension workers are very much aware of farmers who are 
information-dead-ends and, therefore, deliberately select farmer- 
cooperators who are more likely to share rather than hoard the 
innovation.
(2) In the case of HYV's, the demonstration effects and the 
variety of channels and sources might have rendered ineffective or 
very temporary whatever "innovation-hoarding" tendencies there 
might have been among farmers exposed to extension workers.
(3) Being the "bearer of what is new" has become prestigious 
rather than ridiculous, partly because of greater confidence in it. 
Therefore, there might be more to gain sharing than in hoarding the 
information they possess.
(4) With greater exposure to extension workers, there is more 
"credible”  information to pass on to other farmers.
Considering the low ratio of extension workers to farmers, if 
the farmers most exposed to them were to hoard agricultural 
information from this source, extension work would have the net 
effect of supporting those farmers who are a little  b it more 
progressive and prejudicing the interest of those who need extension 
services most.
B. Farmer's Perceptions of Extension Workers
Since the extension worker is considered as the link between 
the products of research and the farmers, their perceptions and
acceptance of the worker is crucial. In the present land reform 
program, for example, as de los Reyes and Lynch point out: "the 
principal element in the program's service-delivery system is the 
extension worker.” 12 As officially defined, the farm management 
technician's (FMT) job is to "disseminate technical information to 
farmers and to demonstrate improved farm management practices 
and techniques (and/or help subject-matter specialists in conducting 
applied researches; and work w ith individual farmers in farm 
planning and budgeting, guide them in the proper conduct of farm 
business and recommend approval of the lessee's loan and work out 
schedule of repayment)."
When the farmers were asked about their expectations of an ideal 
farm management technician, de los Reyes and Lynch found that:
"The highest-ranked quality of a good FMT is competence; all 
respondents expect that the ideal FMT w ill be well-versed in modern 
agricultural practices. Second, he w ill be in frequent contact w ith the 
farmers, which they think requires his living in the barrio where he is 
assigned. The third quality desired of a good FMT is his being a good 
adviser. He is also expected to be courteous and friendly; solicitous 
or helpful in general; industrious and efficient in fu lfilling his duties 
in the barrio, able to provide for farm needs; and a good mediator."
These expectations are very significant indeed because "the FMT 
is supposed to be one of the lessee's strongest links with the 
land-reform program and its services." The same study showed that 
only 50 to 60 percent of the lessees have any kind of work- 
relationship with an FMT. The rice farmers' expectations of technical 
competence and of frequent contact from the FMT reveal a growing 
demand for competent extension services, which is not unrelated to 
their responsiveness to new technology associated w ith agricultural 
extension. The implications of these demands on the quality and 
quantity of extension workers are quite obvious.
There is an interesting piece of evidence which is relevant to 
extension worker's competence. Contado found a statistically signifi­
cant inverse relationship between technical competence and number 
of years the farm management technician had been in his present 
station. Positive correlation, however, was found between number of 
years he had been a farm management technician and authoritarian 
personality. Contado concludes that "the longer the change agent is 
in the service and in his present station and the more autocratic he is.
12Romana P. de los Reyes and Frank Lynch, Reluctant Rebels: Leasehold Converts 
in Nueva Ecija, Philippine Sociological Review, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, Jan.-April 1972, pp. 7-78.
the less likely he will be able to make a high score in a test on 
knowledge of rice production" (the measure of technical com­
petency). He infers that a "rusting effect" possibly operates from be- 
ln9 in a station and on the same job for a long time or that those who 
had remained for a long time in a particular station and in the same 
Position were those who had failed to demonstrate superior ability 
that would merit consideration for transfer or promotion . 13
Some farmers have ambivalent attitudes toward the extension 
worker, perhaps both as a result of their particular experiences which 
may have been unsatisfactory and their own high expectations of 
Potential contributions from extension. The first four items in 
Table 3.6 show that Bukidnon rice farmers have a positive evaluation 
° f extension's role in the improvement of their farming.
Majority of them regard frequent contacts, attending extension 
Meetings, and consulting extension workers as important. On the 
other hand, their actual experiences with extension workers have not 
Produced equally positive perceptions as reflected in Items 5 and 6 . 
They do not seem to have much faith in the extension worker's 
competence as per their experience. This negative reaction is 
understandable, for in the process of doing the study, Chua obtained 
a list of farmer-cooperators from the farm management technician 
but when the interviews were conducted, he found that some farmers 
ln the list had already left their farms a long time ago; others had 
moved to different places; and still others had already died. This 
simply means that the extension agent had been out of touch with 
farmers in his area. Despite this state of affairs, farmers were not 
Prejudiced against the possible contribution of extension.
Table 3.6. Bukidnon rice farmers' perceptions of extension workers.
Agree Undecided Disagree
N  = 379
Percent
1- Do you think frequent contacts 
with extension workers would
help you improve farming? 76 20 4
■ Do you think attending meetings 
called by extension workers,
C.D. workers and agricultural
^aTito E. Contado, Communication Fidelity Between FMT and Rice Farmers in 
*-eVte, Philippines. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1968.
cooperative technicians are 
important?
3. If an extension worker would 
give a talk or would hold a 
meeting, would you attend?
4. What would you do if your 
decision to use the new variety 
would not produce desired 
results?
Accept consequences of 
the decision 
Ask the extension 
worker the reason 
for the failure 
Blame the extension 
worker 
No response 
Landlord is responsible 
for it
5. Extension workers do not know 
any better than farmers.
6. Did the extension workers Or 
other agriculture technicians 
provide you the knowledge and 
skills to improve your farm 
production and farm life?
Very little 
Little
None at all 
Very much
Agree Undecided Disagree
N  = 379
Percent  
88 10 2
93 6 1
32%
60
100%
29 25 46
19%
43
21
17
100%
Source: Leonardo A. Chua, Developmental Scheme for Lowland Rice Farmers of
Bukidnon: A Strategy of Change. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of the Philippines, 
at Los Banos, College of Agriculture, 1973.
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Even the Muslims who had minimal exposure to extension 
workers have favorable attitudes toward the advice of government 
technicians (Table 3.7). They also have a positive evaluation of new 
rice technology and improved production practices. However, 
Muslims from different provinces differ in the degree to which they 
hold positive attitudes toward these practices. In general, those from 
Cotabato and Lanao are more positive than Muslims from Sulu and 
Zamboanga. The latter are most skeptical and negative in their 
attitudes toward new agricultural practices and advice of government 
technicians. However, the majority of Zamboanga farmers are still in 
favor although less so than the three other groups. In the light of 
other findings about Muslim farmers, resistance to change per se is 
not likely to be the bottleneck in increasing productivity. The 
constraints seem to be the lack of infrastructure, facilities and 
services.
In an effort to determine characteristics of change agents 
preferred by rice farmers, Battad asked respondents from four ethnic 
groups in Cotabato. Table 3.8 shows two characteristics which were 
highly endoresed by all four ethnic groups of Muslims, Visayans, 
Tagalogs and llocanos: farm experience and residence in the town or 
barrio. These are both associated w ith the qualities of competence 
and frequency of contact which were regarded as ideal by Nueva 
Ecija farmers. Except for the Visayan farmers who expressed a 
greater preference tor change agents older than they were, majority of 
the three other groups said "age does not matter." To the Muslims, 
having the same religion, tribe and social status was preferred. 
Surprisingly, the Tagalogs were more in-group oriented than even the 
Muslims with respect to preference for someone coming from their 
own "tr ib e " but they were less concerned about similarity of social 
status than the three other groups. Muslims expressed the strongest 
preference for change agents with the same religion. These findings 
point out the need for training Muslim extension workers as a link 
between research results and the Muslim rice farmer.
On the reverse side of the extension situation, Nayga asked 102 
change agents from the Presidential Arm on Community Develop­
ment, the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement and the Farm 
and Home Development Office their perceptions of farmers and 
farmer programs. Majority of them think that farmers most likely 
served by extension agencies have less than 5 hectares. Their 
selection of farmers to be served tends to be the interested farmers, 
small farmers, followed by those who have leadership status,
Table 3.8. Characteristics of change agents preferred by different 
ethnic groups of Cotabato farmers.
Characteristics o f  change 
agents preferred
Muslims Visayans Tagalogs llocanos
— Percent —
1 Age
Younger than I 1 6 5 6
Older than I 6 46 24 16
Same age 13 20 - -
Age does not matter 80 28 71 78
2. Residence
Residing in town or barrio 77 86 84 86
Not residing 3 — — -
Residence does not matter 20 14 16 14
3. Religion
Same as mine 66 30 34 39
Different - - - 1
Religion does not matter 34 70 66 60
4. Tribe
Same tribe as mine 60 54 78 46
Different tribe — - - 4
Tribe does not matter 40 46 22 50
5. Farming experience
Many years of farm experience 94 92 100 97
No farm experience - - - -
Farm experience does not
matter 6 8 - 3
6. Social Status
Same as mine 90 68 35 56
Higher — 6 3 6
Social status does not
matter 10 26 62 38
Source: F.A. Battad, op. cit.
adequate finances, farm accessibility and educational status. These 
were mentioned in the order of importance as ranked by the change 
agents.
Obviously, they are farmers who are perceived to be more 
responsive to extension efforts. When asked what educational level of 
farmers would be most likely to adopt innovations and to attain 
higher income, more than 70 percent said high school or college 
education. On the type of farm which give higher income, 41
percent mentioned diversified farms; 2 2  percent, mechanized diver­
sified farms; 1 2  percent, mechanized specialized farms; and 16 
percent felt that none of the above farms will give higher income. 
Although more than 75 percent of the change agents indicated that a 
successful farmer can attain high and very high status, the charac­
teristics of farms and types of farmers who they think w ill adopt 
innovations and achieve higher incomes are quite high — high school 
and college educated farmers operating diversified and mechanized 
farms. These characteristics are indeed far from being possessed by 
the typical rice farmer.
From the point of view of the change agents (61 percent 
of them), each farmer needs to be visited and assisted more 
than 5 times a year and that there should only be 50 farmers or 
less under the supervision of one change agent. With respect to 
techniques used in introducing innovations, lecture method was 
ranked first followed by demonstration, formal or informal class, a 
combination of the first three, face-to-face contact, visits to farms 
and experiment stations and mass media, last. They also believe that 
a team approach is more valuable than one change agent alone; that 
farm instruction and training is much more valuable than formalized 
training in schools. Their assessment as to why farmers do not adopt 
practices is that farmers cannot afford the capital requirements and 
they are convinced but do not know how to apply them . 14
The change agents' perceptions of intensity and scope of 
coverage needed by the farmers is a far cry from the rather thinly 
spread available manpower at present. Although they believe in the 
value of on-farm instruction, they ranked the lecture method as first 
among the techniques used in introducing innovations. The high 
value they place on team approach comes side by side with their 
stated problem of "lack of coordination with other agencies," so one 
wonders whether they mean w ithin agency or inter-agency team. 
Their perception of constraints on farmers' adoption of innovation as 
due to lack of capital and know-how rather than to traditionalism 
and resistance to change usually attributed to farmers is encouraging 
and doubtless has been influenced by their experiences w ith farmers. 
Furthermore, their ideal with respect to intensity of farmer coverage 
is very much in line with the farmers' desire for more frequent con­
tacts w ith extension workers.
^ R odolfo  C. Nayga, Farmer Education Programs of Selected Agricultural Agencies 
and Socio-Economic Development. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, U.P. College of Agriculture,
C. Some Indications of the Direct and Indirect Impact of Agri­
cultural Extension on Rice Farming
Although farmers themselves perceive extension workers as useful 
and helpful, the magnitude of their impact on rice farming is not 
easy to assess. An analysis by Mangahas gives us some indications of 
the extent to which cooperators and non-cooperators in government 
extension programs makes a difference in their probabilities of HYV 
adoption. Table 3.9 shows that cooperators, who by the nature of 
their participation are more exposed to extension workers than non­
cooperators, have a greater probability of using HYV. This tendency 
was observed both on rainfed and irrigated farms.
Table 3.9 . Standardized probabilities of H YV use in Central Luzon, 
by availability of irrigation and participation in 
government program, crop year 1968-69.
Participation in irrigated Irrigated
Government Program Rainfed Wet Season D ry  Season
Non-cooperators 0.074 0.198 0.232
Cooperators 0.264 0.253 0.402
Percent of Farmers Adopting HYV's Classified by Irrigation 
and Participation in Extension Program
1967 1968 1969
(Planned)
Rainfed Lowland
Cooperator 13.0 24.6 37.7
Others 3.8 7.0 32.9
Total 5.3 10.0 33.7
Irrigated Wet
Cooperator 14.7 33.5 71.1
Others 7.6 17.8 6.19
Total 11.0 25.3 66.3
Irrigated Dry 26.2 47.1 68.4
Source: Mahar Mangahas, A Cross-Sectional Study of the Diffusion of New Rice 
Varieties in Central Luzon. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1970.
Contado's study of Leyte farmers showed statistically significant 
differences in the mean rice yields of farmers who are active, casual, 
and non-participants in farmers' clubs. The mean yields are 68.1 
cavans per hectare, 46.9 and 40.7, respectively, for the three groups.
These findings, however, point out the selectivity factor in parti­
cipation as shown by the fact that active participants have higher 
self-reported social status, economic status, exposure to printed 
media, radio, visits to agricultural schools and experiment stations 
and number of visits to rice demonstrations.15 Furthermore, 
Contado also found that active participation of farmers in farmers' 
clubs is significantly related to effective communication between the 
farm management technician and rice farmers. Participation is 
important to the farmer because it increases his exposure to 
different sources of information, awareness of new information and 
practices, confidence in new practices and in oneself, initiative and 
adoption rate and productivity . 16
The Battad and Derongongan studies in Cotabato and Lanao del 
Sur cited earlier showed very clearly the impact of contact with 
extension workers on adoption of recommended rice production 
practices. The lag in adoption of innovations among Maranao 
farmers, 32 percent of whom never had contact with extension 
workers, is quite pronounced. Although 67 percent were aware of 
HYV seeds, only 22 percent used them; 82 percent were aware of 
fertilizers but only 35 percent used them; 69 percent were aware of 
insecticides but only 7 percent used them. The reasons for non-use 
are quite revealing, for the most frequently mentioned ones are 
unavailability of seeds, fertilizer and insecticides in the locality, lack 
of knowledge on how and what fertilizer and insecticides to use, and 
lack of capital to purchase the inputs. 17 The relationship between 
lack of contact w ith rice expertise and lack of knowledge can be 
inferred from these reasons. The very few Maranao farmers who were 
exposed to extension personnel of different agencies unequivocably 
pointed out that those workers had taught them modern ways of 
farming and, therefore, helped most in increasing their yield. Their 
concern for the matter of expertise in rice production is revealed in 
their response to a question on whether or not they consulted with 
local Muslim leaders regarding rice production. Seventy percent said 
"N o "; 13 percent said "Yes" and 17 percent had no reply. Of 
interest here are the reasons given by those who said "N o ." 
Thirty-one percent said their leaders did not have the competence; 48
15Tito E. Contado, "Factors Associated with the Active Participation of Rice 
Farmers in the Local Farmers' Club,” Com m unity Development Digest, No. 2, July-Dee. 
1969, pp. 25-36.
^®Tito E. Contado. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, op. cit.
percent said they could do it alone; and 2 1  percent indicated that the 
local leaders were not needed in making decisions on their farms. All 
these are signs of the value which Muslim farmers place on 
competence as a basis for consulting anyone on rice production. 
Traditional positions of leadership in the community are not 
associated w ith such expertise.
Although other studies also show significant positive relationships 
between contact w ith extension workers and adoption of recom­
mended rice practices, 18 another way of showing the role of the 
extension worker is through an appreciation of his absence. The 
Bicol farmers, for example, who entered into a management contract 
with the Bicol Development Company during the early years of the 
new rice technology, found yield differences before, during and after 
the termination of the contract. The average yields per hectare were 
70 cavans, 136 and 98, respectively. The decline in their rice yields 
after the contract was attributed by the farmers to the absence of the 
technicians and lack of production inputs. Since they were not sure 
of technical supervision, they hesitated to make investments. Among 
those who expressed satisfaction with the management services of 
BIDECO, availability of technical advice was one important reason 
cited. As a matter of fact, anticipation of such advice was an 
inducement to enter into the management contract. 19 Similar 
findings were reported by Victorio in his study of compact farms 
where the farm management technicians were part of the rice 
production credit program. When farmers were asked later why they 
were not satisfied with their production, ignorance about new 
technology because of the fact that the expected technician did not 
visit them, was prominently mentioned. They claimed that they were 
given inadequate and unsustained technical advisory assistance.20
All of these findings on how much the extension worker is missed 
if he is not available point out his positive contribution to the 
reduction of risk on the part of the farmer, especially if he is 
borrowing money to purchase inputs for his farm. Despite all these
1&Farm and Home Development Office, U.P. College of Agriculture, Rural Change in 
a Philippine Setting, op. c it. ; G. T. Castillo, et a/./The Green Revolution at the Village Level, 
op. c it.: in R. T. Shand <ed.), op. c it. ;  and S. L. Pahud, op. c i t
^W ilfredo G. Olano, Farmers' Responses to the Rice Production Program of the 
BIDECO in Selected Municipalities of Three Bicol Provinces. Unpublished M.S. Thesis, 
U.P. College of Agriculture, 1971.
^ORodrigo P. Victorio, A Study on the Selda System. M.A.T. Thesis, (Economics), 
Notre Dame University, July 1971.
indications of the extension worker's role, a 5-year study showed 
that 80 percent of the contacts with farmers were initiated by the 
extension worker.21 As revealed in the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics figures in this chapter, only a small percentage of farmers 
visited the extension workers' office and their reasons for not doing 
so were "no t necessary" and "too  busy with farm w ork." The 
farmers' heavy reliance on extension-worker-initiated contact which 
co-exists with research findings showing the important role which 
farmers attribute to extension workers, is d ifficu lt to explain. 
Perhaps they acknowledge his positive contribution but do not 
consider him indispensable and, therefore, are not prepared to make 
an effort to  go to the extension worker. They wait for him to come 
to them. But this is also part of the development process.
21 Farm and Home Development Office, op. cit.
The Changing Filipino 
Rice Farmer
One of the most promising developments in the past five years 
of Philippine agriculture is the realization that the rice farmer is not 
the unchanging creature that he has been stereotyped to be. When 
presented with viable alternatives for modifying his life and his ways, 
he has proven to be as responsive as any other modernizing man. With 
the adoption of new rice technology came a modernizing outlook in 
agriculture, new attitudes, aspirations, perceptions and amenities in 
life. This chapter describes the nature of these changes as told in 
several empirical studies, some of which have made observations 
over time. In the midst of all the controversy arising from the 
theorized, expected, anticipated, and actual consequences of the 
green revolution, the rice farmer who is the central figure and the 
original object of all efforts to increase productivity, seems to have 
been neglected. The pre-occupation with structural changes such as 
income distribution, growth rate, and employment dislocations has 
obscured the changes at the individual farmer level. As a matter of 
fact, some macro-economists are skeptical about the value of 
micro-level studies which focus on the village and the individual. It is 
hoped that this chapter w ill rediscover the central figure and give him 
the importance he deserves. After all, we do claim wittingly or 
unwittingly to be concerned about his welfare.
A. The Anthropologist's View
Because of the intensity with which anthropologists pursue 
their social and cultural studies and their wont to be protective of 
"pristine" societies, their insights may be particularly valuable. 
Lewis, for example, in his study of IVambabanga, Isabela, found that 
from 1963 to 1970 when he returned to the place, the most signifi­
cant change, in his judgment, did not come directly from the intro­
duction of new rice varieties but from the extension of the Magat 
Irrigation System. Crops of rice were grown where there was a
single crop before. Grain production increased three times. Irrigation 
societies were still functioning with less internal friction and a greater 
premium was placed on irrigated land. There were new schools, a 
new chapel, improved roads, transistor radios and hand tractors. 
Whatever the actual degree of difference, Lewis concluded that the 
people were much better off. In Buyon, llocos Norte, three crops 
were grown, one of garlic and two of rice. This was made possible by 
the short-maturing HYV's. A great deal of experimentation was being 
done by the individual farmers and they themselves talked about this 
experiment, the reports of new varieties, improved tastes, shorter 
growing periods, greater disease resistance, better marketing, re­
quirements for weeding, cost and uses of pesticides, fertilizers, and 
changing cropping patterns. Lewis believes that the system of 
agriculture changed when llocano rice farmers decided to grow 
miracle rice. He pointed out that in doing so, farmers changed from a 
long-established pattern of farming to one where the risks are 
relatively greater. From his point of view, the real miracle that has 
happened in llocos Norte is the individual adaptations and decision­
making which farmers had to do in the new system of farming. 
However, he thinks that the significant changes in the environment 
are changes which involve "harsh punishment as well as rewards." He 
notes that the two or four HYV's which were replacing the 10 to 20 
different varieties grown before could lead to substantial losses and 
the specter of starvation. 1 It is something like putting all the eggs in 
one basket. With more varieties being grown in the past, the risks 
were distributed. In the new system, the farmers are taking greater 
risks in their desire for greater returns.
Takahashi, another anthropologist who studied a rice village in 
Central Luzon in 1963-64, was impressed by his observation that 
"peasants did not have any w ill at all to increase the level of 
productivity of the land they cultivate. It is too much to expect 
peasants to have a positive desire for increased productivity, yet it is 
puzzling to see them doing nothing when it is quite obvious that a 
little  more care and effort could prevent reduced crops." He cited 
instances when plants remained flooded for a week right after 
transplanting because the cultivator made no outlet in the dike. 
When ordinary rain continued to fall for one or two days, yields 
were reduced due to overflowing of water over reaped palay which
1 Henry T. Lewis, llocano Rice Farmers: A Comparative Study of Two Philippine 
Barrios. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1971, pp. 183-187.
was spread out for drying. Reaped palay was piled into stacks which 
resulted in shattering of grains instead of spreading it out on 
canvasses or mats on the ground. Seed selection was not practiced 
when simple salt water method would have given them better seed­
lings. This apparent lack of willingness to increase productivity, he 
attributed to the land tenure system by which increased output from 
irnproved productivity is taken away by landlords. "Since landlords 
do not meddle with peasants' incomes from work other than tenant 
farming, peasants make efforts to increase their incomes by concen­
trating their own and their families' labor on self-employed small 
business and wage work rather than increase farm productivity 
through such means as intensifying labor in their land and better fer­
tilizing. Thus peasants' input of labor in their land stands at the mini­
mum level, sometimes below the level." As he describes it, the share 
tenancy system is for landlords to pay land taxes and half of farming 
expenses, advance money to tenants for the payment of farming 
expenses and collect both farm rents and advanced money at harvest 
time. Landlords rarely showed positive interest in the management of 
their farms and only a few attempted to increase farm productivity 
through long-term capital investment in land improvement. And 
although tenants were called share tenants they were more like 
agricultural wage workers who share little  responsibility or risks for 
farm management. For them farming does not mean the creation of 
profits from agricultural production but is the basis of the landlord's 
guarantee for their livelihood. In a footnote, Takahashi mentioned 
reports regarding the intensified extension of service being carried 
out in 1967 regarding adoption of new varieties I R-8 , BPI-76 and of 
improved practices such as straight-row planting, adequate fer­
tilization, water management, etc. and the high yields per hectare 
being realized. Despite this information, he remained skeptical and 
Pessimistic: " I t  is certain that this governmental extension work has 
been done in an effective manner, but the actual response of the 
tenants and landlords remain unknown. Since we have seen that the 
Masagana (modern rice cultural practices introduced earlier) had 
once been tried and then abandoned under the present agrarian 
relationship . . .  It w ill be shown in the future whether this change is 
rooted firm ly or not. Of course, the result w ill depend, at least in 
Part, on the effectiveness of implementing agrarian reforms." 2
2 Akira Takahashi, Land and Peasants in Central Luzon: Socio-Economic Structure of 
a Philippine Village. East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 1970.
In a revisit of the same village in 1971, the author recognized 
substantial changes in agriculture and in the life of the villagers. 
These he attributed to such significant elements as (a) the shift from 
share-tenancy to leasehold which started around 1968 even before 
the area was proclaimed land reform district in 1969; (b) the 
introduction of new rice varieties since 1966; (c) intensive extension 
work by 19 experts from Taiwan and 41 Filipinos from 1966 to 
1967; (d) improvement of irrigation facilities by the National 
Irrigation Administration and the Asian Development Bank between 
1967 and 1970; and (e) activation of the Farmers' Cooperative 
Marketing Association under the land reform program. The impact 
on agricultural production is evidenced by the fact that 75 percent of 
the cultivators are under leasehold paying a fixed rental of 20  cavans, 
in some cases 15 cavans per year, per hectare, while the average yield 
of paddy field is more than 200 cavans a year. This represents a two 
and a half times increase over the 1964 yields. New varieties, 
straight-row planting, weeding, application of fertilizer and in­
secticide, construction of improved ditches, and effective utilization 
of backyards are in evidence. Rotary weeders and sprayers are 
owned by as many cultivators just as use of the tractor and the 
thresher has become more common. Improvement in irrigation has 
resulted in the increase of double-cropping from 60 to 85 percent of 
the total paddy field. A ll cultivators sell part and eat part of their 
produce. Some heads o f farm households, who are also part-time rig 
drivers, barbers or harvesters, have given up these side jobs to devote 
themselves more intensively to farming operations. Women who used 
to weave hats have given that up too because of lower returns.
The level of living has likewise improved as observed in new 
houses, renovating of old ones using more durable materials, increase 
in the number of college students, household equipment and even 
fighting cocks. With motorized pedicabs and motorbikes which have 
replaced horse-driven rigs, the town proper has become more 
accessible to the barrio. All told, there is an increase of money 
circulating in the area.
Among the other changes are: (a) shift of credit sources from 
landlords to institutional sources like the rural bank and the farmers' 
cooperative; (b) greater attention given by cultivators to their farms 
such that they watch the field, regulate water level, and take steps to 
minimize production losses; (c) decline in the use of hired labor and 
more intensified use of family labor; (d) growing contractual
relations between cultivators and hired labor, including closer 
supervision of the latter's work; (e) communal customs such as 
gleaning and allowing harvesters to take home sheaves of palay are 
diminishing; and (f) improved farm management by way of m ini­
mizing farm expenses and maximizing returns and heavy dependence 
on family labor.3
Takahashi labels all these changes as the peasantization of share 
tenants who in the past behaved more like rural proletariat or farm 
laborers who had no interest in increasing productivity. However, he 
sees this changing agricultural structure and the accompanying 
peasantization in the disintegration of the village community which 
lends itself to peasant organizations. He also perceives the likely 
polarization of cultivators into those who respond positively to 
institutional stimulations and those who remain timid. This, he 
predicts, w ill lead to accelerated disorganization of the village 
community.
From the descriptive accounts of the two anthropologists, 
Lewis and Takahashi, emerge two general observations: (1) the 
willingness of farmers to assume greater risks in the expectation of 
greater returns is accompanied by an "experimental" outlook in 
trying to find better ways of doing things on the farm; and (2 ) a 
changing work ethic with respect to farm productivity and a 
growing contractual relationship as a result of a more business-like 
approach to rice farming. Both Lewis and Takahashi, however, have 
misgivings about these developments. The first one thinks farmers are 
putting all their eggs in too few baskets by planting only one, two or 
three HYV's instead of the usual multiple varieties. The second one 
worries about the social dislocations which accompany the changes 
taking place. For a long, long time everyone was concerned about the 
persistence of traditional ways in rice farming, the low level of 
productivity and the accompanying poverty. Now that these farmers 
have exhibited signs and symptoms of change, we seem to be afraid 
about the risks they are willing to take and the changes in social 
relationships which are emerging in the process. The misgiving which 
relates to the fact that some will respond more quickly than others 
seems to imply that since they could not all respond equally, it might 
have been better if these changes have not come about at all. This
^Akira Takahashi, Peasantization of Kasama Tenants: Socio-Economic Changes in a 
Central Luzon Village. Seminar Paper presented at the International Rice Research Institute, 
Aug. 19, 1971.
also implies that the traditional community was an ideal community 
where people were equally poor, self-sufficient and social harmony 
reigned. The fact that the farmers responded with enthusiasm to the 
new ways and to the institutional stimulations is an indication of 
what they might have been looking for. To fear disorganization and 
risk is to deny them the capacity to live w ith these things. However, 
to anticipate direct and indirect social consequences with a view to 
scrutinizing policy alternatives is an imperative which cannot be 
escaped. The choice is no longer between change and non-change but 
\ rather between alternative strategies to change. The problem is no 
longer focused on factors associated with acceptance or rejection of 
innovations. It has shifted to  the consequences of acceptance under 
different environmental and institutional settings.
Directly relevant to this matter is Mercado's observation which 
represents a reversal of the commonly accepted notion that "a barrio 
cannot develop when the population is not' ready for it; in other 
words, when its population does not have the basic attitudes required 
for development." 4 The underlying assumption is that unless 
attitudes change behavior w ill not change. Mercado's findings 
demonstrate otherwise in his study of 180 farmers in 44 barrios in 
Albay, in the Bicol region. He compared two groups of farmers, the 
"persuaded" and the "compelled" with respect to their attitudes 
toward and adoption of new IR varieties. The first group had positive 
attitudes toward the new seeds brought about by a persuasion 
strategy composed of farm and home visits, demonstrations, meet­
ings, seminars, field trips, and mass media messages. For the second 
group, the strategy applied included the policy of agricultural credit 
agencies giving loans only to farmers who agreed to plant IR -8 and 
other HYV's. The other techniques employed by some landlords 
were giving seeds to tenants who did not like to plant IR-8 , threat­
ening some tenants with ejection if they would not plant IR-8 , 
promising to handle the initial expenses for planting, fertilizing and 
weeding if the tenants planted IR-8 and promising to pay for the 
number of cavans that would fall short of the expected harvest. In 
many ways, however, these measures subsidized risks for the farmer. 
Initially the "persuaded" and the "compelled" groups did not differ 
in the proportion planting IR -8 and other IR varieties except that the 
latter had negative attitudes toward it. They also adopted more
4 Cesar M. Mercado, Communication Strategies and Their Impact on Launching 
the 1967 Green Revolution in the Philippines. Philipp ine Journal o f Communication  
Studies, Vol. I, No. 1, September 1971, pp. 25-43.
cultural practices than the "persuaded" group. After the first 
planting, 71 percent of the "compelled group" changed from 
negative to positive attitude toward the new seeds, while 6 percent of 
the "persuaded" group changed from positive to negative. There was 
a direct relationship between yield increase and positive attitude 
toward the new varieties. Among those who achieved 1 to 20 cavans 
yield increase, 88 percent had positive attitudes, but among those 
who gained 20 cavans, 97 percent had favorable attitudes.
Table 4.1. Relationship between strategies and attitudes of 
farmers toward IR -8 before and after planting it.
Before A fte r
Persuasion Compulsion Persuasion Compulsion
Percent Percent
Positive Attitude 100 93 70
Neutral 5 5
Negative 100 2 25
100 100
N = 90 N ■= 90
Relationship Between Yield and Attitude of Farmers Toward IR 8
Increased yie ld Same yield Decrease
— Percent —
Positive 92 50 67
Neutral 3 25 9
Negative 5 25 24
Total 100 100 100
Relationship Between Amount of Yield Increase and Attitude 
Toward IR 8
Yield per hectare increase
1-10 cavans 11-20 cavans Over 20
' cavans
Positive 88 88 96
Neutral 4 5 2
Negative 8 7 2
Total 100 100 100
These findings suggest that attitudinal change follows behavioral 
change. Compliance has led to rewarding results and a corresponding 
positive attitude toward what was originally ''compelled”  behavior. 
Obviously, favorable attitudes come with the positive results of the 
"compelled" change in behavior. If compulsion led to negative 
results, one can hardly expect the shift to  positive attitudes.
B. Aspirations, Expectations and Perceptions
In 1963, data gathered from 692 farmers in eight villages in 
Laguna showed that improved farming methods were not perceived 
as the avenue to increased income. Twenty-seven percent of the 
farmer-respondents said that to raise their incomes they would work 
harder. An equal number said they would look for other jobs. Only 
1 percent indicated they would consult technicians about new 
methods o f farming. Nine percent admitted not knowing what to do. 
In the same villages, farmers were also asked for a general evaluation 
of their rice yield. Fourteen percent said their yield was good (32 
cavans per hectare); 33 percent said their yield was acceptable (31 
cavans per hectare); 63 percent said it  was low (22 cavans per 
hectare); 4 percent had no yield evaluation (15 cavans per hectare). 
From these figures, it is apparent that the yield evaluations of the 
respondents were realistic. This realism is further borne out by their 
explanations for low yields. In the order of frequency they were: 
attack by pests and diseases, unfavorable weather conditions, soil 
either very fertile or very poor, improper care and time of planting, 
too many weeds, poor seeds, low tillering capacity, lodging and 
empty grains. It is evident from these responses that farmers 
perceived a direct relationsnip between yield and actual procedures 
involved in rice growing.
Three years later, after the change of cropping pattern, the 
experience of better yields, and greater faith in technical assistance 
from crop specialists, farmers were asked if it were still possible to 
increase yield beyond the volume obtained in the three immediately 
preceding seasons. Ninety percent said yes, 8 percent said no more, 
and 2 percent were uncertain. In the first category, farmers were 
asked by what means they planned to increase yields. Their responses 
included weeding, fertilizer application, spraying against pests and 
diseases, irrigation and planting good seeds. A t that time their 
average yield was about 50 cavans, almost 20 cavans more than that 
in 1963. In early 1969, a conversation w ith some farmers in one of
the villages elicited the following statement: " In  1963, our highest 
yield was 40 cavans, but now unless one has four harvests of at least 
100 each, a farmer still has a lot to learn. He had better go back to 
school (the barrio rice school)."
Besides this heightened ceiling of their yield aspirations, farmers 
have changed their definition of what constitutes as "ridiculous" 
farming practice. In 1964, straight-row planting was laughed at. It 
was regarded as a waste of money. Today in this area, the farmer 
who does not plant in straight rows is the butt o f jokes. The same 
form of ridicule was applied to farmer hold-outs who continued with 
the traditional variety after the majority had discontinued it. These 
villages have now been converted 10 0  percent to the new varieties.5
Change-orientation is related not only to the social pressure to 
conform to the new behavioral pattern but also to the demonstration 
effect in the sense that modern practices have actually contributed to 
a higher level o f achievement in rice production. Another study 
which was done prior to the introduction of HYV's found very high 
positive correlations between a farmer's aspired-for yield and 
actual yields obtained in the village. These findings suggest that 
recognition of what is possible and knowledge of actual achievement 
influence yield aspirations and expectations.6 In other words, the 
actual yield performance of the farmer himself as well as o f the 
village becomes a reference point for the expectation. Therefore, 
where high yields have been experienced either by a few or by many 
farmers, the ceilings for yield expectations would be high.
This enthusiasm among farmers for high yields is manifested 
again in Groot's findings. When rice scientists, extension workers and 
farmers were asked about their predicted average yields 5 years from 
the time of interview in 1969, the farmers gave the highest prediction 
of 153 cavans per hectare; extension workers gave an average of 120 
cavans, while the scientists predicted only 67 cavans average. Farmers 
also perceived the least number o f varietal characteristics as being 
relevant to  varietal selection. They mentioned an average of three 
characteristics; extension workers mentioned more than seven, and
5 Gelia T. Castillo, Impact of Agricultural Innovation on Patterns of Rural Life 
(Focus on the Philippines), A gricu ltu ra l Revolution in  Southeast Asia: Consequences fo r  
Development, Vol. II. Report of the Second SEADAG International Conference on 
Development in Southeast Asia, New York, June 24-26, 1969, The Asia Society, 1970.
5Tej P. Singh and G. T. Castillo, The Effect of Aspirational Level on Adoption of
Recommended Practices in Rice Cultivation, Allahabad Farmer, Vol. 52, No. 5, Sept. 1968, 
pp. 238-295.
scientists gave more than nine.7 Knowing so much more about the 
limitations to their research results, scientists tended to be much less 
optimistic about yield potentials. There were so many more aspects 
(both positive and negative) which they took into account. On the 
other hand, farmers tended to get carried away by positive 
characteristics unless proven otherwise.
The phenomenon popularly known as the "revolution of rising 
expectations”  finds reinforcement in Wickham's study which shows 
that adopters of recommended rice production practices had low 
propensity to pay for irrigation fees. High adoption which represents 
high aspirations and expectations was associated with a less favorable 
evaluation of irrigation services. Since many of the recommended 
production practices were dependent on water for their implementa­
tion, high adopters tended to expect better services in order to 
achieve their aspirations. In the areas which experienced drought, 
there was less satisfaction w ith yield and water adequacy but a 
greater propensity to pay irrigation fees because water shortage made 
them realize the value of water more and were, therefore, more 
willing to pay for it. On the other hand, where water was more 
available, and adoption was higher, the aspirations and expectations 
regarding irrigation services were much higher and consequently their 
dissatisfaction with existing services was greater. Since these ex­
pectations were d ifficu lt to meet, these high adopters w ith high 
aspirations were less willing to pay for what they considered poor 
irrigation services.8
The concept of relative deprivation was also manifested in the 
Laguna farmer-and non-farmer respondents who were asked to 
evaluate the sufficiency or insufficiency of family income relative to 
their needs. Fifty-four percent claimed their income was sufficient 
and 46 percent said insufficient. What is interesting is that people liv­
ing in villages relatively far away from commercial centers were more 
satisfied w ith their income than those living in villages close to the 
commercial centers. Furthermore, villages w ith the highest per­
centages of people claiming sufficient incomes were those whose 
mean computed household incomes were significantly lower than the 
mean or were just around the mean. The villages w ith lower 
proportions o f people reporting sufficient incomes were those whose
?H. C. Groot, op. c i t
®Gekee Wickham, Sociological Aspects of Irrigation. Unpublished M.S. Thesis, 
University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture, 1970.
actual incomes were significantly higher than the mean. This means 
that those objectively better-off were the ones inclined to assess their 
incomes as sufficient and vice-versa. However, there were two out of 
50 villages whose subjective evaluations corresponded closely to 
objective income levels. This indicates that people in those villages 
with low incomes had higher proportions reporting insufficient 
incomes.9
The relativity of satisfaction with their own livelihood and 
community, depending upon the frame reference, is expressed again 
by the Bukidnon lowland rice farmers who think that most people in 
their community are in about the same condition as they are but that 
people living in Cagayan de Oro (the nearest urban center) have a 
better life and are happier. They have a low level of satisfaction with 
their community as indicated by high endorsements of statements 
like "N ot much can be said in favor o f a place like th is" and "This 
place will never seem like home to me." More than 70 percent also 
prefer to transfer to another settlement if the government would give 
them a piece o f land. Realizing, however, the fu tility  of this dream, 
they are unwilling to accept that the future of their community is 
not bright and if they were to start all over again, they would not 
farm in another place. They also disagree that people living outside 
their community are better o ff than farmers in the area. In other 
words, if there were other opportunities, these would seem better 
but considering what they have, the future could be bright although 
life in the urban center appears to be the better and happier one. 
Undoubtedly, satisfaction w ith the community is closely related to 
the people's major occupation. It is significant that 53 percent of 
these farmers did not in itially choose farming as an occupation. They 
are in it because there is no other job available, there is no 
opportunity for them to continue college studies, this is the 
experience they had, their parents and relatives are farmers and the 
feeling that this is the only job they are suited for. About 43 percent 
are in rice farming for positive reasons such as 25 percent of them 
categorically saying " I  like it, it is my ambition." Eleven percent 
admit there is money in it and 7 percent think they can be of service 
to society. The rest (4 percent) were encouraged to farm by their 
parents. In summary, there are more negative than positive reasons 
for being in rice farming and for staying in their community, despite
9 Paul Meijs, An Evaluation Research of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction 
Movement’s Barrio Development Program in Laguna: A Baseline Study. Asian Social 
Institute, Manila, January 1973.
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the fact that about 60 percent of them own the land they farm.
Accompanying this lack of more positive feelings about rice 
farming are certain realities like lack of water as their most pressing 
problem. Although 70 percent o f the farmers used the HYV seeds, 
their averaae yields for 1970-71 were 42 and 22 cavans, respectively, 
for the first and second crop. For 1971-72, the figures were 35 and 
28 cavans per hectare. They had also been plagued by pests and 
diseases. Their most important aspirations for farm improvement in 
their rank order are: to increase rice production per hectare, expand 
size o f farm business, get labor-saving equipment for the farm and to 
achieve higher farm profits. Practically all of them (95 percent) 
expressed willingness to participate in future training programs. The 
training needs they identified were farm management, crop pro­
duction, home improvement and leadership, in that order. Farm 
management areas desired were: planning and programming of farm 
activities, management of different farm production projects, pro­
duction and marketing, use of credit facilities, record-keeping, farm 
accounting and budgeting. In crop production, training, identi­
fication and control of pests and diseases and water management 
were most desired. Diet and nutrition was the priority in home 
improvement and agricultural cooperative training was first in the 
area of leadership. Aspirations for home improvement centered on 
wanting to have new and attractive houses, home furnishings, 
artesian well, and fencing around the house. One cannot begrudge 
farmers these dreams, considering that most of them live in 
cogon-roofed houses which are gradually shifting to galvanized iron 
roofs and strong lumber. 10
In contrast to Bukidnon farmers, there are indications of 
changing attitudes toward farming in other places. An analysis of 
1963-69 data from Laguna villages11 mentioned earlier shows an 
improved evaluation o f rice farming as an occupation. In 1963, the 
question posed to the farmer-respondents was: “ If you were to leave 
your present occupation, what would be the most important basis 
for the decision you would make? "  Sixty percent said prospects for 
higher income and 15 percent mentioned an easier job (Table 4.2). 
Because their major occupation was farming, this response had 
reference to what basis they might have for moving out of farming
1°L . A. Chua, op. c i t
11Gelia T. Castillo, e t al.. The Green Revolution at the Village Level: Philippine Case 
Study (1963-1970). Paper presented at the International Congress for Orientalists held at 
the Australian National University, Canberra, Jan. 6-12, 1971.
(mainly rice farming). The mostsignificant change in 1969 was that 45 
percent of the same respondents fe lt they would not consider leaving 
their occupation and only 36 percent would think of making that 
decision for reason of higher income. This could be interpreted as 
greater satisfaction with farming as a good source of livelihood in 
1969 than in 1963.
Table 4.2. Important basis for deciding to leave 
present occupation.
Basis fo r decision 1963
Percent
1969
t . Higher income 63 36
2. Easier job 15 8
3. Prestige and satisfaction from job 7 _
Not leaving present occupation 7 45
5. Don't know 8 9
6. Availability of capital — 2
Total 100 100
Source: G. T. Castillo, eta/., op. c i t
Even to the hypothetical question asked of them six years before, 
only 7 percent replied that they would not consider moving out of the 
occupation they had at the time. Further support for this interpreta­
tion is provided by the fact that 64 percent of those who said their 
income increased from 1963 attributed it  to increased yields. 
Another significantfinding indicated in Table 4.2 is the value farmers 
place on high income as a criterion for choosing an occupation. 
Prestige and satisfaction derived from the job was mentioned only by 
7 percent in 1963 and by nobody in 1969. Economic returns, 
therefore, rather than psychic returns appear to be the stronger 
attracting power.
Over a 6-year period, the respondents' views on how to improve 
farming have shown remarkable changes toward a recognition of the 
role of modern inputs such as chemicals, fertilizer, weeding, 
straight-row planting, new varieties and the hand tractor. This type 
of response increased from 10 percent in 1963 to 65 percent in 
1969, with the first three inputs being most appreciated (Table 4.3). 
To those concerned with the impact of the new high-yielding
varieties, it might be a disappointment that only 4 percent of the 
responses had reference to new varieties. This could readily be 
explained by the fact that the use of HYV's was already taken for 
granted because practically all of them had adopted one or a 
combination o f these new varieties. As a matter of fact, more than 
80 percent of the farmers had adopted these new seeds as early as 
1967. It was the most highly accepted and readily applied in­
novation. Related to  this observation is the response on consulting 
knowledgeable persons such as agriculturists. There was a decline of 
such response from 25 to 9 percent. Again, is it a diminished 
recognition of the role of technical personnel? This does not seem to 
be the case because data from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show otherwise. The 
use of technically trained personnel is again assumed because they are 
already the major source of information on modern farming. 
Furthermore, 14 percent in 1963 mentioned being the first to  adopt 
new practices as a way to  improve farming. In 1969, no one gave 
this response.
Again, it would seem that new farming methods have made 
headway and, therefore, being the " firs t"  to adopt them was no longer 
the critical factor in 1969. The farmers have moved to another level 
in their farming and so has the reference point. It is no longer a 
question of what ways could improve farming but rather what means 
could further improve what they already had in 1969. For example, 
reliance on own experience and knowledge had faded out and so had 
"follow ing the advice of the Barrio Captain", and the conviction that 
" i t  is hard to change farming methods" but the need to experiment 
on new farming methods gained ground. This concept of "ex­
perimenting" is quite different from being the "firs t to adopt" 
because in the former, the farmer is trying new methods on his farm 
in an effort to choose from alternative ways of doing things. This is 
perhaps traceable to the idea of using different combinations of 
inputs on the farmer's field, which was very much part of the 
technicians' modus operandi in the villages. Noticeable also is the 
drop from 26 to 10  percent of the response indicating that they do 
not know how to change farming methods.
For further evidences o f a modernizing outlook in farming, 
Table 4.4 shows the increase from 47 to 63 percent of respondents 
mentioning technicians from different government agencies as their 
sources of information for modern farming. There was a decline from 
15 to  2 percent of those who relied on personal experiences and
... ,  . ,  . 1963 1969
Ways to improve farm ing  ----------------------------  -----------------------------
N  Percent N  Percent
1 • Use of
a. Chemicals (insecticide,
pesticides) 4 1 99 18
b. Fertilizer 13 4 137 24
c. Weeding, clean culture.
straight-row planting 10 3 86 15
d. New high-yielding
varieties 3 1 21 4
e. Tractor 5 1 22 4
2 . Irrigation water 9 2 32 6
3. Capital 2 1 10 2
4. Higher price for palay 1 _ 2 _
5- Wait and see others'
experiences before trying
new farm practices 20 5 2 _
6. Consult knowledgeable
persons such as agricul­
turists and other government
workers 92 25 49 9
2. Follow the advice of barrio
captain 17 5 _ _
8. Be the first to adopt
new practices 52 14
9- Experiment on new farming
methods 15 4 37 7
10. Rely on own experience
and knowledge 20 5 _ _
11 • Shift to leasehold, owner­
ship or increase size of
area being cultivated 3 1 6 1
12. Unite and organize farmers 4 1 1 _
13. It is hard to change farming
methods 2 1 _ _
14. Don't know how 93 26 59 10
Total number of responses 365 100 563 100
Source; G. T. Castillo, e t al., op. c i t
trials. The use o f other farmers increased because of farmer-leaders 
who were given training. Mass media such as radio, newspapers and 
rnagazines had not been very significant as sources of farming 
information. The roles of parents, relatives, landlords and barrio 
officials were also minimal in this respect. In the case of home 
rnanagement, the trend was the same except for the increase in the
Table 4.4. Sources of information for modern farming 
and home management.
Source o f  in fo rm a tion
Farming
Home
Management
1963 1969 1963 1969
— Percent -
1. Technicians from different 
government agencies 47 63 28 42
2. Reliance on personal 
experience and trials 15 2 32 16
3. Other farmers 10 13 - -
4. Mass media (radio, news­
papers, etc.) 1 1 1 1
5. Parents and relatives 2 1 15 1
6. Barrio council officials 7 3 - -
7. Others (landlord, rural 
bank, etc.) 2 2 1 —
8 . Don't know 16 15 17 36
9. Neighbors and other persons 
we can imitate 6 4
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: G. T. Castillo, et al., op. c i t
proportion of respondents saying, "D on 't know where to obtain 
information on modern home management." This is interesting 
because the role of personal experience, parents and relatives had 
declined but much greater use of home management technicians 
remained to  be realized. Only 42 percent of the respondents in 1969 
mentioned them as source of information for modern home 
management. This discrepancy between the use of technicians for 
farming and for homemaking information is understandable, since 
there was a greater focus on farming and even home management 
technicians worked more on this aspect than on their own field of 
specialization.
Since farming before 1963 was largely traditional and new 
agricultural practices were introduced mainly from the outside, being 
an innovator among these farmers has its status meanings. In 1963, the 
respondents were asked to name persons whom they considered as 
innovators in farming. Table 4.5 shows that in 1963, possession of
farm implements was regarded as an important criterion mentioned by 
45 percent of the respondents. Thirty percent mentioned the use of 
modern farm practices, new seeds and achievement of high yields. In 
1969, technical training acquired from the College of Agriculture or 
from the agriculturists they had contact w ith, gained prominence as a 
reason fo r considering a person as an innovator. The increase was 
from 13 to 47 percent. The use of modern farm practices ceased to 
be a distinguishing characteristic of the farmer innovator, since the 
majority of them by 1969 were already using one or more of such 
new practices. The importance given to possession of farming 
implements in 1963 is due to the fact that the majority of the 
farmers then owned only the barest essential equipment fo r farming. 
The implication is that those who had the implements had a better 
chance of adopting farming innovations. By 1969, hand tractors, 
sprayers and planting boards were no longer rarities in the barrio.
Another significant development is the increased recognition of 
capital (from 2  to 1 2  percent) as a factor in enabling farmers to 
adopt innovations. This is, of course, related to the fact that
Table 4.5 Reasons for naming certain persons as 
innovators in farming.
Reason fo r  naming innovator 1963
Percent
1969
1. Uses modern farm practices, new
rice varieties and has high yield 30 12
2. Had technical training from college
of agriculture technicians and
specialists, hence they also teach
other farmers 13 47
3. Has farming implements 45 6
4. Has sufficient capital 2 12
5. Is industrious, cooperative, and
has good public relations 3 5
6- Has a big farm 1 3
7. Owns the land he cultivates 1 1
8. Has good irrigation water — 2
9. Is the head of the barrio 1 2
10. First to farm here 3 2
11. Almost everybody started using
the new practices at the same time 1 8
Total 100 100
practically all of the new farming methods such as use of fertilizer, 
chemicals and weeding require some capital outlay. In other words, 
the responses were more in the nature of what enabled them to 
innovate. Judging from the 1969 trends, having technical training 
provides the opportunity to keep up with new knowledge and 
combined with sufficient capital with which to put this into effect, 
the conditions for innovation seem to be favorable.
Another interesting observation is that 8 percent o f the res­
pondents in 1969 did not mention any farmer innovators because 
almost everybody started using the new practices at the same 
time, so being " f irs t"  was no longer anybody's monopoly. There is 
some merit in this observation because of the change in cropping 
pattern which required several adjacent farms to adopt new seeds and 
new inputs to go with them. In this sense, several farmers adopted 
the new practices at the same time.
When asked what basis they had for saying that a farmer was 
progressive, about one-half o f the respondents in 1963 and more 
than two-thirds in 1969 mentioned "good harvest and good income 
from farming" which enabled them to buy what their families 
needed and to have some savings and capital. Thrift and hardwork 
was cited by only 7 percent of the respondents (Table 4.6). It is 
particularly enlightening that adoption of modern practices does not 
by itself constitute a hallmark of a progressive farmer as indicated by 
the low proportion of respondents (6 percent in 1963 and 10 percent 
in 1969) giving this answer. This means that the more important 
focus is on the harvest and the income resulting therefrom and not 
mere adoption o f modern farm practices, which is at times 
non-rational and uneconomic.
But more worthy of expanded discussion is the dramatic decline 
in emphasis on "absence of debts" as a characteristic of a progressive 
farmer (from 26 to 6 percent in 1969). This is a substantial change in 
the outlook of people who had traditionally regarded borrowing 
money as something to be avoided. Farm expenses then were re­
garded as expenditures and not as investments from which pay-offs 
could be expected. The intent was to minimize expenses, thus mini­
mizing risks. Apparently, the concept of credit as productive invest­
ment has become more acceptable. In 1963, borrowing was resorted 
to  only under critical circumstances and loans were used mainly for 
subsistence and consumption items. Pahud's 1967 study shows that 
77 percent of the 179 farmers surveyed had debts either in cash
Basis fo r opin ion 1963 1969
Percent
1 • Absence of debts 26 6
2. Good harvest and good income from
farming (sufficient to buy land,
household items, send children to
school and has savings and capital) 48 67
3. Being thrifty and hardworking 7 7
4. Adoption of modern farming practices 6 10
5. Don’t know 5 5
6. Have not seen anybody progress in
farming 1 _
7. Respected by other farmers 1 —
8. Cultivation of a large area, ownership
of land, or being a lessee 3 4
9- Blessed with good luck 3 1
Total 100 100
Source: G. T. Castillo, e t a!., op. c i t
and/or in kind. What is of relevance to agricultural modernization is 
the use they made of these loans. Table 4.7 shows the items on which 
loans were invested. More than half of the respondents said they 
used the money for planting expenses, the bulk of which went to
Table 4.7. Purposes for which loans were used.
Purposes 1967
Percent
1. Planting expenses 58
2. Land preparation 10
3. Fertilizer 10
4. Expenses for pulling seedlings 8
5. Weeding 8
6. Insecticides 3
7. Purchase of seeds 2
8. Purchase of carabao 1
Total 100
the planters as payment. Although more expensive, straight-row 
planting was one of the practices readily accepted. At the time of 
the study, the rate was (*4.20 a day for straight-row planters, P-5.00 
for those who used guide rows and only ^3.50 3 day for the 
traditional method of planting. In addition to straight-row planting, 
loans were spent on weeding and insecticides. This is an indication 
of the extent to which the farmers had begun to recognize the role 
of clean culture in rice production. The rice fields certainly looked 
neater and nicer five years later. Fertilizer and land preparation were 
other items of expense. Due to the decline in labor exchange among 
farmers for land preparation, there was more cash expenditure for the 
purpose. Investing money to purchase seeds was also a new develop­
ment because the new rice seeds had to be bought and at a premium 
price. With the traditional varieties, there was no need to buy seeds; 
they just used what they had from their own fields.
Along with the new uses of credit, there was also a noticeable 
shift in sources (Table 4.8). While in 1963, 32 percent borrowed from 
relatives, in 1967 the most frequently mentioned sources were 
private moneylenders and banking institutions. The increase in 
patronage of private moneylenders from 23 to 38 percent is a 
reflection o f the increased need for credit and the inability of banks
Table 4.8. Sources of loan in cash and/or kind.
Source o f  loan
1963
Percent
1967
1. Private moneylenders (including 
rice millers, businessmen, 
store owners, buyers of rice 
and coconut) 23 38
2. Neighbors, friends, co-farmers 
and compadres 22 12
3. Relatives (include parents, 
brothers, sisters, in-laws) 32 13
4. Institutional sources such as 
banks. Agricultural Credit 
Administration, insurance company 12
5. Landlord 11 8
Total 100 100
and other government agencies to supply such credit although it was 
more needed in 1967. There was a slight decrease in the use of 
landlords as a source of credit, probably because lessees no longer 
obtained loans from them.
Pahud's12 study likewise found a positive relationship between 
amount of money borrowed and adoption of recommended rice 
practices. This is to be expected, since use of these cultural practices 
requires some investment. Among the farmers who did not borrow 
any amount, 28 percent were low adopters and only 19 percent were 
high adopters. The latter were farmers who had enough capital of 
their own. Farmers whose loans amounted to more than P300 were 
mostly high adopters. For these small farmers, P300 was a sizeable 
amount, considering their income levels and the value of the peso at 
the time of the study in 1967. One can, therefore, appreciate the 
risks they had taken in the interest of improving their farming.
c - Innovativeness, Traditionalism and Rationality of the Rice
Farmer
It would be interesting to know how the introduction and 
adoption o f the new rice technology, in part or all of its 
accompanying package, have affected the rice farmer's outlook and 
attitudes. Data from Bukidnon actually provide more insights in view 
of the fact that this province is much farther away from the center of 
diffusion and is, therefore, less exposed to the technology. Tables 
4.9 and 4.10, which include statements attempting to tap the 
innovativeness-traditionalism dimension of the farmer's socio- 
Psychological world, reveal a level o f innovative outlook. He 
Wants a change in his life and in his farming and likewise recognizes 
the value of the instruments by which such changes may come about 
such as credit, new rice varieties, contact with agricultural extension 
Workers and even cooperatives. He is a little  bit ambivalent about 
abandoning completely the old ways or his parents' ways of farming. 
Much more is his disagreement w ith the statement that "everything 
you do on the farm turns out well." This response is probably 
colored by an experienced fact on their part because not everything 
one does on the farm turns out well. About one-third of them do not 
consider rice farming as a business enterprise but as a way of life.
Table 4.9 Innovativeness of 379 lowland rice farmers 
in Bukidnon (1972).
Statement o f  innovativeness
Agree Undecided Disagree
1. Do you want to learn new ways 
to farm? 96
— Percent — 
3 1
2. If an extension worker would 
give a talk or would hold a 
meeting, would you attend? 93 6 1
3. Planning and recording your 
activities on the farm improve 
your management of the farm. 86 12 2
4. A man can usually improve his 
living condition by hard work. 95 4 1
5. Do you think using new 
varieties ot rice would 
increase your production? 85 14 1
6. Credit for capitalization is 
important to improve farming 
and increase crop production. 72 20 8
7. Do you want a change in your 
life? 89 9 2
8. Do you think you will live 
better in the future? 57 40 3
9. Do you think frequent contacts 
with extension workers would 
help you improve farming? 76 20 4
10. Do you think attending meetings 
called by extension workers, 
PACD workers and agricultural 
cooperative technicians are 
important? 88 10 2
Source: L. A. Chua, op. c i t
Side by side with positive endorsements of innovations are 
pockets of uncertainty and fatalism expressed in doubts about a 
better life in the future. With this goes helplessness in the face of 
floods, droughts, pests and diseases, and more than 70 percent put 
man's fortune in the hands of God. These farmers go through every 
year, often more than once, a cycle of natural calamities, including 
pests and diseases. Despite new technology, rice farming remains very 
much subject to the whims of nature. Even pests and diseases are in 
many ways a matter of God except for the breeding of disease 
resistance or drought tolerance into a new variety. Preventive control
Table 4 10. Traditionalism of the lowland rice farmers 
(379 farmers from Bukidnon), 1972.
O pinion
Agree Undecided Disagree
1. A farmer should farm the way 
his parents did. 35
— Percent — 
13 52
2. Extension workers don't know 
any better than the farmers. 29 25 46
3. It is too risky to try new ways 
to farm. 11 23 66
4. It is better to enjoy today and 
let tomorrow take care of itself. 16 13 71
5. A man's fortune is in the hands 
of God. 72 12 16
6. Membership in agricultural 
cooperatives will not do any 
good to a farmer. 18 11 71
7. It is always safe to follow old 
ways of farming. 20 22 58
8. There is nothing that a farmer 
can do against pests and diseases, 
floods and droughts. Everything 
is in the hands of God. 52 14 34
9. Farming is a way of life and 
not a business enterprise. 56 10 34
10. Everything you do on the farm 
turns out well. 43 57
Source: L. A. Chua, op. c it
measures have their own limitations. Incidence of pest and disease 
also appears to be related to weather and climatic conditions which, 
so far, are still under the control of God, despite successful attempts 
at rain-making. Rice-farming is always a risky venture and the 
fatalistic streaks in the farmer's outlook are a reflection of these 
risks. What next year's crop will bring depends very much on what 
Nature has in store.
The Asian Social Institute study of 50 Laguna villages showed 
that residents of rice-producing villages have higher scores in their 
attitudes toward modernization than those in villages engaged in 
production of other crops. The author contends that these progres­
sive attitudes are not due to the fact that they grow rice but rather 
to the fact that these villages tend to be located along the 
national roads. More remote villages tend to grow crops other than
rice. Despite these more progressive attitudes, however, the good 
luck-bad luck syndrome and the dominant influence of the weather 
on their assessment of success or failure remain rather strong. Fortv 
percent o f the respondents believe that a farmer who has had a poor 
rice crop three years in a row is a victim of bad luck. About 60 
percent attribute the poor crop to poor farming methods. To the 
statement that "the new rice varieties w ill not give more yield than 
the old varieties, for it  is bad weather that causes the low yields, not 
the type of rice," 57 percent agreed on the adverse role of bad 
weather. Only 41 percent thought otherwise and gave credit to the 
yield potential of new varieties. 13
Judging from the rational considerations the rice farmer applies 
in his decision-making (Table 4.11), he seems to be guided by the 
maxim that " i f  he does his best, God might do the rest! ”  The one 
item, however, which would make a farm management expert cry is 
the high proportion (61 percent) of farmers who were not keeping 
any kind of farm records at all. Another study which includes 180 
rice farmers from eleven barrios in Laguna and Nueva Ecija where 
intensive programs in agricultural and rural development have been 
undertaken for a number of years, only an average of 40 percent 
used any kind of farm records, yet 70 percent of the farmers said 
they tried to determine cost of production. In eight of the Laguna 
villages, more than 60 percent attempted to look at business trends 
and almost 80 percent tried to determine the opportune time for 
marketing their produce.14 This means that farmers have some basis 
for making their calculations. Experience and day-to-day contact 
with the hard facts of rice production are on their side and, therefore, 
there is probably a lot more substance to their "g u t" feeling than 
to the survey of a farm management specialist.
So far, the experience in the Philippines with respect to the 
modernization or rice farming has shown that the most d ifficu lt 
innovation to introduce and the least accepted is farm record­
keeping. Input-output analysis and cost of production figures have, 
therefore, been a challenging task. The Department of Agricultural 
Economics of the University of the Philippines at Los Banos has 
maintained a farm-record keeping project fo r the past eight years, 
but this involves only about 30 farmer-cooperators. This has been the 
source o f cost of production figures for some national policies.
1^P. Meijs, op. c i t
14R. C. Nayga, op. c i t
Table 4.11. Rationality in the decision-making of 379 
lowland rice farmers of Bukidnon (1972).
Percent
1. How do you decide how much fertilizer to 
apply to your rice crop?
a. According to soil test 37
b. Follow the general recommendation
of extension workers 20
c. According to careful observation in
trial-and-error-like procedure 14
d. On the basis of general knowledge
and experience 10
e. Follow recommendations or practices
of relatives 5
f. According to recommendation of salesmen 1
9- From information gained from mass media 2
h. 1 don't know 4
i. Always used the same amount as last year's 1
j- Used what was on hand 1
k. Used what landlord sent 5
Total 100
2. How do you decide how much rice to plant?
a. According to market conditions 4
b. According to season and cropping pattern 43
c. According to family needs 9
d. According to general needs 20
e. Always planted the same amount 10
f. 1 don't know 4
9. Decided by the landlord 10
Total 100
Why did you plant this variety instead of other varieties?
a. Followed recommendations of extension workers and other technicians 29
b. Choose variety to meet specific problems like disease, pest, season, climate 30
c. According to market demand or price 7
d. Because of special qualities like high yield and disease resistance 8
e. To experiment with a new variety 12
f. Recommended by relatives, neighbors and other farmers 9
9- Followed recommendations of salesmen 1
h. 1 don't know 3
i. Other factors beyond my control 1
Total 100
4. What kinds of written records do you keep?
a. Farm books
b. Ledgers or other records 
~e. Other production records
d. Receipts
e. Bills and/or sales slips
Percent
f. I don't know 4
g. Relies on memory 11
h. No records kept 46
Total
5. How do you use these written records?
a. To estimate profit and loss of entire farming operation 25
b. Input-output analysis of specific enterprise 6
c. To aid in improvement of farm practice 7
d. To figure income tax or other taxes 2
e. I don’t know 50
f. Landlord does not tell me anything about these records 10
Total 100
6. Have you tried to compute on paper what your profit 
was from the lowland rice project?
a. Yes 60
b. No 38
c. I don't know -j
d. Landlord did not tell me about it 1
Total 100
7. The difference between a successful farmer and an unsuccessful one is more 
on how hard they work than on how much time they spend in planning 
their operations.
a. Disagree 12
b. Agree 70
c. No response 3
d. It is not clear 12
Total 100
8 . Farmers really don't have to think a great deal about what they are going to 
do on their farms since this is largely decided for them by the landlord and by 
what kind of farming their neighbors do.
a. Disagree 73
b. Agree 11
c. I don't know 3
d. No response 13
Totai 100
9. What would you do if your decision in using the new variety would not produce 
desired results?
a. Accept consequences of the decision 32
b. Ask the extension worker reason for the failure 60
c. Blame the extension worker 1
d. No response 2
e. The landlord is responsible for it 5
Total 100
Record-keeping needs creativity in format, procedures and 
educational approaches so that it can be effectively utilized by 
farmers who have an average of 3 to 6 years of formal schooling. 
This ability to figure out cost and returns through the use of farm 
records is probably the hallmark of farmer sophistication in modern 
agriculture. A t this point, mere adoption of new varieties is no longer 
a distinguishing badge of innovativeness because many have taken on 
these varieties 10 0  percent.
D. Rice Farmer's Response to Disaster
In 1970 and 1971, there was "tungro" virus disease outbreak 
which hit the major rice-growing provinces of the country, including 
Central Luzon, the Bicol Region and Cotabato. When an inquiry was 
made as to what courses of action had been taken with respect to 
the disease outbreak, a foreign consultant closely associated with the 
national rice production program enumerated the follow ing : 15
"W ith the local outbreak of tungro in seedfields of I R-22 in Cotabato in 
1970 recommendations for insecticides for use in rice seedbeds to control 
the early attacks of green leafhoppers, the vector transmitting the tungro 
virus, were put in The Philippines Recommends for Rice-1970' including 
a kodachrome color photo of a tungro infected rice plant.
"The 1970 edition of the 'Rice Production Manual' produced jo in tly 
by UPCA and IRRI contains complete data on tungro. The manual is a 
reference guide for extension workers and agribusiness representatives."
Beginning in mid-August 1971, concurrently and in con­
sultation with IRRI, the Unified Rice Applied Research Training and 
Information Project (URARTIP) sent "tungro alert" letters to all 
regional and provincial rice specialists, including a full copy of the 
IRRI news release, and w ith suggestions for alerting extension 
workers and rice farmers.
Since then there has been a steady flow  of releases on the 
tungro epidemic, and action, both interagency and by appropriate 
agencies, particularly the Bureau of Plant Industry, the Agricultural 
Productivity Commission and the U.P. College of Agriculture.
An interagency-tungro team held five one-day provincial 
meetings with all professional workers in late August, using 20,000 
copies of a BPI prepared bulletin on tungro. More than 550 people
15Reshon Feuer, Letter to the Dean, U.P. College of Agriculture, October 4, 1971, 
Unified Rice Applied Research Training and Information Project (URARTIP), National 
Food and Agriculture Council (NFAC).
attended the meetings in the five Central Luzon Provinces of 
Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pampanga and Bataan.
An interagency-prepared version of the BPI bulletin was printed 
for farmers by BPI and used in the four most seriously affected 
provinces in a series of meetings with farmer-leaders. A UPCA 
faculty member was the feature speaker at the Bulacan province 
meeting, together with speakers from IRRI and APC; this meeting 
which was called by the Provincial Agriculturist, was attended by 235 
farmer leaders and municipal agriculturists.
The URARTIP staff provided a steady stream of tungro release 
materials. The UPCA Department of Agricultural Communication 
prepared two special "tungro specials" issues of the UPCA Farm and 
Home News that went to 600 receivers. URARTIP staff were in 
frequent contact with APC, BPI, NFAC, Secretary and the Under­
secretary of Agriculture and IRRI in organizing interagency action 
on the tungro epidemic.
The national rice action officer (APC) sent a second release to 
regional and provincial rice specialists, inclosing the farmers' version 
of the tungro bulletin which contained a list of resistant varieties and 
suggested priority action, especially the use of the two most effective 
recently proven insecticides "Furadan" and "MIPCIN” .
Three interagency-action committees had reported to Under­
secretary of Agriculture J.D. Drilon Jr. as of September 29, 1971. 
Dr. Lapis, of UPCA, was chairman of the tungro action committee.
Suggestions for the next rice crop were:
1) Plant only the tungro-resistant varieties such as C4-63 G, 
C4-63, C4-137, IR-20 and BP I -76 (NS), and use recom­
mended insecticides.
2) If planting non-resistant varieties, the use of appropriate 
insecticides is an ABSOLUTE MUST!
3) Several "former seed board" rice varieties which were 
brought to the Philippines during the early 1940's from 
Indonesia to combat that tungro outbreak, are resistant 
and can be used in this emergency. These are Intan, Peta, 
Bengawan and perhaps Tjeremas.
Motivation
The current main problem in dealing with the tungro situation 
is to adequately motivate the rice farmer to accept and to act on the 
flood of proven technical information being made available to him. 
The ultimate decision to grow tungro-freerice rests in the rice farmer.
Tungro: How Serious?
Currently, some individuals tend to panic regarding the present 
tungro outbreak in the Philippines. It is serious in the affected 
localities — affected fields of susceptible varieties untreated with 
insecticides will be a total loss. But the actual hectarage affected in 
the Central Luzon provinces as of September 21, 1971 official 
Bureau of Plant Industry report was 17,000 hectares. This was less 
than 4 percent of the 470 thousand hectares planted in 1969-70 in 
only the four most seriously affected provinces: Tarlac, Pampanga, 
Bulacan and Nueva Ecija.
In these provinces alone there were enough C4-63G and IR-20 
planted during May and June 1971 (harvesting during August and 
September) to replant all of the 1971-72 dry-season crop throughout 
the Philippines three times over. Nearly 15,000 hectares of these two 
tungro-resistant varieties were planted during May and June 1971. A t 
60 cavans per hectare yield estimate (conservative) this was 900,000 
cavans of potential seed of tungro-resistant HYV's.
The Bureau of Plant Industry sprayed about 10,000 hectares of 
the worst affected areas to reduce the infectious leafhopper 
population.
"The tungro-infected area in the other provinces as of the 9/21/71 BPI 
report was about 3,000 hectares, mainly in the Bicol Region and in South 
Cotabato, the latter being the site of the 1970 outbreak.
"Because of the continuing infestation in South Cotabato in 1971, it is 
recognized that stringent precautionary measures are necessary fo r future 
rice crops in the Central Luzon Area: the use of resistant varieties and 
insecticides are being brought to the attention of rice growers in a massive 
extension teaching program getting underway.
"Tagalog versions o f the interagency tungro bulletin are in progress — 
the first edition will be o ff the press on October 1, 1971."
The above letter is reproduced here in detail because it 
underscores certain assumptions made in development programs, 
which influence implementation and performance. The basic as­
sumption in this case is that there is an effective communication 
system such that whatever is scientifically known about "tungro" is 
passed on to and understood by extension workers. A second 
assumption is that extension workers and other professional workers 
and farmer-leaders go out of their way to extend to the farmers the 
information, explanation and procedures for dealing with the 
problem. A third assumption is that the farmers understand, know
how and have the means to comply with the recommended 
procedures. For example, if 20,000 copies of a bulletin on tungro 
were distributed, the question is: How many farmers received these 
bulletins? Of those who received, how many read, understood and 
complied with the suggestions?
Quite apropos to this particular situation are the findings 01 
the Montecillo study on Uses and Effects o f Interposed Agricultural 
Communication which illustrate the gap between the verbal culture 
or the symbolic component of agriculture and the first-level 
production problem. The study shows that press releases and radio 
farm news are effective channels of communication insofar as the 
person-mediators such as extension and community development 
workers are concerned. The first-step flow which traces the link 
between the mass media and the person-mediators was empirically 
supported. The findings indicate that the person-mediators not only 
used the press release and radio farm news but were also affected by 
them, that is, they gained knowledge, developed comprehension, and 
underwent behavior change. However, there was no second-step flow 
concerning the passing of information from the person-mediators to 
the farmers. Mass media with the exception of radio had practically 
no use nor any effect on farmers. Printed materials could be effective 
with person-mediators but they did not seem to be of much use to 
farmers. The absence of the second-step flow  of information and 
influence reaching the farmer could very well represent the distance 
between verbal culture and the practical world of realities in 
agricultural production . 16
An anthropologist (Brian Fegan) residing in a tungro-infested 
area in Central Luzon at that time has some observations which 
illustrate the lack of such a second-step flow of information. He 
writes:
"The information campaign on resistant seeds and protective methods 
was a complete failure here. Publicity in English in the Sunday Manila 
Times was ill-directed. It should have been in Tagalog and in Taliba, 
Pilipino Star, etc., which are the papers farmers read. Instead, too, of the 
scientific form of advice, it should have been the form of a recipe. Farmers 
here have planted two crops since January when the pattern of tungro 
infestation became known to the authorities. A lot had their fingers 
burned on the first crop with R5 and R8, but the normal pattern is to
^Catalina M. Montecillo, The Uses and Effects of Interposed Agricultural 
Communications. Unpublished M.S. Thesis, University of the Philippines, College of 
Agriculture, 1970.
plant Wagwag in October. None of the published information I saw took 
account of this -  all the advice on what to plant was concerned w ith the 
new seeds, d idn 't mention effects of tungro on old and popular high-price 
varieties. Hence, neither publicity nor experience helped redirect them to 
resistant varieties.
"Another problem was the scarcity of seed of resistant varieties for the 
few who had heard of it. There seems to have been infrastructure 
program to ensure that seed was available. I suppose the rice shortage 
exacerbated this, and caused R20 and C4 that should have been reserved 
for seed to go into the markets of Manila. The result here was that farmers 
took seed from the just harvested crop, that was still dormant, and got a 
poor showing in their seedbeds. This led them to distrust the "resistant" 
seed, as they wasted palay and the need to sow extra seed fouled up plant­
ing schedules. Again, the local term for any spray or dressing for disease or 
insect is gamot, which means the same as medicine. The publicity that 
filtered down did not make it clear that spraying is a preventive and not a 
cure. Result, farmers h it by tungro have wasted gallons of spray and gone 
into debt for it and it d idn 't work. This has not helped the general 
popularity of spraying.
"One thing that strikes me is the scarcity of advice about sprays, etc, 
and fo r what purposes they are effective. Is there any chance that the 
makers could be persuaded or required to provide this, plus cautions in the 
main local languages?
"I have had a chance to observe the local extension bloke from the 
Land Reform at work in one of his rare visits here. Instead of agricultural 
advice, he was concerned with publicizing the new land reform code. The 
elections had something to do w ith that, I suppose. But the point is that, 
that is the way things work out at all levels. The Land Reform blokes are 
all playing politics, and have limited opportunity to canvass farmers with 
farming advice. Point is, What to do? That is why I feel extension advice 
ought to go in Taliba. The extension blokes probably do read the Sunday 
Times in English, but that is no guarantee they pass it on, even if they are 
perfect they have very large areas to cover. Seminars at Los Banos have had 
valuable effects, but a one-shot program needs follow-up. Pamphlets I 
picked up down there in Tagalog have done the rounds here, and are 
popular reading. Their effects are so far unmeasurable.
"B ut an opportunity fo r extension economy using the existing seminar 
methods is being wasted, in not picking up the katiwalas of the large 
owners. I am not in favor of strengthening the owner's hand, but the 
katiwalas are all over the place and checking up on farmers' harvest shares, 
secret harvesting, etc.. They also are the contract men for farmers trying to 
borrow from the owner fo r seed, fertilizer and spray or equipment. That is 
to say, they are built-in unpaid extension workers if someone just makes 
sure they are picked up for their m ultiplier effect. A t the moment, they
are no better informed than the farmers. One has given me the locally 
popular explanation of tungro: that after the twenty-day or so dry period 
last August the rain all came from the east. Now rain coming from the 
China Sea picks up salt, and if the palay is dried out, the salt damages the 
roots, causing what is like a cancer. That is tungro. When the west wind 
blows, from late October on, it has no salt in the rain it brings, and the 
tungro w ill disappear. It doesn't matter therefore what seed one plants, the 
tungro is over fo r the year. One katiwala visiting twenty farms with that 
tale can do a lo t of damage. Point is he might be used to carry a more 
accurate tale, and the existing lousy land system made to do a little  to earn 
its keep.
"These peasants or proletarians or whatever are really quite open to 
change in technique that works. The spread of the IR varieties is a case in 
point. But an unwritten story is the spread of threshing tongs (piyuka) and 
the triangular threshing stand to replace the foot threshing. That has 
happened in the last six or so years, I th ink unnoticed. Farmers and 
landless harvesters both give an explanation in terms o f speed, recovery, 
and economy." (Letter dated November 10, 19711
Based on recent experiences with rice farmers in their rapid 
acceptance of new technology, one is not inclined to agree com­
pletely with Feur's conclusion that the main problem in dealing with 
the tungro is to “ adequately motivate the rice farmer to accept and 
to act on the fold of proven technical information being made 
available to h im ." Before a farmer can act, he has to receive and 
comprehend "the flood of proven technical information."
A follow-up study on the incidence of tungro in Gapan, Nueva 
Ecija and farmers' reactions to i t 17 revealed that farmers located in 
areas given first priority on rational basis for water use in that year 
had been able to plant earlier and for the most part escaped severe 
damage to crop yields. Although tungro-resistant varieties were also 
affected in badly infested areas, it was still very evident that they 
produced higher yields than the susceptible ones even under the 
worst conditions. The presence of such varieties in sufficiently 
noticeable areas, enabled the farmers to judge for themselves which 
varieties had better resistance. These observations had consequently 
influenced their preferences for the succeeding crops. Interviews with 
100 farmers showed that 43 of them sprayed their fields and 18 
drained water from the fields but they observed little, if  any, 
effectiveness from these practices. With very few exceptions, farmers
17Randolph Barker, et al., The Changing Pattern of Rice Production in Gapan, Nueva 
Ecija, 1965 to 1970. IRRI Seminar, December 11, 1971.
did not understand what caused the disease nor did they know what 
protective measures to take to prevent another occurrence, other than 
to plant a resistant variety. Only 19 of the 100 farmers associated the 
disease w ith the green leafhopper. In later field visits, farmers 
were seen to be planting resistant varieties but they did not know of 
other protective measures nor did they associate the green leafhopper 
with the virus.
Soon after the tungro infestation, Herrera's study in Gapan 
reported that 97 percent of the farmers obtained lower incomes from 
their rice crop in 1971 compared w ith the 1970 crop due to the 
tungro which adversely affected their yields. Naturally, they also ex­
pressed dissatisfaction w ith these yields but expected better incomes 
in the next five years from a combination of improvements in farming 
methods, hard work, and new technology. Only one respondent 
mentioned stable price as a factor. On the more immediate action to 
take with respect to problems encountered, the most frequently 
mentioned of which were disease and insects, farmers would resort to 
the use of chemicals and change their varieties to more resistant ones. 
This latter course of action means changing to other HYV's. Of the 
193 respondents only 10 said they were no longer willing to use 
HYV's in the future. The experience with tungro was the reason 
given for this unwillingness.18 For 95 percent of the farmers studied 
who were affected by tungro, they were still keeping faith with 
HYV's.
The response of Davao del Sur farmers to a series of disasters was 
less encouraging than that of Gapan farmers. The overall average 
yield reported by Stewart in two barrios of Davao del Sur was about 
60-61 cavans per hectare. These low yields were explained by two 
factors: the tungro disease and the extremely limited use of fertilizer. 
Nearly two-thirds of the 161 farmers interviewed used no fertilizer at 
all for the season in question. Those who applied fertilizer used only 
an average of 1.4 bags per hectare. Only 5 farmers used 3 or more 
bags per hectare. Stewart attributes this limited use of fertilizer to 
successive crop losses due to typhoon, rat infestation and tungro 
epidemic. The crop losses had taxed their financial resources and credit. 
Furthermore, landlords were reportedly not sharing in costs of seeds, 
fertilizers and chemicals; therefore, the tenants had to absorb the 
losses. Declining expenditures for farm inputs as a consequence of
these unpleasant experiences were interpreted by Stewart as a 
pattern of risk avoidance.19
Table 4.12 shows the decline by about half in the percent of 
farmers using chemical fertilizer. Insecticides and herbicides con­
tinued to be applied but in lesser quantities. The unpopularity of 
straight-row planting, the complete absence of the mechanical 
weeder, the dependence on the mechanical thresher, the widespread 
use of the two-wheel tractor and the application of herbicides, were 
related to the seasonal labor shortages arising from the continuous 
cropping pattern and alternative employment activities offered by 
sugar-cane and coconut plantations nearby.
Table 4.12. Changes in farming practices, 1967-1972 
in Hagonoy, Davao del Sur.
V I L L A G E
Sinayawan Beinte Nueve
Main Main Main Main
crop crop crop crop
J 3 S Z - m 2 . 1967. 1972
Number of farmers 95 66
% using chemical 
fertilizer 89 41 83 39
% using organic 
fertilizer 2.1 1.0 3 1.5
% using insecticides 99 100 100 100
% using sprayers 99 99 92 92
% using herbicides 97 95 98.5 98.5
% using straight-row 
planting 36 17 62 18
% using mechanical 
weeder _
% using 2-wheel 
tractor 93 87 88 73
% using 4-wheel 
tractor _ _
% using mechanical 
thresher 98 96 98.5 94
% farms irrigated 
by gravity 100 100 100 100
Source: James Stewart, op. cit.
E. Rice Farmers' Values on Education
Although most Filipino rice farmers have an average of 6 or less 
years of formal schooling, one of their undisputed aims in life is to 
have their children go to college. Tables 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 present 
data from Bukidnon and Laguna. The former study shows the un­
equivocal faith which Bukidnon rice farmers had on the desirability 
of college education as a "passport" to better jobs, better life and 
better social standing. This abiding faith of parents in what college 
education promises for the future holds for both male and female 
children. There were only 3 items which elicited less consensus, i.e., 
high school education was regarded as enough preparation by 35 
percent of the respondents and 16 percent agreed on the undesir­
ability of going to high school or college because it takes children 
away from the farm. The diploma-oriented push for college 
education was substantiated by two-thirds of the respondents who 
agreed that "the most important thing in education is to get a 
diploma or a degree." It must be mentioned here that although the 
rice farmers had an average schooling of 6 years their children had 
already an average of 2 years in high school and 21 percent, college 
education at the time of the interview. This means that the children's 
formal schooling would be so much more than their parents'.
Table 4.13 Bukidnon lowland rice farmers' value on education 
(1972), N=379.
Agree I  d o n 't Disagree
_____________   know
— Percent —
1 Going to high school or college 
will take people away from the 
farm and because of this, it
is undesirable. 16 5 79
High school education is 
enough preparation. 35 5 60
Going to school is not 
really important. 5 1 94
Good education helps a 
person lead a better life. 95 2 3
Voung members of the family 
should get all the education 
they can. 95 1 4
The most important thing in 
education is to get a diploma 
or a degree 66 4 30
Approve D o n 't approve
— Percent —
7. Would you like your son to
go to college? 100
8. Would you like your daughter
to go to college? 99 1
9. Young men need college training
to get along well. 99 1
10. College education gives children 
greater opportunity to get the
best jobs. 99 1
11. College education would give 
your children a better life and
social standing than yours. 99 1
Source: L.A. Chua, op. cit.
Table 4.14 Attitudes toward education among farmers 
and non-farmers in 50 Laguna barrios.
(6,361 respondents) (1972)
A ttitu d e  statements Percent
1. A child of 14 who has completed 2 years of high 
school is offered a job. If you are the parent, 
what would you advise the child?
a. Accept the offer and start working 33
b. Refuse the offer and finish high school 66
c. No answer 1
2. Once I heard a friend say that girls do not need to study as much as boys 
do. Girls will get married and will stay only at home, so their study is 
useless.
a. Agree 22
b. Disagree 77
c. No answer 1
3. There is no need to have a diploma. You can also get a job without one.
a. Agree 35
b. Disagree 64
c. No answer 1
4. When a child will become a farmer, he does not need to finish high school. 
Working in the field needs only experience.
a. Agree 34
b. Disagree 65
c. No answer 1
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Table 4.14 (Continuation)
A ttitu d e  statements Percent
5. With what statement do you agree?
a. Some people say that barrio leaders must have at least a college
degree. 43
b. Others say, everybody who is intelligent can be a barrio leader. 56
c. No answer 1
6. Agricultural seminars are not very useful for the farmers because they are
only theoretical.
a. Agree 34
b. Disagree 65
c. No answer 1
7. Children learn more from older people than in school.
a. Agree 26
b. Disagree 73
c. No answer 1
8. In the province, children don't need high schooling because there is no
office work available.
a. Agree 24
b. Disagree 75
c. No answer 1
9. When a person had passed the age of 35, it would not be any use to
take up studies.
a. Agree 25
b. Disagree 74
c. No answer 1
10. A child who is at school the whole day should stay away from his
books at home to be able to help in household chores.
a. Agree 20
b. Disagree 79
c. No answer 1
Source: Paul Meijs, op. cit.
Table 4.15 with data from farmer- and non-farmer respondents 
from 50 Laguna barrios reveals a little  more realism but the high 
value on education still dominates. Between taking a job and con­
tinuing on to high school, majority would still opt for the latter. 
Only a little  over 20 percent are willing to put girls at a disadvantage 
in schooling on the ground that marriage w ill just keep them at home 
anyway. More than a third believe that one could obtain a job w ith­
out a diploma and that a high school education is not necessary if one 
is going to become a farmer. A similar number look at agricultural 
seminars as theoretical and, therefore, not very useful. Just like the
Table 4.15. Farmers' educational aspirations and expectations 
for their children (7 Laguna barrios).
Aspirations Expectations
1963 1969 1963 1969
—Percent—
1. Elementary 29 8 47 29
2. High school 21 21 14 30
3. College 36 69 6 14
4. Don't know 8 1 27 21
5. It's up to them to decide _6 _6 _6
N = 370 100 100 100 100
Farmers' occupational aspi­
rations and expectations 
fo r the ir children
1. Farming 22 4 38 25
2. Blue-collar job 19 16 20 20
3. White-collar job 31 53 6 10
4. Don't know 11 6 30 31
5. It's up to them to decide 17 2 1 _ 6 1 1
N = 370 100 100 100 100
Source: G. T. Castillo, et. a!., op. c i t
Bukidnon farmers, the Laguna respondents do not agree that farm 
and household chores are not more important than schooling. The 
lack of office work in the province is not accepted as a reason for not 
pursuing secondary education. Furthermore, being older than 35 
does not make it useless to take up studies. The room for adult 
education type of activities is, therefore, an open one.
The dream, the aspiration, and the future is one thing; the 
reality is another. Shifting educational and occupational aspirations 
and expectations are evident in Table 4.15. The following trends 
have been observed in the changes from 1963 to 1969:
(1) There was a general rise in levels of parental aspiration for 
their children both for education and occupation. The proportion of 
household heads wanting college education for their children almost 
doubled from 36 to 69 percent with a corresponding reduction of
those wanting only elementary schooling (29 to 8 percent). Those 
desiring white-collar occupations increased from 31 to 53 percent. 
The reduction in those whose original aspirations were for their 
children to become farmers was from 22 to only 4 percent.
(2) Heightened parental aspirations were also accompanied by 
greater expectations. Those expecting high school education in­
creased from 14 to 30 percent and from 6 to 14 percent for those 
expecting college education. Expectations for white-collar occupa­
tions increased likewise from 6 to 10 percent.
(3) There were more "don 't knows" for expectations than for 
aspirations. Apparently these parents knew what they wanted for 
their children but there was a high degree of uncertainty as to 
whether they could get what they wanted.
(4) Within a six-year period, the shift in aspirations and 
expectations was toward college education and white-collar occupa­
tions. The dreams and expectations of parents for their children were 
definitely away from farming in spite of some improvement in 
material level of living, increased income attributed to increased 
yields by a majority of the respondents and despite their moderniz­
ing outlook in farming. Apparently, even the changes in farm­
ing did not made it attractive enough to make them want their 
own children to be in it. Furthermore, college education which 
they aspired for was not associated w ith farming. As a matter 
of fact, among these farmers, they could not understand why 
persons with college degrees such as agricultural extension workers 
would work in the village and get their feet muddy. However, it is 
too stereotypic to conclude that this college degree and white-collar 
orientation necessarily meant a dislike for manual labor. A more 
plausible explanation seems to lie in the attraction to an occupa­
tional syndrome marked by less physical hardship, greater income 
stability, less exposure to the risk of natural calamities, and in many 
instances, higher income and security for the future. Among some of 
these farmers studied, however, there were those who definitely 
earned more than teachers and government employees in the light of 
recent yield levels they had achieved. Perhaps, it was precisely because 
of these gains in farming that respondents aspired more and expected 
more because they could afford to offer a little  b it more to their 
children.
(5) The biggest differential observed in Table 4.15 is between 
level of aspiration and expectation both for education and occupa­
tion. While 69 percent were for college education, only 14 percent 
expected this to happen, considering their available means of 
livelihood. While 53 percent wished their children could have 
white-collar occupations, only 10 percent expected this to happen. 
When faced with the realities, 25 percent of the parents thought their 
children would also be farmers although only 4 percent wanted them 
to be such.
The other type of differential which can occur but which 
is not shown by the data at hand is that between expectation and 
actual fulfillment. How many of those who expect their children to 
be in white-collar jobs would eventually have the satisfaction of 
seeing them get there? In terms of the larger social issues frequently 
being raised nowadays, which of these two gaps contribute to social 
frustration, the aspiration-expectation gap or the expectation-fu/fill- 
ment gap?
The degree to which fu lfillm ent of aspirations and expectations 
has taken place may be gleaned from a larger study of which 7 
villages reported above were a part.20 In 1968, only 6 percent of 
farmers' children were enrolled in college or had gone to college; 22 
percent were in high school; the rest were in the elementary grades, 
for 9 percent already 7 years old had not yet gone to school.
In terms of occupation, the proportion who were working as 
hired labor increased from 46 percent in 1963 to 55 percent in 1968 
The explanation given by the authors for these two trends was that 
major operations in land preparation such as plowing and harrowing 
were being done more with the hand tractor which was either hired or 
owned. Farming activities were also being performed more in a 
business-like manner. Additional farm labor such as transplanting and 
weeding were now hired and paid. Therefore, instead of helping on 
the family farm for free, other members of the family worked as 
hired laborers for somebody else. This might be the reason for the 10 
percent reduction in the number of children who helped their 
parents on the farm and the 9 percent increase in the children who 
worked as hired laborers. Only 2 percent of the children were in 
white-collar jobs, 10 percent in blue-collar work, and 2 percent 
were farmer-cultivators. The probabilities therefore of farmers' 
children attaining college education and acquiring white-collar 
occupational status were very slim. Their prospects of becoming 
farmer-operators were not very good either due to scarcity of land for
20Farm and Heme Development Office, Rural Change in a Philippine Setting. 
University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture, College, Laguna, 1971.
all the children to cultivate. So far, being a hired farm laborer seemed 
to be a more realistic expectation.
But dreams of fulfillm ent persist regardless of how well 
or how badly rice farmers are doing. Increasing modernization 
in rice farming has not made the occupation encouraging enough 
for farmers themselves to wish it for their children. As a matter 
of fact, improvements in livelihood due to output increases provide 
more resources for educating children away from the farm. The 
desire is still for their children to find a better life through college 
education and non-farm occupation. So far its non-fulfillment seems 
to be accepted. What is the choice, anyway?
F. Income and Life's Amenities
Even if farmers do not keep cost accounts, debit-credit ledgers, 
and farm and home budgets, they seem to have a pretty good idea of 
how they are doing. Of course, the adequacy of one's income 
depends not on its absolute value but more on what one can do with 
it relative to what he wants. When the Laguna farmers in 7 villages21 
were asked to assess their 1969 income compared w ith what they 
had in 1963, 41 percent reported an increase; 28 percent decrease; 
and 31 percent, the same (Table 4.16). They were then asked to state 
reasons for the assessments they made. Fifty-three percent of those 
who said their income decreased attributed it  to poor yield from their 
upland crops and from rice due to the typhoon and the drought (Ta­
ble 4.16). Insufficiency of income due to higher cost of living and lack 
of steady and additional sources of income were also mentioned. 
Although cited only by 9 respondents, the loss of the land or 
reduction of area being cultivated is of concern because we can 
anticipate more of this phenomenon with the increasing population 
pressure on cultivable land.
For a more direct consequence of the improvement in agri­
cultural productivity, Table 4.16 provides encouraging data. Sixty-four 
percent of those who said their income increased attributed it  to 
increased rice yield and 16 percent mentioned additional sources of 
income from farm jobs. Conversion to leasehold was regarded as the 
key to increase income only by 3 percent. What is noteworthy in 
these findings is summarized by one farmer who said: "M y income 
increased when my yield increased. Even if I am a share tenant,
Table 4 16. Farmers' evaluation of 1969 income level compared to 
1963 (370 farmers from 7 Laguna barrios) and reasons 
for their evaluation.
A. Evaluation
1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. The same
Percent
41
28
31
100
B. Reasons fo r saying their income decreased o r remained the same as 1963
Decreased income  
N Percent
2 .
3.
4.
5.
8 .
Income still insufficient 
(increase in cost of living; 
no savings)
No steady and/or additional 
sources of income 
No change in source and 
amount of income 
Poor yield from coconuts, 
bananas due to typhoon and 
in some cases plants have no 
fruits yet
Poor rice yield due mostly to 
the drought and in some 
instances, disease, lack of 
capital and use of old variety 
Farmer is still a share tenant 
No more land being cultivated 
or size of farm being culti­
vated has been reduced 
Illness and old age
18
14
22
31
9
7
101
31
9
_6
100
C. Reasons fo r saying the ir income increased.
1. Increased rice yield
2. Availability of additional 
sources and some livestock
3. Plants such as bananas, coconuts 
and coffee have begun to
bear fruits
4. Increase in wages
5. Share tenant became a lessee
6. Farmer acquired a farm to cultivate 
or increased the area
being cultivated
7. Price of crops has gone up
N
92
23
9
2
147
Same i ncome 
N Percent
18 36
14 9
42
22 6
12
2
3
_3_
113
32
8
40
10
1
2
2
100
Percent
63
16
6
4
4
6
1
100
my share also increased." Bearing in mind that only a few of the 
farmer-respondents were lessees, the majority of those who reported 
increased income due to increased yields were share tenants.
Despite this development, much has to be done to help raise the 
levels of those (59 percent) who felt their income decreased or re­
mained the same. Furthermore, only two farmers paid attention to 
the price of crops. The market orientation therefore needs to be 
enhanced and an alternative to the present system of marketing- 
credit tie-up has to be found. When expected harvests are pegged to 
advanced loans, the creditor and not the farmer dictates the 
price and, therefore, on the part of the farmer, price is not a factor in 
marketing decisions. As a matter of fact, at this point, there is no 
longer any decision-making in marketing.
Closely related to the increase in income levels is the change in 
the material comforts and trappings of everyday life. As it is pic­
turesquely described by A. M. de Guzman:
"Houses in the project are similar to those which can be 
found in most of the poorer barrios in the country. Each home is 
made of light materials like bamboo, buho, nipa or cogon with 
galvanized iron sheets being occasionally used for roofing materials.
"The house is ordinarily a one-to two-room affair, sometimes 
with a makeshift division between the kitchen and the all-important 
multipurpose receiving-dining-bedroom-sala-porch area. Here the 
farmer and his wife may receive their guests, while away their time, 
eat and sleep. Generally what passes for furniture is a bench called a 
'bangko' which if present would be offered to  a visitor. Wallpaper 
consisted of cutouts of favorite screen personalities or faded formal 
photographs with the subjects peering at the camera uneasily and 
stiffly. When night came, the multipurpose living room automatically 
became a bedroom by spreading a large mat which was shared in 
groups by threes or fours, depending on the size of the household. If 
the visitor stayed overnight, the farmer would graciously offer the 
living room and he and his family retired in the kitchen even if  the 
division between the kitchen and his room was more imaginary than 
real. This kitchen had no form of drainage whatsoever and so kitchen 
water remained under the house, creating a very muddy, smelly, 
unsanitary condition. Built with an open hearth of flimsy flammable 
structure, it also had few utensils to speak of. Pots, a basin, two la­
dles, a turner, frying pan, a kettle and a few u tility  plates fo r eating 
and other purposes cluttered the kitchen. A drinking glass or two for 
the entire family completed the setup. Spoons and forks, if there
were any, were reserved for very special occasions. Drinking water 
was usually stored in earthen jars and not always provided with 
a dipper so that one had to dip into the jar with the common drink­
ing glass. Toilets were rarely found and whatever existed were no 
more than dug holes. The majority of the people answered the call 
of nature under bamboo clumps, banana plants and bushes. Stray 
animals always helped dispose of whatever waste there was.''22
Over a six-year period, changes in material level of living had 
become evident. Houses made of more durable materials like wood, 
concrete hollow block and galvanized iron roof had increased from 
5 percent in 1963 to 26 percent in 1969. There were marked 
increases in the proportion of households possessing specific items 
such as chairs, tables, benches, cabinets, bedrooms, beds, kitchen 
drains, kitchen sinks, stoves, radios, sewing machines, toilets, and 
sources of water for household consumption. The improvements 
came not only in quantity but also in kind. An over-all comparison 
of 1963 and 1969 levels of possession of different household items 
shows a doubling (23 to 49 percent) of households having 10 or more 
items. Hence, after six years, and after increased income from 
increased yields, life tor these rice-farming households was still poor 
but less miserably so, at least as far as material comforts are 
concerned.
Shand, commenting on the 41 percent who assessed their 
income as being greater in 1969, 28 percent who said lower and 31 
percent who said the same (Table 4.16), came to the conclusion that 
the average change was close to zero.23 This judgment on the 
magnitude of change is an arithmetical one -  which is filled with 
pitfalls. Following his logic, an average of zero can actually be arrived 
at in three ways such as (a) 50 percent decrease and 50 percent 
increase; (b) 100 percent no change; and (c) 30 percent decrease, 30 
percent the same and 30 percent increase. If change were assessed in 
this manner, it would be d ifficu lt to register any change at all any­
where. As a matter of fact, one of the burning issues generated by 
the green revolution is centered on the "whys" of the increase, de­
crease, and status quo. Table 4.16, for example, indicates that 32 per­
22 a. M. de Guzman, et al.. Work Roles of Barrio Extension Workers in a Cooperative 
Rural Development Project: An Analysis. Farm and Home Development Office. University 
of the Philippines, College of Agriculture, 1969.
2 3 r . T. Shand, "An Interim Judgment," in Technical Change in Asian Agriculture. 
Australian National University Press (forthcoming).
cent of those who reported the same income status attributed this as­
sessment to increase in cost of living and the fact that their income 
was still regarded as insufficient. Those reporting decrease in income 
cited poor rice yield due to drought, disease, lack of capital and use 
of old rice varieties. On the other hand, increased rice yield was held 
as mainly responsible for the increase in income. Considering the 
reasons cited by the rice farmers for the assessment of their 
incomes, a verdict of zero change is hardly acceptable and this 
becomes less so when one looks at perception of status differences 
w ithin the village.
To the question: “ In what ways do you think people in 
your village differ with respect to their status in life? ", the 
most significant response in 1963 was : “ There are no differences in 
status here; we are all poor." (Table 4.17) One-fifth of the respondents 
gave this reply. Thirteen percent did not know how people differed 
in status; 12 percent mentioned differences in tenure status, while a 
total of 21 percent gave responses pertaining to relative wealth or 
poverty. An analysis of the responses belonging to this particular 
category reveals that when they mentioned "r ich " and "poor", it did 
not have the same meanings as rich and poor in the social class sense 
of upper and lower class, because there were no really rich people in 
these barrios. This meaning is evident in such expressions they used 
such as: "some are poor;'' "some are a little  bit better o ff,"  "some 
have sufficient means for everyday needs; others don 't." In other 
words, the concept of rich and poor is really more a matter of some 
being poor while others have a little  more, although many res­
pondents emphasized that there were more people who were poor 
than those who were better-off. The notion of sufficiency- 
insutficiency was related to life subsistence character of existence in 
tnese barrios and sufficiency in the most essential necessities of life 
was already regarded as a better-off situation.
In 1969 only 2 percent of the respondents said there were no 
perceived differences in barrio people's status in life. Apparently, 
there was either more consciousness as to what makes fo r status 
differences or more actual basis for differentiation. Perhaps the 
perception of "being all poor" had become less descriptive of the 
situation in the barrios after 6 years. Besides the marked reduction 
from 20 to 2 percent of respondents who perceived no differences in 
status, the following other changes may be gleaned from the data in 
Table 4.17: (1) a drop from a total of 21 to  14 percent among those
Table 4.17. Rice farmers' perceptions of status differences within the village.
1963 1969
Source o f  status differences --------------------------------  ----------------------
N Percent N  Percent
No perceived differences in status 
Relative wealth or poverty:
72 20 6 2
(a) Some are rich: some are poor
(b) Some are poor; some are a
18 5 13 4
little bit better-off 
(c) Some have sufficient means;
50 14 28 8
others don't 
Status in farming:
9 2 7 2
(a) Difference in tenure status
(b) Differences in size of land
43 12 38 10
being cultivated 3 1 19 5
(c) Differences in yield
(d) Differences in types of farming, 
such as lowland or upland
1 8 2
rice, coconuts, etc. 
Occupations engaged in:
(a) Differences in source of
16 4 3 1
livelihood 20 6 52 14
(b) Employed or unemployed 
Personal outlook in life:
(a) Differences in individuals' 
drive to improve their live­
7 2 6 2
lihood (lazy or industrious) 
(b) Differences in ability to 
take a long-range or short-
29 7 52 14
range view 
(c) Differences in ability to
3 1 4 1
respond to new ideas 
(d) Differences in outlook arising 
from varied places of origin,
6 2 10 3
religion and politics 
Attitudes toward self and others 
in the community (everyman to
10 3 12 3
himself, no unity) 
Availability of capital
25 7 31 9
and resources 2 1 20 6
Luck
Don't know how people differ
1 — 15 4
in status 45 13 38 10
Total 362 100 362 100
mentioning notions of relative wealth or poverty; (2) increase in those 
who became aware of differences in source of livelihood and in those 
who saw differences in individual drive to improve livelihood. Source 
of livelihood differed in terms of farm or non-farm but more with 
respect to whether one was a farmer or a mere farm laborer. The 
distinction from the content of the response was greater in this 
aspect than that between share tenant and lessee. What is crucial for 
being better-off in the barrio was having land to cultivate whether or 
not one owned it. From this study, informal conversations and 
observations,24 "the lowest guy in the totem pole" was he who had 
no land to work on and was therefore dependent on available but 
unstable farm jobs. The increased attention on difference observed in 
individuals' drive to improve their livelihood (from 7 to 14 percent) 
also deserves comment because the responses specifically stated: 
"some are lazy;" "some are industrious"; "some work hard even when 
they already have, while others don't have and yet do not work hard.'' 
This trend might be explained by the fact that with the introduction 
of an agricultural development project, emphasis on improving rice 
production brought certain opportunities for improvement in live­
lihood and therefore there were those who were willing and able to 
take advantage of the opportunities, while others had been less 
responsive or less able.
The third type of change occurred in the emergence of criteria 
which were not or were hardly mentioned in 1963. These include 
difference in size of land being cultivated, differences in yield, and 
availability of capital and other resources. Again here, the 
developments in rice production seem to be relevant. For example, 
farmers w ith bigger areas to cultivate would have that much more 
potential for having more total harvest. Yield differentials were also 
emphasized. Finally, those who had available capital were better able 
to take advantage of new farming methods and business 
opportunities than those who were lacking in such resources.
Data from Gapan, Nueva Ecija are more dramatic with respect 
to farmers' evaluation of their rice profits and their general 
livelihood (Table 4.18). Seventy-five percent claimed their rice profits 
were higher in 1970 than in 1965. This was attributed mainly to high 
yield. Assessment of their level of living for the same periods had a 
similar trend, w ith 69 percent reporting that they were better-off in 
1970 than in 1965. Being better-off was closely tied to increased farm 
income and high yield, with 9 percent mentioning increased off-farm
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income. Reasons for being worse-off focused on low yield. General 
livelihood for people dependent on rice farming was considered 
better-off in 1970 than in 1965 by 77 percent of the respondents. 
The reasons cited again mentioned improved yield. Twenty-nine 
percent dwelt on the effects on standards of living and material 
amenities acquired. The salutary effects of shifting to leasehold was 
specifically mentioned by 13 percent. One would have expected a 
greater salience of this factor, considering that Gapan, Nueva Ecija is 
a pilot area in land reform.
The ups and downs of livelihood in rice-growing villages go with 
the ups and downs in rice yield. In 1971-72 a serious infestation of 
the tungro rice disease brought down all the yields. As indicated in 
Table 4.18, poor harvest was the major reason for being worse-off in 
1971 than in 1970. The seriousness of this calamity may be gauged 
by the fact that 96 percent of the farmers reported lower rice profits 
and consequently lower level of living.
To the watchers of the "green revolution evils," Table 4.18 
provides further fuel to the fire. San Nicolas which was a good 
irrigated village, as expected, showed the highest proportion of 
farmers reporting higher rice profits and higher level of living in 
1970. compared to 1965; however, Mahipon, the rainfed barrio had 
higher proportion reporting similar response than Malimba (irrigated 
but water system has problems). In other words, considering its 
physical disadvantage, the rainfed barrio should have been the least 
likely village to report higher rice profits. What is even more 
amazing is that 97 percent o f the Mahipon farmers claimed that 
livelihood of rice farmers in 1970 was better than in 1965. This 
proportion is higher than for San Nicolas (90 percent) and only 45 
percent for Malimba. Apparently, the rainfed farmers were more 
aware of their gains compared to their 1965 situation, although 
relative to the irrigated barrios, their yields were much lower. On the 
other hand, the farmers in Malimba where an irrigation system was 
located, had greater expectations and more frustrations because the 
irrigation was not well functioning as it should. San Nicolas 
which had good irrigation also had good yield performance. When 
farmers in the 3 villages were asked about the most significant change 
in rice farming since 1966, about 92 percent mentioned this plus the 
shift to leasehold. Their hopes for the future were also pinned on 
the promise of the new technology (Table 4.19), with 95 percent 
expecting higher income in the next 5 years. They also unanimously
Table 4.19. Gapan rice farmers'expectations on income and 
farm improvements.
A. Percent farmers expecting higher income in the next 5 years
Higher 95%
No 5%
N = 193 100%
Reasons for expecting higher income:
(1) Yield-oriented reasons with emphasis on 
new technology and recommended 
production practices
(2) Will work harder
(3) Will have other sources of income
(4) Vague feelings of optimism
B. Can farming still be improved?
Yes 99%
No 1%
N = 193 100%
Ways of improving rice farming:
(1) Sufficient capital 23%
(2) Application of new technology 21%
(3) Solve irrigation/water supply problem 28%
(4) Solve rice disease infestation 10%
(5) Work harder 0%
(6) Mutual cooperation between farmers
and technicians 1%
(7) Cooperation among farmers 1 *
(8) Government help
1% 
100%
(9) Educating farmers
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. cit.
believed that farming could be still improved. Again, their perceived 
means of accomplishing this was a combination of the new 
technology, irrigation water, and sufficient capital.
Again, changes in tenurial structure as one way of improving 
farming did not surface in any of the responses. When asked about 
the major problems they were faced w ith in rice farming, only 1
percent of the farmers mentioned being a share tenant. The most 
frequently mentioned problems were lack of capital, rice disease and 
water supply.
Given a chance to achieve increased incomes, what do rice farm 
families do with their newly found "wealth"? Table 4.20 shows food 
consumption as an obvious priority, w ith children's education, 
payment of long-term debts and purchase of a radio appearing as 
important. Improvements in the house and the purchase of 
household items came next. Seventy-six percent also increased their 
savings. When asked about the source of the means for increased 
consumption, farm income was predominantly mentioned but one 
cannot ignore a good number of farmers who traced their improved 
purchasing power to a combination o f farm and off-farm income. It 
seems so evident that given the income, farmers know what they 
want to do with it. The basic necessities get prior attention. Where 
fewer farmers report increase in rice profits, the accompanying 
amenities are also less, as illustrated in Table 4.21 where Davao del Sur 
has lower proportion of farmers experiencing increase in rice 
profits, level o f living, and purchase of household and farm items.
Table 4.20. Rice farm households' increase in consumption items 
from 1965 to 1970 and source of income for it 
(193 farmers of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.)
Consumption iterns Households reporting increased
(Gapan, consumption o r purchase o f  items
Nueva Ecija) and the ir sources o f  income fo r i t
Percent Farm O ff-farm  Combination  
Num ber o f  to ta l income income o f  the two
reporting reporting
increase Num ber report,ng
1. Food consumption 
Total N = 193
Rice 141
Vegetables 142
Fish 139
Eggs 140
Chicken 140
Pork 124
Beef 97
Canned goods 112
Milk 127
Coffee 127
Cooking oil 136
2. Children's education 107
73 87 2 52
73 87 2 53
72 85 2 52
72 85 2 53
72 85 2 53
64 78 2 44
50 57 2 38
58 68 2 42
64 77 2 48
64 76 2 49
70 82 2 52
55 67 2 38
Table 4.20 (Continuation)
Consumption items Households reporting increased
(Gapan, consumption o r purchase o f  items
Nueva Ecija) and the ir sources o f  income fo r  i t
Percent Farm O ff-farm  Combination
o f to ta l income income o f  the two
Num ber reporting Number reporting
reporting increase
3. House improvement or
new house built 99 51 59 6 34
4. Radio 120 62 75 12 33
5. Sewing machine 56 29 35 2 19
6. Living room set 70 36 42 6 22
7. Dining room set 47 24 27 3 17
8. Clothes cabinet 92 48 54 6 32
9. Gas or electric stove 34 18 25 3 6
10. Bed 16 8 11 2 3
11. Bicycle 16 8 8 - 8
12. Motorcycle or motor
scooter 18 9 11 - 7
13. Bought tractor or other
farm implement 41 21 24 — 17
14. Increased savings 76 39 47 1 28
15. Paid off any long-term
debts 119 62 80 2 37
16. Started new farm
enterprise 10 5 7 - 3
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. c i t
Table 4.21. Percent of farm households reporting increase 
in level of living and consumption items from 
1967 to 1970
Baybay, Leyte Hagonoy, Davao del Sur
Canipa Marcos Tab-ang Sinayawan Beinte Nueve
N - 49 66
—P ercen t-
56 95 66
1. Rice profits 55 38 45 24 32
2. Level of living N o  d a t a 20 35
3. Food consumption 61 48 47 51 38
4. Educ. expenditures 41 33 39 27 23
5. House improvements 45 62 45 12 30
6. Savings 2 - 9 10 9
Canipa
Baybay, Leyte
Marcos Tab-ang
Hagonoy, Davao del Sur 
Sinayawan Beinte Nueve
7. Reduction of indebtedness 49 53 70 N o d a t a
8. Household furniture 
(includes appliances) 45 35 38 8 23
9. Household appliances - - - 41 41
10. T ractor - 1 2 9 6
11. Farm tools and 
equipment 57 51 21 19 2
12. Other farm enterprises 2 2 2 3 6
13. Bicycle 8 - - 19 19
14. Motorcycle or scooter - — - 1 4
Source: Stewart, op. c i t  T. E. Contado and Jaime, op. cit.
The case of Baybay, Leyte is also interesting. Barrio Canipa 
which had the highest percentage of farmers reporting increased rice 
profits was a rainfed barrio until 1967 when a private irrigation pump 
was installed and farmers paid a fee for the water. The new rice 
varieties and the pump irrigation made double-cropping profits 
between 1967 and 1970. Compared with those of Baybay and Hago- 
noy, Gapan farmers seemed to have gained most, relative to how they 
were before HYV. This is understandable because Gapan has more of 
the institutional infrastructure, being a pilot and reform area.
SUMMARY
When the Filipino rice farmer adopted the new rice technology, 
a modernizing outlook in agriculture, new attitudes, aspirations, 
perceptions and amenities in life came along and so did some 
undesirable experiences. This chapter described the nature of these 
changes on the basis of the empirical evidences available. The most 
dramatic but unanticipated change (if one were to go by the social 
scientists' pessimistic prognostications) is the farmer's enthusiastic 
response to the new technology and its accompanying package. This 
development has just about ended the era of the traditionally 
self-sufficient farmer who grew his rice crop on his own, using his 
family labor, his seeds, his carabao, his plow, etc. Now, he has to 
establish links with the outside world for his seeds, inputs, credit,
market, farm equipment, irrigation services, technical advice, and 
other elements considered essential or incidental to modern 
agriculture. From all indications, the Filipino rice farmer is not 
resisting these changes. Willingness to take risks in the interest of 
larger returns has likewise been very evident. A few attempts to 
"compel”  adoption behavior among the reluctant has also led to 
positive attitudes arising from rewarding results in terms of 
production. So far, even adverse experiences with the new 
technology have not resulted in a reversal to the old seeds except 
that in some cases, a pattern of risk avoidance is resorted to by 
reducing inputs.
A progressive farmer has been redefined as one who does not 
avoid indebtedness but one who borrows for productive purposes. 
Credit is now his battle cry. With the greater production potential 
offered by new technology, an experimental outlook has emerged 
side by side with a more vigorous work ethic geared to increasing 
productivity. However, these new opportunities to get ahead in life 
tend to be disequalizing in the sense that farmers no longer need to 
be equally poor. For reasons of differentials in resources or 
responsiveness, there are those who are more able than others to 
take advantage of these opportunities. Despite this, even farmers who 
are relatively disadvantaged compared with others consider them­
selves better-off relative to how they were before.
Rising levels of aspiration and expectations w ith respect to 
productivity and the "good life " are accompanied by greater demand 
for infrastructure and other agricultural services. The farmer's 
definition o f his problems and his prospects for the future lie in 
the application o f what he views as promising new technology and 
the modifications in the institutional and infrastructural framework. 
However, the increasing modernization in rice farming has not 
persuaded farmers that children ought to follow their footsteps. 
Educational and occupational aspirations remain very much away 
from farming even if they know that chances of fu lfillm ent are rather 
slim. It is also obvious that many rice farmers are in rice farming for 
negative rather than positive reasons because for them there are no 
alternative ways of making a living. In the midst of all the 
innovativeness manifested not only in attitudinal but in behavioral 
terms, there is a residual of fatalism-good-luck-bad-luck syndrome 
and man's fate continues to be placed in the hands of God. This is 
interpreted as a reflection of the reality that rice farming in the
Philippine is very much subject to the whims of nature, scientific 
technology notwithstanding.
Although more contractual relationships are emerging, the farm 
business is far from being the "business”  which economists dream of. 
Farmers' assessments of rice profits and level of living have been 
directly associated with the benefits of the new technology rather 
than w ith any other factor. Even in areas where land reform has been 
vigorously pursued, the change in tenurial status has hardly been 
mentioned as a contributory factor to  increased rice profits or 
improved level o f living. It is possible that from the farmer's point of 
view, the shift from share tenancy to leasehold or to 
owner-operatorship is valued as a source of durable security and only 
incidentally as an instrument or an incentive to increased productivity. 
Consumption and enjoyment of life's material amenities go w ith the 
fortunes of good harvest just as a poor harvest means deprivation.
Employment and Income 
Distribution Aspects of the  
New Rice Technology
Many years ago, the world of international development 
expertise was preoccupied mainly with the problem of increasing 
productivity and of winning the race between food and population. 
The development of technology to cope with this crisis was therefore 
of top priority although there were doubts expressed then as to how 
traditional subsistence-oriented farmers would respond to these 
efforts toward modernization. Now, more than 10 years after and 
some ''breakthroughs”  (major, minor or minimal, depending upon 
who is assessing it), we expect such technology not only to solve the 
food problem but also to reduce inequalities and to generate 
employment or at least, not to worsen the status quo while at the 
same time produce food for the exploding population. If the new 
rice technology could accomplish growth, income distribution and 
employment simultaneously, it would indeed make green revolution 
watchers happy. It might also be the greatest miracle of all times.
In order to assess the employment and income distribution 
implications o f the new rice technology, this chapter examines trends 
in mechanization and adoption of recommended farm practices, 
changes in farming status and farm labor patterns, and the role of 
off-farm and non-farm employment. Studies on farm size, labor 
input, yield and income levels associated with the new rice 
technology are also reviewed in regard to the income distribution 
question and the manpower dilemma in rice production is presented.
A. Trends in Mechanization and Adoption of Recommended 
Production Practices
1. Tractorization
A long time ago, man designed machines and other equipment 
in order to lighten the human burden while promoting efficiency and
effectiveness in getting things done. A t present, the fear with respect 
to the developing countries is the labor-displacing effect of such 
machines. In some ways, the societal gains from non-mechanization 
are in conflict with the private rationale for it. The chances that a 
farmer w ill opt for a labor-absorbing technique in the interest of 
promoting ILO's World Employment Program are probably very 
slim. Rather, he would do so for his own reasons defined within his 
environment and socio-cultural institutional framework. It would, 
therefore, be a boon if the effects of his choices contribute to 
employment creation. When one has seen the back-breaking work 
involved in rice production (which has been romanticized in the 
Philippine folksong "Planting rice is never fun, bent from morn till 
the set of sun"), at the individual farm and farmer level, the twin 
demands for liberation from sweat and toil and for labor absorption 
create a disturbing dilemma on the part of those who have to live 
with it. Since the tractor is the most " in "  symbol of mechanized and 
often presumed to be "progressive" Western agriculture, its 
introduction and the consequences of its adoption are currently of 
great concern. Before it is dismissed as a social evil for displacing 
labor, we have to understand at least some of the circumstances 
surrounding its adoption.
In 1965, when hand tractors were beginning to appear more 
frequently in the rice paddies, a study revealed the reasons for 
purchasing these machines. Table 5.1 shows clearly that peace and 
order and physical problems involved in caring for the carabao was as 
important, if not more so, than the desire for greater efficiency and 
additional economic returns. In the three municipalities studied in 
Laguna,1 there was one tractor in 1959; 4 in 1960 and 6 in 1961. 
Then, there was a rapid increase to 50 in 1962, 58 in 1963 and 68 
in 1964. By 1965-66, each farmer in the sample studied owned a 
tractor and the following year, 50 percent of these farmers had 
acquired two or more. The desirability of owning this piece of 
machinery may be gauged from the fact that 88, or 44 percent, of the 
total tractor purchases in 1964-65 among the farmer-respondents, 
were on a cash basis. About 98 percent of these cash purchases came 
from savings and crop sales. One sold a carabao and another sold land 
to buy the tractor. The rest of the purchases were done bv installment 
with down payment coming mostly from crop sales, then savings and
1 Nelly G. Alviar, A Study of Tractor and Carabao Cultivated Farms in Laguna. Paper 
prepared for the Seminar on Economics of Rice Production, IR R I, December 11-13, 1969.
Table 5.1. Reasons for buying hand tractors, 
150 Laguna farmers, 1965.
Percent o f  to ta l respondents 
giving reason
1. Difficulty in the care of the carabao:
carabaos are stolen, poisoned, need
care and feeding 60
2. Saves time in land preparation: works 
faster, easier, cheaper, can work
continuously 44
3. Affects the depth of paddy. The paddy 
becomes shallower with use of hand
tractors over time 24
4. Purchased primarily for own use 21
5. Purchased as a source of income by
renting out 19
6. Suggested and financed by landlord 4
7. To ease the work of the carabao 3
Source: R. Barker, S. S. Johnson, N. Alviar, and N. Orcino, Comparative Economic 
Analysis of Farm Data on the Useof Carabao and Tractors in Lowland Rice Farming. Paper 
prepared for Farm Management Seminar With Focus on Mechanization, Manila, Feb. 24 to 
March 1, 1969.
two from carabao sales. Loans were obtained mainly from the 
landlord, the rural bank, relatives, friends and private moneylenders. 
The installment payments came from crop sales. Doubtless, the 
investments in these tractors were not inconsequential.
The number o f tractors per farm increased from 1.25 for 
1964-65 to 1.44 for 1965-66 to 1.66 for 1966-67. The purchase 
price per tractor went up from F2,544 to F2,935 to F3,225; the 
average horsepower also went up from 4.6 to 4.8 to 5.0. Of greater 
significance is the fact that during the first year o f the survey, there 
was some sharing of tractor purchase. In the second year, each 
farmer owned at least one tractor, and by the third year, 50 percent 
of the operators owned two or more.
Comparing the characteristics of carabao-operated and tractor- 
operated farms, Alviar found the latter twice (4.8 ha.) as large 
as the former (2.3 ha.). The tractor-operated farms were almost 100 
percent double-cropped, while the carabao-operated ones were only 
about 62 percent. In terms of status tenure, 97 percent of carabao 
farms were operated by the tenants, while tractors farms had only 81 
percent operated by tenants. The total man-days per hectare was 77 
for the former and 74 for the latter. For plowing and harrowing, the 
number of man-days were 20 and 13, respectively. This shows a
difference of 7 man-days attributable to tractor use. According to 
Alviar, the economics of tractor use shows that a custom rate of 
P120 per hectare with 12 percent interest and a 7-year life, a tractor 
breaks even if  used in an effective crop area of about 12 hectares. If a 
farmer has only a crop area of 5 hectares, it is not advisable for him /  
to buy a tractor unless he rents it out and serves 10 hectares or more. 
Assuming that it takes 21 days at P8 a day for a carabao to plow and 
harrow a hectare, then a carabao can work on about 10 hectares a 
year at f164  a hectare. It costs less to use a tractor for land 
preparation provided it  is kept as fu lly  occupied as possible. But such 
does not seem to be the case. Data from Laguna for 1964-69 show a 
decreasing trend in number of hours used per year, from a total of 
523 hours in 1964-65 to 345 in 1968-69 (Table 5.2). The decline in 
use was both for on-farm and off-farm although proportionately 
speaking, the total hours devoted to off-farm use remained almost 
the same — more than 40 percent. Majority of the tractors were used 
for less than 500 hours and were serving less than 10 hectares. Under 
such circumstances, tractor use was already uneconomic based on 
earlier calculations. This reduction in area and the reluctance of 
owners to hire them out because they claimed that repair and main­
tenance costs were often higher than income derived from tractor 
hire. Despite this seeming uneconomic investment in the hand 
tractor, why do the farmers purchase tractors at such high costs?
Table 5.2. Average number of hours used per tractor per crop year. 
Laguna, 1964-1969.
Crop-year t
Hours used per year
On-farm I Off-farm Percent o f  to ta l Total
1964-65 376.8 146.4 28 523.2
1965-66 252.8 236.8 48 289.6
1966-67 232.8 216.0 48 448.8
1967-68 224.0 168.8 43 392.8
1968-69 188.0 156.8 46 344.8
Source: Nelly G. Alviar, op. cit.
As Alviar explains it, timeliness is an important aspect 
of tractor use, the costs and gains from which are not easy to
compute directly. Timeliness has reference to the need to accomplish 
land preparation w ithin a much shorter period due to 
double-cropping in a year or 5 crops in two years made possible by 
the introduction of early-maturing varieties. It is also related to 
seasonal labor shortages where crops like coconut or sugar cane 
compete for available labor during the peak seasons.
Some other cultural and institutional factors must be involved 
in tractor use; different parts of the country differ in patterns. 
In a Leyte study, only 2 percent of 171 farmer-respondents used the 
hand tractor. Although there was 100 percent double-cropping, the 
average cultivated rice field was less than one hectare.2 In Davao del 
Sur, almost 90 percent of the farmers were using 2-wheel tractors3 
while in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, 4-wheel tractors were used — 100 
percent in the well-irrigated village, 83 percent in the poorly 
irrigated and only 42 percent in the rainfed village.4 Laguna uses 
practically no 4-wheel tractors, only hand tractors. In Davao, 
Cotabato and Gapan, the practice of custom-hiring tractors is much 
more prevalent then in Laguna where hand tractor ownership is more 
common. Of course, it is reasonable to expect a higher percentage of 
hand-tractor than 4-wheel tractor ownership considering the sizeable 
cost of the latter. Farm size is not an adequate explanation for the 
differences because the average size of tractor-operated farms is even 
larger (4.8 hectares) in Laguna than in Gapan (3 hectares) where 
4-wheel tractors are in greater use.
For added insights into the farm level impact of hand tractors, it 
would be worthwhile to see the seven-year experience in a rural 
development area in villages in Laguna. The first tractor in the place 
was acquired in 1963. A t the end of that year, there were only about 
5 tractors operated for hire. As of 1970, there were 100 tractors in 
the area owned mostly by tenant farmers. The prevailing rate then 
for land preparation on a contract basis was F I 50 per hectare. The 
work involved preparing the land until it was ready for transplanting. 
On a daily basis, the fee was F30. Linder both arrangements, the 
person hiring had to provide breakfast, lunch and two snacks. If the 
tractor was hired w ithout the operator, the fee was F17 per day. In 
this case, the farmer had to hire two operators at F4.00 per day. The 
1970 cost of one tractor was F6,000 and most of the owners bought
2T. E. Contado and R. A. Jaime, op. cit.
2James C. Stewart, op. cit.
4 R. T. Herrera, op. c i t
it on an installment basis. Under this arrangement, there was a down 
payment of P700 and P700 was paid every six months thereafter for 
a period of six years.
A general consciousness of the sizeable investment in the 
tractor and in other new prices of equipment and their depre­
ciation have led to new norms governing their use. A more business­
like relationship is emerging. When asked if tractors are borrowed 
under the traditional mutual exchange of labor, farmers smiled 
and said: "O nly if one's own tractor breaks down is there an 
attempt to borrow someone else's." The tacit understanding is that 
at some future date the other party will reciprocate. This implies 
that if a farmer does not have a tractor, he has no basis for the 
exchange.
A definite hiring price for tractor use, either in cash or in kind, 
has become customary. In the case of sprayers, they can be borrowed 
for free by a friend, relative, compadre or neighbor only once 
or at the most twice. Lender and borrower alike understand the 
potentially disastrous effects for both parties if the application of 
insecticides and rodenticides is misunderstood or mishandled. The 
near effect o f all this has been for farmers to want to purchase their 
own equipment or to rent for a fee, so they can use it regularly 
w ithout embarrassment.5
Besides the use of hand tractors for plowing and harrowing they 
double as a means of transportation. During the off-season months, 
they are used for hauling passengers and rice from the village to the 
town. As of 1970, in one village, 11 Kubota hand tractors with 
improvised trailers attached to them had been the only means of 
transportation since 1966. A total of 10 to 12 persons can be 
accommodated at one time. Kubota owners charge a fare of f0 .25  
per person orP0.30 per cavan of unhulled rice from the village to the 
town. The net earnings from this other function of the hand tractor 
are used to pay the installments on the tractor or to repay loans. To 
service all these vehicles, including hand tractors, jeepneys and 
tricycles in the area, a Caltex gasoline station was installed in 
1968.
2. Credit and Tractorization
At the national level, Barker relates the growth of tractorization
^Felix M. Eslava, Jr. The Sprayer That Was Nearly Rejected: A Case Study prepared 
for a graduate course in Social and Cultural Change. University of the Philippines, College of 
Agriculture, 1969.
in the Philippines to shifts in government policy. From 1959 to 
1962, tractor importation was discouraged by the effect of the peso 
devaluation while the rise in tractor sales from 1962 to 1964 was 
related to expansion of sugar-cane area due to increase in sugar 
prices. Then, the Central Bank of the Philippines negotiated two 
loans with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- 
(/ ment to promote farm mechanization. An initial loan of $5 million 
for the period from April 1, 1966 to May 31, 1968 resulted in a 
sharp increase in tractor sales (Table 5.3). In February 1970, the 
de-facto devaluation of the peso brought a sharp decline in tractor 
sales despite the second CBrlBRD loan worth $12.5 million for the 
period from September 1, 1969 to March 31, 1973.6 Though the 
CB:IBRD loans partly explain the increase in tractor sales, it is far 
from being an adequate explanation. An examination of tractor sales 
and loan releases in Table 5.4 clearly indicates that CB:IBRD loans 
account for only a portion of tractor sales. For example, in 1967 
only, 36 percent of tractors and 24 percent of power tillers sold were 
financed from these loans. For 1968 only, 16 percent of tractor sales 
and more than 12 percent of power tiller sales came from CB:IBRD 
loan releases. The situation in 1969 was even more dramatic because
Table 5.3. Imports of tractors and sales of power tillers in the 
Philippines, 1958-1970.
Year
Four-wheel 
Tractor imports
Power tille r  
sales
1958 735 n.a.
1959 572 n.a.
1960 297 )
1961 102 ) 1505 estimated
1962 262 ) cumulative total
1963 918 ) of power tillers
1964 859 ) sold between
1965 769 ) 1960 and 1965
1966 518
1967 2203
1968 1443
1969 1390
1970 764
Source: Randolph Barker, ef a/., Employment and Mechanization in the Philippine 
Agriculture (Paper prepared for ILO, Oct. 1971).
Original data were obtained from the Bureau of Census and Statistics and 
Agricultural Machinery Dealers Association, Manila.
^Randolph Barker, Labor Absorption in Philippine Agriculture. Paper prepared for 
the Workshop on Manpower and Human Resources. Los Bafios, Laguna, October 13-15, 
1972.
there were only 54 and 34 loan releases but tractor sales were 1358 
and power tillers sold were 910. The floating rate in 1970 neither 
explains the increase in tractor imports from 982 in 1970 to 1065 in 
1971 and increase in sales from 987 to 1086, although there was 
a decline in power tiller sales from 475 in 1970 to 258 in 1971.
Another evidence which mitigates the role of the CB:IBRD 
loans in the increasing tractorization is the fact that the total 
withdrawals from the IBRD loan was F19,531,225.76 as of March 
1972. The total amount available was $5 million or at least P30 
million equivalent. For the second CB:IBRD Credit Program covering 
the quarter ending March 31, 1972, the total withdrawals amounted 
to only P18 million, while the total amount available was P80 million 
up to March 31, 1973. This means that the loans were only partially 
utilized even when tractors and power tillers were purchased. There 
is a strong suggestion that financing came from elsewhere and the 
IBRD loan could hardly be held as total sources of the tractor 
purchases.
Since the CB:IBRD loan program offers only a very partial 
explanation for the increase in tractor sales, what else could explain 
this development? Again, an examination of tractor import and sales 
figures in Table 5.4 reveals the spurts in 1967-1969. This coincides
Table 5.4 Annual sales of power units and number of mechanization loans 
released under CB:IBRD credit program.
No. o f  loans
Year Total Total Inven­ Tota l Sales released fo r
im ports sales to ry power tille rs tractors tillers
1960 297
1961 102 813 (711)
1962 262 994 (732) (Estimated
1963 918 863 55 cumulative
1964 859 950 ( 91) total of power
1965 769 607 162 1505 tillers sold
1960-65)
1966 518 664 (146) 1932 72 126
1967 2203 1531 672 3058 560 724
1968 1443 1630 (187) 1873 265 228
1969 1390 1358 ( 32) 910 54 34
1970 982 978 4 475 150 42
1971 1065 1086 21 258 (Jan.-May) 251 109
Source: IRRI Dept, of Agricultural Engineering Economic Research 1973. Data were 
from the Bureau of the Census and Statistics and Agricultural Machinery Dealers 
Association, Radiowealth, Inc.
with the sugar boom as well as with the advent of HYV's and the 
intensification of the rice production drive. One could, therefore, 
speculate that these two developments could have encouraged the 
agricultural machinery dealers to meet an anticipated demand for 
their wares. Probably the existing government policy at that time was 
not such as to dampen this enthusiasm.
What should be of equal if not greater concern is not just 
tractorization but the tendency for loans to be used for purchasing 
big tractors rather than power tillers. Forty-five percent of the 
CB:IBRD loan releases which make up 69.2 percent of the total 
amount released for the period 1966-'1971 went to 4-wheel tractors 
and only 18.3 percent of the releases making up 6-9 percent of the 
total amount released went to power tillers. Furthermore, 63.7 
percent of the loan releases went to Luzon; 21.0 percent to Visayas 
and 15.3 percent to Mindanao. Sixty-seven percent of the total 
amount of loan releases went to Luzon; 22.6 percent to Visayas and 
10.3 percent to Mindanao. Therefore, as far as the CB:IBRD loans 
are concerned, they have gone mostly for large tractors with greater 
concentration in Luzon than in the Visayas and Mindanao. Consider­
ing that rice lands are more predominant than sugar in Luzon, one 
might infer that these tractors are being harnessed for rice pro­
duction. Farm level studies would substantiate this inference because 
of the popular use of tractors for land preparation in Central Luzon.
Although we know the trends at the aggregate level, farm level 
studies w ill give us information on tractor use and ownership. An 
IRRI survey of 142 respondents from among a population of 500 
tractor owners in a high tractor density area in Nueva Ecija provides 
a picture of the local situation (Table 5.5). Supportive of the aggregate 
findings is the prevalence of the heavy over the light machines, with 
newer tractors having almost twice as much horsepower as the older 
one and naturally at a much higher cost. Eighty-eight percent of the 
tractor owners are farmers, almost all of whom are owner-operators 
who cultivate an average area of 28 hectares. It is significant that 78 
percent of the farmer tractor owners use their machines also for 
custom service besides the ten non-farm full-time custom service 
operators. The latter travel as far as 500 kilometers in search of work 
for their tractors. They move from one area to another according to 
the cropping pattern in the area. Although the data indicate heavier 
tractors in the irrigated areas, 40 percent of the light machines are 
located on the rainfed land. Considering that the area being
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.
double-cropped is only about 50 percent, demands on power for 
double-cropping cannot be a thoroughly convincing argument for the 
degree of tractorization which has occurred. Just as expected, the 
average number of persons employed by tractors is only 5 (including 
2 farm laborers and 3 tractor drivers).
The average capital expenditure was P35,547 for each machine. 
Further suggestion of possible economic irrationality in tractor 
acquisition is the relatively low level of utilization which averages 
only about less than 6 months, w ith the lighter machines enjoying 
longer use than the medium (5 months) and the heavy (5.9 months) 
ones. Only 25 percent of the tractor's working days are spent on 
their own farms during the wet season and 16 percent during the dry 
season. The rest of the days are on off-farm work. The IRRI study 
also points out that most tractor owners buy pieces of equipment 
which they seldom use. For example, 65 percent of them have disc 
plows but only 29 percent use the tractor for plowing. The rotavator 
is supposed to be more effective for tillage under wetland conditions. 
In the case of the harrow, although 20 percent of them own it, ma­
jo rity  of the farmers still maintain carabaos to do the harrowing.
Aggregate figures on tractors sales and CB:IBRD loan releases 
show that 73 percent of the tractors were financed from these 
loans. Understandably, only 15 percent bought on a cash basis 
and 85 percent did so on installment. Incidentally, the March 1972 
Progress Report on the CB:IBRD Farm Mechanization Program 
registered P19,531,225 as total amount released but loans out­
standing as of March 31, 1972 totaled ^13,797,596 and loans past 
due the same date, P4,866,144. Considering what appears to be less 
than economically rational aspects of tractor purchase, one wonders 
how much of these loans could actually be repaid from proceeds of 
tractor use either on-farm or off-farm. The role of the agricultural 
machinery dealer in the choices made by the farmers cannot be 
ignored and perhaps needs to be paid attention to as much as 
government policy on credit and mechanization.
3. The Adoption o f Recommended Practices
To raise productivity levels, a package of practices was 
developed to accompany the new seed. The latter was never meant to 
be a single ingredient. However, the adoption of these cultural 
practices has been a source of apprehension among employment 
experts because of their potential labor-displacing effects. What is 
often forgotten in the wake of such fears is that rice production in
the past had been mostly a plow-plant-and-wait-for-the-harvest 
process w ith not much care being given to the rice plant. For 
example, the introduction of herbicides is considered labor-reducing. 
Actually, weeding operations by whatever method absorbs labor 
especially when one considers that there was little  or no weeding 
being done before. Of course, some methods require more labor than 
others but which farmer would opt for a more expensive choice if 
institutional, technological and wage factors prevailing in a particular 
locale dictate otherwise? An IRRI study on weeding practices in 
1966 and 1970 illustrates precisely this point (Table 5.6). In Laguna, 
for example, there are no nonweeders and nobody used chemicals 
only as o f 1970. Instead, they used a combination of hand, rotary 
weeder and chemicals. Straight-row planting is practiced everywhere 
in Laguna although some of the transplanting is not done in two-way 
straight rows. The local custom of giving weeders the option to
Table 5.6 Method of weeding used by 153 farmers in Laguna survey 
and by 76 farmers in Central-Luzon surveys, 1966 and 1970, wet season.
Laguna Central Luzon-Laguna
1966 1970 1966 1970
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Chemical only (1) 39 25 0 0 3 4 2 3
Hand only (2) 12 8 1 1 40 53 28 37
Rotary weeder only (3) 9 6 2 1 3 4 0 0
(1) + (2) 38 25 23 15 7 9 21 28
(1) + (3) 34 22 17 11 0 0 1 1
(2) + 13) 1 1 4 3 1 1 5 7
(1) + (2) + (3) 20 13 106 69 3 4 7 9
No weeding 0 0 0 0 19 25 12 16
Total 153 100 153 100 76 100 76 100
Source: Ricardo A. Guino and Wm. H. Meyers, The IEffect of the New Rice
Technology on Farm Employment and Mechanization. IR R I, Saturday Seminar, December 
4, 1971.
harvest has minimized the use of herbicides and reinforced the 
ongoing practice of straight-row planting and rotary weeder. An 
economic calculation of this custom would yield an unfavorable 
balance for the farmer compared to the harvester, but this is a social 
device for sharing the harvest w ith the other members of the 
community -  a redistribution of "wealth" in a way. But the age-old 
practice of having neighbors and relatives perform the weeding 
operations in the field so that they also have the privilege of
harvesting the same field is coming under scrutiny. The farmer now 
sees the advantages of specifically hiring labor to perform the 
weeding so he could obtain timely, effective and better-supervised 
services. Under the traditional arrangement, the farmer is somehow 
constrained by long-standing personal relationship from demanding a 
new quality o f work. Actually, the system of paying in rice rather 
than in cash has also been found to be expensive, for there is a 
custom of measuring the harvester's share in more tightly packed 
cans than the farmer's share. Hiring labor to perform weeding, 
however, means more cash outlay which is hard to obtain.7
An IRRI analysis concluded that the economic advantage 
o f using herbicides compared with hand weeding is principally 
decided by the cost of the labor for hand weeding and the amount of 
labor saved by substituting herbicides for hand weeding. If the cost 
of herbicide is P70 per hectare and if  labor is hired for weeding at 
T3.50 per day, then it would be more profitable to use the herbicide 
than to hire 175 hours or more of labor to do the job. (Table 5.7). 
However, if only 125 hours are used for hand weeding it would pay 
to continue hand weeding. If the price of herbicide falls to P30 per 
hectare and the wage rate remains the same, it  now pays to use 
herbicide when the labor saved by hand weeding is comparatively 
small. The drop in herbicide price from F70 to P30 is likely to have 
an impact on increased use of herbicides.8
These estimates, however, assume that hired labor for weeding 
is available when needed and that the farmer has the cash to pay for
Table 5.7. Cost per hectare of hand weeding at different weeding 
intensities and farm wage rates.
D aily farm  
wage rate 
P 75
Cost o f  weeding (P/ha) 
Hours fo r hand weeding 
125 175 225
2 19 31 44 56
3 28 47 66 84
4 38 62 88 112
Source: Department of Agricultural Economics, Annual Report, 1969, IRR I.
7G. T. Castillo, The New Rice Technology and Patterns of Rural Life in the 
Philippines, Rice Science, and Man. IR R I, Los Banos, Philippines, 1972.
^Department of Agricultural Economics Annual Report, 1969, IR R I.
it. Furthermore, it  does not take into account the customary 
weeding-harvesting option practiced in certain localities which acts as 
social pressure against herbicides. Another assumption in the 
computation is that farmers would apply the recommended amount 
of herbicides. Actually, the Gapan farmers who are predominantly 
herbicide users apply only minimal amounts. One look at their rice 
fields tells us that the weeds only "smell”  the herbicides and are not 
about to die from it. Again, effective use of these chemicals requires 
sufficient dosages applied at appropriate times. This needs more 
capital and more labor, both of which are expensive, hence the 
farmer (or his family members) performs the herbicide operation 
himself using minimal amounts. This saves capital and labor but does 
little  to stop the weeds. A similar situation exists in Davao del Sur 
where practically everyone uses herbicides. Leyte is more like Laguna 
in favoring straight-row planting and rotary weeding. The weeding- 
harvesting option is practiced there too (Table 5.8).
In the same table, both the Gapan and Leyte villages definitely 
show increase in the proportion of farmers using chemicals, fertilizer, 
insecticides, and weeding devices. In Davao del Sur, the down­
ward trend in fertilizer use and straight-row planting is explained 
by Stewart as risk-avoidance and lack of capital due to successive 
crop failures. Landlords in this area do not assume any share in the 
production costs because the sharing system is such that one-third of 
the produce goes to the landlords and two-thirds to the tenant.9 
These cultural practices which accompany the new seeds are by 
nature labor absorbing. Unlike the traditional varieties whose care 
was le ft mainly in the hands of God, the new ones perform best 
when lavished with "tender, loving care" so to speak. As a matter of 
fact, one o f the most important changes brought along by the new 
seeds was the tendency to adopt more of the package practices 
than they did before. The mere adoption of practices which were not 
used before is already an important change. The next step is to 
intensify or improve the manner with which such methods are 
pursued. This means more timely and more thorough weeding, more 
timely and more appropriate insect control measures, etc. Again, all 
these require even higher labor inputs and therefore at this point, the 
farmer begins to look for labor-saving measures. Who wouldn't?
Another practice which is a favorite of back-to-nature advo­
cates is the use of organic fertilizer. In Table 5.8, one can see that
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in Leyte and Davao del Sur hardly anyone used it. In Gapan, some 
farmers from Malimba and San Nicolas adopted the practice before 
HYV but by 1971, it had been dropped. Mahipon, the rainfed village, 
continued on with 93 percent of the farmers and despite the fact 
that all of them use chemical fertilizer. For them it's not an either-or 
but a combination of both. What accounts for this exceptional 
behavior of Mahipon farmers? Herrera attributed the use o f organic 
fertilizer, especially carabao manure, to the following factors:
"(a) Hauling of organic fertilizer is not much of a problem as 
the farmers' houses are usually right on the farm;
(b) Being the farthest barrio from the town proper, it  is 
relatively d ifficu lt to bring in chemical fertilizers consider­
ing cost, time and effort in transporting them, hence the 
necessity of using available organic fertilizer;
(c) As a rainfed barrio, the use of organic fertilizer involves 
less risk compared to chemical fertilizer since the farmer 
needs no capital; and
(d) Influence of a resident farm management technician who 
gives advice on the merits of different types of fer­
tilizers.” 10
Another important factor which Herrera failed to mention is that the 
rainfed-single-crop situation leaves more time for the farmers to 
indulge in organic fertilizer hauling and spreading in the field. A 
labor-absorbing practice is, therefore, afforded.
Another interesting observation in Table 5.8 is that Leyte farmers 
apply insecticides but few use sprayers. They are probably utilizing 
systemic chemicals which are dissolved and borne through the 
water and, therefore, need not be sprayed. Whether this is more 
labor-consuming than the sprayed kind is rather unclear. Even the 
introduction of an irrigation pump is labor-absorbing not only be­
cause someone needs to operate and look after the pump but more 
because the presence of water where it did not exist before, enables 
farmers to adopt many of the practices they would not have been 
able to do otherwise. The effective applications of fertilizer, chemi 
cals and weeding are all dependent on water.
An additional input which is seldom reckoned in the com­
putation of man-days is the day-to-day visits which the farmer makes 
to his field. There is no questionjthatjnore of this is being done now 
than five or six years ago. What this means is expressed by one 
farmer who said that frequent inspections of his crop give him a
chance to spot problems such as disease, weeds, lack o f fertilizers, 
and water, and enable him to apply remedial measures immediately 
before the situation goes beyond repair. Barker et a!., for instance, 
found no significant difference in nitrogen input and farm size 
between the top and bottom yielders in the same village. However, 
(_they found distance of house from the farm a significant factor. 
Among the group of lowest yielders there were many cases where it 
required half an hour or more to walk to the field. The suggestion from 
these results is that given the same physical conditions, close
day-to-day management of the crop conributes to better yields.11 It 
is also very possible that higher production expenses stimulate more 
frequent field supervision in order to minimize losses from sizeable 
investments. It is a risk-reducing measure. Stewart likewise reports 
that with the adoption of HYV's additional labor has been devoted 
to the care of the growing plant in the form of spraying and other
types o f pest control, weeding and simply visiting the fields more
often for inspection purposes.12
Table 5.9 shows a more detailed picture of the adoption pattern, 
extent of mechanization and relation to irrigation and use of HYV. 
Among the trends evident in this table are:
(1) The unirrigated barrios of Sta. Cruz, Kapalangan and 
Mahipon, which reported lower percentage of farms 
planted to HYV as of 1970, showed the highest use of 
mechanical threshers and lowest use of herbicides, 
insecticides and fertilizers.
(2) Barrio Mangino stands out in its use of straight-row 
plant ing and mechanical weeding. As mentioned 
previously, these practices are relatively rare in Gapan. The 
only explanation for their use in Mangino is that these 
practices were introduced by a rural reconstruction worker 
who was once assigned to the barrio. What is remarkable is 
the non-diffusion of the innovation to adjacent barrios. 
As pointed out earlier, Gapan farmers spend practically 
nothing for herbicides and do not do much mechanical 
weeding either. Apparently, the importance of weeding has 
not been effectively communicated.
(3) The pattern of tractor use is not related to percentage of 
________ adoption of HYV but rather to the quality of irrigation
11 R. Barker et al., op. cit.
^2j. Stewart, op. cit.
Ta
bl
e 
5.
9.
 A
ve
ra
ge
 
yi
el
d,
 i
np
ut
 
le
ve
l, 
an
d 
far
m 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
in 
10 
ba
rri
os
 
of 
G
ap
an
, 
19
70
, 
we
t 
se
as
on
.
o’Q. tS
§
to 5Q.
2 *
.C
1
P
I  *>- -S 
0. 6?
9 m •«
f  «j; «.■C <o
13
■9 n!
R 2>-
I  I
U. C
"O c  ■$ 5 ni
£ * ^
QQ
O T J - O O C N O O O O O
r* »- »- q  q  i-e cq
p*-’ p*’ co oo o  cm’ ^  o  O
CM
p*. cq cq cq p*» cq 05 cn
p-’ cn o  lo o ’ ib  co ib o  o>
t -  r -  p* r**
03 03 03 LO 03 r-
LO T— «—' P-’ o o o p- 03 oT— CN LO CN *“ *—
CO CN P* CN
CO CN O o r— O o O
o cq o CO q q P-
oLO *!■ o p*‘
COCN cbCN 03CN *■' cb
03 CO cq co. CN cq <3* LO
CN CN CN r“’ r" o o o
LO LO LO cq o CO co «. 00
CO CO CO CN CO CO CO CN CN CN
CN P* 03 03 CO p*; o P- p* o
r-‘ 03 00 00 cb LO cb ib cb T-
LO 03 CN LO CN cq LO cq q
p*‘ 03 03 03 P*’ ib p»* CO* ib
CN LO 03 03 cq T- O) q q o
COp* CNCO
COCO 8 §
p*LO p-CN p**r— oCN
CN O 03 03 r* p* 03 q CN
COP- s COCO
LO
*fr S?
P**LO cbCN 03 cbCN
iq cq q CO CO
8 8 8 t03
CN03 8 03 00p^ P»*
?—
T— r—
03 CO CO 03 o P* 03 o CO
COCO 3 s 03LO P»LO LO*LO S cb<3- cb o
Z  00 
o' o'
O
o
c/)
oc
03
c I  1
D
CJ 1 §• (0 •—
a  -c
>ro■o
13
cdc/)
op*-
03
s
03
z
c(0
aCD
O
c
al
CL05c
O
n
O 03 O -
— CO . T—
j a -
j? t  0) QJ .Q =  -* C m fc c 
CD QJ 
^  CD U O Q)
s .01 °
2 8 Q=
|  d E  
-o to *
C
Eaj
C/3
Ta
bl
e 
5.
 1
0 
Di
ffe
re
nc
es
 
in 
la
bo
r 
in
pu
ts
, 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
an
d 
m
ec
ha
ni
za
tio
n 
lev
els
 
be
tw
ee
n 
lo
ca
l 
an
d 
HY
V 
in 
19
66
 
an
d 
19
70
, 
we
t 
se
as
on
. 
C
en
tr
al
 L
uz
on
, 
an
d 
La
gu
na
.
e
Si. 3 
, 51
,c
vs
1
iS
I
o „
-J
.c
V *C3  ^£ £ I  s i
'Q -c
 ^ (tj £
-c
I s !^  5 5J i: ^4. K "S
I s
-J I  
£ 
a
I  £
in «-
If) CD
0 ) ^ - 0 )  r*
S ep CN Oco
O) CO O) Is*
r-‘ CN CN CN
s oo co o) O) co r** cnLD CD LD CD CD CD CD
C O C D O L D C N C D - r - l D
' “ C O C N C O C N C O C N C O
C O O O i l D O O r ^ O O L D
ID CO P"* ^  CO CO r- r- 
CO CN t- CO r- CO
iDCDr^iDP^or^oo*— 0 ) r“ O * “ O * — CD
r ^ c o o r ^ o c o o c o
T - r - r - r - r - f N r - C N
*  CO 00 ID 
CN CN
CD LD CO CD
p" CO LD r-
8 S 2 5 >  _
<
&p
CC
CC
5
"O
E
o*
a
E
UJ
&o
oc
-6
a>
h-
o 2
-9 a
5 4S 
I S
I*
?  e  C  Q)
s >  s «
» x
ii
I I
!v o
-C  c
S oiiQ. <  O)
-S *"•.. V *
o a3
cn CC
-S °2  CD
Ta
bl
e 
5.
11
 
La
bo
r 
in
pu
t 
an
d 
m
ec
ha
ni
za
tio
n 
on 
76 
fa
rm
s 
in 
C
en
tr
al
 L
uz
on
 
an
d 
La
gu
na
 
Pr
ov
in
ce
,
19
66
-6
7 
an
d 
19
70
-7
1 
cro
p 
ye
ar
.
£
kS> WQj
F I  
I  I  
0)
.c
*Q *- 
4 !
J
5
,|
«LO
1^
i2
l ^ . r
M l  
5 I
<b A, 0)
O 2
£
13
c<tj o  .s; 
•J jj w
a
*  fcs. Cb
O Q.
I  45
JP
O  CO C O C O  O  CO CO ofr cn *-
Ps CO CD 00 o- CD CD CO
LO
CN CN
G)
cn in
CN CN
O
°
CO o  
cd r- 
G) O)
0 0  IS . 
«- CN
O CD 
LO
CD Tf 
CN CN
CD O  
CD r* 
CD O)
D- O 
LO
CO rs 
CD CO
co »-
CN
in
CN CN
I
8 5?
*- o
co ps
CN CN
CD CD 
«- CN
0) CD 
«“ CN
CD CO 
«“ CN
CO O
co r-
CD CD
CD CN 
*- CN
Q
I
40
l
i
CO CD 
CN CN
CD
CO ps 
CO CD
CO CO 
CN CN
in cp
CN CN
£ S
CD CO 
«- CN
CD O  
CD Ps 
CD G)
CD is. 
«- CN
CD CD 
ps |s
CD O  
CD Ps 
CD CD
So
ur
ce
: 
Ra
nd
ol
ph
 
Ba
rk
er
, 
La
bo
r 
Ab
so
rp
tio
n 
in 
Ph
ili
pp
in
e 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
. 
Pa
pe
r 
pr
ep
ar
ed
 
fo
r 
the
 
W
or
ks
ho
p 
on 
M
an
po
w
er
 a
nd
 
Hu
m
an
 
Re
so
ur
ce
s,
 
Lo
s 
Ba
fio
s,
 
La
gu
na
, 
O
ct
. 
13
-1
5,
 
19
72
.
The first four barrios have better irrigation.
(4) Higher fertilizer use is directly related to HYV adoption 
and quality of irrigation.
When total labor inputs for local varieties and HYV are 
compared, there is a difference of six man-days in favor of HYV, 
with the increase coming from weeding, harvesting and threshing, 
(Table 5.10). The number of farmers using mechanical threshers 
declined from 69 to 55 percent. The extent of tractorization 
remained the same for both local varieties and HYV in 1970, but 
showed a great increase from 14 percent in 1966 to 49 percent in 
1970. The other noticeable trend is the increase in the proportion of 
man-days using hired labor (from 59 to 63 percent).
More than any other single factor in rice production, double­
cropping has added to labor input. For example, Table 5.11. In 
irrigated one-crop areas 63 man-days were used in 1966 and this 
increased to 67 in 1970. But in irrigated two-crop areas there were 
70 and 71 man-days for wet and dry seasons, respectively. There was 
an increase not only from 1966 to 1970 but a doubling of labor 
requirements in cases where farms changed from single- to double­
cropping, i.e., from 67 man-days of one-crop irrigation to a total of 
141 man-days for both wet and dry seasons. Increases in labor input 
occurred from 1966 to 1970 both in the one-crop and double­
cropped irrigated areas but the addition of a second crop where there 
was none before meant a doubling of man-days required for the crop 
year.
The average yield difference in 1964-66 between rainfed and 
irrigated areas was about 11.12 cavans per hectare (Table 5.12). For 
1968-70 this difference widened to 13.6 cavans. Despite the higher
Table 5.12. Philippine average yields per hectare by variety and irrigation,
1964-1970.
1964-66 1968-70
Average
cavans/ha
Average Local H Y V
Irrigated lowland 38.59 41.54 38.54 45.40
Rainfed lowland 27.47 29.06 28.60 31.76
Source: Computed from C. Crisostomo and R. Barker, Growth in Philippine 
Agricultural and Rice Productivity: The Impact of the HYV's. IRRI  Saturday Seminar, Nov. 
27. 1971.
yield of HYV compared to local, the yield levels are very far from 
satisfactory considering what the potentials are. The 3-cavan d if­
ference between HYV and local for the rainfed areas is small but to 
rainfed farmers, it is probably a significant improvement or else, 
adoption of HYV's in rainfed areas would not have taken place as 
much as it  has.
B. The Mechanical Thresher: An Antecedent to Intermediate Tech­
nology13
The presence of the big McCormick mechanical thresher in 
Gapan, Nueva Ecija is a study in itself. But whatever its social, labor 
and economic implications are, its introduction has nothing to do 
with HYV's because this machine had been commonly used in the 
place long before World War II. The more relevant question is: What 
has made it stay the way it has?
In the Gapan area, the two most common methods of threshing 
are the hampas or hand flailing and the tilyadora or the McCormick 
thresher. In the former system, the harvesting and threshing are 
usually done by the same person who threshes whatever he has 
harvested. The crop is threshed immediately after harvest and sharing 
is done after threshing. The arrangement is such that the harvester- 
threshers get 20 out of every 100 cavans or one-fifth of whatever 
they threshed. If cash is paid to them, the rates are P3.00 a day 
excluding meals or P2.50 a day including meals. The hampas method 
prevails during the wet season when the ground is soft and wet and 
the tilyadora cannot reach the fields.
In the dry season, the McCormick thresher does the job. Contra­
ry to what one might expect from large machinery, a lot of labor is 
involved before the thresher could perform its operation. Harvesting 
is done manually with a custom wage rate of 5 cavans for every one 
cavan of seeds used for transplanting a particular area. This roughly 
means a payment of 5 cavans per hectare harvested. Such a peculiar 
way of determining the harvester's pay leads to an understatement of 
the amount of seeds used. In most cases, the crop is handled four 
times from harvesting to final stacking: handling during harvesting, 
tying into bundles, preparing of small piles and making final stacks 
small or big. Stacking is usually done by the farmer himself w ith the
I^This section draws primarily from the studies of Lorna P. Domingo, Rice Farmers' 
Response to the Introduction of Intermediate Technology in the Land Reform Area of 
Nueva Ecija, University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture, Dec. 1972; and R. T. 
Herrera, op. c i t
mutual exchange labor from co-farmers. If stacking is hired, the cost 
is about 3 cavans per hectare of area harvested. The regular fee paid 
for the McCormick is 3 to 5 percent of the total amount threshed. 
All the handling operations take place during the intervening period 
between harvesting and threshing. The length of this time lag ranges 
from less than a week to three months (average almost 3 weeks), 
depending on when the tilyadora could reach and service them. An 
additional service usually rendered by the thresher owner is the 
hauling of threshed rice from the place of threshing to the farmer's 
house, using the truck which pulls the thresher. This is quite a saving 
on the part of the farmer because the usual hauling fee is PI .00 per 
cavan.
During the wet season, when many of the fields are too wet to 
be reached by the services of the tilyadora, farmers hire people to 
haul their harvest to the site of the machine. Most of them hire 15 to 
20 people to haul a hectare's harvest in one day at P3.00 each or 5 
people w ith bullcarts at P5.00 each. Where farmers have to wait for 
the tilyadora to come to certain specified sites, many consider 
it advantageous to make big haystacks of the harvested rice 
stalks. Among the advantages cited were: lessened movement of the 
tilyadora, thus hastening threshing; lessened spillage; less exposure to 
rain of rice stalks kept in big haystacks; and minimized efforts 
expended by tilyadora operators, since the rice stalks to be threshed 
are concentrated in a few places where big stacks are ready for 
threshing. Because of the size of the tilyadora, moving it from one 
place to another is quite a problem. The preparation of these big 
stacks is an additional expense because seven people are hired to 
make them. They usually ask for payment in rice or are given free 
lunch and snacks which cost as much as P20-P30. In the interval 
period between the harvesting and the threshing, another process 
comes in, i.e., the drying. Most farmers prefer to dry the rice before 
threshing whether by hand flailing or by machine. But while waiting 
for the tilyadora, drying takes place anyway. More specifically, the 
farmers consider drying before threshing advantageous because the 
grains shatter easily when dry; the rice could be stored immediately 
after threshing; less grains remain with the straw, hence less wastage; 
discoloration and grain damage are minimized, thus the rice 
commands a better price.
All told, while the McCormick machine is an efficient thresher, 
the labor requirements before the actual threshing can take place are 
considerable. When the costs of using the hampas method and the
tilyadora are compared, assuming a 100-cavan. yield per hectare, 20 
cavans go to the harvester-thresher under the hampas method. On the 
other hand, the tilyadora costs for the 100 cavans are : 5 cavans for 
the harvester, 3 cavans for the piling and stacking and 5 cavans as the 
thresher's fee. This amounts to a total of 13 cavans, or 7 cavans less 
than the cost of using the manual harvester-thresher. In addition, free 
or discounted cost of hauling threshed rice to the farmer's house and 
free use of sacks and thread are further privileges which the farmers 
enjoy when they patronize the tilyadora. Roughly, this large machine 
is efficient in its job while at the same time absorbing much labor in 
pre-threshing tasks. On the part of the farmer, the cost of using the 
thresher is lower than that of the manual method. However, one 
cannot deny the high capital cost involved in the purchase of the 
machine. Its social cost is higher than the non-mechanized method of 
threshing.
Given these two extreme alternatives of physical labor and the 
use of a large imported machine, a search for something in-between 
was embarked upon. As the rationale for the program states: "Labor 
inputs presently constitute the largest cash cost in the production of 
rice. The increase in minimum wage for agricultural labor has also 
tended to augment the shares of total cash outlays going to labor. 
This creates an atmosphere within which an intermediate technology 
which w ill reduce costs or increase output and revenues becomes 
highly desirable. In response to this emerging need, the IRRI is 
developing a number of machines such as the table thresher, the row 
seeder and the grain cleaner which are capable of providing increased 
labor productivity w ith low investment requirements w ithout the 
concomitant scale labor displacement at high operational costs." In 
this connection, a pilot program for the evaluation and testing of 
improved agricultural machinery designs in the land reform area of 
Nueva Ecija, was launched in 1972.
The Domingo follow-up study of farmers' responses to the 
table thresher provides clues to some of the problems in developing 
“ in-between" technology.
To introduce the table thresher, the FACOMAS (Farmers' 
Cooperative Marketing Association) were invited to participate. Of 
the 20 table threshers delivered for trial in the dry season of 1970, 
only 11 were used by 23 farmers. In the following wet season, the 
number of users was reduced to 14 w ith 7 new ones; thus, only 7 out 
of the original 23 users continued using the machine. The rest would 
like to see it again in the next wet season when tilyadoras are not
available. The reasons for the rejection of the table thresher (20 
delivered, only 11 were used) are quite revealing:
(1) In one FACOMA, the matter of the table thresher was 
discussed with a representative from hired labor. Predictably, 
he opposed the acquisition of the machine lest it reduce their 
earnings if not tota lly displace them, since hired labor was performing 
the harvesting, threshing and winnowing tasks in the community. 
The FACOMA manager himself said that he would utilize available 
family labor if there was a table thresher. Peace and order conditions 
being what they were at the time, the manager feared that hired 
laborers would steal the motor or sabotage the whole machine.
(2) Technical difficulties in operating the machine. The 
complaints aired were: d ifficu lty  of transporting the table thresher 
because it was heavy, unstable, and there was not sufficient area to 
hold on; threshed rice needed cleaning and winnowing; operators and 
helpers got rice dust all over their bodies; and threshing capacity was 
lower than that of the tilyadora.
(3) One FACOMA owned a tilyadora which serviced members 
at 4 percent.
These reasons for rejection can be reduced to problems with the 
innovation itself and resistance from vested interests. Actually, the 
table thresher is not likely to displace much labor because its 
threshing capacity is much lower than that of the tilyadora but the 
number of people required to operate it ranges from 4 to 8. The 
users o f the table threshers were asked to rank the three methods of 
threshing on the basis of six attributes and came out w ith the 
following:
First Second
1. Capacity McCormick Table thresher
thresher
2. Least effort
expended McCormick Table thresher
thresher
3. Cleanliness of
grains threshed McCormick Table thresher
and hand
4 Least grain Hand Table thresher
damage and hand
5. Least spillage Table thresher Hand
6. Can thresh wet
rice Table thresher Hand
Overall McCormick Table thresher
Third 
Hand flailing
Hand flailing
McCormick
McCormick
McCormick
Hand
This evaluation leads one to conclude that an intermediate
technology is intermediate in what it can do. But there are other 
observations which are relevant. With a table thresher, family labor 
could be employed, thus minimizing losses from hand threshing 
which arise from the practice of throwing away rice stalks even when 
grains are still present. The intent is to have "gleaning" companions 
clean up the hay after threshing. The more grains left in the hay, the 
more grains w ill be gleaned. Most of the farmers look at the table 
thresher as a useful machine if and when the tilyadoras could not 
service them. Domingo's prognosis is that the tilyadora is not likely 
to be replaced by the table thresher. However, in view of the big 
Pantabangan Dam project which envisions double-cropping and 
continuous irrigation, prospects for the adoption of the table 
thresher may be better because the rice fields are expected to be wet 
all the time, thus making it  d ifficu lt for the tilyadora to reach them.
When asked about labor implications of the table thresher, 77 
percent of the respondents who used the machine stated that there 
would be no labor displacement and it would, in fact, increase the 
demand for labor. Labor to them was so scarce that they would still 
need to hire harvesters, feeders and gram cleaners. They believed that 
harvesting and threshing would be hastened and labor demand would 
be created for other farm operations such as land preparation, 
planting and weeding. The 23 percent who said that adoption of the 
table thresher would result in labor displacement attributed this to 
the anticipated shift to family labor and the loss of jobs for those 
who do hand threshing and who operate the tilyadoras.
The row seeder which is intended for direct seeding again 
appears to be labor displacing until one examines the disadvantages 
which farmers cited such as the need for leveled and thoroughly 
prepared land, more weeding, its non-applicability on farms larger 
than 3 hectares and non-applicability during the rainy season. Further­
more, the seeds are more exposed to rats, birds, and chickens. All 
these things which require additional attention on the part of the 
farmers probably make up for whatever labor is saved from trans­
planting. - -
In general, the respondents complained of shortage of hired 
labor which led them to use more family or exchange labor or both. 
At the peak of labor demand, farmers often made advanced payments 
in order to have priority on hired labor. It is also significant that 
most o f the farmer's credit was spent for payment of labor.
C. Changes in Farming Status
One of the issues relevant to the effects of changing agricultural
technology is related to changes in tenure and farming status. From 
available benchmark and terminal survey data gathered in 1963 and 
1968, Cuento14 was able to identify and analyze the patterns of 
change which took place among 338 of such shiftors located in 36 
Laguna barrios. Of the 338, a total of 226 shifted from farm 
operators to hired farm laborers and non-farm work; 72 shifted from 
hired farm labor to farming. To facilitate the discussion, the first 
group w ill be designated as farmer-operator shiftors and the second, 
farm laborer shiftors, although Cuento's analysis called them farm to 
non-farm and non-farm to farm shiftors. Tables 5.13 and 5.14 present 
the nature of the shifts which had taken place over a period of 5 
years. Table 13 shows 45 farmer-operators, 37 of whom were share- 
tenants in 1963 and became hired farm laborers in 1968. On the 
other hand, of 32 hired farm laborers, 22 became share tenants 
(Table 5.14). What is also noticeable is the number of coconut share 
tenants who became hired farm laborers (Table 5.13). Because this 
analysis of shiftors was only an interesting afterthought rather than a 
planned research objective, not all the respondents gave explanations 
for the shift in status. Nevertheless, the reasons cited by those who 
either volunteered or were incidentally asked the question provide 
the range of possible explanations (Table 5.15). What is noticeable in 
these cited reasons is the predominance of factors other than "farm 
being taken away by the landlord," which has often been speculated 
as an undesirable consequence of the new rice technology and the 
concomitant yield increases. However, regardless of crops grown, the 
trend was farmer-operators.shifting to hired farm laborer.
Regardless of what the reasons are for shifting from one tenure 
status to another, evidences show that increase in earnings and in 
production accompanied both types of shifting. Among the farmer- 
operator shiftors, the levels of gross earnings changed from 57 
percent to 47 percent under the low income category; 29 to 38 
percent in the middle income and 9 to 13 percent in the high 
category from 1963 to 1968. The average rice yield per hectare of 
those who were farming in 1963 was 36 cavans per hectare for the 
wet season and 43 for the dry. On the other hand, the farm laborers 
of 1963 who became farmer-operators in 1968 had average yields of 
69.5 and 78.8 for the wet and dry seasons, respectively. However, 
the 1963 farmer-operators cultivated larger farms than those of 1968.
Incidentally, when asked what they considered as the chief
14C. M. G. Cuento, "Occupational Mobility in the Rural Setting: Rural Change in 
Philippine Setting," op. cit.
Ta
bl
e 
5.
13
. 
P
a
tt
e
rn
s 
of
 
sh
if
t 
fr
om
 
fa
rm
-o
p
e
ra
to
r 
to 
hi
re
d 
fa
rm
 
la
b
o
re
r.
■o
$
£
1
Q) *
5 -a
I  §
i  *
«o1
I  a  
<fc 10 
8 5 
I  «O £ 
8 §
0)
o
O)O
CD r- co 00 lf> O
ID 00
CD O) CN r- 
CO r- ID
«- cn «- co
^  ID O)
CO CO 
ID  CO
CN T- o  CM
r-co If) «- CN ID CD ^  ID £ N r  8 S
•i 2
s s
s J§
S * §
5 O qj
|  i  nO Q)
t | 8
£  <5 £
(0
I  §
2 <0
5  C  fc m
S is i  
8 & 6
|■8
€ E c
O § .2
l i l l *  
* * 8 8  8
j|Ii
a
.*>
c
&
I s
•? .2
I
*  i  §
!
8 ao 2
a  m
M  6 I
£ C O) (0
s
CO «5f CO
CN
» *  I fl  CN
r -  r -  CO
S CO CN
*- O
CN
r* o
CN T-
CN r -  CO CO T- 'f
8  
. .  01 e <8 
£  & 
o
S £
n
aco O
O C
8 2
CN CN CO
§ 5
CO . £
I l . b
1 s. s s
°  "o .£  '£
? S | e
i f=  2  -o c  
o  -8 c  ro
*♦- _ w v.
Q) f- k_ CO
2  c =  3  __
®  O  o  n
l» 3® -O
EoW
£
. **- 
>  o
I fCO «- 
**“  (0
! 2 
«  co
5  «
I Ia3 3 i -v> m - 
8 >§
W _  w QJ O
I  I j i  “
§  Z  -Q 3
1 I(0 ft)
1  =
2 I
fi K13 o> 
<o c
J? S>
•a O  
° oL-
o «;
CO o  TJ CO
Ta
bl
e 
5.
14
. 
Pa
tte
rn
s 
of 
sh
ift
 
fro
m 
hir
ed
 
far
m 
la
bo
re
r 
to 
fa
rm
-o
pe
ra
to
r.
■a,
I
£
o
c.o
!
O
£
oo
8
3COO
6
A <0
to s
* 1  
I  * sS Q ♦-o &
s I
c/5 &
0) <TJ r- C V.§ O S Q. *-O &
*6 s 
co S
«LC c:
c  i^ o
<D <TJ .Cr v. v»S Qj OS o «-O &
I  5Co
0 )  Cb-J *»
£ c co js ■c £ 
CO a
CN *  *  00 ^  V »—
CD CN » - CN
CO r-
t— t—  CD CO
in lo *-
CM T -  1 -  CO
— o 
O ® W■o z i-
11
001
CN CD
CO
-
CO
LO
r-»
- 40
CD
53 74
CN
-
LO
CO
£
CO
To
ta
l
Pe
rc
en
t
a
3
ao
jC
o
S I
■g
jC
h* ■= Co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
of 
hi
re
d 
far
m 
la
bo
re
r 
an
d 
blu
e 
co
lla
r, 
liv
es
to
ck
 
ra
is
er
 
an
d 
hi
re
d 
far
m 
la
bo
re
rs
. 
So
ur
ce
: 
C.
 
G.
 
C
ue
nt
o,
 
fa
bl
e 
7 
— 
Na
tu
re
 
of 
sh
ift
 
fro
m 
no
n-
fa
rm
in
g 
to 
fa
rm
in
g,
 
op
. 
ci
t.
Table 5.15. Reasons for shifting.
Reason
Number
responding
Farmer-operator to  farm laborer:
Old age b
Sick/sickly 6
Farm taken away by landlord 8
"Nalulugi" (losing) due to typhoons,3 
drought, infestation, etc. 7
Farm sold to pay debt 2
Working animal died/lost 5
Farm given up due to other jobs (blue-and-white 
collar jobs). 4
Engaged in fulltime jeepney or tricycle business 2
Rented his farm to someone else 1
Farm borrowed by father-in-law 1
Decided to work with father 1
Total 43
Farm laborer to  farmer-operator:
Was able to acquire a farmb 4
Bought the right to work on the farm 2
Farm taken over by father from sonc 1
Inheritance 1
Given free use of land 4
Taken as subtenant 1
Bought a farm 1
Income from non-farm job not enough 3
Was able to acquire farm animal 1
Total 18
aThis was especially true in the San Pablo area. There were very destructive typhoons 
in 1966 and 1967
bHow the farm was acquired was not specified. »
cRespondent was father, non-farmer before.
Source: C. G. Cuento, Table 5. op. c i t
barrier to the achievement of family goals for a better and more 
progressive life, inadequate family labor was cited by the farmers of 
1968. The average labor potential in terms of number of family 
members who could help in farming was about 2.73 for nuclear 
households, which made up 75 percent of all households studied, and 
4 percent for extended households. However, sizes of households 
were 6.4 and 7.5, respectively. This probably means that other
children were still young and could not contribute significantly to 
labor needed for the farm. If the situation described in Cuento's 
study is widespread in the country, then it is tru ly ironical that we 
have a combination of small farm, large family size but inadequate 
family labor, hence an increased productivity per unit area and per 
labor input seems to be called for in order to support a large family. 
Here, agricultural innovation and population do seem to interact in a 
not-too-encouraging manner.
D. Changes in Farm Labor Patterns
With increasing population pressure, land reform and changes in 
rice technology, labor patterns have shown changes. Table 5.16 pre­
sents data on tenure status and family labor utilization based on man- 
days of potential labor per farm. The evident trends are: (a) There was 
an increasing proportion of available family labor being devoted to 
farm work by owner-operators, part-owners, lessees and lessee-tenants, 
with the latter two categories exhibiting the largest increase, (p) 
Share tenants decreased the proportion of family labor input on the 
farm but showed quite an increase in non-farm work, (c) On the 
whole, owner-operators and part-owners did not show as much 
change in the allocation of family labor to farm, non-farm and 
off-farm work. On the other hand, lessees, more than lessee-tenants 
and share tenants registered a reduction in potential man-days of 
family labor not gainfully employed. Considering the larger in­
crease in family labor input for farm and non-farm work and the 
reduction of non-gainfully employed man-days among lessees than 
among any of the other tenure groups, perhaps land reform could be 
credited with having contributed to increased labor absorption. 
However, the change could not be attributed completely to land 
reform because share tenants also showed a reduction in non- 
gainfully employed labor. Furthermore, labor input in non-farm 
work increased for both lessees and share tenants. On the negative 
side, one wonders why owner-operators and part-owners have lower 
family labor input and have more non-gainfully employed man-days 
than the three other tenure groups. This is contrary to everything 
that has been said about the expected outcomes from ownership of 
land. What implications does this have for absorption of family labor, 
given "Operation Land Transfer" or the shift from leasehold to 
owner-operatorship?
For a close scrutiny of the changes in labor patterns which
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accompanied the shift from the old to the new variety, Table 5.17 
indicates a definite increase in total man-days of labor per hectare. 
The tasks with increased labor requirements are: transplanting, 
weeding and replanting, harvesting and threshing. Reduced man-days 
occurred in land preparation both in the case of human and animal 
labor although there was a slight increase in the use of the tractor. 
The other significant change was the considerable increase in the use 
o f hired labor while operator, family and exchange labor declined. 
These data from the Manuel and Lopez study more than any other 
available data on comparative labor requirements of the traditional 
and the new varieties, show the difference more dramatically. 
Perhaps, the fact that the study was done in the early diffusion stage 
of the new variety explains the dramatic difference. Early adoptors 
were usually very conscious about the more exacting requirements of 
the new seeds and therefore devoted more time and labor to weeding 
especially. Of course, the increased yield also resulted in increased 
labor for harvesting, threshing and hauling. Now that the new seeds 
have been widely planted, the comparison between traditional and 
HYV is d ifficu lt, if not impossible to make. The new seeds have 
become common variety and no longer enjoy special treatment as a 
general category.
In the interest of labor-absorption. Table 5.18 tells us that it is 
rather foolish to insist on growing rice when we could solve the rural 
unemployment problem by producing onions, pole sitao, pineapple, 
tobacco, cabbage, watermelon, sugar cane, gabi, pechay, tomato and 
garlic. Unfortunately for the World Employment Program, the 
Filipino farmers prefer to eat rice and grow rice. The dream of 
multiple-cropping and diversified farming advocate is to persuade the 
rice farmer that it pays to grow crops other than rice. However, with 
market uncertainties and prospective gluts in the supply of cash 
crops, the farmer is not about to give up his rice. As Marom 
observed: "Small farmers tend to minimize risks by concentrating 
their resources on a single crop which w ill provide them w ith a maxi­
mum amount of security. For most Filipino farmers, this means rice 
production, even though it may not always be the most economical 
crop. Farmers encouraged to grow soybeans instead w ill say ' What if 
there is no market — I can't feed my family on soybeans.'15"
15Assa Marom, Comment on the B. de los Reyes Paper, Philipp ine Sociological 
Review, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, Jan.-April 1972, p. 99.
Table 5.17. Man, animal and tractor utilization per hectare of 100 
lowland rice farms in Rizal Province by variety and season, 1967-68.
Old variety New variety
Man A n im a l Tractor Man A n im a l Tractor
Days per hectare
Wet season
Land preparation 
Transplanting 
Weeding and replanting 
Other pre-harvest 
Harvest, thresh and 
haul
28.45
12.95
13.65
2.95
25.86
19.73 0.53 27.60
17.37
29.38 
5.83
30.72
15.89 1.35
Total
Hired
Operator, family and 
exchange labor
83.86
45.38
38.48
19.73 0.53 110.90
70.79
40.11
15.89 1.35
D ry season
Land preparation 
Transplanting 
Weeding and replanting 
Other pre-harvest 
Harvest, thresh and 
haul
28.84
18.49
22.71
5.52
25.10
28.08 1.13 24.48
18.76
46.28
6.67
35.97
11.24 3.02
Total
Hired
Operator, family and 
exchange labor
100.66
49.65
51.01
28.08 1.13 132.16
96.34
35.82
11.24 3.02
Source: P. C. Manuel and M. P. Lopez, Productivity of Farms Using Traditional and 
Improved Rice Varieties in Rizal and Laguna, Seminar on Economics o f  Rice Production  in 
the Philippines, IR R I, Dec. 1969 (Cited in C. M. Crisostomo, et al.. The New Rice 
Technology and Labor Absorption in Philippine Agriculture, Malayan Economic Review.)
Table 5.18 Labor requirements per hectare of 
selected crops.
C r o p Man-days
Rice
Lowland-irrigated 
Lowland non-irrigated 
Upland
Onion
77.7
70.2
67.9
417.1
Crop Man-days
Pole sitao 382.5
Pineapple 219.5
Native tobacco 194.8
Cabbage 185.2
Watermelon 171.0
Virginia tobacco 58.1
Sugar cane 147.8
Gabi 141.9
Pechay 111.5
Tomato 108.7
Garlic 84.0
Cassava 73.0
Peanut 61.1
Soybeans 47.0
Camote 45.0
Cowpea 39.5
Corn 37.0
Mongo 31.5
Coconut 24.2
Source: C. M. Crisostomo, e ta /.. The New Rice Technology and Labor Absorption 
in Philippine Agriculture, Malayan Economic Review. Authors derived data from a number 
of sources.
E. Farm Size, Labor Input, Yield and Income Distribution
Studies on farm size and productivity cited in the chapter on 
Land Reform showed that regardless of irrigation facilities, tenure 
status and even before HYV, there is a tendency for smaller farms to ^  
have higher yields. Table 5.19 again illustrates this point besides 
indicating the lack of yield differences among tenure groups. To 
those who point an accusing finger to the new seeds as being biased 
toward larger farms, this is disconcerting. Griffin's explanation for 
the unexpected results is response bias, i.e., a tendency to understate 
yields and this tendency is inversely correlated w ith farm size. The 
larger the farm the greater is the tendency to understate the yield. 
Therefore, he believes that yield differentials are probably greater in 
actuality than in reported figures. Having found this likely 
explanation, he then observed that the smaller farmers also used more 
nitrogen per hectare than the largest farmers. On the other hand, the 
latter were twice as likely to use tractors as farmers w ith less than
two hectares and they were somewhat more inclined to use 
chemical weedicides and insecticides. Griffin interpreted these 
findings as the tendency for smaller farmers to use fertilizers largely 
as a substitute for land while the big farmers tended to substitute 
machines and chemicals for labor. Large farmers, (being the villains 
that they are in the green revolution) "produced less per hectare, 
provided less employment and were relatively more extravagant in 
their use of scarce capital resources." This, he said, is a characteristic 
of large farmers whether or not they innovate. If one were to follow 
this reasoning and if  one were to use the Philippine farm size figures 
he has given (although his source is not stated), 81 percent of farms 
are small (less than 5 hectares) and, therefore the "green revolution" 
is a boon to small farmers whether in productivity, innovativeness or 
labor use.16 But one is inclined to think that green revolution 
watchers tend to interpret phenomena in the fashion of "Tails you 
win; heads I lose."
To avoid falling into the same intellectual trap, it seems more 
reasonable to find out why smaller farms are more productive. Table 
5.20 offers some relevant evidences for three types of farms: (1) 
two-crop irrigated lowland, (2) one or two-crop irrigated lowland 
plus other crops, and (3) upland rice and other crops. Data show 
that smaller farms use more capital, more labor and have higher 
multiple cropping index than larger farms although the correlation is 
less than perfect. Predictably, given these inputs, smaller farms have
Table 5.19. Yield per hectare for irrigated two-crop farms, by tenure 
and farm size, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, 1970 wet season.
Farm size 
(Hectares)
Yield (cavans/ha)
Leasehold Share
tenant
Owner
operator Mean
Less than 2 61 ,3(2.7t/ha) 72.6 (3.2) 65.8 (2.9) 68.1 (3.0)
2 to 4 59.0 (2.6) 59.0 (2.6) 61.3 (2.7) 59.0 (2.6)
Over 4 52.2 (2.3) - - -
Mean 59.0 (2.6) 61.3 (2.7) 61.3 (2.7) 49.9 (2.2)
Source: Agricultural Economics Annual Report 1971, IRR I.
^®Keith Griffin, Economic Aspects of Technical Change in the Rural Areas of 
Monsoon Asia. UNRISD, Geneva, January 1972.
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higher incomes per hectare. Again, the small farms appear to be 
more "virtuous" than the big ones and since there are many of them, 
technology designed to increase productivity ought to find a 
hospitable haven among a majority of small farms.
In terms of income distribution resulting from these three farm 
types, the lowland rice and other crops have the highest Gini Ratio, 
followed by lowland rice only and the lowest is upland rice and other 
crops. This suggests that the farm type which offers the lowest 
income (upland rice) also results in the most equitable income 
distribution, and the farm type which produces the highest income 
also offers the least equitable income distribution (Table 5.21). Based 
on this bit of evidence, the pursuit of equitable income distribution 
seems to lie in keeping farmers equally unproductive and poor!
Table 5.21. Gini Ratio* of the distribution of income 
(returns above variable costs), Albay,
1968-1969
Farm type G in i Ratio
Lowland rice (LL) 0.3316
Lowland rice and other crops (LO) 0.3615
Upland rice and other crops (UO) 0.3146
All farms combined 0.4126
Rice farms only 0.3521
*Gini Ratio measures the area of concentration of income to the area of the 
maximum possible concentration. The ratio equals zero if there is perfect equality, and 
unity if there is perfect inequality.
Source: M.L. Sardido, op, cit.
Table 5.22 provides further data on farm size. Again, there is an 
inverse relationship between yield and farm size. On the other hand, 
the larger farmers had a greater propensity to use credit. When asked 
to evaluate their rice profits and level of living in 1971 compared to 
pre-HYV, there was a curvilinear tendency, w ith the middle-sized 
farms reporting lower evaluations. The bigger farms showed a higher 
proportion saying their level of living was higher in 1971 than in 
1965. The smallest farms reported higher profits and level of living 
than the middle-sized ones.
As far as tenure status goes, share tenants had the smallest
Table 5.22. Farm size by yield, use of credit, evaluation of rice profits 
and level of living in 1971 compared to pre-HYV.
Yield in  cavans 
per hectare
Two hectares 
or less 2.1-4
4 o r more
— P e r c e n t  —
Below 20 2 2 12
21-40 15 32 40
41-60 33 37 28
61-80 33 18 8
81 or more 17 11 12
N =
100 100 100
Use of credit 2 or less 2.1-4 4+
Borrowed 44 57 72
Did not borrow 56 43 28
100 100 100
Evaluation of rice
profits in 1971
Compared to pre-HYV 2 or less 2.1-4 4+
Higher 79 73 76
Lower 17 27 24
Same 4 - -
100 100 100
Evaluation of level
of living in 1971
Compared to pre-HYV 2 or less 2.1-4 4+
Higher 77 65 84
Lower 15 30 16
Same 8 5 —
100 100 100
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. cit.
farms, with combination share-lessees having the largest farms, 
followed by lessees and owner-operators (Table 5.23). The share- 
tenants who also had smaller farms achieved productivity levels next 
to owner-operators and higher than lessees. The three tenure groups 
did not differ in the use of credit but more of the owner-operators.
predictably, fe lt that their rice profits and level of living were higher 
in 1965. Clearly, credit was more used by large farmers but 
smaller farms had higher yields. Level of living and rice profits were 
considered higher by larger farmers and by owner-operators. Since 
share tenants had smaller farms, the positive factor in their direction 
was higher yield than lessees and a lower proportion of them than 
owner-operators belong to the lowest yield levels (27 against 37) with 
40 or less cavan per hectare.
Table 5.23. Tenure status by farm size, yield, use of credit, evaluation 
of 1971 rice profits and level of living compared to pre-HYV.
(3 Barrios of Gapan, Nueva Ecija)
Farm size
Share
tenant Lessee
Owner-
operator
Combi­
nation Tota l
— P e r c e n  t  —
2 ha. or less 31 20 21 9 25
2.1-4 67 65 46 64 62
4.1 or more 2 15 33 27 13
— — — — --
100 100 100 100 100
N = 89 60 33 11 193
Yield in
cavans per ha.
20 or less 3 3 6 9
21 to 40 24 37 31 18
41-60 38 33 24 46
61-80 23 22 15 9
81 + 12 5 24 18
100 100 100 100
Use of credit
Wet 1971
Borrowed 55 55 52 73
Did not borrow 45 45 48 27
100 100 100 100
Evaluation of
rice profits in 1971
Compared to pre-HYV
Higher 73 75 82 64
Lower 25 25 18 36
Same 2 — _ _
Farm size Share
tenants
Lessee Owner-
operator
Combi­
nation
Evaluation of level 
of living in 1971 
Compared to pre-HYV
Higher 68 70 78 64
Lower 26 25 15 36
Same 6 5 7-- -- -- --
100 100 100 100
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. c i t
Among the social evils attributed to the green revolution the 
one most forcefully put forward by Griffin and others is increasing 
inequality. Unfortunately, as far as the Philippines is concerned, 
Griffin makes inference without citing evidence directly linking the 
new technology w ith the inequality. Examples of his inferences are 
as follows:
" In  new states of India and Pakistan,. . .  incomes originating from 
agricultural activities are exempt from income tax . . . A similar situation 
exists in the Philippines. The land tax is negligible and the income tax is 
low and easily evaded. In fact, as Professor Ishikawa notes, 'No one can 
look at the Philippine tax system w ithout being shocked by its serious 
regressive nature! ' Thus, in the three Asian countries which are in the 
vanguard o f the 'green revolution' the most prosperous people in rural 
areas are subsidized but not taxed; policies have been introduced which 
ensure that they receive the benefits of the agrarian change while those 
who are less prosperous incur its costs. The consequences are greater 
inequality and, in some instances, greater misery."
In a positive-negative concession to the green revolution, Griffin
says:
"There is no doubt that under appropriate circumstances the green 
revolution can make an important contribution towards increasing 
agricultural output in underdeveloped countries. The new technology, 
however, is neither necessary nor sufficient for achieving more rapid 
growth. Moreover, as we have seen, it has become reasonably clear that the 
introduction o f high-yielding varieties of foodgrains has often been 
associated w ith increased economic inequality and greater social dif-
ferentiation in rural areas. Thus, the 'revolution' creates as well as 
alleviates problems and thereby raised issues of public p o licy ."17
On the nature of the green revolution, Griffin regards it as 
"largely a biological and chemical revolution from a technical 
standpoint. But from a socio-economic point of view, it has largely 
become transformed into a commercial revolution. This is a 
consequence not only of the nature of the technology but also of the 
government policies which have been used to disseminate it. In 
practice, the new technology has been successful primarily in the 
context o f commercial agriculture. Moreover, the revolution tends to 
accelerate capitalist agriculture but does not necessarily initiate it, 
although it has done so in a few areas."18
Keeping Griffin's misgivings about the green revolution in mind, 
let us take a look at Table 5.24 which supplies the hard-to-come-by 
data on the direct income distribution effects of the new rice 
varieties. From the table, the following observations can be made: 
(1) The range of incomes associated with the local varieties is much 
narrower than the range for the new varieties, i.e., a more equal 
income distribution but a very low income level. (2) With the new 
varieties, 19 percent of the farmers in the first crop and 27 percent in 
the second crop moved up and out of the ceiling income level of 
F600-P699. In other words, the income ceiling was raised. Eight 
percent of those growing the local varieties for the second crop 
displayed a break from the predominant income levels. (3) Looking 
at the lower end of the income range (f'300-'f399), we see 78 
percent o f local variety growers as against only 44 percent for new 
variety users. For the second crop, the respective proportions found 
at the lower end are 64 and 40 percent, respectively. (4) In an 
absolute sense, the income range for local varieties during the first 
and second crops is very low indeed. Even with the new varieties, 
the incomes are still low in an absolute sense. (5) With the new 
varieties, there is undoubtedly a greater income inequality but higher 
income for most of the farmers. With the local varieties, there is 
greater income equality but lower income for most of the farmers. 
The question one is therefore forced to ask is: Which of the two 
situations would policy-makers opt for? Which of the two situations
1?Keith Griffin, Policy Options for Rural Development, Background Paper for the
Ford Foundation Seminar on Rural Development and Employment, Ibadan, Nigeria, 
April 9-12, 1973.
Table 5.24. Income distribution patterns (returns above variable costs/ha.) 
among lowland rice farms growing new varieties and local varieties, Albay,
1968-1969
F irs t crop Second crop
New varieties Local Varieties New varieties Local varieties
%
Mean
income %
Mean
income %
Mean
income %
Mean
income
r f r
Below 100 18 8.74 19 52.35 7 82.20 8 14.51
100-199 3 194.92 6 182.67 14 147.71 16 163.22
200-299 13 243.30 28 244.81 14 243.26 32 246.85
300-399 10 324.70 25 348.78 5 372.61 8 350.98
400-499 11 462.20 10 475.32 19 422.74 4 469.60
500-599 8 519.36 3 517.50 9 530.41 20 553.51
600-699 18 657.70 9 638.66 5 646.65 4 617.40
700-799 5 742.40 - - 9 739.29 _ _
800-899 3 855.00 - - 9 849.78 _ _
900-999 3 920.50 - — 2 908.22 8 987.81
1000-1099 3 1071.42 — — 7 1050.42 _ _
1110-1199 5 1129.40 - - - - - -
Total 100 457.18 100 297.88 100 481.63 100 363.54
Source: Moises L. Sardido, op. c i t
would farmers themselves opt for? One is "equal but poor" while the 
other is greater inequality relatively speaking, but less poverty in an 
absolute sense for majority of the farmers. As far as the implications 
for policy in the interest o f equality are concerned, there are at least 
two options. The first would be to find measures to bring the lower 
end to a higher plane. The other is to prevent the 19 percent from 
moving out of the previous income ceiling. In opting for the use of 
the new varieties, Filipino policy-makers and rice farmers seem to 
have chosen the path of pushing farmers' income ceiling upwards 
rather than freezing it to prevent relative inequality and absolute 
poverty.
The other source of inequality associated with the new rice 
technology is again pointed out by Griffin. Citing the accompanying 
table from the International Rice Research Institute, he proceeds to 
make the following conclusions and predictions:
" I t  is clear from the above that those farmers who depend on rainfed ag-
riculture are at a considerable disadvantage, particularly compared to those 
who are able to double-crop their land using irrigation. Farmers in rainfed 
regions use high-yielding varieties on a m inority of their land and obtain 
yields only two-thirds as high as those in the most favored situation. 
Since the irrigated farms were more prosperous than the rainfed farms 
even prior to the introduction of the improved seeds, the new technology 
led to an increase in inequality.
"Furthermore, it would appear that in at least some instances, the use 
of new seeds on rainfed farms results in a lower net income for the 
cultivator. On the rainfed farms of Gapan, fo r instance, between 1965 and 
1970 the area under high-yielding varieties rose from 1.7 to 1.8 tons per 
hectare. A t the same time, the amount of fertilizer used more than 
doubled, rising from 9.2 to 20.5 kg. per hectare and the proportion of 
farmers using herbicides, insecticides and tractors increased by well over 
one hundred percent. Since output remained roughly the same while 
material inputs rose substantially, value added mu.it have declined. 
Innovation almost certainly led to greater poverty on these farms and one 
could anticipate that in the future the farmers w ill revert to the traditional 
varieties o f  rice.
"The story is quite different, of course, on those farms which are able 
to harvest two crops a year. The new technology causes yields to increase 
by 20 to 50 percent and net profits undoubtedly rise as w ell."19
Water supply and adoption of high-yielding varieties of rice on 513 
farms in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, 1970.
Irrigated  
2 crops
Partia lly
irrigated
Rainfed
1. Percent of areas planted 
to HYV's 96.5 62.5 31.6
2. Yield per hectare (tons) 2.7 2.1 1.8
3. Nitrogen per ha (kg) 49.8 28.9 20.5
4. Percent of farmers 
using insecticides 90.5 78.2 56.8
5. Percent of farmers 
using herbicides 52.0 21.8 11.4
6. Percent of farmers 
using tractors for 
plowing 32.0 20.0 22.0
1^Keith Griffin, Economic Aspects of Technical Change in the Rural Areas of 
Monsoon Asia, op. cit.
Griffin's verdict of greater inequality and greater poverty among 
rainfed farmers who used the new varieties and his prediction that 
they w ill return to the traditional varieties — is not as simple and as 
self-evident as he illustrates. To probe deeper into the complexities 
involved in assessing the impact of HYV's, Table 5.25 and 5.26 are 
presented with data from three barrios of Gapan which have good 
irrigation (San Nicolas), poor irrigation (Malimba) and rainfed 
(Mahipon). The rainfed barrio had bigger farms (ave. 3.5), a higher 
proportion of lessees and owner-operators than Malimba and San 
Nicolas. While Mahipon and Malimba farmers doubled their applica­
tion of nitrogen per hectare in 1970, San Nicolas, the well-irrigated 
barrio, trebled its use of nitrogen. Considering the increased input of 
nitrogen, the yield increases were quite modest as shown in Table 5.25. 
Just as Griffin concluded, the irrigated two-crop barrio of San 
Nicolas shows a distinct advantage over Malimba and Mahipon. 
Likewise, the verdict of greater inequality appears warranted in the 
light of the widened yield range which resulted in all three barrios. 
Does this greater inequality in yield levels mean greater poverty? If 
one examines the three upper yield levels, Mahipon showed an in­
crease of farmers achieving this from 36 to 49 percent or an increase 
of 13 percent who moved up into this category. Malimba showed 54 
to 64 percent improvement, an increase of 10 percent. San Nicolas 
moved up from 84 to 96 percent or an increase of 12 percent. 
Concomitantly, there was a decrease in the proportion of farmers at 
the lower levels from 1967 to  1970. The advantage of San Nicolas is 
very evident in that none of its farmers ever belonged to the 20 
cavans and below category even before HYV. While San Nicolas is 
certainly more prosperous than Malimba and Mahipon, on an 
absolute basis, its yield levels are not high by any means. Although 
Mahipon and Malimba farmers are worse o ff than San Nicolas farmers 
both before and after HYV, they were better o ff in 1970 than in 
1967. Therefore, relative to how they were before, there was less 
poverty in 1970 than in 1967. This inference is reinforced by 
findings previously cited in the chapter on "The Changing Filipino 
Rice Farmer" where a higher proportion of Mahipon than Malimba 
farmers indicated that their rice profits and level of living were higher 
in 1970 than in 1965. And when asked to assess the livelihood of 
people in their barrios who were dependent on rice farming, 97 
percent of Mahipon, 90 percent of San Nicolas and only 45 percent 
of Malimba farmers indicated that they were better o ff in 1970 than 
in 1965. Noticeable is the nearly 100 percent of rainfed Mahipon
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Table 5.25. Basic characteristics of 193 farms in three barrios of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, 1971.
A. Location characteristics
Median
Num ber o f  farms Combi­ No. o f
Median Share Lease Owner nation persons
In In farm size tenants holders operator tenure in house­
village sample (ha) (%) (%) (%) (%) hold
San Nicolas 105 55 2.5 56 24 16 4 7.0
Malimba 85 66 3.0 59 23 9 9 6.0
Mahipon 211 72 3.5 26 46 25 3 6.0
B. Cropping characteristics
Median area 
in Rice (ha)
Percentage o f  
rice area
Q
Wet
season
D ry
season Wet
irrigated
D ry
Percentage o f  
rice area 
doubled-cropped
Principal 
form  o f  
irrigation
San Nicolas 2.5 2.5 100 100 91 gravity
Malimba 3.0 3.0 100 100 97 gravity
Mahipon 3.5 - 0 0 0 none
C. Use of modern varieties
Percentage o f  farmers 
making any use o f  
modern varieties 
Wet D ry
San Nicolas 100 96
Malimba 100 98
Mahipon 97 0
Percentage o f  
rice area planted  
to modern varieties
Wet D ry
100 96
98 98
87 0
Vear o f  greatest 
adoption o f  
modern varieties
1967 and 1968
1967
1967
D. Average nitrogen (kg) per ha used, wet pre-HYV, 1970 and 1971
Mahipon Malimba San Nicolas
1966 1970 1971 1966 1970 1971 1966 1970 1971
Ave.
N
kg/ha 15 25 25 27 52 54 25 75 93
Table 5.26. Yield levels in three villages in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, 
1967, 1970, 1971 wet season.
 Mahipon__________ Malimba_______ San Nicolas__________ Total________
Yield in ______ Rainfed_______ Poorly irrigated Well-irrigated______________________
cav/ha 1967 1970 1971* 1967 1970 1971* 1967 1970 1971* 1967 1970 1971*
Percent
Less than 20 8 4 84 2 6 94 - - 35 4 4 72
21-40 56 47 14 44 30 6 16 4 32 41 28 18
41-60 32 38 2 43 47 - 53 17 33 41 35 10
61-80 4 10 - 10 15 - 30 40 — 12 20 —
81 or more - 1 - 1 2 - 1 39 — 2 13 _
‘ Tungro season
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. cit.
farmers who gave this favorable evaluation. Ironically, as shown in 
Table 5.27, there was greatest equality when yields were lowest. This 
was achieved in 1971 during the tungro season when the rice crop 
was seriously affected by the disease. But again, even in disaster, San 
Nicolas still was not as badly damaged as Malimba and Mahipon.
Contrary to Griffin's prediction that rainfed farms would revert 
to traditional varieties and despite the serious tungro infestation in 
1971, 95 percent o f Mahipon, 97 percent of Malimba and 93 percent 
of San Nicolas farmers w ill still plant HYV's because there are other 
tungro-resistant varieties. One hundred percent of Mahipon farmers 
believe in the over-all effectiveness o f the new rice technology. This 
faith is substantiated and quantified in Table 5.27 which shows that 
under best, worst, or average conditions, the rainfed farmers believe 
that HYV's w ill give them better yields than the local ones. Though 
hard hit, they still believe in the new varieties and, therefore, 
did not behave the way Griffin thought they would.
Stewart, in his analysis o f Davao del Sur farmers, shed 
additional light on this phenomenon. Comparing costs and returns 
from a ''bad'' year with HYV and a "good" year w ith traditional 
varieties, he found that "even in a bad" year, the farmer who is 
planting the new varieties ends up only a little  worse o ff than he was 
during a "good" year with the traditional varieties. The difference in 
his net yield for sale or consumption is only a little  more than 6 
cavans for 1967 and 1972. The farmer has learned to expect high
Table 5.27. Average yield reported and farmer yield expectations on 
irrigated and rainfed farms, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, wet season, 1970.
No. o f  
farms
Yield
reported
(m t)
Ave.
cond ition
Yield expectations
best Worst 
cond ition  cond ition  
(m t per ha.)
Irrigated 2-Crop
Local 16 1.9 2.0 2.6 1.4
HYV 321 2.8 2.8 3.8 1.8
Rainfed
Local 109 1.7 1.8 2.6 1.0
HYV 68 2.1 2.4 3.4 1.5
Source: Randolph, Barker, e t at.. The Changing Pattern of Rice Production in Gapan, 
Nueva Ecija, 1965 to 1970, op. c i t
yields from the new varieties and is naturally disappointed at crop 
failures, but all things considered, his net farm income today 
bottoms out at a level not too much' lower than the best he could 
expect using traditional varieties.20 These observations are rather 
significant because they emphasize a very important point over­
looked in assessing the impact of the green revolution.
For a dissenting conclusion regarding the profitability of HYV, 
Smith's analysis of rice productivity in Iloilo is presented. Following 
discussion with agricultural technicians on the Provincial Develop­
ment Staff, farm management specialists of the Agricultural Pro­
ductivity Commission, the Bureau of Plant Industry, the Agricultural 
Credit Administration, several farmers in the province as well as a 
cooperative manager, he found that on properly irrigated lowland, 
yields averaged 40-45 cavans per hectare w ith traditional seeds and 
65-72 per hectare with HYV. Given these productivity levels and the 
costs of production he had calculated, Smith arrived at the 
conclusion that: "from  the farmer's vantage point of income (rather 
than the technicians' approach of higher productivity) in the lower 
price ranges which prevail, the H Y V  technology is less profitable, per 
crop than the lower yielding traditional methodology, for the 
'typical' yields cited. Even when higher prices are obtained, the 
increased profit from the higher yield is marginal, while the cash
outlay requirements more than double. For a typical yield of 100 + 
cavans per hectare, the HYV technology is clearly advantageous in 
terms of total profit, but the increased cost, effort and risk involved, 
place it in a category which most small farmers are either unable to 
attain or are as yet unwilling to undertake."
Although this explanation seems very logical, one wonders why 
there have been a rapid spread and a continuous adoption of HYV if it 
were less profitable than the traditional varieties. An examination of 
Table 5.28 shows that Smith's cost of production figures need detailed 
scrutiny because it makes certain important assumptions. It assumes 
that traditional variety planters use no fertilizer,very little  weeding or 
weedicides, no fungicides, little  or no insecticide, no straight-row 
planting, no rogueing, no seed treatment, credit -  and from little or 
no production inputs, average yields of 40 to 45 cavans are obtained. 
The second assumption, on the other hand, says that planters of 
HYV's give their fields the maximum use of fertilizers at all stages in 
the growing period, weeding, weedicides, insecticides, fungicides, 
straight-row planting, made possible by the use of credit. With all of 
these production inputs and tender loving care the typical yields are 
said to be 65-72 and rarely go to 100+. In other words, Smith 
assumed the best performance from traditional varieties with none or 
little  inputs and assumed the lower performance levels for maximum 
inputs in the case of HYV. From an agronomic point of view, it 
would seem that with the high levels of all the input requirements, 
the productivity should approximate the yield potential of HYV. In 
order to meaningfully examine the validity of his assumptions, data 
from 36 barrios of Laguna are presented (Table 5.29). Benchmark data 
were gathered in 1963 before any of the HYV's were developed and 
then a survey of the same areas was conducted again in 1968. About 
500 lowland rice farmers were studied with respect to changes which 
had taken place over a 5-year period. Table 5.29 indicates that even in 
1963 when old varieties were then the recommended seeds, zero use 
of fertilizer, insecticides, weeding and weedicides, straight-row 
planting was not the case. Furthermore, 78 percent of the farmers 
were using credit and therefore were paying interest contrary to no 
credit costs Smith assumed for traditional varieties. Despite the use 
of these inputs in lower quantities than for HYV's the yield levels 
for traditional varieties were quite low, w ith almost one-half in the 
wet season and one-third in the dry season having yields of 30 cavans 
and less per hectare. With the adoption of improved and newer 
varieties, the use of recommended practices also increased and so did
Table 5.28. Estimated per hectare costs for rice culture, Iloilo Province, 1972.
Item  o r A c tiv ity Q uantity
Cost o f  producing  
trad itiona l H Y V  
(in  pesos)
1. Seed 1 cavan P55.00 1*55.00
2. Plowing 5.00 5.00
3. Harrowing 5.00 5.00
4. Seed treatment - 7.00
5. Sowing seedbed 5.00 5.00
6. Fertilizing 4 kg. 14-14-14 - 3.00
7. Spraying 2 tbsp. Sevin - 1.00
8. Irrigating 2.50 2.50
9. Plowing (By carabao) 60.00 60.00
10. First harrowing 30.00 30.00
11. Draining 5.00 5.00
12. Irrigating 5.00 5.00
13. Second harrowing 30.00 30.00
14. Draining 5.00 5.00
15. Fertilizing 50 kg. Urea - 153.00
200 kg. 14-14-14 - 6.00
16. Leveling 30.00 30.00
17. Pulling seedlings 60.00 60.00
18. Transplanting 70.00 90.00
19. Insecticide 1 Itr. Diazinon - 8.00
(Foliar) - 6.00
20. Fungicide 1 kg. copper - 16.00
21. Replanting 12.00 12.00
22. Insecticide 1 Itr. Gusathion — 19.00
(Foliar) - 6.00
23. Fungicide 1 kg. Hinosan - 35.00
24. Weedicide 25 kg. Tavion 10.00 74.00
(Granule) 3.00 3.00
25. Rogueing - 6.00
26. Weeding 40.00 60.00
27. Irrigating 5.00 5.00
28. Insecticide 1 kg. Folidol 10.00 19.00
29. Fungicide 1 kg. Hinosan - 35.00
30. Draining 5.00 5.00
31. Top dressing fert. 50 kg. Urea - 28.00
- 3.00
32. Irrigating 5.00 5.00
33. Irrigating fee 25.00 25.00
34. Draining 5.00 5.00
35. Interest on loan for labor
and materials (P800
@8% x 1/2 yr.) - 32.00
36. Harvesting (Yield x 1% x Selling price)
item  o r A c tiv ity Quan t ity Cost o f  producing  
trad itiona l H Y V  
I  in  pesos)
37. Threshing and drying
38. Warehouse fees
39. Land rent
(Yield x 7% x Selling price) 
(Yield x 1/2 peso) 
variable
Source: Kenneth F. Smith, Palay Productivity and Profitability in Iloilo 1971-72, 
US/AID, Philippines 1972. Country Paper for Small Farmer Credit in the Philippines, AID  
Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit, March 1973, Agency for International Development, 
Dept, of State, Washington, D.C., March 1973.
their loans from f355  in 1963 to P595 in 1968. Definitely, even with 
the adoption of the new varieties by 1968 the input levels applied 
were far from what Smith assumed in his analysis.
His estimated cost of fertilizer per hectare for HYV is f193, 
P110 for insecticide and fungicide, P77 for weedicides, P60 per 
weeding and P32 for interest on credit. On the other hand, the 
estimated costs for growing the traditional varieties are zero for 
fertilizer, P13 for weedicides, zero for insecticides and zero for 
interest on credit. Again, using data from Gapan, Nueva Ecija which 
appeared in Table 5.9, the actual inputs used and yields obtained 
in the well-irrigated barrio using HYV are 73.2 kg. of nitrogen per ha. 
which is roughly the same as Smith's computed N per ha. for all the 
fertilizer he assumed would be used with HYV;  only P7.50 per 
hectare for insecticides, only P3.50 for herbicides and only 15 
percent used weeders but the average yield obtained is 83.9 cavans 
per hectare.21 Smith's assumptions, therefore, need to be re­
examined before his verdict could be taken seriously.
What is interesting in Smith's analysis is the income distri­
bution implications of different tenure arrangements whether it 
is HYV or traditional varieties. The farmer is in the best position 
under a leasehold, but he is better o ff on a 50-50 than on a 60-40 
sharing arrangement because of the way the costs are shared (Table 
5.30). The Laguna data on yield are also interesting because the new 
yield levels have reduced the proportion of lowest yielders (30 and
Table 5.29. Lowland rice production practices, yield, credit behavior 
of farmers in 36 barrios of Laguna, 1963 and 1968.
Percent of farmers.
A. Use of recommended varieties (o ld
recommended varieties)
1. For 1963 — Raminand, Tjeremas, Milfor,
Intan, Mangarez, Thailand 69 -
1968 — New recommended varieties —
Peta, BPI-76, BPI-76-1, BE 3,
IR 8, C-18, FK 178, C4-63 - 83
2. Application of fertilizer 66 82
3. Planting in straight rows 47 65
4. Use of rotary weeder 50 63
5. Use of insecticides 50 66
6. Use of 2, 4-D 60 60
7. Seed selection before harvesting 39 65
8. Germination test 32 41
Total No. of farmers 484 516
B. Yield per ha in cavans
Wet Season D ry  Season
1963 1968 1963 1961
Pre-HYV Pre-HYV
— P e r c e n t -
30 and less 44 11 34 4
31-45 32 23 24 14
46-60 18 22 23 17
61-75 4 18 9 16
76-90 1 11 6 16
91-105 1 7 2 11
106-120 4 1 11
121-135 2 1 6
136 and above — 2 - 5
Ave. yield (cav /ha ) 35 58 41 72
C. Borrowing Behavior
1963 1968
Percent of farmers borrowing 78 88
Total No. of farmers reporting 780 780
Average amount borrowed 355 595
Amounts Borrowed 
50 and below
- P e r c e n t -  
21 16
1963 1968
Percent of farmers
51 to 100 16 15
101-200 19 14
201-300 10 10
301-400 7 5
401-500 9 9
5 0 1 -1 0 0 0 13 17
1001 and above 5 14--
100 100
— P e r c e n t
Length of repayment
Paid in less than a month 1 2
Paid within 1-6 mos. 16 30
Paid within 7-12 mos. 12 15
Paid within 13 mos. and up 2 2
Not yet repaid at time of surveys 
in 1963 and 1968 69 51
100 100
Source: Farm and Home Development Office, Rural Change in a Philippine Setting: 
A General Report on the Five-Year Project on Alternative Extension Approaches. College of 
Agriculture, University of the Philippines, 1971.
Table 5.30. Costs and benefits of rice production tor typical 
and atypical yields of traditional and H YV production for 
an Iloilo share-tenant (50-50) (60-40) and lessee 
1972 given the same selling price for rice.
Share tenant 150-501
Traditional (cav/ha ) HYV (cav/ha )
40 45 65 72 80 90 100
Selling Price at P20 per cavan
Cost 116 124.25 361.25 372.8 386 402.5 419
Income 400 450.00 650.00 720.00 800 900 1000
Profit 284 325.75 288.75 347.2 414 497.5 581
Cost/Benefit 1:3.45 3.62 1.80 1.96 2.07 2.24 2.4
Table 5.30 (Continuation)
Cost
Income
232
480
248.5
540.0
722.5
780.0
745.6
864
772
960
805
1080
838
1200
Profit 248 291.5 57.5 118.4 188 275 362
Cost/Benefit 1:2.07 2.17 1.08 1.16 1.24 1.34 1.43
Lessee (F ixed rental 25% o f  yield)
Cost 432 473.5 962.5 985.6 1012 1045 1078
Income 800 900 1300 1440 1600 1800 2000
Profit 368 426.5 337.5 454.4 588 755 922
Cost/Benefit 1:1.85 1.91 1.35 1.46 1.58 1.72 1.86
Source: K. F. Smith, op. cit.
less) from 44 to  11 percent during the wet season and from 34 to 4 
percent during the dry season. A t the upper levels, those obtaining 
76 and higher yields increased from 2 to 26 percent in the dry 
season. As had been previously observed, there was greater equality 
in yields when they were low in 1963 than when they were higher 
in 1968. The question again arises: How can we achieve greater 
equality in yields at the upper level rather than at the lower level?
A purely economic analysis misses the cultural components of 
different ecological settings which mitigate the most severe of 
adversities. Actually, the rice farmer is much more sensible than 
some economists give him credit for. Otherwise, he would not 
continue to adopt the new seeds which according to Griffin are 
characterized by several serious disadvantages specified as:
"F irst, the high-yielding varieties tend to be more delicate than 
indigenous plants and require a great deal more care on the part of the 
cultivator. Second, the new seeds at present available are in general less 
resistant to drought and flood, and thus require sophisticated irrigation 
and water control facilities . . . Third, the big-yielding varieties are some­
what more susceptible to disease and infestation by insects and thus 
require protective applications of herbicides and pesticides. The severe 
outbreak of tungro in the Philippines in 1970 and 1971 underlines the 
importance o f plant protection. Fourth, the new seeds often but not 
always — are more productive than local varieties even in the absence of 
fertilizers but the differences are not very great unless substantial amounts 
of fertilizer are applied . . . The response of seeds to fertilizer cannot occur 
in the absence of water, and for this reason irrigation and fertilizer (and 
perhaps pesticides as well) may be complementary in some countries.
Consequently, the package of material inputs that accompanies the new 
seeds may compel massive investment in industries supplying fertilizer and 
plant chemicals, and expenditure on irrigation works and equipment. 
Alternatively, many of the necessary material inputs could be imported, if 
it is cheaper to do this than produce them locally, but this implies a need 
to earn more foreign exchange or reduce imports of other items. 
Storage, transport, distribution and marketing facilities must also be 
provided, and farmers must have access to credit and technical infor­
mation. Hence, from the point of view of the economy as a whole, the 
widespread extension of the green revolution is likely to be expensive in 
terms of fixed and working capital and the opportunity cost of this capital 
(and of scientific personnel) may be high."22
If one reads between the lines of Griffin's arguments, one could 
infer that the more equitable and less miserable course of action for 
us to take would be the least expensive one of maintaining local 
varieties, no fertilizer, no mechanization, no irrigation, no insect­
icides, no tender loving care to rice plants, no credit, no extension 
and no input of scientific personnel who could be spending their 
time more profitably doing something else. And since he is also 
worried about increasing commercialization in agriculture, there 
would be less poverty and greater equality if rice farmers remained 
subsistence-oriented, preferably at equally low productivity levels. In 
this way, we save precious foreign exchange and are spared the 
problems of storage, transport, distribution, marketing facilities, 
credit and extension of technical information to farmers. Who 
knows? This might also solve the food and population problem.
Fortunately, as stated earlier, rice farmers are much more 
adoptive and versatile in their adoption and use of a combination of 
strategies, only one of which is the new rice seeds. Fegan illustrates 
this versatility in his description of farmer's response to problems in 
different ecological settings, such as:
"Zone I. Low-lying swampy zone subject to seasonal flooding. In 
Candaba swamp and its fringes, daily season floods cannot be drained; in 
the dry season the area is at the end o f gravity irrigation, hence worst 
served. Rice is the main crop but yields are unpredictable because farmers 
cannot control water levels. Deeper floods wipe out crops about two years 
out o f five, and farmers are unwilling to risk cash investment. The short­
stemmed, early-maturing nonseasonal, high-yielding varieties of rice devel­
oped at the IRRI (IR 8) which do best with high inputs of nitrogenous 
fertilizer, are not well adapted to the swamp. They may be drowned when
22k . Griffin, ibid.
voung, or yield very poorly if immersed during flowering or panicle stage, 
while fertilizer is as likely to be flushed out by a flood as to benefit the 
crop. The traditional long-stemmed, long-maturing seasonal varieties are 
less prone to be drowned and flower after the season when floods can be 
expected. The strategy of planting the lower yielding traditional varieties 
appears to make good sense. But even so, in only three out of five years 
can a reasonable harvest be expected.
"On the other hand, this area is probably best favored fo r subsistence. 
Fish, frogs, and shellfish are in good supply, and some are sold fo r cash in 
the town market. The house lots along river levees provide bamboo, 
firewood and fru it trees; in the dry season, vegetables are grown on the 
sandy loam, stream banks and cucurbit cash crops in narrow strips 
irrigated by pump from streams backed up with weirs. Farmers tend to 
adopt a subsistence rather than a cash strategy.
"The share tenancy and debt systems have been made easier on tenants 
in the swamp because of the history of agrarian unrest. Landowners and 
katiwaia (estate overseer) are disinclined to acquire a reputation fo r being 
harsh in supervision of harvest and crop-division or collection of debts, for 
fear of reprisals...........
"Zone 11. Flat, nonflooding area with some gravity and pump irrigation. 
This zone is basically one-crop, rainfed land, although some parts have 
supplementary irrigation from private or government schemes to guard 
against the field drying out. Drainage and flooding are not general prob­
lems. The limited area in the north served by a branch of the Penaranda Ri­
ver Irrigation Scheme is.a schedule to receive enough water fo r two crops 
one year in three. A second crop can also be grown in narrow strips close to 
more reliable streams by pump river water to labor-intensive cucurbit cash 
crops. The area is closest to the main North-South highway and transport 
to jobs is convenient. Subsistence is neither as practicable nor as necessary 
as in the swamp; farmers are cash-oriented. This is the area most favorable 
to rice-farming; farmers have a degree of control over water, and are ready 
to  risk cash inputs. The high-yielding IRRI varieties and varying degrees of 
the associated technology have already increased yields and farmers
generally are optimistic that yields can be further raised The
principal problem in the way of increasing harvest remains water control 
and extension. The Penaranda River Irrigation Scheme schedule provides 
sufficient water fo r two crops only one year in three, while poor 
maintenance, favoritism, and anarchy in the distribution of water along 
sublaterals often cause water shortage, particularly near the extremities of 
the system. Certified seed is d ifficu lt to obtain w ithin 50 kilometers of the 
area and is double the standard price. Agricultural chemicals are only now 
beginning to have intelligible recipes and precautions, common measures 
and meaningful names or descriptions of pests and diseases printed in 
Tagalog on the package. Lack of information about economical and
practicable methods is the main barrier to change; only in the case of rats 
is there important cultural resistance to pest control.
"Zone III. Rolling rainfed land. This area has no drainage problem, but 
is nonirrigated, one-crop land depending on rain trapped in irregularly 
shaped paddies following the contours of low h illy  country. Soils are 
generally more permeable and fields dry out more quickly than on the clay 
lowland. Dry-season crops are at present unimportant, but recent 
experiments by IRRI show promise.
"Subsistence here is poor. Streams are interm ittent and home lots on 
slope land dry out quickly. The result is that tree crops are not vigorous 
and vegetables must be laboriously handwatered from the pump. Because 
there are few jobs in the area, there are relatively few landless workers. 
Further, during the long dry season even farmers go away to work and 
send back remittances. However, the farmers are cash-oriented and have 
taken enthusiastically to the use of chemical fertilizer, and certain 
high-yielding varieties of rice, notably IR-5 which proved unexpectedly
productive despite occasional drying out of the fields The greater
frequency here o f tenants who became lessees even before the latest 
amendment (R. A. 6389) may be because of the d ifficu lty  small or 
medium owners with dispersed holdings had in supervising and collecting 
shares, the freedom from debt given by dry-season off-farm earnings 
and the non-dependent example of the owner-cultivators.
" Submarginal farmers -  In all three areas those farmers with larger 
farms have had higher absolute harvest, hence have been better able to 
make the necessary cash inputs to improve per-area yields and to retain 
enough to self-finance the next crop. In the fla t land (Zone II), especially 
if i t  is nonirrigated, a farm under about two hectares is submarginal, in the 
sense that under present standard yields of about 50 cavans per hectare, it 
is insufficient to support a normal-sized household. The required area may 
be above two and one-half hectares in the rolling terrain (Zone III), three 
hectares in the swamp (Zone I). Farmers in those zones with less land, 
unless they have off-farm sources of income that permit sufficient time o ff 
for farming in season, tend to be trapped in a cycle of debt and 
dependency on owners, to have poor yields because they cannot afford or 
risk cash inputs and to be the least willing to transfer to legal 
leasehold. " 23 _ ____________
Without meaning to glorify degrees of poverty associated with 
different ecological settings (none of them are really well-off in an 
absolute sense), one realizes the variety of mitigating circumstances 
within the culture which enables people to survive. Therefore, the 
impact of agricultural innovation is very much influenced by the 
nature of ecology and the combination of social and cultural
23Brian Fegan, Between the Lord and the Law: Tenants Dilemmas, Philippines 
Sociological Review, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2. Jan.-April 1972, pp. 114-116.
circumstances obtaining in the area where it is adopted. It is 
infinitely more complex than the apprehension of the "rich getting 
richer and the poor getting poorer." Some people are poor in 
absolute terms while others are poor only in a relative sense. But the 
question still arises with respect to equality: Equal to whom? With 
respect to what? A country can be equally poor w ithin itself but 
terribly unequal with respect to another country. The frame of 
reference for equality should, therefore, be made explicit if  equality 
is what we mean to achieve. The next question is how we can solve 
the problem of absolute poverty w ithout producing greater 
inequality. But to pursue equality per se w ithout attention to 
alleviating absolute poverty where it is extensive is a strategy which is 
not likely to be popular. If we can be equal but rich, why not? 
International development experts seem to know how to make the 
rich less rich (provided perhaps they do not have to suffer) but it is 
in finitely more d ifficu lt to make the poor less poor, if not rich. 
There are more measures proposed for the former but not very 
creative and effective proposals for the latter.
F. Off-Farm and Non-Farm Employment Aspects of Rice 
Production
Any assessment of the employment and income situation of rice 
farmers whether growing old or new varieties is incomplete and even 
misleading if the off-farm sources of income and employment were 
not taken into account. As Fegan describes it:
"O ff-farm work can complement farming in three ways. First, the 
farmer has a cash flow  fo r subsistence, education of his children, and social 
expenditures and is likely to go into debt. A t the prevailing 50 percent or 
more interest fo r non-agricultural loans from money lenders and 50 percent 
subsistence ration during farming season only from landowners to tenants, 
the farmer with a 'side-line' income does not have to repay capital and 
interest at harvest. . . . Second, good rice-farming now and in the future 
w ill need increasing cash inputs for mechanical cultivation to shorten the 
time the land is idle, fo r certified seeds, chemical fertilizer, insecticides and 
weedicides, and supplementary irrigation. No matter how much time a 
farmer has, however, he cannot substitute it for cash to meet this need 
except in the case of weeding. On the other hand, except for the daily 
cutting o f grass for carabao during the palay season and brief attention to 
water levels, the tasks required for good protection and maintenance of 
growing rice are not constantly demanding, and can be accommodated to  a 
job under prevailing conditions. Third, an off-farm job allows the farmer 
to spread his risks and is a cushion against crop failure. Hence, it need not
be economically rational for the farmer (and much less his household) to 
withdraw from off-farm work. Some who do withdraw in response to 
higher income from the farm do so not to work harder on the farm, but 
out o f a preference fo r leisure."
Fegan disputes Takahashi's claim that lessees are abandoning 
paid off-farm work to concentrate on the land. He argues that the 
farmer does not have to allocate his labor to either full-time job or 
full-time farming, but can strive for the optimum mix of both, 
balancing his need for cash against the need for attention to his 
farm.24 In Sandoval and Gaon's data from Table 5.16, lessees 
increased family labor spent on both farm and non-farm work, while 
share tenants decreased their family labor fo r farm work but 
increased it for non-farm work. This partly supports Takahashi's 
contention, but Fegan's argument seems plausible too because lessees 
as well as share-tenants devote increased family labor to non-farm 
work. What is more significant is that from 1963 to 1969 both 
lessees and share-tenants reduced the proportion of their family labor 
which was not gainfully employed. This means that for these two 
tenure groups, absorption of family labor had improved but for 
owner-operators and part-owners it had remained essentially the 
same.
Over an eight-year period from 1962 to 1970, 14 out of 16 
cooperators (8 share tenants and 8 share lessees) from a farm-record 
keeping project showed increased net shares. One of them 
experienced a decline in net share as a result of drought and rat 
infestation, and the other one experienced practically no change in 
net share for the same reason. Accompanying the increase in net 
shares from rice production was an increase in non-farm income for 
13 out of the 16 farmers. Eighteen different sources of off-farm and 
non-farm family income were mentioned by the 16 farmers: tricycle 
driving, buy-and-sell of rice, crops, livestock, etc; sari-sari stores; 
tractor rental and operation; harvesting rice; duck raising; sale and 
hiring out of carabaos; taking care of coconuts; carpentry; 
dress making; working in tne factory; working in sugar-cane fields; 
gathering banana leaves; laundry; fishing; poultry raising and money 
sent by son in the navy.25
24Brian Fegan, Jobs and Farms: The Lessees’ Alternatives and Peasantization, 
Philippine Sociological Review, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2.
25E. P. Abarientos, e t al.. Impact of Technology and Small Farmers and Their 
Families: An Eight-Year Experience in the Farm Record-Keeping Project, 1962-1970. 
Dept, of Agricultural Economics, U.P. College of Agriculture, Aug. 31, 1972.
In order to obtain a more detailed picture of the role which 
off-farm and non-farm incomes play in the life of rice farmers, Herre­
ra focused specifically on the rainfed farmers of Mahipon who grow 
only one crop of rice a year. It has been a puzzle as to how they ma­
nage to survive, considering the relatively low yields and even in the 
wake of tungro infestation.
Table 5.31 indicates quite clearly that only 3 out of 69 farmers 
household-heads do not have off-farm income. They are not alone in 
the business of earning a living, for their wives, sons and daughters 
make their own contributions in this regard. The reason for the lower 
proportion of children participating in off-farm income earning is 
their youth. Majority are below 10 years. Almost half of the wives 
join in breadwinning. All of the 69 households have backyard non­
rice enterprises during both seasons. Tables 5.32 to  5.35 give us an 
idea as to what these sources of off-farm income are. It is evident 
that the rice farmers themselves, their wives and children work as 
hired farm labor for other rice farmers both w ithin and outside 
Mahipon. Harvesting, transplanting and pulling seedlings and fishing 
are the most predominant jobs engaged in. From these tables, one 
could also find support for Fegan's view that off-farm jobs 
complement rather than conflict with their own farming because 
these off-farm jobs are engaged in precisely during the crop season 
when the farmers are growing their own rice crop.
Table 5.35 shows that backyard poultry and piggery projects are 
a source not only of food but also of cash.
In monetary terms, these various off-farm activities generate as 
much as F132,430 for the barrio, w ith an average of F1,919 per 
household of a little  more than 2 off-farm income earners. This total 
off-farm income ranges from P500 to P6,000 and therefore adds 
substantially to whatever returns are obtained from rice farming. The 
fact that majority of these off-farm jobs also come directly from rice 
production means that it is incomplete and inadequate to reckon 
employment effects only in terms of the labor input on the farms 
they are operating, because they obviously derive income from other 
rice farms. The Mahipon rice farmer is therefore both a 
farmer-operator and a hired farm labor (Table 5.36).
Stewart has the same observations in his Davao del Sur study 
and makes the point that the Philippine farm community must be 
examined as a system rather than as a series of self-contained farm 
units. The economics of rice farming goes beyond the purview of 
individual farm units and computations strictly centered on returns
above variable costs do not tell the whole story. As Stewart describes 
it:
"Farmers and their families in these communities work fo r each other 
in such tasks as pulling and transplanting seedlings, weeding, and 
harvesting. Fanners estimate that they spend P140 per hectare for pulling 
and transplanting seedlings which amounts to P250 per farm. Most labor 
for these tasks is drawn from w ithin the community, so even if 20 percent 
of the work force comes from outside the community it would still leave 
— if  evenly distributed about P200 per family in off-farm income. Weeding 
is less significant on an average basis due to the use of family labor and 
herbicides, but in harvesting, the harvester's share of 1 in 11 amounts to 
about 5 cavans per farm. If evenly distributed among families in the 
community, this would mean an additional income of f  115 per family.
"These figures do not include additional farm income from the sale of 
eggs, vegetables, meat, etc. or income from non-farm sidelines in which 
many farm families are engaged. . . .  So as a system, if labor costs are not 
computed, there often exists a state of near equilibrium in which the 
average farmer does not get too far ahead but does not fall too far behind 
either."26
Table 5.31. Household members of 69 Mahipon rainfed farms 
with off-farm income (1971), Gapan, Nueva Ecija.
Percent o f  
household
Household Tota l members w ith
members members o f  off-farm  income
69 households
Husbands 69 66 94% 50 14 41
OQ 24 1 6Wives OH HO /O
Sons 132 38 28% 37 2 1 0
Daughters 139 31 22% 30 1 5
Total 404 164 141 18 62
No. of household with non-rice farm 
enterprise 25 4 69
Total number of households 69
Ave. size of household: 5.85 Ave. No. of off-farm income
earners per household: 2.38
Household members w ith  
off-fa rm  income
Crop Off-crop
season season Both
ontv on ly  seasons
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. cit. 
26j, c. Stewart, op. c i t
Table 5.32. Sources of off-farm income for 69 households of 
Mahipon rainfed farms (crop season).
Occupation Husbands Wives Sons Daughters Total
Harvesting 39 11 28 13 91
8 15 23 27 73
Pulling seedlings 3 1 8 — 12
Fishing 19 - 4 _ 23
Tractor operator 5 - — — 5
Threshing machine contractor 2 — — _ 2
Buntal hat making - 1 — — 1
Storekeeper - 1 — — 1
Catching frogs 1 - - — 1
Food vendor - 1 — — 1
Selling bags - 1 — — 1
Vegetable gardening 1 — — — 1
Buy-and-sell animals 1 - — — 1
T o t a l 79 31 63 40 213
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. c i t
Table 5.33. Sources of off-farm income for 69 households of
Mahipon rainfed farms (off-crop season).
Occupation Husbands Wives Sons Daughters Tota l
Carpenter 9 _ _ _ 9
Gathering firewood 3 - — — 3
Tailor - — 1 1 2
Truck driver (bakery truck) 1 — — _ 1
Market vendor - 1 — _ 1
Buy-and-sell (carabao) 1 - — — 1
Fishing 1 - — _ 1
Catching frogs 1 - - — 1
Jeepney driver (passenger jeepney) - - 1 — 1
Total 16 1 2 1 20
Table 5.34. Sources of off-farm income of 69 households of rainfed Mahipon farms
(both seasons).
Occupation Husbands Wives Sons Daughters Tota l
Fishing 26 _ 5 31
Carpenter 3 — _ _ 3
Tricycle driver 5 — 4 __ 9
Tricycle mechanic 1 _ _ 1
Storekeeper — 2 __ 2
Selling carabao's milk 7 - — _ 7
Jeepney driver 2 — _ _ 2
Truck driver (gravel and 
sand) 1 1
1
1
Making "singkaw" 1 __
Catching birds 1 — — __
Making slippers - — — 2 2
Dressmaking - — — 2 2
Buy-and-sell (animals, 
palay, jewelry) 1 2 1 4
Elem. school teacher — 2 _ __ 2
Beautician - 1 — __ 1
Barrio self-defense unit 1 — — __ 1
Catching frogs 2 — _ __ 2
"Kiskis" (rice mill) 
operator 1 __ _ 1
Restaurant cashier - — 1 __ 1
Security guard 1 — — __ 1
Total 63 7 11 4 75
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. c i t
Table 5.35. Off-farm enterprises of 69 households in rainfed Mahipon.
Household
off-farm
enterprise
Crop season
Home
consumption
For
sale
O ff-crop season
Home F or 
consumption sale
B oth seasons
Home F o r  
consumption sale
Vegetable garden 25
— No. o f  households ■ 
1 3 11
Household
Off-farm
enterprise
Crop season
Home
consumption
O ff-crop season
F or Home 
sale consumption
Both seasons
F or Home For 
sale consumption sale
— No. o f  Households -
Mango trees - -  1 1 -
Raising chicken - - 65 21
Raising pigs - - 10 58
Raising clucks - - 10 8
Raising goats - -  - 1 1
Milking carabao - - 2 1
Raising turkey - - 1 -
Ranch - — — 1 —
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. cit.
Table 5.36. Household off-farm income of 69 farmers of rainfed 
Mahipon (1971, Gapan, Nueva Ecija).
Crop season Off-crop season Both seasons
Income 
Household from  
off-fa rm  fam ily  
income enterprise
Income 
Household from  
off-fa rm  fam ily  
income enterprise
Household
off-fa rm
income
Income
from
fam ily
enterprise
Total P39,604.00 P1,262.00 P 6,134.00 P195.00 P51,407.95 P33,656.00
Ave. 
per house­
hold P 671.25 P  50.50 P 383.40 P  48.75 P 1,168.40 P 486.40
Total household 
off-farm income 
P 1 32,430.00
Ave. per 
household P 1,919.30
Distribution of Total Household Off-Farm Income
Income L e v e l No. Percent
PSOO 12 17
501 --  1000 16 24
Income level No. Percent
1001 -  1500 11 16
1501 -  2000 11 16
2001 -  2500 3 4
2501 -  3000 3 4
3001 -  3500 1 2
3501 -  4000 2 3
4001 -  4500 3 4
4501 -  5000 3 4
5001 -  6000 4 6
T o t a l 69 100
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. c i t
In other words, w ithin the rice farming community there are 
built-in institutional devices for employment and income 
distribution. The higher the yields, the more rice there is to harvest, 
the greater the harvest's share. And since farmers and their families 
work for each other the yields and work opportunities are "shared" 
and distributed in a number of culturally accepted ways. The 
yrowing trend toward the use of hired labor does not necessarily mean 
that members of farmer-operator households are doing less farm 
work but rather they are performing hired work for others while 
other farmers and their families work for them. Because of the 
dearth of studies on farm labor in the Philippines, it  is impossible at 
the moment to determine how extensive this farm labor pattern is. A 
related question pertains to how large the population is of landless 
farm laborers in the rice-growing areas. With the population pressure 
on land, how many of the farmer-operators' children could expect to 
be farm laborers? A t least in the Philippines, the category labeled 
hired farm labor includes (1) the farmer himself who could be a 
tenant, lessee or owner-operator who hires out his services to other 
farmers on a part-time basis; (2) the wife and children of the farmer 
who work for other farmers; and (3) the landless laborers and their 
families who do not have land to cultivate and are therefore 
dependent on work available from farmer-operators.
The practice of working for each other for pay in cash or kind
partly solves the disadvantages associated w ith the traditional system 
of unpaid family labor where children render "free" services on the 
family-operated farm. Although obviously they receive food, 
shelter, etc.; there is little , if  any cash payments involved because it is 
considered a duty for children to work on the family farm and that 
such labor should not be given wages but spending money only 
(Table 5.37). Wife and children are also very much part of the 
decision-making on the farm. More than 80 percent of 
farmer-respondents believe they should discuss important matters 
with the wife and children. However, 34 percent of them do not 
think that all farm labor should be provided by family and relatives.
Table 5.37. Bukidnon lowland rice farmers' attitudes 
toward family labor (1972)(379 farmers).
A ttitu d e Agree Disagree
Percent
1. Children sharing in family farm work 
should not be paid their wages for 
their share of labor because they are 
members of the family. 78 22
2. All farm labor should be provided 
by members of the family and 
relatives. 66 34
3. Work of children on the farm is a
duty. 92 8
4. Children who work on the family farm 
should not be given wages. 78 22
5. Children who work on the family farm 
should be given spending money only. 91 9
6. A farmer should not discuss important 
farm matters with his wife. 13 87
7. A farmer should not discuss important 
farm matters with his children. 18 82
Source: L. A. Chua, op. cit.
G. Labor Absorption in Non-Agricultural Activities
With increased family income associated with increased yields 
and off-farm jobs, rice farm families have reported increase in
consumption items like food, household furniture, improvements in 
housing, bicycles, farm implements, expenditures on children's 
education, etc.27 Gibb made an attempt to quantify the impact of 
about 25 percent increase in farm income (mainly rice growing) on 
labor absorption in non-agricultural activities in the local urban 
center of Gapan and three of the surrounding rural towns 28 The 
research used establishment surveys to reconstruct the history of 
non-agricultural employment since 1966 in and around a set of five 
agricultural market centers in Central Luzon. Besides questions on 
number employed, the establishments were asked how many of their 
customers were farmers. Some preliminary results from his study 
appear in Table 5.38. It w ill be noted here that employment in retail 
of traditional and non-traditional goods and services, manufacturing 
for household items, light transport, housing components, construc­
tion, etc. increased by about 78 percent in Gapan and 81 percent in 
the rural towns during the 1967 to 1971 period. The increase in these 
types of employment was much higher than that in agricultural 
inputs, processing and trading and heavy transport and 
machinery-related establishments which reported only 16 and 14 
percent increase fo r Gapan and rural towns, respectively. These 
findings indicate that increases in farm income result in expanded 
purchasing power and therefore a greater demand for goods and 
services which could now be afforded. Although the evidences linking 
productivity, consumption and expansion of employment 
opportunities in meeting the demands for goods and services have 
to come from a variety of sources, the linkages advanced by Gibb 
appear plausible. Farm and household surveys provide the 
productivity, consumption and aspiration aspects reflecting increased 
demand for goods and services. When one has seen the before-after 
(1967-1971) conditions in the surrounding rice farming households 
and villages, the links become more obvious. Among the most 
conspicuous are the tricycles plying the routes from town to village 
and the improvements in housing and home furnishings. Gibb reports 
that the tricycles were mostly owner-operated by farmers' children. 
As mentioned in another chapter, Gapan farmers reported increases
27G. T. Castillo, et al., The Green Revolution at the Village Level, op. c it:, R. T. 
Herrera, op. c i t ;  J. C. Stewart, op. c i t ;  T. E. Contado and R. Jaime, op. c i t
28Arthur Gibb, Jr., Report on On-Going Research: Some Evidence on the Impact 
of Agricultural Modernization on Non-Agricultural Incomes in Agricultural Market 
Centers. Institute of Economic Development and Research, School of Economics, University 
of the Philippines, Discussion Paper No. 72-4, April 11, 1972.
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in food consumption, purchase of household items, and educational 
expenses which they attribute mostly to increases in farm income 
and partly to non-farm income.
Again, the Gibb study tells us that the employment and income 
distribution effects of the new rice technology are not confined to 
direct labor input in rice production. If the new rice technology has 
brought about increased yields and increased incomes and if  the 
latter have stimulated consumption and a greater demand for goods 
and services, then there is an indirect employment effect from the 
new rice technology.
H. The Manpower Dilemma in Rice Production
One of the fears generated by the advent of the new rice 
technology is that labor-saving devices would come into greater use 
and human labor would be displaced. When we reckon the size of 
our labor force in aggregate terms, we arrive at the conclusion that 
we need to promote labor-absorbing activities in order to offset 
unemployment. Setting aside this macro-level view, the 
anthropologist proceeds to examine in depth the manpower situation 
in rice production as it  is practiced in a particular place. Using 
intensive time and motion study for a close-up view of actual work 
performance in a rice-growing village, Jamoyawon in Siargao Island, 
Northeastern Mindanao, Sodusta concluded that labor resource for 
rice production is inadequate due to the shortage of "qualified”  
skilled workers.29 Three major reasons account for this shortage:
(1) There is a high percentage o f children among the village 
population. The community's definition of a qualified worker 
is one who is at least 15 years of age in order to meet physical 
requirements for land preparation, repair of sluices, etc. Based on 
this criterion alone, out of 768 barrio population, only 423 workers 
or 55 percent are "qualified" to engage in rice cultivation. This 
means about 5 persons per hectare for the 84 hectares of rice lands 
during the first crop and 9 persons per hectare for the 45 hectares 
cultivated for the second crop. A household may have seven 
members but five could be children all below 15 years of age. As a 
matter o f fact, only 20 percent of the peasants receive assistance in 
farm work from their own households. Land preparation, the most 
arduous task of all, is left practically to the peasant himself or to a
29Jesuscita Sodusta, Manpower and Wet Rice Cultivation in Jamoyawon, Siargao 
island, Northeastern Mindanao, 1973.
hired hand. (2) The available labor force is engaged in a variety of 
household and other "nonproductive”  activities which compete with 
the time and labor required for rice production but which are 
essential to everyday life. The wife, for example, is almost 
completely occupied w ith doing the household chores and attending 
to the children. The children are in school or helping in these chores. 
Older children are either working elsewhere or are married and, 
therefore, have their own households to care for. The seasonality of 
rice production makes them look for other jobs, hence they cannot 
be depended upon to be around to perform farming operations. The 
simultaneous demand on the farmer's time and energy results in 
irregular work schedule which has repercussions on agricultural 
production. This also affects the continuity of input in the rice field 
by the same worker. (3) Majority of the labor force are 
undernourished or malnourished. The adult members of the 
household lack the energy and vigor needed for intensive muscular 
work. Table 5.39 shows the calorie deficiency which exists among 11 
peasants whose food intake was analyzed in relation to nutritional 
requirements. A physical examination also showed evidences of 
calorie-protein malnutrition as shown in the form of chronic 
tuberculosis, nutritional anemia, simple goiter, beriberi and scurvy. 
Stunted growth was observed among children. In some instances, 
gastro intestinal parasites aggravate the calorie-protein deficiency.
Because life must go on for the peasant, adjustments to the 
labor and energy shortage in rice production are made in the 
following manner:
(1) Four or five carabaos are used fo r land preparation. This 
alternative may not be available for long because of the 
declining carabao population. Nearly 50 percent of the 
peasants have to borrow an animal to prepare their land 
for planting. As a solution to the "farm  power" shortage, 
the carabaos do not offer a good answer because much 
time and energy is spent in taking care of them (Table 5.40). 
Of all the activities engaged in by the peasant, caring for 
this work animal occupies most of his time.
(2) The different stages in land preparation are combined, 
shortened or om itted in order to save time and tabor. Such 
short cuts lead to inadequate land preparation, luxuriant 
growth of weeds, while leaving unharmed a sufficient 
number of micro-organisms vital to the decay of plant 
residues. Thus an ecological balance is achieved which
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enables the peasants to obtain some harvest w ithout using 
fertilizer, hardly any weeding, and practically no 
insecticides although they use IR-5.
To illustrate the short cuts resorted to in land preparation, 
Sodusta interviewed the peasants as to how much time was involved 
in each stage. Having obtained such information, she proceeded to 
make direct observations of the actual procedures followed. As she 
discovered, data obtained from the interviews represented what 
peasants consider as the "ideal”  way of preparing land. Their actual 
practice deviates considerably from their ideal as a means of a*djusting 
to the labor problem. Table 5.40 shows that ideally, land preparation 
takes a total of 27-1/2 days. In practice, only 7 days were spent, 
with the first three stages shortened and the last two were 
eliminated. Needless to say, this system of land preparation is very 
inadequate.
Table 5.40. Data on time spent by peasants on land preparation 
obtained from interviews and from direct observation.
Data from interview 
10,000 sq. m. area 
No. of plots: 20 
No. of animal 
resources: 4-5
Data from direct observation 
8,552 sq. m. area 
No. of plots: 21 
No. of animal 
resources: 4
Five stages in land preparation  
1. F irs t tillage (one to 2 weeks, 1. 9 hours and 25 minutes
then fallowing takes
place)
2. Second tillage about one week 2. ) 12 hours then transplanting follows
3. Puddling 4 to 5 days
4. Levelling 2 days
5. Iron ing  1/2 day, then transplanting
3. )
4. not practiced
5. not practiced
follows
Average No. of hours worked
per day: 5 hrs. 3 hours, 3 minutes and 34 seconds
Total work days spent: 27 1/2 days 7 dcys
(3) To cope with the energy requirement in land preparation, 
considering calorie-protein deficiency, the peasant spends
much time sitting idly between tillage activities and taking 
a nap or resting (Table 5.41). These two activities combined 
come next to taking care of carabaos as most frequently 
engaged in by 11 peasants for the 55-day period of the 
second crop.
A fter this intensive time and motion analysis of work in rice 
production, Sodusta expresses misgivings about the present 
preoccupation with multiple cropping as an answer to what is 
defined aggregatively as a labor-surplus problem. Sodusta's findings 
may be reinforced in other places if repeated because farmers often 
complain about lack of farm hands as a reason for not performing 
certain recommended farm practices. Casual observations at the 
village level also confirm the health and nutrition problem of farm 
workers. Given these realities of low productivity due to low energy 
input, how does one break the vicious cycle? Labor-saving rather 
than labor-absorbing practices seem to be called for. How does this 
relate to the mechanization and labor displacement issues in 
employment? Here we see the discrepancies in the implications of 
macro- and micro-level studies on the manpower problem. As 
Sodusta suggests: "The numerical size of the household is a poor 
indicator of the strength of the household!' In the same vein, the size 
of the labor force is an inadequate indicator of effective manpower 
for agricultural production.
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The Philippine Land Reform Program 
and the New Rice Technology
On August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844, otherwise known as the 
Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed with the major objectives 
of "effecting land tenure reform, to improve the general welfare, and 
to increase the income of the farmers through the improvement of 
their productive capabilities."1
According to Sacay, the land reform program was instituted to 
increase the production of food and commercial crops by modifying 
the way land resources are utilized. The Code adopted a land-use 
policy aimed at intensifying the cultivation of 7.5 million hectares of 
cultivated land primarily to increase food production and at develop­
ing the 2.2 million hectares of undeveloped land into large-scale 
plantations primarily to increase commercial crop production for 
domestic manufacture and export. The two phases of the land reform 
program included the abolition of share tenancy and the establish­
ment of a leasehold system and the transfer of landownership to the 
cultivator. As a consequence of the program, it was expected that 
landlord capital would be channeled into industry. On the argument 
that share tenancy status is a reflection of financial condition which 
like poverty cannot be abolished, Sacay provides the following 
justifications:
(1) Share tenancy does not lend itself to providing the 
incentives so necessary for increased production. If the farmer has to 
share the increment in production with the landowner, he has little 
incentive to work harder. Such would also be the case where farmers 
entirely provide expenditures for tools, equipment and other 
production inputs. In a leasehold system, rental for the use of land is
^Pedro R. Sandoval and B. V . Gaon, Agricultural Land Reform in the Philippines: 
Economic Aspects, UPCA, 1971, p. 7.
fixed (25% of the past three normal harvests) and, therefore, 
increased production through better management, harder work and 
larger capital investment entirely accrues to the farmer.
(2) Share tenancy nourishes paternalistic tendencies among 
farmers and as has been previously proven, credit and agricultural 
extension efforts have almost always been ineffective in high tenancy 
areas. This is attributed to the fact that share tenants have not had 
the opportunity to become "independent, self-reliant individuals and 
to develop better managerial skills necessary for increased production 
and income."
(3) Associated with share tenancy is the prevalence of usurious 
credit practices. Although sharing arrangements may in fact be fair, a 
significant proportion of the share of tenants is claimed by 
landowners in the form of credit charges.
(4) Share tenancy is a manifestation of the poor financial 
position of the farmers and is also a manifestation of the existing 
social structure. In 1903 the percentage of tenancy was 19 percent 
and in 1963, this increased to 39 percent.
In view of the above reasons, the Land Reform Code was to 
serve as the instrument for the abolition of share tenancy. However, 
under the first phase of the land reform program, the operations 
must not only " f i l l  the vacuum created by the withdrawal of 
landowner participation in the production process but must also 
provide the necessary support and services to insure an increase in 
productivity and income."2
Ruttan assessed this Code with optimism, for it  sharply departs 
from previous legislation in the sense that there is important 
emphasis placed on both equity and productivity objectives and 
program instruments. He describes the document as bearing the 
"unmistakable im print of a group of young economists and 
intellectuals who were primarily concerned w ith the failure of 
existing agricultural development program to generate sufficiently 
rapid gains in agricultural productivity to match the rapid 
population growth rate . . . The productivity orientation of the 
legislation was particularly useful in gaining the support of the 
growing industrial classes that would not have been swayed by
20 . J. Sacay, The Philippine Land Reform Program, Phil. Econ. Journal No. 4, 
Second Sem., 1963, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 169-183.
political appeals for equalitarian justice for the peasantry during a 
period when organized rural unrest was apparently dormant."3
Tavanlar, who was Chairman of the Presidential Land Tenure 
Committee during the Magsaysay Administration when emphasis was 
more on land distribution and resettlement, underscored recently 
that "the success of an agrarian reform program depends on the 
introduction of modern and improved agricultural practices and 
inputs which enable the farmer to derive the most income from his 
plot of land . . .  To those who contend that land reform should 
bestow landownership to the tiller to give him human dignity, my 
reply is I agree. But let us remember also that human dignity is 
attained by most farmers of the world, not by landownership but by 
being successful farmers."4
The new rice technology's role in the land reform program 
depends on the extent to which it  has been harnessed as an 
ingredient in the pursuit of the productivity objectives and the 
consequences of such an application. An assessment of its 
independent role apart from the institutional setting is, therefore, 
virtually impossible, hence the need to present the various aspects of 
the tenancy situation.
Given these expressed objectives and hopes for Philippine land 
reform, this portion of the analytical review presents results of studies
relevant to:
^  (a) Patterns and scope of tenancy
(b) Some general characteristics of landlords and tenants
(c) Landlord-tenant response to the Land Reform Program
(d) Landlord-tenant role perceptions and expectations
r "  (e) Landlord-tenant patterns of decision-making
*' (f) Tenure status, farm size, productivity and innovativeness
(g) Land reform in the New Society
A. Patterns and Scope of Tenancy
In a predominantly agricultural country where wealth is reputed 
to be unevenly or inequitably distributed, landownership and 
tenancy questions are very politically salient. As a matter ot fact,
3V. W. Ruttan, Equity and Productivity Issues in Modern Agrarian Reform 
Legislation. Paper presented at the International Economics Association Conference on the 
Economic Problems of Agriculture, Rome, Sept. 1-8, 1965.
4 Eligio J. Tavanlar, Land Reform in the Philippines, Manila Chronicle, March 4 
1971, p. 16.
attempts at land reform are a reflection of this preoccupation. To 
provide an objective basis for viewing the tenure situation, Table 6.1 
presents data on farms by types of land tenure as of 1960. It should 
be pointed out that more than half of the 2,166,216 farms and about 
two-thirds of the total farm land area were fu lly  and partially owned. 
Only 40 percent of the farms and 26 percent of the area were 
tenanted. Of the 864,538 farms under tenancy, 86 percent were 
operating on a share of produce arrangement (Table 6.2). In rice 
farming, tenancy which is about 48.1 percent of the total number of 
farms, is concentrated in the Central Luzon provinces where the 
incidence of dissident activities in the past had always been 
associated with the high tenancy rate.
Table 6.1. Number and area of farms by types of land
tenure, Philippines, 1960.
T e n u r e
Type o f  land tenure Land area
Num ber o f  Percent o f Area in Percent o f
farms to ta l hectares to ta l
Full owner 967,725 44.67 4,133,276 53.17
Part owner 310,944 14.36 1,139,956 14.67
Tenant 864,538 39.91 2,000,201 25.73
Manager 2,487 0.11 365,309 4.70
Other forms of tenure 20,522 0.95 133,742 1.73
Total 2,166,216 100.00 7,772,484 100.00
Source: Census o f  the Philippines: 1960 — Agricu lture, Vol. II, Summary Report,
ip. 8-9. Bureau of the Census and Statistics, Republic of the Philippines, Manila.
Table 6.2. Number and area of farms by type of
tenancy, Philippines, 1960.
Type o f  land tenure Land area
Num ber o f Percent o f Area in percent o f
farms to ta l hectares to ta l
Cash 13,500 1.56 47,008 2.35
Fixed amount of produce 34,145 3.95 88,911 4.45
Share of produce 745,426 86.22 1,677,857 83.88
Type o t  land tenure Land area
Tenure  — --------------------------------------------------------------------------
Num ber o f  Percent o f  Area in percent o f
farms to ta l hectares to ta l
Cash & fixed amount of produce 693 0.08 3,676 0.18
Cash & share of produce 10,847 1.25 34,083 1.70
Rent free 29,816 3.46 55,918 2.80
Others 30,105 3.48 92.748 4.64
Total 864,538 100.00 2,000,201 100.00
Source: Census o f  the Philippines: 1960 -  Agricu lture, Vol. II, Summary Report pp 
8-9, Bureau of the Census and Statistics, Republic of the Philippines, Manila.
Data in Table 6.3 show the total rice farm area in Central 
Luzon and how they were distributed by tenure as of 1960. The 
highest percentages of share-tenanted area were in Pampanga (72%) 
and Nueva Ecija (57%) w ith Bulacan (50%), Tarlac (49%) and 
Pangasinan (38%) following in descending order. Conversely, 
Pangasinan and Bulacan had the largest portions of rice land under 
full owner-operators. For the five provinces of Central Luzon, more
Table 6.3. Distribution of farm area by tenure operator in five provinces 
in Central Luzon (May, 1960).
Bulacan Nueva Ecija c
.51£ Pampanga Tarlac A ll Philippines
- P e r c e n t
Full owner 20.5 15.9 28.1 5.4 18.3 53.2
Part owner 15.2 9.1 26.0 6.3 15.7 14.7
Tenants: all types 60.7 61.1 43.2 81.3 55.8 25.7
Cash tenants 0.6 1.7 0.8 1.2 0.5 0.6
Fixed amount of produce 7.1 1.5 2.1 5.3 3.8 1.1
Share of produce 50.4 56.6 38.2 72.2 48.7 21.6
Mixed types of the above 2.6 1.2 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.4
Manager 2.6 12.8 2.4 5.3 5.8 4.7
Other forms of tenure 1.1 1.2 0.2 1.6 4.4 1.7
Total area of farms 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
in hectares 74,636 217,730 84,879 168,701 115,371 7,772,485
Source: Census o f the Philippines, 1960-Agriculture: Summary Report, Vol. II, p. 9 
(Cited in Shigeru Ishikawa, Agricultural Development Strategies in Asia: Case Studies of the Phil­
ippines and Thailand, Asian Development Bank, 1970).
than half of the rice area was under share tenancy. Less than a fifth  
was fu lly  owned and one-sixth, partly owned.
With respect to farm size distribution in 1960 for the country, 
out of a total 1,041,882 rice farms, 1,042 (0.1%) were larger than 
200 hectares and 4,688 were over 50 hectares (0.5%). Farms over 
500 hectares accounted for 373,985 hectares out of a total hectarage 
of 3,112,131 (12% of the area). The most number of rice farms 
(330,667 or one-third) were from one to two hectares in size; the 
second most numerous (24%) were from two to three hectares 
(249,412).5 Table 6.4 shows that the average rice farm is 3 hectares; 
farms of 10 and above make up 20 percent of the total area of rice 
farms and farms larger than 200 hectares make up only 2 percent.
To illustrate this farm size and area distribution, the case of 
Tarlac province in Central Luzon is presented below.6 A picture of 
the farm size distribution such as that of Tarlac shows that farm size 
is not as inequitably distributed as landholdings, with 60 percent of 
the rice land in farms between one to 5 hectares and 80 percent of 
the farms belonging to this category. Hundred-hectares farms are 
only .07 percent of the total number and 7 percent of the land. 
However, the picture of landownership may be another matter. 
Small farm size with an average of about three hectares is partly a 
consequence of owned land being distributed for tenant operations, 
each of which is regarded as a separate farm. Hence, a 100-hectare 
piece of rice land owned by one family could realistically be divided 
into at least 30 farms being cultivated by 30 tenants.
To illustrate the phenomenon of concentration of land 
ownership, Table 6.5 presents the extent of landholdings attributed to
Farm Size in Hectares No. o f  Farms Area
0 -  1 1,706 763.2
1 -  3 18,753 32,906.0
3 - 5 10,255 36,259.0
5 - 1 5 4,659 31,216.9
1 5 - 2 5 132 2,395.4
25 -  100 74 3,333.8
1 0 0 -2 0 0 17 2,111.3
200 and above 10 6,385.8
Total 35,606 115,371.4
5 USAID, Land Reform in the Philippines. Manila, 1971, mimeographed, 93 pp.
6|bid.
Table 6.4. Average farm area for major Philippine crops.
Crop Farms
(number)
Area
(hectares)
Percent o f  to ta l area in
Size o f  
farms 
(hectares)
Farms o f  10 
hectares 
or over
Farms larger 
than 200 
hectares
All farms 2,166,200 7,772,500 3.6 33 8
Sugar cane 17,800 249,400 13.9 80 43
Abaca 36,000 209,000 5.8 49 8
Coconut 440,300 1,938,600 4.4 38 3
Palay 1,041,900 3,112,100 3.0 20 2
Corn 378,800 949,300 2.5 20 1
Tobacco 22,900 38,400 1.7 8 0
Source: Frank H. Golay and Marvin E. Goodstein, Rice and People in 1990, Table 7, 
p. 14. Manila, 1967, (Based on 1960 Bureau of the Census and Statistics figures).
100 landowners in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. Almost 60 percent of 
the total hectarage of landholdings belong to the upper ten 
landowners. The largest landholding which is 3,741 hectares already 
comprises 30 percent of the total area. In this situation, the 
distribution of landowners according to size and the computed 
average would be both misleading. The former shows that almost 
half of the landholdings are 40 hectares and below and the latter 
shows that the average size of land owned is 123 hectares. Both con­
ceal the concentration of landownership in the hands of a few 
landowners.
Griffin criticizes farm size data presentation in Philippine studies 
because " i t  is virtually impossible to detect the degree of inequality 
in the distribution of landed wealth. The data are organized 
according to the size of the operational unit, and since most 
landowners — particularly in the rice growing regions — break up 
their estates into a large number of small tenant farms, a size 
distribution of farms gives a misleading impression of equality. Farm 
sizes may be equally distributed; farm ownership is no t."7
The use of operational farm-size data rather than size of 
landholdings arises from the fact that size of land area being
7Keith Griffin, Economic Aspects of Technical Change in the Rural Areas of 
Monsoon Asia, op. c i t
Table 6.5. Size of landholdings of 100 riceland owners in 
Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, 1965.
Landowners 
grouped b y  
decile
Range o f  size 
o f  landholdings 
in  hectares
Percent o f  
to ta l area 
o f  landholdings
Size o f  
landholdings
Percent o f  
landowners 
in  each size 
category
1 -  10 3 - 1 4 0.82 20 & below 19
1 1 - 2 0 1 5 - 2 1 1.46 21 - 4 0 29
21 - 3 0 21.5 -  28.5 2.06 41 - 6 0 12
31 - 4 0 3 0 - 3 3 2.54 61 - 8 0 8
41 - 5 0 3 3 - 4 2 3.04 81 -  100 7
51 - 6 0 43 -  59.5 4.12 101-120 6
61 - 7 0 63.33 -  93 6.10 121 -  140 3
71 - 8 0 9 5 - 1 1 6 8.14 141 -  160 2
81 - 9 0 1 2 0 -2 1 6 .7 3 13.10 161 -  190 1
91 -  100 227 -  3741 58.32 191 - 3 0 0  
396 
420 
462 
792
1
1
1
1
1
Total 12316.55 3741
Total 12316.55
1
Source: Data from E. Bernal-Torres, University of the Philippines College of 
Agriculture.
cultivated can easily be obtained from the farmer-cultivator himself. 
Research on size land owned has been handicapped for at least two 
reasons:
(1) How does one determine ownership of land? Is it  by legal 
papers o f possession or by virtue of whoever has 
responsibility for looking after the land? Many pieces of 
land are fuzzy with respect to ownership.
(2) Is the land conjugal, individual, communal or family 
property? A family of eight children which has total 
landholdings of 100 hectares may be considered a big 
landowner as a family but if  the property has been divided 
among eight children, it  is not such a big holding, 
especially if this means eight separate nuclear families.
The definition, identification, and actual counting of 
landowners and their holdings are, therefore, a very practical 
problem which doubtless has been among the bottlenecks in the 
land reform program, especially when land ceilings and expropriation 
proceeding are involved. As a matter of fact, this problem of land­
ownership directly affects the decision as to wno the respondent 
ought to be in a landlord study, particularly when the land is held by 
a family. One needs to know who is the major decision-maker in the 
family w ith respect to the land. This constitutes a study in itself.
Before Bernal's study was conducted in 1965, there had been 
no attempt at systematically obtaining data on landlords in the 
Philippines. Among the reasons she cited for this lack were: (1) the 
highly fragmented nature of landholdings; (2) the system of property 
transfer which in most cases is mere verbalizations of arrangements, 
hence the utter lack of formal records or contracts; (3) possibly there 
are underdeclarations of total landholdings to the extent that 
"dum m y”  owners are thought to exist. In the course of her own 
study, Bernal encountered names in land tax records which were 
of those persons who were deceased, had sold the land, left the place, 
were completely unknown or had fictitious addresses. In many cases, 
the official records were completely useless, hence greater reliance 
was placed on local residents' knowledge as to who the landlords 
were. In addition, knowledgeable tenants, overseers, and neighbors 
were also sought out for further information, particularly on sizes 
and whereabouts of holdings. As Bernal describes it: ''Just to trace 
the whereabouts of respondents (landlords) had been a challenge 
short of being a real detective work.” 8
All these, however, do not invalidate the point made by Griffin.
Since the first phase of the land reform program aims at the 
abolition of share tenancy, data on this have direct implications for 
program operations. Table 6.6 indicates that program coverage as of 
1967 in relation to total number of share tenants and area farmed 
is rather low even in the Priority I provinces of Central Luzon. Only 
about one-fifth of the tenants and a fourth of the area come under 
their program. In the lower-priority areas, the proportions are as low 
as three percent of tenants in Mindanao. It should also be noted that 
the average area farmed per tenant is only about 2.24 hectares with 
the llocos Region and the Visayas reporting much smaller farms.
8 E. A. Bernal, The Role of Landlords in Philippine Agricultural Development: An 
Exploratory Study. Unpublished M. S. Thesis, University of the Philippines, College of 
Agriculture, 1971.
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Table 6.7 shows the over-all scope of land reform as of May, 
1971 which included only a third of the provinces, a sixth of the 
municipalities and about a fourth of the rice area and rice farmers. 
Although this looks like an improvement over the 1967 figures, there 
is no question that the actual scope is still much below the 
expectations. An interesting development was Camarines Sur, Bicol 
Region, where in 1971 leasehold was supposedly operational in 37 
municipalities and six Land Reform Project Teams were fielded.9 
In 1967, the Bicol Region was of fifth  priority but in 1971 
Camarines Sur had more municipalities under coverage than any of 
the provinces in Central Luzon. This is significant in the light of the 
reported take-over by 300 members of the Bicol Landless Tenants 
Association (June 18, 1972) of a 40-hectare portion of the Soler 
Estate. The legal officer of the land reform office in the area 
reported in December 1971 about farmers' restlessness and threat to 
enter the property unless the Estate was expropriated. This Soler 
Estate was composed of three parcels totaling 2,000 hectares.10
Table 6.7. Scope of coverage of land reform operations as of May 1971.
Tota l scope 
Philippines
Present
coverage
Percent o f  
coverage o f  
to ta l scope
1. No. of provinces 66 20 30.3
2. No. of cities, municipa­
lities and municipal
districts 1,506 236 15.7
3. Land resources (hectares)
Total land area 30,000,000 3,700,525 12.3
Total farm area
(all types) 7,772,484.6 1,279,328.5 16.5
Total rice area 3,038,502.1 718.812.5 23.7
Total com area 952,970.4 69,139.4 7.2
4. Human resources
Total population 37,008,419 6,753,348 18.2
Total farm population 12,668,250 2,261,766 17.8
Total rice farmers 1,061,333 292,469 27.6
Total corn farmers 382,558 22,563 5.9
Source: Agrarian R eform : To F u lf il l a N ationa l Dream. The National Media Produc­
tion Center. Aug. 8, 1971 (Cited in P. R. Sandoval and B. V. Gaon, op. c it.)
9The National Media Production Center, Agrarian Reform: To Fulfill a National 
Dream, Aug. 8, 1971.
10Zenaida Babao, "Bicol Farmers Seize Portion of Soler Land," MT, June 19, 1972,
For a rough single indicator of the vigor w ith which Land 
Reform operations have been pursued, Table 6.8 presents the financial 
investments which had been made from 1964 to 1971. One of the 
most notable features in this table is the great discrepancy between 
the authorized appropriations and the actual obligations. The latter 
ranged in magnitude from 12 to 34 percent of what had been 
authorized. It is, therefore, misleading to gauge performance against 
authorized appropriations. There had been an over-all increase in 
actual obligations made to the seven integrated agencies from almost 
32 million pesos in 1964 to 55 in 1967, 58 in 1968 and 74 in 1970. By 
1971, the amount had declined to 52. Of more direct relevance to 
the new rice technology because of their promotional and supportive 
role toward its effective adoption are the Agricultural Productivity 
Commission (APC) and the Agricultural Credit Administration 
(ACA). The amounts obligated to APC remained practically at the 
level of 13 million pesos except in 1966 and 1967, when these 
reached about 18 million. The allocations to ACA were very erratic in 
magnitude, ranging from one million in 1966, increasing to 16.5 
million in 1967, almost 13 million in 1968 and 15 m illion in 1969 
and reaching an unusually high figure of about 23 million in 1970 
but dropping to 6 million in 1971. Other things being equal, one 
would expect that with increased expenditures, there would be 
greater farm level support for improving productivity. Of the seven 
agencies, the Land Bank had minimal or no support for four 
years even in 1964 when program implementation started.
On the relationship between farm size and ownership, the case 
of two barrios, Sinayawan and Beynte Nuwebe, in the municipality 
of Hagonoy, province o f Davao del Sur provides village-level insights. 
While the average farm sizes in the two villages are 1.83 and 1.79 
hectares, respectively, the tenancy rates are 86.3 and 92.4 percent. 
The rest are owner-operators. These rates are very high, considering 
that theoretically, tenancy should not exist in these areas where land 
was supposed to have been acquired by individuals who would 
themselves cultivate the land. As a mater of fact, Davao and 
Cotabato belong to Region IX which is next to the last region in 
terms of priority for land reform. But as Stewart describes it:
. . .  "much of the land in Hagonoy was acquired in parcels of 24 hectares 
under the Homestead Act. In many cases this land has since been divided 
for purposes of sale or inheritance. Today the 137 hectares of irrigated 
iceland in Beynte Nuwebe are owned by 15 individuals whose average size 
of holding is 9.14 hectares. In Sinayawan, 383 hectares are owned by 76
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individuals whose average holding is 5.04 hectares. However, more than 100 
hectares ottm s land are presently submerged due to poor drainage and have 
been abandoned. These averages tend to obscure the concentration of 
ownership. In Beynte Nuwebe, five individuals with holdings of 20 
hectares or more own nearly 80 percent of the land. In Sinayawan, eleven 
individuals whose average holding is 16.3 hectares own nearly half of the 
land."11
On the other hand, the changing tenure situation in Gapan, 
Nueva Ecija, a high priority land reform area in Central Luzon, gives 
some reason for optimism. In the 1960 Census, Gapan was reported 
to have 87 percent of farmers as share tenants. In 1969, about 45 
percent, or 1065 out of 2232, were share tenants. A study of three 
villages in the municipality yielded the following figures:12
Mahipon Malimba San Nicolas
Leasehold 46% 26% 23%
Share tenants 26% 59% 57%
Owner-operators 25% 6% 16%
Part-owners 3% 9% 4%
For the province of Nueva Ecija, an Institute of Philippine Culture 
study estimated the total number of rice farmers to be 70,800, 
distributed as follows: 8,200 owner-cultivators (11%); 28,900 lessees 
(41%); 26,100 share tenants (37%); 4,800 part-owners (7%); and
2,800 lessee-share tenants (4%).13 Comparing these figures to the 
reported 76.3 tenancy rate for Nueva Ecija in 1960, one notes that 
changes have taken place perhaps not in ownership but at least in 
tenure status from share tenant to lessee.
On the relationship between farm size and tenure classes, 
Montenegro's data indicate that differentials w ith respect to farm 
size exist not only among tenure groups but also among tenants 
themselves (Table 6.9). One will note that the median values for farm 
size are smaller than the mean values because of the relatively wide 
dispersion which occurs in the area being cultivated by the different 
tenure groups. Montenegro's analysis reveals that among all farms in 
Bay, Laguna "the 10 percent with the larger farms operate 35 
percent of the land while the 50 percent who farm the smaller farms
H  J. Stewart, op. c i t
1^R. T. Herrera, op. c i t
13R. P- de Reyes, IPC/BAECON Study of Socio-Economic Conditions Among 
Rice Farmers in Nueva Ecija. Final Report, Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de 
Manila, 1971.
operate only 20 percent of the farm land. In Mayantoc, Tarlac, 10 
percent of the larger farms operate 38 percent of the land while 50 
percent who farm the smaller farms operate only 22 percent of the 
land." Judging from the data in Table 6.9, we would expect that the 
full owners, part-owners, and managers who make up the smaller 
groups would be the most likely operators of the larger farms referred 
to. However, even among tenants themselves, there are those who are 
large and those who are small. As Montenegro concludes from his 
data: "Among sharecropping tenants (Bay, Laguna), the 10 percent 
with larger farms operate 35 percent of the land while 50 percent of 
the smaller farms operate only 25 percent of the land. In Mayantoc, 
Tarlac, 10 percent of the larger share tenants operate 25 percent of 
the land while 50 percent of smaller farms operate only 26 percent 
of the land."14
Table 6.9 Tenure classes by size of farm (Mayantoc,
Tarlac and Bay, Laguna), 1965.
M A Y A N T O C
TARLAC
Mean Median 
(In hectares)
Mean Median 
(In hectares)
All farms 
Full owner
3.39
4.10
2.49
2.52 All tenants
3.39
2.20
2.48
1.29
Part owner 2.52 2.39 Sharecrop 2.20 1.29
3.60 tenants 2.30 2.27
Tenants 2.20 1.29
Others 7.82 4.66
BAY, LAGUNA
All farms 2.14 1.43 2.14 1.43
Full owner 2.20 1.40 All tenants 1.69 1.64
Part owner 3.30 2.58 Sharecrop
tenants 1.65 1.36
Tenants 1.69 1.64
Others 4.70 3.69
Source: J.E. Montenegro, Tenure Classes (Owners, Part Owners, Tenants, Manager, etc.) by Size 
of Farm, 1965. IRRI Seminar, Dec. 1, 1966.
In summary, one would say that there are both large and small 
landholdings but a situation exists whereby large landholdings are 
cultivated in small farms which are operated by share tenants and 
leaseholders. Among farmer-cultivators there are owner-operators, 
and part-owners who themselves operate farms smaller than landlord 
holdings. Among share tenants and lessees there are those who 
cultivate smaller or larger farms relative to other tenants. Hence, 
farm size is not as simple and straightforward a variable as it appears,
especially if it is conceived as an intervening variable which 
determines who will be affected positively or negatively by the new 
rice technology. Is it size of farm or size of landholdings which is the 
more crucial factor? If one adds to this the variety of existing 
sharing arrangements and lease rentals, then the complications are 
compounded even more. Farm size also means different parts of the 
country. Twenty hectares of rice land in Laguna is not the same as 
20 hectares in Mindanao. The physical and ecological setting and the 
infrastructure of facilities and services w ill account only for part of 
the differences. There are other economic and socio-cultural aspects 
of land ownership and farming which undoubtedly differ among 
regions.
B. Some General Characteristics o f Landlords and Their Tenants
In order to appreciate and assess the interaction, if any, 
between land reform and the new rice technology, it  is necessary to 
get acquainted w ith the principal characters in land reform — the 
landlord and the tenant. Data from the Bernal, R. P. de los Reyes, 
and Lopez studies15 were consolidated for this purpose. While there 
are many source materials about tenants, these studies have been 
chosen because they are the only ones which specifically provide 
information about landlords and their relationship to tenants.
Tables 6.10 to 6.14 show the following characteristics of landlords:
a. Absentee landlords tend to have bigger landholdings than 
those who reside in the area where their land is located. The average 
size for the former is 287 and for the latter, 37 hectares. In terms of 
distribution, about half of the absentee landlords have more than 
100 hectares; only 3 of the resident landlords belong to that 
category. These landholdings tend to be fragmented with an average 
of 3 to 4 parcels located in different places (Table 6.10). Such a 
situation tends to obscure the concentration of landownership.
b. Landlords, despite the stereotype we have of them, are not all 
well-to-do by any means (Table 6.11). Using size of landholdings, other 
sources of income and certain level of living indicators, Bernal 
classified 112 landlords according to socio-economic position. 
Twenty-one percent of them belong to the upper class; they possess 
the trappings of good living, such as 2 or more cars; 2 or more 
houses, trips abroad, etc.; have other major sources of income and at
the same time have the biggest landholdings. The upper middle class, 
which is about one-third of the group, is composed of executives or 
government officials who live a comfortable life and own 51 to 100 
hectares of land. The lower middle class, which is another one-third, 
are white-collar job holders like school teachers, supervisors or 
owners of small-retail business with few employees. Their houses are 
not as expensive as those of the other two upper classes and they 
take pride in several household appliances. A little  more than 10 
percent o f the landlords own between 5 to 10 hectares; they operate 
sari-sari stores (small retail stores) and high level of living indicators 
are absent in their homes.
The most important observation from the data in Table 6.11 is 
that the bigger landowners tend to have other substantial sources 
of income. Those of the lower class who have small landholdings also 
tend to have only small businesses as other source of income and none 
of the prestigious symbols of "good" living. They would, therefore, 
be expected to depend more on income from their land for their 
livelihood.
Table 6.10. Total landholdings of 112 rice landlords.
Farm size 
in  hectares
Resident
landlord
Resident-A bsen tee 
landlord
Absentee
landlord
5 -  9 3
— N u m b e r —
2
1 0 -  24 22 4 2
25 -  49 18 7 7
5 0 -  74 2 5 3
7 5 -  99 3 4 3
1 0 0 -1 2 4 1 4 2
125 -  149 1 2 2
1 5 0 -  174 - — _
175 -  199 - - 1
200 -  299 1 5 1
300 -  399 - — 2
400 and above - — 5
Ave. Area Per 
Landlord 37.40 95.95 287.86*
‘ Includes two with 1,055 and 3,742 hectares. 
Data from E. A. Bernal, op. c i t
c. Besides having the bigger landholdings, the absentee 
landlords also have more tenants. They are also the landlords who 
have other substantial sources of income (Table 6.11).
Table 6.11. Socio-economic position of 112 rice landlords.
Socio-economic
position
Size o f  farm and 
other sources o f  
income
Level o f  living 
indicators
1. Upper class More than 100 hectares; 2 or more cars
owners of major business 2 or more houses
21%
or major stockholders of Vacation and trips
corporations abroad
Membership in international 
and national organizations
2. Upper middle 51 — 100 hectares; execu­ 1 — 2 cars/jeeps; F 2 5 .0 0 0 -
class tives or officials of large P50.000 value of residence
34% business or in govern­ Vacation and trips to Baguio
ment; owners of large and other out-of-town
retail business places in the Philippines 
Membership in national and 
local organizations
3. Lower middle 11 — 50 hectares; white- F10,000-F20,000
collar job holders; grade house
school teachers; first Local organization
34% level supervisors; owner membership
of retail business with 
employees
Several household appliances
4. Lower class 5 — 10 hectares; engaged Absence of high level of
in small business without living indicators
11% employees (sari-sari stores)
Source of data: E. Bernal, op. c i t
d. Lands have been acquired by inheritance or by purchase or 
both. Tenants also tended to be inherited either from the landlords, 
parents or from the previous landowners and have worked with 
them for a long time. Only about one-fourth of the tenants applied 
to or were asked by the landlord (Table 6.12).
e. Most of the landlords reported conjugal and individual 
ownership of the land (Tables 6.12 and 6.13). The latter could simply 
mean that the title  or any possession papers are in one person's name 
but the proceeds from the land probably go to the family. 
Communal properties which refer to those lands still owned in
common by brothers and sisters were reported less in the IPC than in 
the Bernal study. This was evident also in the case of individually 
owned properties. One can speculate that this division of properties 
has occurred as a result of land reform (Tables 6.12 and 6.13). Although 
60 percent of 112 landlords in Bernal's study said they would not 
buy land anymore, 26 percent were still interested in further land 
acquisition. In general, they also believed that increased investment
Table 6.12. Some general characteristics of 112 landlords 
(Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, 1965).
1. Type of ownership 6. Age
Individual 34% Below 40 19%
Conjugal 36% 40 -  49 29%
Communal 19% 5 0 - 5 9 31%
A combination of 6 0 - 6 9 13%
the above 11% 70 and above 8%
2. How acquired 7. Sale of rice land
Inherited 24% Only 23% ever sold
Bought 34% landi
Both 40%
Bought and
leased 2%
3. Ave. No. of tenants 8. Future purchase of
Resident landlord 7 rice land
Resident-absentee Will not buy 60%
landlord 13 Will buy 26%
Absentee 38 Undecided 14%
4. How tenants were 9. Attitudes toward
acquired investment
Inherited from a. Increased invest­
parents 43% ment will increase
Retained upon farm output (Yes) 80%
land purchase 14% (No) 20%
Applied to landlord 20% Of those who said
Asked by landlord 6% yes, 80% are
Some inherited. willing to invest
some applied 6% in farm improvement.
Some inherited. b. Investment preference
some transferred 11% Farm 33%
5. Education Non-farm 48%
Elementary 23% Non-commit­
High school 22% tal 19%
College 52% 10. Plan to sell land among
Vocational 3% those who have not sold
any (Yes) 36%
would increase farm output and were willing to invest in farm 
improvement.However, when asked to choose between farm and non­
farm investment, only 33 percent chose the first and 48 percent, 
reform program. That those who own land tend to hang on to it is 
evidenced by only 23 percent of Bernal's sample ever having sold a 
parcel of their land. The rest have never sold any portion of their 
holdings, although the Bernal sample reported 36 percent who 
planned to sell mainly because of land reform.
f. The manner by which purchase of land was financed is 
relevant in understanding the landlord's resistance or willingness to 
part with his property in a land reform program. The IPC study 
found that 80 percent of those who bought lands used their savings 
or earnings and 20 percent used bank loans in addition to the savings. 
Pensions, backpay, and sale of other properties were the other 
sources. Sixty-four percent of all the land parcels were acquired after 
World War II and about 25 percent of postwar acquisitions were 
made after the land reform promulgation in 1964 (Table 6.13). In 
attempting to predict response to the land reform program, one 
would expect those who bought their properties from their savings 
and earnings to be less willing to give up ownership. The fact that 
land acquisitions were still made after land reform proclamation 
makes one wonder if the purchasers believed the law would actually 
be implemented. Otherwise, they would not have invested their 
money in these pieces of land.
Table 6.13. Characteristics of 73 Nueva Ecija rice landlords.
Share Lessee Landlords Lessee Share
1. Area of rice land 
owned (median in
hectares)........................ 9.5 38.7 38.1
2. Median No. of par­
cels or locations
of rice lands .............. 3 3 4
3. Manner of acquisi­
tion .......................... 21% inherited 39% inherited 19% inherited
41% bought 28% bought 48% bought
64% of all the land parcels were acquired after World 
War II and about 25% of post-war acquisitions were 
made in 1964 after land-reform promulgation.
4. No. of tenants 
(median per land­
lord) .......................... 4.1 14.2 13.7
Share Lessee Landlords Lessee Share
5. Types of ownership
6. How purchase of 
land was finan­
ced ...................
7. Sale of land . . . .
8. Age ...................
Education
9.
10.
11 .
1 2 .
13.
50%
23%
8 %
19%
80%
of all landlords report conjugal property 
individual ownership 
communal property 
a combination of the above
of those who bought lands used their savings or 
earnings. 20% bought lands with a bank loan added 
to savings. Pension, backpay and sale of other properties 
were other sources.
Only 18% reported having sold a parcel of land. The rest 
have not sold any portion of their holdings.
About 57 years average
Junior Senior Junior
High School College College
— P e r c e n t  —
Travel
Baguio ...................... 64 83 86
Hongkong .............. 0 28 26
Tokyo ................... 0 28 26
Europe ................... 0 17 21
U.S. or Canada . . . . 0 22 21
No. of residences
More than one . . . . 15 50 67
At least 1 passenger
vehicle ................... 29 71 76
Mass media exposure
Read daily news­
paper .......................... 29 72 62
Watch T V  daily . . . . 21 61 38
Read magazine once
a week ................... 45 78 80
Involvement in politics
as a candidate . . . . 15 35 14
Tenant-landlord
division of harvest
50:50 ................... 67 55
Source: R. de los Reyes, op. c i t
g. Of direct relevance to land reform program are the 
comparative characteristics of landlords who went into leasehold 
arrangements with their tenants, those who shifted to some 
compromise leasehold or a combination of share and lease, and those
who maintained share tenancy. Tables 6.13 and 6.14 show differences 
in the characteristics of these three groups of landlords. The first and 
second groups tended to have bigger landholdings, more tenants, 
higher education, more travel both locally and internationally, 
greater exposure to mass media, and more ownership of houses and 
vehicles and more involvement in politics than those who maintained 
share tenancy. It is particularly interesting to note that a higher 
proportion of lease (39%) than share (21%) and lease-share (19%) 
landlords inherited rather than bought their landholdings. All of 
these findings contradict the stereotype of the big feudal landlord 
who would resist land reform. It is the smaller landowners who have 
few tenants, lower educational attainment, less exposure to mass 
media, lower proportion who own vehicles or more than one house, 
less politically involved and have a higher proportion who bought 
rather than inherited their lands. These are the landlords who have so 
far resisted land reform at least as far as the first phase of shift from 
share to leasehold is concerned. These findings should not at all be 
surprising because it is precisely the big landowners who also have 
occupational and wealth alternatives other than land. The small 
landowners more o f whom bought rather than inherited their land 
would be more disinclined to part w ith what they have acquired 
from earnings and savings. They are in many ways the nouveau riche 
who have yet to establish themselves firm ly and land is one secure 
basis for entrenchment. Those who have other alternatives and have 
more entrepreneurial acumen among the big landowners would 
venture into "greener pasture" in non-farm investments. However, it 
is also possible that the bigger landowners who are also more 
politically sophisticated and politically powerful do not really see the 
reality of land reform implementation beyond the leasehold, hence 
their relative lack of hesitation to go along with the first phase. After 
all, they might never have to part with their land anyway.
Table 6.14 provides information on characteristics of landlords 
and tenants belonging to the three tenure groups: share tenants, genuine 
leasehold and compromise leasehold. There is not much difference 
among the three tenant groups with respect to age, education, 
number of children, years of tenancy and farm size being operated. It 
is the three types of landlords under the three tenure arrangements 
who differ in characteristics, particularly in size of holdings with 
averages of 11.8, 206.7 and 20 hectares, respectively, for share, 
genuine and compromise leasehold landlords. The averages for the 
number of tenants are about 6, 100 and 12. De los Reyes also
found that they differ w ith respect to sharing arrangements with 67 
percent of the share landlords and 55 percent of the lessee-share 
landlords; about 70 percent have written contracts with leaseholders. 
Needless to say, the landlords as a category are older and have much 
higher educational attainment (college) than their tenants (third or 
fourth grade). Obviously the only thing they have in common is the 
relationship arising from the land which the landlord owns and the 
tenant cultivates.
Table 6.14. Characteristics of tenants and landlords by tenure groups.
Average
Share
tenancy
Genuine
leasehold
Compromise
leasehold
characteristics
Tenant Landlord Tenant Landlord Tenant Landlord
1. Age 51.0 58.5 49.0 60.6 48.0 60.0
2. Education 
(years of 
schooling) 3.3 8.5 4.0 10.5 3.2 9.3
3. Wife's age 46.8 - 46.0 - 43.6 -
4. Wife's educa­
tion 3.1 7.0 3.7 12.6 2.5 5.9
5. Children's ave­
rage age 18.0 23.9 15.8 26.5 13.8 21.4
6. No. of children 6.3 4.7 6.3 6.6 6.4 3.8
7. Farm size (Size 
of holdings for 
landlord) 3.1 11.8 3.2 206.7 2.8 20.1
8. Total No. of 
years as tenant 24.7 — 22.8 - 20.5 -
9. No. of years as 
tenants of land­
lord studied 18.5 20.6 18.0
10. No. of tenants - 5.9 — 99.5 — 12.0
Data were obtained from R. Lopez, op. c i t .  Tables 10, 37 and 40, pp. 221 and 230.
Her study which was done in Nueva Ecija estimated a total of
70,800 rice farmers broken down as follows: 8,200 owner-cultivators 
(11%); 4,800 part-owners (7%); 28,900 lessees (41%); 2,800 
lessee-share tenants (4%); and 26,100 share tenants (37%). From a 
sample of 1,028 farmers, certain background characteristics were 
identified. Thirty-eight percent of them have finished elementary
schooling but there are tenurial differences w ith owner-operators and 
part-owners reporting a median of six grades; share tenants, five 
grades and lessees, four grades. With housing facilities as an indicator, 
owner-operators have more durable and bigger houses located in 
larger-sized home lots. For example, only 10 percent of tenants as 
against 40 percent of owner-operators live in homes made of concrete 
materials. The latter also have a median-sized house of 32 square 
meters while tenants have only about 24. The median area of the 
house lot is 600 sq. m. for the owner-operators and 350 for share 
tenants. The size o f both house and lot declined progressively from 
owner-operator, part-owner, lessee to share tenant. In terms of health 
and sanitation, 90 percent of rice farmers studied have a private force 
pump in their homes but about two-thirds have open pit toilets and 
10 percent have no toilets at all. Rice farmers also tended to come 
from rice farming families and have very low mobility in terms of 
residence. Owner-operators tended to continue farming parcels of 
land which grandfathers and parents worked on, while tenants moved 
from one parcel to another due to difficulties in relations with 
landlords, soil productivity, etc. As pointed out earlier, tenants have 
been tenants for a long time (about 20 years) and most were 
inherited with the land or went w ith the transfer of property from 
one owner to another. Indebtedness to others was reported by 70 
percent o f all the rice farmers but the size of the debts declined from 
owner-operator, part-owner, lessee to share tenant. Perhaps this is 
related to available collateral, hence credit-worthi ness especially for 
production loans. More of the owner-operators get credit from banks 
while half of the lessees obtain credit from moneylenders and the 
same proportion of share tenants are provided loans by their 
landlords.
C. Landlord-Tenant Response to the Land Reform Program
With the enactment o f the Agricultural Land Reform Code in 
1963 and the implementation of a land reform program, how did the 
landlords and the tenants respond to this Act which was hailed as 
"the key to the emancipation of the Filipino farmers from the 
centuries-old bondage of share tenancy which usually leaves tenants 
little  initiative, a low level o f living, and prevents improvement in 
their productivity” ? 16 As the former Governor of the Land
16l\larciso M. Mindajao, The Adoption of Agricultural Leasehold in Selected Land 
Reform Project Team Areas in Bulacan Province. Unpublished M. S. Thesis, U. P. College of 
Agriculture, 1971.
Authority puts it . the only condition our farmers have known 
is poverty. He has inherited a social malady. He is anchored to the 
land he does not own. He is forced to produce a maximum harvest 
and yet is caught in a system where additional effort is not 
compensated. A high degree of dependency has been bred between 
the farmer as tenant and his landlord as owner. The only relationship 
they have is sharecropping. This produces an abusive accumulation of 
wealth by the few and an inequitable distribution of products.''17
Because the leasehold system is the first phase of the land 
reform program, its acceptance or rejection by tenants and landlords 
was regarded as vital to implementation. Among its salient features 
are: (a) automatic conversion of share tenancy to leasehold when an 
area is declared a land reform area; (b) the lessee pays the landowner 
a fixed rental of 25 percent of the average normal harvest during the 
three agricultural years immediately preceding the establishment of 
leasehold after deducting the expenses for seeds, the cost of 
harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling and processing, whichever are 
applicable; (c) from leaseholder the farmer may become an 
amortizing owner, then full owner of the farm lot; (d) credit facilities 
and technical assistance are to be provided to the leaseholder by the 
government through its appropriate agencies; and (e) the landowner 
has the right to appeal to court to eject his tenants because he wants 
to cultivate the land personally.
There are two avenues for shifting to leasehold as provided for 
in the Agricultural Land Reform Code: (a) By voluntary election 
whereby a share tenant notifies his landlord in writing at least one 
month before the next agricultural year that he is going into 
leasehold. If the landowner agrees, they sign the contract. If not, the 
farmer can bring the petition to the Court of Agrarian Relations 
which decides the matter, (b) By proclamation of an area as a land 
reform area. The shift from share tenancy to leasehold is automatic 
and it means that all agencies relating to agricultural leasehold have 
been put into operation to assist farmers in everything they need.
With all the measures designed to liberate the share tenants 
from a "life  of poverty, bondage and injustice," one would think 
that tenants would have been enthusiastic to shift to leasehold in 
order to take advantage of the Code's provisions. For a glimpse into 
the predispositions, attitudes and actual behavioral responses to the
I^Conrado F. Estrella, "New Guidelines for Land Reform," Solidarity, Vol. 6, No. 7, 
July 1971, pp 2-12.
program, the results of several relevant studies are reviewed. Douglas 
who conducted a study of 50 farmers in Gapan, Nueva Ecija (Tables
6.15 and 6.16) two years after the Code was passed found them to be 
optimistic about the future; the present was perceived as better than 
the past; future living conditions were expected to be better and 
were even optimistic about prospects for more people to own land in 
the future. They also favored change in the existing land tenure.
Although the future looked bright the present way of life in 
Gapan was considered very inadequate. Compared to the farmers, 
fewer town leaders thought future living conditions would be better. 
There were also fewer of them who favored change in the land tenure 
system. This latter response in understandable, since town leaders 
were probably landowners. In general, the farmers were also more 
positive than the town leaders regarding what the government was 
doing to help solve the country's problems. Both groups, however, 
agreed that the government should be more active in bringing about 
community improvement. From the responses in Table 6.15, farmers 
also seemed to prefer science-based knowledge to luck, omens and 
old ancestors' work techniques. Table 6.15 shows that despite the 
expressed desire to see changes in the land tenure system, the farmers 
preferred an adjustment (66%) within the existing system (such as 
better crop-sharing ratios) rather than a complete overhaul of the 
system (16%). There were also 18 percent who favored a retention of 
the old system because of harmonious relation with the landlord. 
Although the Douglas study covered only 50 farmers and 23 town 
leaders, the findings somehow anticipated the results of other 
studies.
Table 6.15. Attitudes of farmers and community leaders toward change, 
toward government projects, and toward science-based 
innovation (50 farmers from 2 barrios 
and 23 town leaders, Gapan, Nueva Ecija).*
t  „  , Farmers LeadersT o p i c  Poles
Positive Negative Positive Negative
A. Optimism about
direction of change
1. Future (10-15 years Improvement/
ahead) decline 72.5 9.8 78.1 13.0
2. Past (time of youth Better now/
age 10-12) Worse now 58.5 31.3 73.8 25.9
3. Future landowner­ More will own/
ship prospects Fewer will own 54.8 13.7 52.0 8.6
Farmers Leaders
T o p i c Poles
Positive Negative Positive Negative
4. Future living
conditions
5. Present Gapan way
of life
6. Favor change in
Future better/ 
Future worse 
Adequate/ 
Inadequate 
Pro-change/
58.8
13.7
- P e r c e n t -
29.3 39.0 
66.6 17.3
47.7
69.5
present land tenure 
system
Anti-change
64.6 15.6 21.6 39.0
B. Belief in community
improvement through 
government activity 
1. Helpfulness of barrio 
gov't.
Helpful/
Harmful 66.2 13.6
2. Barrio should under­
take more projects
More/fewer 
or none 94.0 6.0 __ _
3. Helpfulness of 
municipal gov't. Helpful/ 80.2 19.8 78.2 _
4. Helpfulness of na­
tional gov't.
Not helpful 
Helpful 80.2 19.8 69.4 4.3
5. Government doing all 
or some necessary 
things to solve 
country's problems
Ves/none 
or only a 
few
76.3 23.7 26.0 26.0
6. Gov't in general More/same 
should be more active or less 92.2 7.8 100.0
C. Preference for science- 
based knowledge and 
. innovation 
1. Value of work tech­
niques of father's 
generation
Obsolete/
Useful
13.6 86.1 25.9 73.8
2. Accuracy of omens 
in foretelling
Inaccurate/
Accurate 23.7 11.6 45.4 4.5
3. Ability or luck
and connections de­
termine success
Ability/Luck 
and connec­
tions 43.0 43.0 47.7 34.7
4. Value of professor's 
advice and science 
for crop culture
Valuable/ 
Not valuable
74.4 3.8 91.2 8.6
‘ Data from: Louis H. Douglas, F ifty  Farmers o f  Gapan: The Propensity to Develop 
in One R ural Philipp ine S ituation, Kansas State Univ., Spring 1966 (mimeo, 46 pp.).
**The neutral responses are not included in the tabulations, hence the two percentages 
do not total 100.
1. Retain old system of land tenure in to to
a. Harmonious relations with landlord
b. No difference
2. Completely overhaul the sy s te m ..............
3. Adjust within the system .........................
a. Better crop sharing ration (75-25)
b. Better sharing of expenses
c. Curb usury
d. Make any changes that are good
*Data from Louis H. Douglas, op. cit.
The 1964-65 Annual Report of the Land Reform Project Team 
in Plaridel, Bulacan (the first place to be declared land reform area) 
cited the persistent refusal of farmers to shift to  leasehold from share 
tenancy. Of the 1379 farmers studied in the first land reform area 
to be proclaimed, 724, or 53 percent, refused to enter into leasehold 
and 362, or 26 percent, refused altogether the technical services of 
field personnel. A 1967 report18 from the same municipality says 
that out of 439 share tenants who refused to shift to leasehold, 87 
percent claimed to be satisfied with their present status. Reasons for 
refusal were: they could easily borrow money from the landlord for 
any purpose; kin relations with the landlord; and plain good 
relationships. The rest of the respondents were dissatisfied with share 
tenancy but could not shift to leasehold due to fear of ejection or 
harassment by the landlord; fear that the landlord would no longer 
extend credit; unwillingness to speak to the landlord about the 
matter; and wait-and-see attitude resulting from a lack of confidence 
in the success of the land reform program. Lessees who did not want 
to  enter into written contracts with the landlord said: "The landlord 
is known to be a good man and as such keeps his word of honor.”  A 
written or oral contract does not make a difference to the tenant. 
The landlord forfeits as a favor and as a bargain to the tenant his 
share in the second crop.
Another survey was conducted in 1968 in old land reform areas 
in Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Bataan, Pangasinan and Pampanga and
18%
16%
66%
18Eugenio Lopez, A  S tudy o f  Certain Aspects o f  Leasehold and Credit Operations in 
Plaridel, Bulacan. Plans and Program Office, National Land Reform Council, Diliman, 
Quezon City, (mimeo), May 19, 1967.
which included both lessees and share tenants. When tenants were 
asked what sort of attitudes landlords had toward them, majority of 
the answers were favorable to the landlord. Even before land reform 
operations in Concepcion, Tarlac, tenants had already claimed that 
the landlord is a "person who looks after himself but who is much 
interested in the tenants' well-being." There were others who admitted 
that "his landlord is a person who tries to give him (the tenant) as 
much as he can." These opinions about the landlord are more 
pronounced among ex-tenants who are now lessees in Plaridel, 
Bulacan and San Luis, Pampanga which were surveyed after one year 
of land reform operations. Majority of the landlords surveyed also 
regarded their tenants as honest and loyal.19
As of 1971, Mindajao reported that in Bulacan with 24 
municipalities proclaimed land reform areas, only 4,540 or 24 
percent of 18,564 share tenants had adopted leasehold. The rest 
opted to remain share tenants. The reasons for this reaction were 
revealed in Mindajao's study of 60 leaseholders and 60 share tenants 
from four land reform project team areas in Bulacan. Farmers who 
had been exposed or were knowledgeable about the salient features of 
the agricultural leasehold system were more likely to perceive its 
relative advantages such as being better off, having more share from 
the harvest and being able to provide better care for their family. 
Those who perceived these advantages had more tendency to 
indicate personal rather than mass media as sources of their infor­
mation about land reform. Although farmers perceived the relative 
advantages o f leasehold, those who feared ejection by landlords were 
less likely to adopt leasehold. On the other hand, those who 
perceived the advantages of leasehold and at the same time perceived 
the availability of farming inputs were more likely to shift to 
leasehold. Both those who had good interpersonal relations with 
their landlords and those whose relations were not so good perceived 
the relative advantages of leasehold. However, when the share tenants 
were asked why they had not made the shift, 48 percent gave as the 
main reason, the fact that they had harmonious relations with their 
landlords; 13 percent were apprehensive about the possibility of 
ejection by way of the legal provision on personal cultivation by the 
landlords; and 8 percent said that the landowner was a kin relation 
and kind to them. Among the reasons given by those who adopted
19lndex Inc. June 1968. Report of Robot-Gallup Survey, National Land Reform 
Council, March-April, 1968.
leasehold: 33 percent wanted to raise their standard of living and to 
make their life better; 23 percent expected to get a bigger share from 
their farm produce; and 12 percent welcomed the chance to become 
managers of their own farms and be able to decide independently on 
farming matters.20
Baskinas in her interview of 19 farmers who shifted from share 
tenancy to leasehold even before Laguna was declared a land reform 
area provides insights complementary to reasons of share tenants for 
refusing to shift. Unhealthy landlord-tenant relations, landlord's 
wish, implementation of the land reform program and desire for 
bigger share and higher income were cited as the rationale of lessees 
for changing their tenure status.21 Just like Mindajao, Sandoval et 
al.22 reported that of the 366 share tenants studied in 1967-68 from 
7 provinces of Central Luzon, 117 or 32 percent remained share 
tenants. Of these 117, there were 49 or 41 percent who were not 
willing to shift to leasehold for reasons of good relations with the 
landlord. It should be pointed out that at the time of the survey in 
1968, only 15 percent of more than 500 rice farmers claimed they 
understood "very w ell" the land reform program; 26 percent said 
"fa irly  w ell"; 34 percent reported "no t very well"; 5 percent "no t at 
a ll"; and 20 percent did not give any indication. When asked about 
their impression of the land reform program, 71 percent said, " it 's  
good"; but considering that only a small proportion understood the 
program well, this concept of "goodness" of the program is a very 
vague one. This lack of comprehension on the part of the farmers 
about the land reform program must have contributed to its slow 
acceptance of leasehold although the Mindajao study pointed out 
that perceived advantages of leasehold led to shift to leasehold if 
farming inputs were available — from sources other than the 
landlord. Further support for this need is also found in the Sandoval 
et al. survey which revealed that the forms of assistance most 
preferred by farmers were technical assistance, 38 percent; financial, 
26 percent; and legal assistance, 3 percent. The rest did not indicate 
preference. Apparently from the point of view of rice farmers, land
20|\l. M. Mindajao, op. c i t  
91Juanita P. Baskinas, Leasehold Tenancy: A Step to Rural Development, Journal o f  
A gricu ltu ra l Economics and Development, Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan. 1971, pp. 27-41.
22p. r .  Sandoval, et al., A n  Econom ic Analysis o f the Effects o f Land Reform  in  
Selected Areas in the Philippines  Seminar paper presented at the Department of Agricul­
tural Economics, U.P. College of Agriculture, Feb. 21, 1969.
reform involves mostly technical and financial assistance and only 
minimally legal assistance.
As was discussed earlier from the IPC and Lopez studies, the 
landlords who have gone into leasehold have bigger landholdings, 
higher education, are more modernizing, more politically inclined 
and more well-off than those landlords who remained in the sharing 
system. Although this augers well for changing social structure, 
certain responses to the leasehold provision of the land reform 
program deserve to be examined. Contrary to the notion that share 
tenancy is "bad" and should be eliminated, 40 percent of the Nueva 
Ecija farmers (IPC study) who had been share tenants said it was 
"a good" system; 30 percent said it was "no t good"; and the rest 
thought it might be good or bad depending on certain conditions. 
The often cited reason for the share tenants' refusal to shift to 
leasehold as being due to kin relations with the landlord was not 
found to be as important as has been previously assumed because the 
study showed that only about one-fourth of the tenants were kins of 
the landlords. Share tenancy was considered good because the 
landlord shared farming expenses and provided inputs; it was the 
only way of life for which they were prepared; and that landlords 
were generally good. Furthermore, they mentioned the prospects of 
a large share when harvests were good and that as long as the yield 
was good, share tenancy was a good thing. More than half of the 
share tenants preferred a good sharing arrangement to leasehold and 
they also preferred assured tenancy to ownership of the land they 
were farming. As a matter of fact, 45 percent of the share tenants 
interviewed intended to remain in that status, 23 percent were 
determined to get out, while 31 percent were uncertain as to what 
they wanted to do. As expected, 89 percent of the lessees favored 
the lease system with bigger share of the harvest and freedom to 
operate the farm more independently as important reasons. They 
also emphasized the pressure on themselves to be th rifty  and 
industrious in order to have a good yield and ability to finance their 
farming. Adverse reaction to leasehold was due to the lessee's having 
to pay rental in spite of crop failure.
On the part of the landlords, more than half of the lessee-share 
landlords favored the conversion of share tenancy to leasehold but 
about half of share landlords were against it. Although majority of 
the landlords thought that share tenants would eventually become 
lessees, about 70 percent of them predicted that a reversion to share
tenancy would occur. Less than 20 percent anticipated lessee 
continuity. Their major reason for pessimism was the lessee's lack of 
sources for farm expenses. On the land reform program itself, more 
than 75 percent of the landlords recognized the equity objective; 
about 15 percent saw its productivity component which aims to 
motivate farmers to work hard and learn scientific farming in order 
to increase rice production. The rest were cynical and regarded the 
Code as a political gimmick to obtain more votes from the masses. 
Despite an understanding of its objectives, almost 60 percent of the 
landlords complained that the land reform program had only resulted 
in ill-feelings between landlord and tenants. They also resented the 
fact that despite the disadvantages which had accrued on their side, 
the landlord was still referred to as the oppressor. It is also revealing 
of changing status relations that tenants are said to have become 
"aggressive and proud." Undoubtedly, most of the landlords (70 
percent) considered the program as beneficia)^ to tenants and against 
landlords, particularly in terms of increased tenant's share of the 
produce. As a consequence, half of all landlords no longer 
considered acquiring rice land as a good investment.
For a more comprehensive analysis of landlord-tenant relations 
and their effects on tenant response to the land reform program, 
Lopez' study of 117 tenants and 59 landlord pairs from 7 provinces 
of Central Luzon provides valuable insights. In the study, tenant 
response to land reform was categorized into three types: those who 
remained share tenants; those who shifted to leasehold as per legal 
provision with registered written agreements, known as genuine 
leasehold; and those under compromise leasehold which is legally 
acceptable although it  carries only an oral contract. When a number 
of factors were examined for their relationship to land reform 
response, several significant observations emerged. Contrary to the 
common stereotype that the landlord is not only master of his 
tenant's life, the Lopez' study showed that out of the 117 pairs of 
landlord-tenants in 9 spheres of activity where the landlords could 
have dictated to their tenants, thus making up a total of 1,053 
possible "dictate situations," there were only six actual dictate cases, 
four of which were concerned with preventing the tenant from 
shifting to leasehold. Only two were followed. The other spheres of 
activity studied for possible dictate by landlord and acceptance by 
tenant were: use of pesticides, use of weedicides, straight-row 
planting, prevention from forming associations, prevention from 
relating to the Agricultural Credit Administration and the Land
Reform personnel, which in many ways would inhibit the shift to 
leasehold.
Comparing the three groups of tenants w ith respect to 
precipitating factors which are significantly related to acceptance of 
leasehold, Lopez found that the genuine leaseholders were more 
knowledgeable of their rights as tenants and had greater access to 
legal defenders (private lawyers and public defenders) than com­
promise lessees; the share tenants had the least access to this facility. 
Genuine lessees also had greater consciousness of and accessibility to 
alternative sources of financial loans such as the Agricultural Credit 
Administration, the Philippine National Bank, the Rural Bank and 
private moneylenders other than their landlords. Although the three 
groups did not d iffer significantly in their consciousness of skills they 
possessed and alternative occupation they could engage in which 
would be more profitable than farming, share tenants showed a lower 
consciousness of occupational alternatives than the two other groups. 
It is important to recognize, however, that about two-thirds of the 
respondents had little  awareness of such alternatives. In other words, 
majority of them saw no other occupational opportunity outside of 
farming. Another interesting observation is the expression of bene­
volent paternalism in reverse, i.e., the more the tenants felt they were 
greatly needed by their landlords and the more they thought it  
would be d ifficu lt for the landlords to find replacements should they 
quit, the more the tenants were likely to stay on as share tenants, as 
if they pitied their landlords.
It has often been argued that the tenant's debt of gratitude 
(utang na loob) to his landlord prevents him from shifting to 
leasehold, hence Lopez' study hypothesized that the greater the 
service rendered by the landlord to his tenants, the greater the 
likelihood that they would remain share tenants. The data did not 
support the hypothesis. The three groups did not differ significantly 
as far as services from the landlord were concerned although as 
expected, there was a higher percentage of share tenants who had 
received greater services from their landlords before land reform. 
This situation could be interpreted as a potential restraining 
influence on the part of the landlord over his tenant. But is this 
potential influence so actualized as to be really effective? The data 
show one case where the landlord actually exercised his influence 
over the tenant so he would remain a share tenant. There were two 
cases of genuine leaseholders who admitted good relations with the 
landlord and expressed initial reluctance to shift for reasons of
gratitude, but the landlord induced them to shift because he believed 
that leasehold was beneficial to both parties. Another landlord who 
was providing loans to his tenant opposed land reform but did not 
interfere when the share tenant shifted except for a request that it be 
a compromise leasehold. The study also indicated that it was not the 
amount of services rendered by the landlord per se but rather the 
value attached by the tenant to the services which enabled the 
landlord to have influence provided he would in fact, exert the 
influence. These services acquired a quality of influence over the 
tenant, especially when he had no alternative resources.
The tenants in the seven provinces differed significantly in the 
importance attached to four types of services such as: financial loan, 
financial help, home lot and miscellaneous services. Those from 
Nueva Ecija gave greater importance to home lot and financial help. 
Bataan considered miscellaneous services of greater value, and 
Pampanga, financial loans. However, the home lot was uniformly 
given by tenants in seven provinces greater importance than any of 
the other services. This is understandable because their very existence 
depends on whether or not there is a plot of land on which they 
could put up a house. Before land reform, the amount of services 
rendered by the landlord to his tenant was not related to whether or 
not the landlord approved or opposed the provisions of the Land 
Reform Code but after five years of land reform implementation the 
intensity of services provided by the landlord differed significantly 
among the three groups, with the greatest services received by those 
who remained share tenants, followed by compromise lessees; 
genuine lessees had services from the landlord considerably reduced.
Lopez' explanation for this turn of events is that the act of shift­
ing to leasehold was not immediately perceived as a part of the 
giving-and-taking process. In the beginning, it  was conceived neither 
as a favor nor a disfavor. It was only when the social meaning of land 
reform became internalized as part of their exchange of relations that 
the act to shift or not to shift to leasehold became an ingredient in 
the bargaining. On the part of the landlord, he must offer services to 
win the tenant away from leasehold. On the part of the tenant, not 
to shift means a possibility of demanding more services from the 
landlord. It is probably at this point where the mere presence of a 
land reform law has been beneficial to the tenant even if  only 
because this is an option he now has which he did not have before.
Of some significance also is the fact that tenants who shifted to 
genuine leasehold were residing farthest from their landlords, com­
pared to the compromise lessees and those who remained share 
tenants. Apparently, the geographic distance between landlord and 
tenant prevented the closeness of social ties, thus making it  easier for 
the genuine lessees to break away. Similar observations were made by 
Herrera in a recent study conducted in the rainfed, rice village of 
Mahipon in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. An inquiry as to why there were 
more lessees in Mahipon than in the irrigated and more developed 
villages revealed that absentee landlords who also had more tenants 
were more predisposed to contractual relations characteristic of 
leasehold arrangements. Furthermore, the presence of several tenants 
tilling land for one landlord enabled the tenants to approach the 
landlord as a group in order to ask for leasehold. There was less 
embarrassment as a group than as individual tenants making such a 
request to a landlord, especially if the latter happened to be residing 
nearby.23
As a rough general indicator of landlord-tenant response to the 
leasehold aspect of the land reform program, the conversion rate from 
share tenancy to leasehold may be used. As of June 1967, 10,022 
share tenants out of 407,699 had shifted to leasehold.. This 
represents 2.4 percent conversion out of the total.24 In 62 
municipalities proclaimed land reform by 1968, there were 13, 377 
out of 86,939 share tenant farmers in the proclaimed area who 
obtained leasehold contracts. Although this would be about 15 
percent for the proclaimed areas in terms of the total picture, it is 
-only 3.2 percent. As of December 1969, in the 54 proclaimed 
municipalities, 28,616 out of 196,365 or 15 percent share tenants 
had been converted to leasehold agreements of one kind or another. 
Only 6,663 (3.4 percent) were written and duly registered. About 2 
percent were written but not registered and the remainder were oral 
many of which probably w ill not meet the criteria specified in the 
Code. Again, as a proportion of the total number of share tenants, 
28,616 means only about 7 percent. It was also found that 
municipalities proclaimed in 1964, 1965 and 1966 have higher rates 
of conversion with 60 percent reported including oral agreements; 18 
percent were reported for 1968 proclaimed areas and much lower for 
1969 proclamations. The latter were not accompanied by increase in 
resources and legal services made available.25
2 3 R. j .  Herrera, op. c i t
24National Land Reform Council, Land Reform Leasehold Operations: A Four-Year 
Program 1968-1972. Diliman, Quezon City.
25USAID, Land Reform in the Philippines, op. cit.
A review of land reform conducted by a four-man study 
team in 1969 concluded that "the land reform program has had only 
limited success w ith less than 4 percent of the share tenants in 
proclaimed land reform areas converted to registered leasehold 
status, 2 percent having unregistered written leases and 9 percent 
said to have arrived at oral agreement." The report tags the 
inefficient administrative structure as one of the primary causes 
citing such salient defects as: lack of coordination among the various 
land reform agencies which retain their independence and control 
over their respective resources; inadequate financial, logistical and 
technical support to field personnel; shortage of effective legal 
officers to assist in conversion; and absence of an efficient mechanism 
for finalization of titles. Considered as secondary problems are 
inadequate farm credit and marketing arrangements and the lack of 
effective institutions through which the land reform program should 
be administered.26 A 1971 report noted that while Nueva Ecija 
which is a pilot project in land reform showed 44 percent, the national 
program reported only 3 percent conversion from share tenancy to 
leasehold.27
D. Landlord-Tenant Roles (Actual, Perceived and Expected)
In the web of landlord-tenant relations directly or indirectly 
associated with the requirements of rice farming, the two parties to 
the tenure system assume certain roles. A land reform program by its 
very essence is designated to change those roles. Bernal's typology of 
landlords28 gives us an idea as to their outlook on farm development 
and personal relations between them and their tenants. Again, this 
typology helps avoid the single stereotype of the landlord and 
instead provides the following "ideal types" w ith in which landlords 
vary in real life:
(1) Traditional-paternalistic. — Those who regard the personal 
relations of give and take between landlord and tenant as more 
important than the monetary expressions of costs and returns. The 
old arrangement is permitted to go on. The landlord projects a father 
image with a distinct superordinate-subordinate type of relation-
26Rolando Espina, Pessimism Clouds Future of Land Reform Program, Manila 
Chronicle, March 18, 1970, p. 1.
S. A ID , USAID Development Assistance to the Republic of the Philippines, 
Fiscal Year 1971.
28e. A. Bernal, op. c i t
ship. Any formalization of arrangements is frowned upon, lest it 
stand in the way of their relations.
(2) Traditional-nonpaternalistic. — They are not concerned 
with either farm development or personal landlord-tenant relations. 
Old arrangements with respect to farm management are permitted to 
go on but they have eased themselves from personal ties w ith the 
tenants.They have interests other than the farm and they may be 
aptly labeled as the indifferent landlords.
(3) Modern-paternalistic. — Landlords who take advantage of 
the paternalistic practices for an ulterior motive — that of driving the 
tenants toward greater efficiency. They are apt to keep up with 
modern trends in agriculture and are willing directors of the 
development of their own farms.
(4) Modern-nonpaternaiistic. — Landlords who have grown up 
away from the farm and have been in contact with the industrializing 
sector. They tend to look at farming as another business that ought 
to be profitable and would deal with their tenants in the same 
manner as their business associates.
Of the 112 rice landlords studied, 84 percent were classified as 
modern-paternalistic; 10 percent, modern-nonpaternaiistic; 5 percent, 
traditional-paternalistic; and 1 percent, traditional-nonpaternalistic. 
The prevalence of the category called modern-paternalistic reflects 
an opportunistic combination of what is desirable from the old and 
the new ways of dealing w ith the management of rice farms. To 
utilize paternalism in the interest of increasing productivity represents 
a very calculated approach on the part of the landlords.
With respect to participation in the farm business, Torres and 
Sandoval identified two types of landlords: (1) Managing landlords, 
those who take a direct hand in supervising and coordinating the 
productive activities on the farm. As the capitalist, the managing 
landlord is also in varying degrees the ultimate decision-maker 
on the farm. (2) Non-managing landlords are mostly absentees who 
delegate the management of the farm to an overseer or the tenants 
themselves. These include big city businessmen, career people and 
retirees who do not manage the farms they own. Between these 
two types are varying categories:
(a) Managing landlords who operate a portion but lease other 
landholdings.
(b) Part-time farmers who have another major source of 
income and who visit the farm only on weekends.
(c) Gentlemen farmers whose only source of income is the farm 
and are therefore available to supervise farm activities.
(d) Peasant landlords who own a piece of land but are 
culturally and economically undifferentiated from the rest of the 
barrio people.
Among the duties these rice landlords allocate to themselves 
with respect to their tenants are: credit assistance, followed by 
provision of rations, and housing facilities. Ten percent said they had 
no obligations to the tenants (Table 6.17). Of tenant obligations to 
the landlord, " to  work well on the land" was mentioned by 65 
percent of the landlords. More than a third also expected to be given 
a share in secondary crops. Twenty percent of them still expected 
tenants to perform free services at the landlord's home. That this 
expectation existed even in 1965 when Bernal's study was conducted 
is some evidence of a lingering "feudalistic" vestige.
Table 6.17. Duties/obligations of landlord to tenants and 
tenants to landlord as viewed by 112 rice landlords.
Landlord  duties
Percent 
o f  to ta l Tenants' duties
Percent 
o f  to ta l
1. Credit assistance 90 1. Work well on the land 65
2. Provision of ration 71 2. Give landlord a share 
in secondary crop 35
3. Housing facilities 46 3. Perform free services 
at home
20
4. None 10
Source of data: E. A. Bernal, op. c i t
Table 6.18 shows Lopez' data on tenants' perceptions of their 
landlord's roles before and after land reform. Some of the roles 
defined for the landlord exhibit a high degree of agreement among 
the tenants. Among the more definitive roles in the economic sphere 
are for the landlord to (a) provide the tenant extra emergency funds 
aside from operational farm expenses which are nondeductible from 
the harvest, (b) praise his tenants for a good harvest, (c) give free rice 
and other food supplies to augment family supplies, (d) let tenants 
decide how to cultivate the land and what variety to plant, and (e) be 
strict w ith tenants who are not his friends or relatives.
Table 6.18. lenants' perception of tneir landlord'* role before 
and after land reform. (Data were obtained from 
Rogelio Lopez, op. c i t .  Tables 30 and 32 pp. 199-209)
Before A fte rexpectations . . . .
Positive Negative Positive Negative
—P e r c e n  t—
A. Economic sphere
1. The landlord should provide 
the tenant with extra funds 
aside from operational 
expenses, in cases of emer­
gency, which are not deductible 
from the harvest nor to be
repaid by the tenant. 83 17 75 25
2. The landlord should think 
a good harvest on the farm 
is a result of the tenant's 
fear that a bad one might 
result in his being ejected
by the landlord. 9 92 6 94
3. The landlord is strict 
with tenants who are not
his relatives or friends. 74 26 77 23
4. In case of a good harvest, 
the landlord should praise 
his tenants; in case of 
failure, he should console 
them for they will be, 
after all, more affected
by it. 81 19 78 22
5. The landlord should give 
free to tenants some
palay and other food supply 
in order to augment their
supplies for their families- 78 22 72 28
6. The landlord should inform 
his tenants about better 
farming techniques and 
rice variety to plant in
the field. 44 56 37 63
7. The landlord should just 
let the tenants decide 
how to cultivate the 
land and what variety to
plant in the field. 86 14 86 14
8. The landlord should inspect 
the field personally every 
now and then to find out 
how his tenants are get­
ting along. 36 64 31 69
9. The landlord should not 
think field inspection
is a necessary part of 
his job as a landlord, 
whether he has an overseer
or not. 68 32 64 36
B. On the tenancy arrangement
10. The landlord should bear 
in mind that a written 
agreement with his tenants 
will make their mutual 
personal relationship
artificial. 39 61 39 61
11.The landlord should 
eject a tenant who 
insists on a written 
contract because a 
written contract is a 
breach of their mutual 
personal understanding. 24 76 24 76
12. The landlord should have 
a written contract with 
some but not all of his
tenants. 48 52 46 54
13. The landlord should 
remind his tenants that 
an oral agreement bet­
ween themselves is just 
as good as a written
one. 88 12 88 12
14. It is the landlord's 
duty to help the tenants 
in case the latter find 
difficulties in fulfilling 
the terms agreed on orally
or in a written contract. 94 6 92 8
15. Being the owner of the 
land, the landlord has the
right to determine his own 
terms to be included in 
the agreement before the 
tenant does.
16. The landlord may also think 
that the tenant should be 
the first to insist on
the terms to be agreed 
upon.
17. The landlord should see 
to it that the terms agreed 
upon with his tenants are 
faithfully observed
18. The landlord should let 
the traditional agreement 
between him and his tenants 
be the one enforced for­
ever.
C. In  the sphere o f  po litics
19. The landlord should 
expect that his tenants will 
support the landlord's 
candidate during election 
time and that his tenants 
should not wait to be told 
to do so.
20. The landlord should think 
that his tenants are 
obliged to vote for his 
candidates.
21. Should the candidate give 
money to the landlord for 
his tenants, the landlord 
should give only to those 
who are his favorites.
22. The landlord should try 
to win over his tenants 
with fond jokes and 
festive treats in order 
to get their support 
during election.
23. For the sake of his 
tenants, the landlord
46
68
94
90
54
32
10
44
71
92
85
56
29
15
28
15
14
72
85
86
20 80
94
92
should ask for any 
kind of help from the 
candidates.
24. The landlord should 
force his tenants to 
vote for his candi­
dates.
25. Let the tenants choose 
for themselves their 
candidates.
26. The landlord should 
make a house-to-house 
campaign among his 
tenants in order to 
request them to vote 
for his candidates.
27. The landlord should 
leave the task of 
getting the tenants' 
support to the candi­
dates or his leaders.
14
11
90
15
73
86
89
10
85
27
88
94
93
12
90
91
10
D. In  the sphere o f  religion
28. The landlord should see 
to it that his tenants 
profess the same religion 
as he does.
29. The landlord should 
reprimand or punish 
those tenants who do 
not go to church.
30. The landlord should 
prefer tenants who are 
known to be religious.
31. The landlord should 
explain to his tenants the 
teaching of the church so 
that they will know how 
to lead Christian lives. 15 85 13 87
32. The landlord should take 
care Of the tenants' 
church expenses for such
9 91 7 93
5 95 4 96
85 15 88 12
events as baptisms,
wedding and others. 10
33. The landlord should ask 
his tenants to keep 
sacred articles in their 
homes like the crucifix
or sacred pictures. 3
34. The landlord should leave 
the priest alone to deal 
with the tenants concer­
ning their religious
affiliations. 86
35. The landlord should warn 
his tenants not to enter­
tain ministers of
Protestant sects. 10
36. The landlord does not 
interfere with the 
religious affiliations
of his tenants. 84
E. In  the social o r recreational sphere
37. The landlord should consider 
his tenants' families as 
extensions of his own family
circle. 88
38. The landlord orders his 
tenants to follow every­
thing that he or his children
tell them to do. 10
39. The landlord allows some 
tenants only or their 
children to mingle with
his own children. 24
40. The landlord should ask 
his children to have get- 
together affairs with the 
tenants' children or him­
self and his wife should 
mix socially with his
tenants and their wives. 41
41. The landlord should pro­
vide his tenants with re­
creational facilities. 45
90
97
14
90
16
10
12
90
76
59
86
85
86
23
59
90
97
14
91
15
14
91
77
41
42. Any social gatherings 
of tenants should be 
held only with the per­
mission of the landlord.
43. The landlord should let 
the tenants worry about 
their own recreational 
needs.
44. The landlord should lead 
his tenants in social 
affairs.
45. The landlord should be 
always ready to join 
social affairs to which 
he is invited by the 
tenants.
94
91
75
91
25
10
95
20
72
90
80
28
F. In  the sphere o f  education
46. The landlord should 
consider himself respon­
sible for the education of 
his tenants' children.
47. The landlord should not 
allow his tenants to send 
their children to school 
so they will have helpers 
on the farm.
48. The landlord should give 
material support, especially 
to the children of his 
favorite tenants.
49. The landlord should advise 
his tenants as well as their 
children on the necessity 
of formal education.
50. The landlord should give 
clothing allowances and other 
material support for the 
study of his tenants' children.
51. It is up to the landlord to 
decide whether or not his 
children will be sent to 
school.
17
12
32
52
23
83
88
68
48
77
15
12
35
52
24
85
88
65
48
76
Expectations Before 
Positive Negative
A fte r  
Positive Negative
52. Let the tenants
decide for themselves 
what to do concerning their 
children’s education. 94 6 83 17
53. The landlord should 
persuade his tenants to 
send their children to 
school. 48 52 45 55
54. The landlord need not 
concern himself about the 
education of his tenant's 
children. 52 48 50 50
Personal field inspection by the landlord was not regarded as 
necessary. Feelings about this practice became even more negative 
after land reform.
On tenancy arrangement, the role definitions were very in­
consistent, probably suggesting the inner conflicts between tradi­
tional-personal istic relations and the current push for more con­
tractual arrangements. For example, while they did not endorse the 
statement that a written agreement led to artificial mutual personal 
relationships, they believed that an oral agreement was just as good as 
a written one but that a tenant should not be ejected for insisting on 
a written contract. A t the same time, they also believed that the 
traditional agreement between them and the landlord should be the 
one enforced forever. However, there was a general endorsement of 
the desirability to fu lfill the terms agreed upon whether in a written or 
oral contract. The tenant-respondents were divided on the question 
as to whether the written contract should be only with some but not 
all of the landlord's tenants. They were also ambivalent as to whether 
the landlord had the same prior right to determine the terms of a 
contract. They rather hoped the landlord would think that the 
tenant had the first priority to insist on the contract terms.
In the sphere of politics, there was a very we 11-ex pressed desire 
for the tenants to be left alone to make their own decisions regarding 
political candidates. This desire for non-interference from the 
landlord was intensified after land reform. A similar feeling was 
expressed regarding religion and church matters. However, they
believed that landlords should prefer tenants who were known to be 
religious.
On the social and recreational sphere, ambivalence was again 
manifested as to what the role of the landlord should be. Although 
they believed that the landlord should consider his tenants' 
families as extensions of his own family circle, they rejected the idea 
of the landlord's worrying about his tenants' recreational needs and 
his leading tenants in social affairs. As a matter of fact, they would 
like to see the landlord ready to join social affairs when invited by 
the tenants but not for him to lead them or to exercise sanctions in 
such social affairs. In a way, it was a kind of reverse snoDDery! Tney 
did not go for selective social mingling between tenants' and landlord's 
children. On the other hand, they were divided as to whether their 
wives and children should get together and mix socially with the 
landlord's wife and children and whether the-landlord should provide 
recreational facilities.
As far as education of the tenants' children was concerned, 
the expectation was for noninterference on the part of the landlord 
and nondependence on him for material support for the purpose, 
but half of the respondents did not agree that the landlord 
should not concern himself with the education of his tenants' 
children. Half of them also ascribed to the landlord the advisory role 
regarding the necessity of sending children to school.
One generalization which might be derived from Lopez' data 
on tenants' perceptions of the landlord's role is that tenants 
seemed to be in the tw ilight zone where they want to "have their 
cake and eat it too." This was the manifestation of a transitional phase 
in the relationship between the landlord and tenant and therefore, 
role definitions were also in the process of changing. While they 
perceived certain advantages in the new relationships they also 
seemed to be aware of the social costs involved and, therefore, 
wanted to hang on to the advantageous features of the "old 
system." This is quite obvious in their desire for independence 
of action and decision-making on the farm but at the same time 
they expected continuing welfare services and certain personalistic 
considerations from the landlord. It is very interesting to note, 
for example, that 86 percent of the tenant-respondents thought 
that the landlord should just let the tenants decide how to cultivate 
the land and what variety to plant in the field but 44 percent 
of them considered it the landlord's role to inform them about 
better farming techniques and what variety to plant in the field.
Those who endorsed this "information role" of the landlord was 
reduced to 37 percent after land reform. The desire of the tenants, 
however, to be left to decide how to cultivate the land and what 
variety to plant was strong whether before or after land reform. 
On the whole, the changes in the perception of the landlord's 
role from pre-land reform to post-land reform tended to be in the 
direction of a desire for greater independence from the landlord.
As regards the role expectation of share tenants, genuine lessees 
and compromise lessees, the first group showed a significantly greater 
expectation that landlords should provide extra funds and should 
help them in case of difficulties. The genuine lessees expected the 
least from the landlord. Those on a compromise leasehold had less 
expectation than the share tenants but greater than the genuine 
lessees. In general, the share tenants were more paternalistic in their 
expectations about the landlord than the two other groups. They 
expected more landlord tolerance and attitudes conducive to 
maintaining close emotional ties with tenants. They continued to 
expect and thus accept the landlord's unequal treatment o f tenants. 
Genuine lessees were least paternalistic in their expectations. The 
share tenants were more receptive of the landlord's innovative role 
on the farm as shown by their expectation that he should inform 
tenants about better farming techniques and rice varieties to plant 
and that the landlord should inspect the field personally to find out 
how his tenants were getting along. The latter was not a matter of 
distrust but more to perform the expected role of informing tenants 
about new farming practices.29
In the Institute of Philippine Culture study,30 share tenants 
ranked sharing farm expenses first, providing fringe benefits second, 
and courtesy and pleasantness, third in their role expectations of an 
ideal landlord. Lessees ranked pleasantness and courtesy first and 
sharing farm expenses, second. Extending credit is also more 
important to share tenants than to lessees. Again, the increased 
independence of the lessee from the landlord is reflected in his 
enhanced self-respect which expects a pleasant and courteous 
treatment from his landlord. The landlords themselves consider being 
discourteous, unpleasant and not extending credit to tenants as 
characteristics of an undesirable landlord. Industriousness and 
honesty are expectations of an ideal share tenant and lessee both
29 R. Lopez, op. c i t
3 0 r . P. de los Reyes, op. c i t
from the point of view of farmers and landlords. These two qualities 
assume significance in the light of earlier findings cited from the 
Lopez' study that tenants do not think field inspection is a necessary 
part of the landlord's job. Another interesting observation from the 
IPC study is the emergence of the lease-share landlord as being more 
paternalistic than either the share or lessee landlord. Apparently, his 
increased efforts at paternalism are aimed at retaining share tenants 
he still has, since he has already lost about one-half of his former 
share tenants.
Another source of evidence on how important a sense of 
independence is to the farmer is Herrera's data from three villages in 
Gapan, Nueva Ecija.31 When 193 farmers were asked about 
preference for tenure status, as to be expected, 186 out of 196 chose 
owner-operators; two chose share tenancy; one chose leasehold; and 
four did not reply. What is significant is not their almost unanimous 
desire to be owner-cultivators but rather their reasons for the 
preference. Fifty-seven percent of the farmers preferred this because 
of the obvious reason that they would enjoy and own all the 
produce from the land, but 41 percent specifically mentioned the 
desire to be "the ir own boss" as the major reason for wanting to be 
an owner-cultivator. Freedom of action and independence from a 
"boss" seemed to be as important a consideration to the farmer as 
increased income. The economist, however, can argue that increased 
income, in many ways, enables one to "buy" independence.
E. Landlord-Tenant Patterns of Decision-Making
A frequently held stereotype of share tenancy is that of a 
feudalistic system characterized by landlord dominance and tenant 
subservience. Lopez, however, argues to the contrary on the basis of 
findings from his study that: "the traditional share tenancy system is 
a jo in t personal partnership defined by flexible informal norms and 
pervaded by a degree of trust and confidence depending upon the 
socio-physical situation of the actors. Opinions on the extensive 
power of the landlord and the abuses of such powers did not find 
empirical support. If, however, abuses of landlord power was a 
matter of fact, then the abusive exercise may not be traced to the 
present-day partnership but elsewhere, perhaps to the preceding 
generation of tenants. If it  was true of the preceding generation, at
least in Central Luzon, we might say then that the power structure in 
the system has changed.''32
For the purpose of this review, patterns of decision-making with 
respect to farming matters are of direct relevance. Table 6.19 from the 
Torres and Sandoval study shows that decisions on what variety to 
plant and fertilizer to use were made in three ways: landlord alone; 
tenant alone; and jo in t landlord-tenant. Although landlord decisions 
were more frequently mentioned (44) than tenant decisions (33), the 
situation was certainly not a monolithic exercise of power. On 
matters concerning time of harvesting, planting, and sharing, kind of 
secondary crop to plant and choosing the field for each crop, the 
decision was left mainly in the hands of the tenant.33
On individuals consulted by farmers regarding farming de­
cisions, data from Lu's study in Table 6.20 show half of the farmers 
reporting consultation with the landlord on purchase of fertilizers 
and farm chemicals, change of rice varieties and rice production 
practices. This is to be expected because the landlord is supposed to
Table 6.19. Pattern of decision-making on the farm 
(Responses of 112 rice landlords)*
Decision D e c i s i o n m a k e r
made
Landlord Tenant Overseer Landlord  
and tenant
Tenant and
overseer
Num ber o f  responses —
Variety to plant 44 33 12 23 _
Fertilizer to use 46 32 1 28 2
Time of harvesting 12 78 2 18 1
Time of planting 11 82 2 14 1
Time of sharing 11 67 4 12 2
Kind of secondary 
crop to plant 10 62 2 13 1
Choosing the field for 
each crop 9 63 2 13 3
Source of data: E. Bernal-Torres and P. R. Sandoval, op. c it
32 r .  M. Lopez, op. cit.
33E. Bernal-Torres and P. R. Sandoval, "Landlord Participation in the Farm 
Business," Philippine A g ricu ltu ris t,\/o \. 51, June 1967, pp. 65-66.
Decision on 
farm business
Wife Landlord
Extension
worxer
Other
specialists
1. Buying fertilizers 62 52
Tota l N  = 395  
— P e r  c e n t  — 
37 5
2. Where to sell agri­
cultural products 69 4 - -
3. Engaging in a new 
enterprise 73 2 2 -
4. Buying a carabao 83 7 0.2 -
5. Buying farm tools and 
equipment 75 6 6
6. Buying farm chemicals 67 41 48 4
7. Where to borrow money 84 25 12 -
8. Changing new varieties 60 52 40 3
9. Changing new rice 
cultural practices 58 50 40 8
Source of data: Hsueh-yi Lu, op. c it
share in these farm expenses. The extension worker is also consulted 
by about 40 percent of the farmers regarding the above-mentioned 
matters but what is interesting is the extent to which the wife is 
consulted by the farmer on decisions involving the farm. In 
Lopez'study (Table 6.21), more share tenants (25.4%) than com­
promise (12%) and genuine lessees (3%) reported actual influence by 
their landlords on the selection, use, and adoption of rice production 
practices. Only 16 percent of the total number of farmers studied 
reported such kind of influence from their landlord. Similar findings 
were reported by R. P. de los Reyes: "More than lessee landlords, share 
and lessee-share landlords tend to decide alone (6 vs. 27 and 11 
percent) or together with their tenants (12 vs. 35 and 47 percent) 
what variety of seed will be planted for the rice crop. Eight out of 10 
lessee landlords leave the matter entirely in the hands of their lessees. 
On choice of fertilizer, again share tenants are allowed much less 
participation than lessees. Share and lessee-share landlords, compared 
with lessee landlords, more often make the decision w ithout 
consulting the tenant (33 and 16 vs. 7 percent) or in consultation
Table 6.21. Percent of farmers actually influenced by therr landlords on the 
selection, use and adoption of rice production practices.
Tota l N  = 117
Share 
tenants 
N  = 59
Genuine 
lessees 
N  = 33
Compromise 
lessees 
N  = 25
Variety 25.4
— Percent — 
3.0 8.0
Fertilizer 17.0 0.0 12.0
Pesticide 15.2 0.0 8.0
Weedicide 15.2 0.0 8.0
Straight-row 10.2 0.0 8.0
No. of farmers reporting 15 1
Total 
3 19
Percent of total 25.4 3.0 12.0 16.1
Data were obtained from R. Lopez, op. c i t .  Table 45, p. 241.
with him (30 and 37 vs. 0 percent). Nine out of 10 lessee landlords 
leave the choice to their tenants.”  Time of planting was decided by 
the tenants; harvest time, tenants alone or in consultation with 
landlords. One-fourth of share landlords, one-sixth of the lessee- 
share, and none of the lessee landlords reported making decisions on 
the second crop.34
Barker and Cordova, in a study of 30 Laguna tenants and their 
landlords interviewed separately, found that these two groups were 
in almost complete agreement as to who was responsible for 
decisions regarding the kind and amount of inputs to use such as 
fertilizer, insecticides and weedicides. In 80 percent of the cases, 
tenants made the decision. The landlord came to the farm only 3 or 
4 times during the crop season. In only a few cases where the 
landlord was actively participating in the decisions that he visited the 
farm about once a week.35
34R. P. de los Reyes, op. cit.
3 5 r . Barker and V. G. Cordova, Decision-Making With Respect to the Use of Inputs 
on Laguna Farms. Paper prepared for the Seminar-Workshop on the Economics of Rice 
Production, IR R I, Dec. 11-13, 1969.
A. G. Pal in her study of the adoption of IR-8 specifically 
asked 74 tenants whether they expected advice from the landlord on 
rice variety. Seventy-six percent said "Yes" and 24 percent said 
"N o ." However, only 50 percent expected to follow the advice and 
39 percent said " i t  depends." When asked why they would follow 
the landlord's advice, majority (69%) of the responses focused on the 
element of reciprocal relations and mutual advantage such as: "he 
knows what is good for both of us; our relationship is good; so he 
cannot blame me; and he also listens or follows my advice." 
Deference to the landlords as owner of the land and source of initial 
capital was mentioned only by 31 percent. Those who would not 
follow landlord's advice said the decision on rice variety was up to 
them as tenants. A few indicated that landlord's knowledge was 
based on experience. Regarding amount of fertilizer to be used, 65 
percent expected advice and 62 percent expected to follow advice. 
The most important reason for following the advice was the 
realization that fertilizer was good for plants and that the landlord 
knew what was good. Deference to the landlord as owner is only a 
minor reason. Reasons for saying " i t  depends" also revolve on the 
element of mutual agreement and mutual advantage. Those tenants 
who would not follow their landlord's advice were convinced they 
knew conditions better and therefore, their own judgments were 
followed.36 Besides the obvious absence of a one-way dictate or 
advising from the landlord, the fact that 24 percent of tenants did 
not expect advice on rice variety and 35 percent on amount of 
fertilizer means the tenants were completely left alone in these 
matters and even when advice was expected and given, not all 
expected to follow and those who followed did so for reasons of 
mutual advantages rather than just subservience to the owner of the 
land.
Empirical evidence from other studies lends further support to 
Lopez' conclusion that the traditional share tenancy system is a jo in t 
personal partnership and that notions of the landlord's extensive 
power and the abuses of such powers are not empirically substan­
tiated.
F. Tenure Status, Farm Size, Productivity and Innovativeness
The existing land tenure system in the Philippines has often 
been regarded as a barrier to agricultural development. It has been
36a . G. Pal, op. c i t  “ . 1
r u  ,w  “ t  t w ,
— 1 ~ 7  (  " o  i . ri-yV -f I '  *
~u  •-» ^  ^  V ,  >
usually argued that w ithout the promise of enjoying the full benefit 
of their additional efforts, share tenants w ill not have the incentive 
to produce more. Typical arguments come from the anthropologist 
who traces the link between small farm size and low agricultural 
productivity in two ways:
(a) "Crop production is insufficient under the present technology
and land use to support the family entirely. Family members must all take
up subsidiary subsistence and income-producing activities which in turn
take time and energy from farm work. In a system of better market
incentives this time and energy might be spent in additional labor that it
takes to perform the technological innovations which would increase yield.
(b) On such small farms even if increased production were accepted in
theory, farm families cannot accumulate enough capital to make
important improvements to invest in fertilizers sufficient to have a
significant effect upon yields. Already living on a marginal existence, most
farm families are unwilling to sacrifice anymore in consumption in order
to take a chance that increased yields w ill result. For the tenant, increasing
yields or improving the land is not worth all his additional efforts anyway
because he still gets only half of the product. What is the use of producing
for someone else's consumption? What little  capital most small owners
and tenants can accumulate over basic family consumption needs is not
re-invested in farm development. I t  is spent mainly in the form of tu ition
fees for the education of their children so that they may have a chance to
37raise their status in the social system which lies outside the barrio."
From the political scientist, the assessments are along the same 
line as illustrated in the following: "The results of low agricultural 
productivity are several. Most obviously, the tenant cultivator is 
impoverished. . . . Undoubtedly, community development is 
dependent upon change in the economic condition of the tenant 
farmers. . . the non-emerging class of farmers who have been the 
object of apparently futile efforts aimed at improving their 
conditions."38 Another analysis leads to the same conclusion that 
"low  productivity, lack of capital and marketing facilities weakened 
the small farmers and tenants and forced them to depend upon the 
large landowners or Chinese merchants for capital and storage 
facilities. Low productivity has its roots in the land tenure pattern, 
the social system, and the values and attitudes of the people.
37James N. Anderson, Some Aspects o f  Land and Society in a Pangasinan 
Com munity. Paper read at the Seminar on Religious Acculturation, Baguio, Philippines, Jan. 
1962.
Attempts to improve productivity through extension services, 
research and technological improvements are hampered by the 
tenants' indifference and apathy."39
A prominent leader of a farmers' organization sharpened more 
directly the issue of better agricultural technology or tenure reform. 
As he argues: "Simple recommendations like straight-row planting 
may increase the harvest but need additional labor or capital. 
Moreover, inasmuch as the landlord w ill share in the increase, the 
farmer w ill get actually very little  benefit — at least not large enough 
to give him appreciable incentive. From the viewpoint of the tenant, 
seed selection is not the first measure. The first measure is equitable 
sharing which is provided by law. Hence, to the tenant it is more 
urgent to enforce the Agricultural Tenancy Law than to improve 
seeds."40
Because of the contention that the prevailing tenure 
arrangement does not provide enough incentives for increased 
production in an economy where agricultural production is low and a 
large share of the produce goes to the landlord who is uninterested or 
unable to reinvest in agriculture, under the Philippine land reform 
program, the emphasis is on the need to shift to an owner-based 
agriculture. The assumption is that landownership win provide the 
incentive for increased productivity, since the operator w ill no longer 
share with somebody else.41
While social scientists and agrarian reform leaders tagged the 
prevailing land tenure system as a crucial barrier to agricultural 
development, technocrats were preoccupied with other factors. It is 
not the intention of this analysis to judge the rightness or wrongness 
of thes' two preoccupations but rather to review the empirical 
evidences relevant to the positions taken.
The Rice and Corn Study Committee which was created by 
President Marcos in late 1965 to recommend adequate solutions to 
achieve self-sufficiency in rice and corn identified in its January 8, 
1966 report the basic causes of low production and productivity in 
rice and corn as follows: "(1) lack of irrigation water, (2) unrealistic
39Jean Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines. Little, Brown and Co., New York. 
1964, p. 48.
^Ojeremias U- Montemayor, Farmers' Organizations and Rural Development, 
Philippine-American Rural Development Workshop, Los Bafios, Laguna, June 6-17, 1966.
41 A. M. Wiseblat and P. R. Sandoval, Rice Production: In s titu tion a l Factors and 
Economic Incentives Paper prepared for the seminar on Studies on the Economics of Rice 
Production. IRRI ,  Dec. 8-9, 1971.
pricing and monetary policies which serve as disincentives to 
production, (3) ineffective communication of the technical informa­
tion to the farmers, (4) inadequate credit and lack of credit 
supervision, (5) inefficient warehousing, milling and marketing, (6) 
unavailability of and high cost of agricultural production inputs and 
equipment, (7) poor administrative management and lack of coor­
dination of agencies involved in rice and corn, (8) ineffective 
organization of producers, millers and retailers, (9) unrealistic 
implementation of land reform resulting in a shift from rice and corn 
production to other crops, (10) disastrous effect of typhoons, (11) 
population explosion, and (12) lack of civic conscience and national 
discipline."
Among the 16 guidelines for implementing the Rice and 
Corn Program are these three areas particularly germane to the 
subject under review: (a) We w ill concentrate manpower, technical, 
financial and other material resources to areas w ith high productive 
potentials for rice and corn as determined by land-use and 
land-capability studies, (b) We w ill not fight the landowners but use 
them as powerful ally in our rice and corn program, (c) We shall see 
to it  that the rice and corn production program is strictly an 
economic development function of the Government and not a 
political function.
Besides identifying the "unrealistic implementation of land 
reform which resulted in a shift from rice and corn production to 
other crops" as one of the basic causes of low production the Rice 
and Corn Study Committee categorically stated that:
"the primary objective of land reform is not to increase rice and corn 
production but rather to achieve social justice for the farmers. This means 
paving the way towards eventual ownership of land the farmers cultivate, 
doing away with unfair tenancy practices and exploitive rents, providing 
them with production and marketing facilities and services, and making 
the farmers conscious of their responsibilities in the new role they w ill 
play in the decision-making process. Actually, land reform is only one of 
the tools for increasing production. The implementation of a land reform 
program should be done cautiously, because it is an institution dealing 
w ith human beings whose attitudes and behavior cannot be changed 
overnight. Land reform can only be pushed through as fast as we can 
effect human changes. Otherwise, it would boomerang on the Adminis­
tration, creating discontent instead of satisfaction."42
42 D. L. Umali, Chairman, Rice and Corn Study Committee, A  Realistic Rice and 
Corn Program fo r the Philippines. The Committee Report, Jan. 8, 1966.
These views of the Committee were essentially supported by 
another technocrat whose thoughts on the subject are reflected in 
these statements:
'T he  pace of implementing the Land Reform Program as an instrument 
affecting effective hectarage devoted to the food crops is rather slow and 
perhaps rightly so, because this provides an opportunity fo r the lessons 
learned in the first land reform districts to be forged into the law and the 
implementation program. Rapid implementation could offset efforts to 
raise production in land reform areas, unless a much greater support is 
provided for the tenant farmers in terms of readily available credit to meet 
their farm needs. Partly because of preliminary research reports that 
production in some land reform areas decreased because tenant farmers 
were unable to obtain traditional financial assistance after having been 
weaned from their landlord, some government leaders have begun to 
espouse the idea that a district would be ripe fo r land reform only after 
the tenant farmers in the area have succeeded in raising their production 
and their income to a level that would give them a sense of real security 
and independence."43
The Filipino technocrats' views on the desirability of cautious 
implementation of the land reform program are not shared by a 
foreign agrarian reform expert who says: "Some fear that if the 
government overextends the land reform operations, lack of adequate 
supporting services might do more harm than good. This fear is 
rather exaggerated. The very fact of conversion of share tenants into 
leasehold w ill release considerable resources which are not presently 
available to farmers. The credit provided by a landlord ranges 
generally between P I00 to P150 per hectare. On reduction of rent 
from the present 1/2 to 1/4 of the average normal produce (minus 
certain costs) the farmers w ill get additional resources even of a 
higher order as soon as he has harvested the first crop. Thus, 
additional financial resources w ill be required mainly during the 
period between the first sowing and the harvest."44
This calculation appears to be a very reasonable one except that 
in shifting from 1/2 to 1/4 share accruing to the landlord, the lessee 
shoulders all the expenses which in the old system are shared by the 
landlord. Furthermore, the vagaries of nature which wreck havoc on
43J. D. Drilon Jr., Some Aspects of Philippine Agricultural Development An 
Exploratory View, Philippine Review o f  Business and Economics, Vol. 5, No. 1, April 1968, 
pp. 34-67.
44A. N. Seth, Summary of Observation on Land Reform in the Philippines. FAO 
Regional Office in Bangkok, 1968.
crops between sowing and harvesting set back the farmers to a 
negative balance, and, therefore, his credit needs are both for 
consumption and for production. It is precisely the unavailability 
of alternative sources of credit which has held back the conversion to 
leasehold. Another important factor which should be borne in mind 
is that the 25 percent rental for leasehold is a fixed percentage but the 
basis for deriving the percentage is a highly variable one, depending 
upon the average yields of the normal harvests in the three agricul­
tural crop years preceding the establishment of leasehold.
In the years immediately after the passage of the Land Reform 
Code a very real issue had been: Which should come first, measures to 
increase productivity or the declaration of an area as a Land Reform 
District? In the light of this issue, the position taken by the 
technocrats assumes considerable significance, especially because the 
declaration of land reform areas was in fact, done in bits and pieces. 
Theoretically, if increased productivity has been effected before land 
reform, rentals would be high. However, in practice, it is probably 
fair to say that actual increased yields do not necessarily mean 
reported increased yields. The situation could very well be one of 
increased actual yield, lower reported yields and relatively low 
rentals depending upon the "entrepreneurial'' ability of the tenant, 
the perceptiveness and knowledgeability of the landlord and the 
nature of interaction between these two forces as shaped by past and 
present bargaining relationships. The managing landlord who sees and 
knows what is going on and the absentee landlord for whom field 
inspection is not an acceptable function might conceivably arrive at 
different rentals from similar actual yields. A t any rate, the 
determination of yields and establishment of rentals is one of the 
most manipulable and negotiable provisions of the Land Reform 
Code. As a matter of fact, in the initial period of the new 
high-yielding varieties, share tenants were cautioned by some lawyers 
to stay away from IR-8 in order not to increase yield before an area 
is declared a land reform area. However, the yield prospects were too 
great a temptation for many of them; they planted it anyway but 
"depressed" their yield reports.45
4 5 G. T. Castillo, M iracle Rice as Produced by the Press, op. c i t  and G. T. Castillo, 
'm pact o f  A g ricu ltu ra l Innovation on Patterns o f  Rural L ife  I  Focus on the Philippines), 
A gricu ltu ra l Revolution in SE Asia: Consequerce fo r Development. Vol. II, Asia Societ> 
1970, pp. 13-52.
But all of these pros and cons on the relationship between the 
land tenure system, innovativeness and productivity are the rhetoric 
of the "green revolution." What we need is to look at what the 
empirical evidences tell us.
Baskinas' analysis of the factors associated w ith adoption of 
recommended rice production practices among 480 farmers in 36 
Laguna barrios showed no statistically significant differences among 
tenure groups with respect to adoption. As a matter o f fact, the 
tendency was in the opposite direction, with owner-operators 
exhibiting lower adoption. Among the possible explanations for 
this trend are findings to the effect that share tenants and lessees 
had the best irrigated farms; owner-operators had the poorest irr i­
gation. Almost half (48%) of the owner-operators were farming for 
home consumption; they and part-owners were engaged in diversified 
farming with livestock and upland crops, while share-tenants and 
lessees were more specialized in rice production; owner-operators had 
the lowest level of family labor applied on the farm; had the highest 
educational level not only for themselves but for their children, 
hence employment tended to be outside of the farm; owner-operators 
also had lower cash expenses and less money borrowed for the farm 
than share tenants and lessees; owner-operators also had lower yields 
per hectare.46
Barker et al., in a study in Gapan, Nueva Ecija of 513 farms 
from 1965 to 1970, which was declared land reform area in 1964, 
found no yield differences between tenure groups although owner- 
operators showed lower rate of adoption of HYV and higher level of 
fertilizer input.47
The Lopez study compared share tenants, genuine lessees and 
compromise lessees on the extent to which they had adopted 
recommended rice production practices before and after land reform 
proclamation. Table 6.22 shows considerable increase in the overall 
proportion of farmers adopting the complete package of HYV, 
fertilizer and pesticide from 5.2 percent before and 51.5 percent 
after land reform. Report of no adoption declined from 22.7 to 7.2 
percent. One would therefore be inclined to attribute the heightened 
innovativeness to the land reform program, except for the fact that 
all the three tenure groups exhibited the same phenomenon.
46Juani ta P. Baskinas. Factors Related to the A dop tion  o f  the F our Low land  Rice 
Practices. Farm and Home Development Office, U.P. College of Agriculture, 1971.
4 7 R. Barker, et al., op. cit.
Table 6.22. Percent of farmers adopting recommended 
rice production practices before and after 
land reform by tenure group.
Compromise
Share tenants* Genuine lessees** Lessees*** A l l  farmers 
Before A fte r  Before A fte r  Before A fte r  Before A fte r
1. None 28.2 6.5 16.7 6.7 19.0 9.5 22.7 7.2
2. Pesticide only 8.7 — 10.0 3.3 — — 7.2 1.0
3. Fertilizer only 10.9 10.9 26.7 10.0 9.5 — 15.5 8.2
4. H Y V 8.7 8.7 -  3.3 9.5 4.8 6.2 6.2
6.5 15.2 -  6.7 -  14.3 3.0 12.3
5. H Y  V and
fertilizer
6. Fertilizer and
pesticide 34.8 13.0 40.0 10.0 52.4 14.3 40.2 12.3
7. H YV and
pesticide _ _ _ _ _  4.8 — 1.0
8. Complete package 
(H YV, fertilizer
and pesticide) 2.1 45.7 6.7 60.0 9.5 52.4 5.2 51.5
Total N 59 33 25 117
Before Land Reform = 1.24 N. S.
After Land Reform = 1.85 N. S.
Data were obtained from R. Lopez, op. c i t ,  Table 46, p. 242.
•Share tenants — Tenants who refuse to shift to leasehold at the time of the study. 
"G enuine Lessees -  Tenants who were pure lessees as per R. A. 3844. 
• • ‘ Compromise Lessees — Tenants who shifted to leasehold under special 
arrangement; their landlord not covered by the above law.
Chi-square tests yielded no statistically significant differences be­
tween share tenants, genuine lessees and compromise lessees w ith 
respect to adoption of new rice production practices, although share 
tenants exhibited lower adoption of the complete package than 
lessees.
A variable related to innovativeness is the farmer's aspiration for 
more share of the produce per hectare. It is interesting that levels of 
aspiration on rice share were practically the same before and after 
land reform proclamation, but there are differences between the 
three tenure groups. The average share of the produce per hectare
aspired for was 71.4 cavans. The share tenants who aspired for more 
share per hectare cultivated were those who shifted later on to 
leasehold, hence the data in Table 6.23 show statistically significant 
differences between the three groups, with those who remained share 
tenants exhibiting the lowest aspirations; 32 percent of them wanted 
72 or more cavans per hectare, while 48 percent of genuine lessees and 
56 percent of compromise lessees had similar levels of aspiration.
Table 6.23. Farmers' aspirations on rice share by tenure groups.
Cavans per hectare Sharetenants
Genuine
lessees
Compromise
lessees
— P e r c e n t  —
1 5 - 4 3 32.2 24.2 12.0
4 4 -  71 35.6 27.3 32.0
72 - 185 30.5 45.4 52.0
186 - 300 1.7 3.1 4.0
Total 100 100 100
Total N 59 33 25
X 2 = 12.73 d.f. = 4 p =  0.02
Data were obtained from R. Lopez, op. c i t ,  Table 34, p. 217.
Data from Tables 6.22 and 6.23 are quite revealing. Although share 
tenants and lessees did not differ significantly in yields per hectare, 
what seemed to differentiate the non-shiftees from the shiftees to 
leasehold was the desire for increased share of the produce rather 
than just productivity per se. However, Lopez' findings also 
indicate that share tenants who had great financial alternatives 
(other than the landlord) available to them before land reform 
were the ones who shifted to leasehold. Hence, the aspiration 
for a greater share of the produce was accompanied by the existence 
of an actual means of attaining it, given financial alternatives other 
than the landlord from whom most lessees were automatically cut o ff 
fo r credit upon the shift to leasehold.
For more details on the economic effects of land reform, the 
Sandoval and Gaon study is the only comprehensive analysis 
presently available. Table 6.24 shows a decline in total cropland from 
1963 to 1967-69 but an increase in effective crop area and doubling 
in index of double-cropping from 23.51 to 48.38 percent brought
about by improvement in irrigation systems. These increases in 
effective crop area appear to have occurred more among part-owners, 
lessees and lessee tenants than among owner-operators and share 
tenants. The index of double-cropping also increased much more 
among lessees and share-tenants than among owners and part-owners. 
Another trend worth noting is the disappearance of the upland crop 
area and the consequent increase in the lowland rice crop area.
As far as productivity and tenure status are concerned, data in 
Table 6.25 show that before land reform, lessee tenants and part- 
owners had higher yields than share tenants, lessees and owners. The 
latter reported the lowest yields. During the post-proclamation 
period 1967-68, owners exhibited the highest yields, share tenants
Table 6.24. Average utilization of cropland by tenure (550 farmers. Central Luzon).
Tota l Cropland Average E ffective  Crop Area Index o f  Double Cropping
1967-68  1968-69  1963-65  1967-68  1968-69  1963 -65  1967-68  1968-69
— In  Hectares - — In  Hectares - -  Percent —
Owner 4.35 2.52 2.25 2.04 3.10 2.32 19.69 25.78 3.83
Part-owner 2.92 3.70 3.41 3.23 4.48 3.96 10.54 22.16 18.03
Lessee 3.51 2.89 3.17 2.33 4.51 4.36 15.96 59.12 41.61
Lessee-tenant 2.00 3.50 4.88 2.09 5.10 5.38 4.45 49.08 12.38
Share-tenant 3.40 2.38 2.41 2.94 3.52 3.19 26:42 48.72 34.06
A11 farms 3.94 2.85 3.06 2.74 4.16 3.92 23.51 48.34 31.50
Lowland rice 2.23 2.71 2.73 - - - - - —
Upland rice 1.71 0.05 0.02 - - - -
°ther crops - 0.09 0.31 - —
Source: P. R, Sandoval and B. V. Gaon, op. c i t
Table 6.25. Mean rice yield per hectare by tenure (550 farms, 
Central Luzon) in cavans per hectare..
■ Tenure
Pre-Land Reform  
1963-65
Post Proclamation Period 
1967-68 1968-69
Owner 41.3 53.3
49.3*
Part-owner 53.5
50.7 46.8
Lessee 45.7
51.0 51.6*
Lessee-tenant 53.6
48.3 51.0
Share-ten ant 47.7
49.0 52.9*
A ll farms 47.0
50.5 51.1*
Landlord's N e t returns Landlord ’s N e t returns
share to  farmer share to  farmer share to  farmer
1963-65 1967-68 1968-69
— In  pesos per hectare -
Owner 221.3 964.2 -
161.3
Part-owner 176.0 218.9 156.7 399.6
130.2 253.9
Lessee 173.9 188.8 177.4 247.5
171.6 373.4
Lessee-tenant 264.1 33.2 255.9 187.3
254.5 171.4
Share-tenant 275.1 18.5 354.0 109 8
374.3 14.8
A ll farms 227.2 17.2 207.5 243.8
201.7 233.7
•Significant at the one percent p ro b a b ility  level.
Adapted from  P. R. Sandpval and B. V . Gaon, op. c it. Tables 2, 3, 4, 31a, and 33a.
and lessee tenants, the lowest yields. For 1968-69, share tenants had 
the highest yields, followed by lessees and lessee tenants. A 
comparison of 1963-65 and 1968-69 yields shows statistically 
significant difference for owners, lessees, share tenants and all farms. 
Part-owners and lessee tenants showed decline in yields. Based on 
these findings one cannot say that tenure status makes a difference in 
productivity despite the shift from share tenancy to leasehold. Further 
support for this statement is found in Table 6.26 which compares 
precisely the shiftees and non-shiftees. The share tenants in 1963-65 
had slightly higher average yields (47.7 cavans per ha) than old 
lessees (45.6). As of 1968-69, those who remained share tenants 
achieved slightly higher yields than new lessees. However, the modest 
average increases for all farms from pre-land reform to post­
proclamation fail to substantiate the claim that land reform measures 
would lead to a decline in production during the early stages. The 
absence of significant differences in productivity between different 
tenure groups and even trends contrary to the contention that share 
tenants would have no incentive to increase yields, lead one to re­
examine the commonly held assumptions regarding the farmer's 
motivations. The old notion appears too simple an explanation for
Table 6.26. Comparison of crop production and disposal of 
shiftees and non-shiftees, before and after Land 
Reform Proclamation, Central Luzon, 1963-1969.
1963-65 1968-69
O ld
lessees
Share
tenants
N ew
lessees
Share
tenants
No. of farms 79 384 205 115
Average effective crop 
area (ha ) 2.34 2.94 4.23 3.23
Average prod, per ha 
in cav. 45.6 47.7 51.4 52.2
Disposition of production in percent
Harvester's share 9.0 9.5 11.9 10.2
Seeds used 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.3
Landlord's share 26.4 41.2 20.0 42.1
Operator's share 62.2 47.3 66.0 45.4
the choices he makes and the behavior which follows.
In a preliminary report on a meticulous and systematic 
cross-sectional analysis of data from Nueva Ecija, R. P. de los Reyes, 
Mangahas and Murphy48 found no statistically significant differences 
among tenure groups w ith respect to yield per hectare (regardless of 
irrigation and variety used) and area planted (1968/69-1971/72), but 
for the dry season of 1972-73 owner-cultivators farmed a larger area 
on account of better availability of irrigation facilities. One-fifth of 
these owner-cultivators reported owning irrigation pumps. The 
three tenure groups neither differed significantly in production 
expenses, both in labor and non-labor costs; in use of carabao and 
farm equipment; use of household labor on farm, off-farm and 
non-farm activities; and use of non-household labor whether in 
number of persons or number of days. The proportion of self- 
financed farmers was higher for owner-operators (42 percent) and 
share tenants (27 percent). They also obtained bigger loans from 
ACA/FACOMA and banks. Lessees came next in amount borrowed 
from these sources. In terms of credit source, amounts of loan from 
other sources and interest rates, the tenure groups again did not 
differ significantly. The ratio of livestock sold to value of rice output 
is about the same for the three groups. However, when it comes to 
net income per hectare, owner-cultivators realized the highest mean 
net income (wet season F615, dry season P783) followed by lessees 
(P448 and P447), then by share tenants, the lowest (P332 and 1*259). 
Data on the national level for all crops during those years show a 
higher proportion of lessees who were able to borrow from 
ACA/FACOMA and a higher proportion of owner-operators who 
obtained loans from the rural bank. Fewer share tenants obtained 
loans from both o f these sources (Table 6.26).
Further insights into the problem may be derived from the lower 
half of Tables 6.25 and 6.26, both of which very clearly illustrate the 
advantages of a leasehold over a share tenancy arrangement. It is 
quite evident as to how much accrues to the farmer and to the landlord 
as far as net returns are concerned. Table 6.26 illustrates dramatically 
what happens to the share tenant when he shifts to leasehold. From a
47.3 percent share o f the produce he moved to 66 percent share 
when he shifted to leasehold. The concomitant reduction in landlord's
<8 r . p . de los Reyes, Mahar Mangahas, and F. J. Murray, Land Reform and 
Agricultural Development in Nueva Ecija: Report on Phase One, Ateneo de Manila, Institute 
of Philippine Culture, March, 1973.
share was from 41.2 to 20 percent of the produce.
All the above observations give rise to the following speculative 
thoughts regarding the lack of significant productivity differences 
among tenure groups:
(a) Those who find it d ifficu lt to accept the lack of pro­
ductivity differences among tenure groups after land reform blame it 
on the lessees' lack of access to credit because landlords pull out from 
this role when tenants shift to leasehold. Data in Table 6.26 at least for 
the years analyzed do not bear this out. Both owner-cultivators and 
lessees have enjoyed more credit from a cheaper credit source. Lack 
of irrigation cannot be the culprit either fo r the lower yield 
performances of owner-cultivators. They actually have an advantage 
in this aspect. Furthermore, where the intergroup comparison is 
w ithin irrigated and within rainfed areas, the no-yield difference 
among tenure groups still occurs.
(b) In the absence of a better explanation for this phenomenon, 
a naive and rather simple one is temporarily offered until a 
more sophisticated rationale can be found. The shift from share 
tenancy to leasehold does not necessarily lead to increased pro­
ductivity because at least in itia lly the lessee could attain an increase 
in his net returns simply by obtaining a larger share of the produce 
and decreasing what accrues to the landlord. What occurs is merely a 
redistribution which can be accomplished w ithout increasing farm 
yield. This means an improvement in the status of the individual 
farmers w ithout necessarily altering the yield per hectare. Another 
negative factor in the productivity, actual or reported, of the lessee 
during the transition stage, is the need to depress yields, i f  no t in 
fact, at least in report in order to arrive at a low rental rate which 
w ill have to be fixed w ith the landlord via a bargaining process. As 
mentioned earlier, the rental rate which is based on the average yield 
of three preceding normal crop years is the most vulnerable and 
manipulable aspect of the leasehold provisions. If this proposed 
explanation is acceptable, what needs to be determined in the 
interest of achieving the national goals of increasing productivity is: 
A t what point and what would it take for a lessee to move from a 
first-level goal of increasing his returns simply by an increased share 
of the produce to increasing his over-all farm yields as a second-level 
source of improved status.'’ Data from Table 6.25 show the stable 
share of the landlord from 1963-65 to 1968-69 but the lessee's share 
increasedfrom"P188.8010^247.50 to'P'373.40. The lessee tenant had
a slight decline in landlord's share but an upward trend in what went 
to the lessee himself.
Herrera's study which included 60 farmers who had shifted to 
leasehold, indicated that 41 percent admitted that they had 
benefited from the shift; 54 percent fe lt that both lessee and 
landlord gained from the new arrangement. Only 5 percent thought 
that it was still the landlord who had the advantage. Their reason is 
that "when the crop is damaged, the lessee has no share but the 
landlord w ill get something just the same even w ithout any expenses 
on his part." Lessees who perceived advantages on their side stressed 
the fact that they would receive more of the share. Only 5 percent 
mentioned heightened aspiration to produce more since the rental 
was already fixed. Those who perceived advantages to both parties 
said "both receive reasonable share, 75% for lessee and 25% to 
landlord."49
(c) In the case of the share tenant, who for one reason or 
another, could or did not want to shift to leasehold, there appeared to 
be greater incentive to increase farm productivity because that was the 
only way he could achieve a larger share, i.e., 50 percent of 100 
cavans per hectare is higher than 50 percent of 50 w ith expenses 
shared also on a 50:50 basis. In other words, the lessee's initial 
avenue for increased income was via a larger share of the "p ie "; the 
share tenant on the other hand, had to enlarge the pie before his share 
of it can be enlarged. Table 6.25 shows that the landlord's share 
increased from F275.10 to P354.00 to P374.30 while the tenant's 
share went from P18.50 to F109.80 and a share decline to ^14.80 in
1968-69. Although both parties increased their respective shares for 
1967-68, Tables 6.25 and 6.26 both show a decline in the share 
tenant's in 1968-69.
(d) Seeing the enormous net income differences among tenure 
groups and between those who shifted and those who did not, 
economists would find it  almost impossible to believe that the farmer 
would go through two stages in increasing his returns. Why could he 
not aim for the maximum returns which means not only increasing 
his share o f the pie but also increasing the size of the pie itself so that 
his share of it  would be even bigger? Indeed, why doesn't he? The 
first stage of increasing his share from shifting to leasehold is an 
obvious one but the experience and the studies have also shown 
that despite what seems obvious to us, share tenants have their "good
reasons" for wanting status quo in their tenure.
One arrangement says that farmers have been in this "feudal" 
state for so long that the alternatives they perceive in life are all 
narrowly circumscribed within this system. Another explanation 
relevant to this which we have neglected because of the moral 
judgment attached to land reform as a "good thing" is the possibility 
that share tenancy is not such a "bad" system and is not as feudal as 
we thought it was. As Lopez and R. P. de los Reyes found in their 
studies, landlords do not seem to behave like "tyrants" and tenants 
do not seem to feel "oppressed." Perhaps the Philippines is fortunate 
in having had its agrarian unrest long before World War II and having 
had instances o f oppressive landlords getting it "by the neck", so to 
speak, literally and figuratively. The cruel and oppressive social 
and personal treatment of tenants by landlords (as stereotypes would 
have it) has not surfaced in the studies reviewed. The lessons of the 
past seem to have been learned well and the threat from "rebel" 
elements has probably protected tenants from abuse. One also hears 
about landlord abused by his tenants but such stories are never 
written about because they are against the " lit t le "  man. Intellectual 
and moral norms of the times are on his side as all of us acknowl­
edge they should be.
Finally, there should be no surprise if farmers focused on 
increasing their share of the pie rather than on increasing the size of 
the pie. The former (social justice and income distribution) was 
always advanced as the rationale for land reform. That increased 
productivity w ill result from land reform is something which we 
assumed would take place. After all, isn't it the most economic 
response to the situation? That this has not yet manifested itself is, 
therefore, a puzzle to everyone.
From the previously cited studies of Lopez, R.P. de los Reyes and 
Sandoval-Gaon, one can make this inference: Since it is the landlords 
w ith bigger landholdings, more tenants and who are geographically 
farther away from the tenants who are more inclined to go into 
leasehold arrangements with their tenants, and since leasehold has 
brought about a larger share of the produce to the tenant, income 
redistribution has in fact taken place where it  is most needed. This 
phenomenon becomes a lot more significant when one considers that 
there are many more tenants than there are big landlords. Conversely, 
it is the landlords with smaller landholdings and less other sources of 
income who have tended to hang on to share tenancy arrangements.
Therefore, although share tenants may have bigger net returns than 
before land reform, landlords also have bigger net returns, hence 
increased productivity may have occurred but not income 
redistribution. Again, however, these landlords are the smaller ones 
who have fewer tenants and less alternative income sources, hence 
there is not much to redistribute, in the first place.
Despite the disadvantages shown in the situation of the share 
tenants with respect to share of the produce, we must not be led to 
believe that he is not utilizing options outside of rice farming. Table 
6.27, which compares shiftees and share tenants,shows that the share 
tenants are devoting a greater proportion of family labor to non-farm 
rather than to farm work. Shiftees put in more labor on the farm and 
less on non-farm. The other significant item is in capital investment. 
Shiftees put in more money on the land but share tenants invest 
more on work animals and other animals like livestock and poultry 
which do not have to be shared with the landlord. In terms of farm 
inputs, more shiftees than share tenants utilized them in 1968-69. 
Perhaps this is already the beginning of the second-level stage of 
attempting to increase income except that shiftees and share tenants 
are responding differently. The former are putting in more labor and 
inputs on the farm; the latter are devoting more time on farmwork 
and livestock the returns from which do not have to be shared with 
the landlord. Judging from these second-level developments, lessees 
rather than share tenants may be the source of increased productivity. 
Hiwatig's study of 1964 and 1966-69 lessees indicates that the 
earlier shiftees had higher yields per hectare, lower cost of production 
per cavan, and consequently higher farm incomes than those who 
became lessees later. Double-cropping was also more apparent in the 
1964 than in the 1966-69 group.50 Although these results may be a 
reflection of differences in amount of material and technical support 
given to lessees at the two-time periods and a product of lower lease 
rentals in 1964 than later, it is also possible that 1964 lessees were 
already at the second-level stage of income improvement while the 
later lessees were still in transition.
Another problematic area with respect to land reform is the role 
of the landlords in the introduction and/or adoption of new rice 
production practices. As has been previously cited, the Rice and Corn
50Mario Hiwatig, Rural Levels of Living in Selected Land Reform Areas, Philippine  
A gricu ltu ra l Situation, Vol. 8, Nos. 2 & 3, April-Sept,. 1971, Bu. of Agricultural Economics, 
Quezon City.
Table 6.27. Comparative status of shiftees and share-tenants in 
1968-1969 (366 farms in 7 Central Luzon provinces).
No. o f farms Shiftees Share-Tenant.
251 (205 lessees 115
( 36 lease-tenants
( 7 part-owners 
( 3 owners
1. Total effective crop area (ha ) 4.36 3.23
2. Percent double-cropping 57.84 53.74
3. Utilization of available family 
labor (days per farm)
Total days per farm 594.4 553.6
Percent distribution
Farm work 22.6 19.0
Off-farm work 1.6 1.2
Non-farm work 15.3 20.4
Not employed 60.5 59.4
4. Average capital investment (In pesos)
Land 5,932 5,088
Buildings 17 4
Tools and equipment 90 81
Supplies .and materials 6 3
Work animals 414 514
Other animals 138 286
Total 6,597 5,976
5. Percent of farms using
Fertilizers 93% 80%
Insecticide 67% 54%
Weedicide 39% 24%
6. Average yield per hectare
in cavans 51.0 52.3
7. Landlord's share in pesos P182.3 P374.4
8. Net returns to farmer P177.1 1* 11.6
Data were adapted from P. R. Sandoval and B. V. Gaon, op. c i t ,  Tables 38, 39, 40, 
41, and 43.
Study Committee categorically stated that one of its guidelines is not 
to fight the landowners but to use them as a powerful ally in the rice 
and com program. A similar position has been espoused by another 
economist-technocrat when he evaluated land reform implemen­
tation in 1965.
"The lessons learned in land reform implementation have special relevance 
to the administrative and field organization, the establishment of close 
working relationships with tenants and landowners, and the means to 
providing a general process in the attainment o f landownership. Land
reforms cannot be successfully implemented by ignoring the interest of 
landowners nor by hostile attitude to those who have long standing 
interest in the land."
We further recognized that an effective land reform program can be 
achieved only through the goodwill and cooperation of 
landowners.51
Although those measures appear to be protective of landlords' 
interests, considering the circumstances at that time, it  was probably 
the most logical approach to take for purposes of encouraging 
production. A t any rate, what is of concern in this analysis is the 
unintended and unanticipated consequences of such a measure. Two 
possible consequences are: (1) a kindling of interest in their riceland on 
the part of absentee and non-managing landlords because of new 
production potentials; and (2) an intensified management function 
on the part of already managing landlords.
Needless to say, managing landlords have more to. do w ith 
decisions regarding farming operations than non-managing or absentee 
landlords. Table 6.28 shows the difference between these two types of 
landlords, w ith managing landlords exhibiting greater capital invest­
ments and adoption of more innovative farming practices. With 
landlords who exercise management functions, the prospects of 
bargaining for lower lease rentals are not very bright, since actual 
yields are not likely to be unknown to the landlord. Where these 
yields are high, the shift to leasehold would mean high rentals.
However, data before the advent of high-yielding varieties 
(Table 6.29) show no significant differences in farm output under 
landlord, overseer or tenant supervision. In 1969, a case study of a 
330-hectare farm reported that the tenanted portion had an average 
yield of about 45 cavans per hectare, while the owner-administered 
and non-tenanted area had yields of 79 and 98 for two crop seasons.52 
The yield differential may be due to the desire of share tenants to 
"depress" yields since the farm is located in Central Luzon, a land 
reform area.
In the early days of IR-8, there was the accusation that 
landlords "forced" their tenants to plant this variety in order to 
increase yield and eventually lease rentals. Pal's study53 of 74
51 Amando Dalisay, Agricultural Development in the Light of Development Goals 
and Performance 1949-1965. Research & Development Office, University of the East, 
Manila, Sept. 1967, p. 12.
52j_ d . Drilon, Jr. and Ray Goldberg, The Sanchez Rice Farm. A Study prepared for 
the Inter-university Program for Graduate Business Education in the Philippines, 1969.
53A. G. Pal, op. c i t
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Table 6.28. Important changes introduced on the,farm by two types of rice landlords (1955),
Landlord type
Changes introduced Managing 
Tota l N  = 68
Non-managing 
N  = 44
Frequency o f  Mention
1. Divisible inputs such as fertilizer, 
seeds, pest control 80 32
2. Improved cropping pattern 8 7
3. Improved rice cultural practices 18 7
4. Land improvements 55 23
5. Improved tenant-landlord relations 
such as change from crop-sharing 
to leasehold and extension of credit 
to tenant 3 6
6. Bought tools and equipment for the 
farm (tractor, thresher, irrigation 
pump, weeder) 31 18
Source of data: E. Bernal -Torres and P. R. Sandoval, op. c i t ,  p. 70.
farmers, 96 percent of whom were share tenants in a community not 
far from Los Banos, the original source of I R-8, showed that the 
major reason fo r planting the variety as early as the first season of its 
introduction (1966) was that they had heard and seen its high- 
yielding performance. Those who did not plant it then thought IR-8 
was expensive to grow and they had yet to see its yield performance.
Table 6.29. Farm output under different supervision and size of operating units (1965).
Landlord  Overseer Tenant
Size
No.
Ave. y ie ld  
cavans 
per ha
No.
Ave. y ie ld  
cavans 
per ha
No.
Ave. y ie ld  
cavans 
p e r ha
1.00- 1.99 14 57 2 60 5 57
2.00 - 2.99 21 54 16 54 8 45
3.00 - 3.99 26 48 22 46 7 46
4.00 and above 18 46 22 47 2 40
There were those who wanted to plant it  but the landlord advised 
against it, at least not yet. For the next dry season (1967), the most 
frequently mentioned reason (70%) for using the variety was its 
proven high-yielding performance. By that time, 7 percent of the 
reasons mentioned that the landlord liked the variety; the next wet 
season (1967), 18 percent of the reasons mentioned this factor also. 
Another study by Liao conducted among 155 rice farmers from 
Calamba, Cabuyao and Binan in the province of Laguna found 
exactly the same reasons. About 90 percent of the 110 farmers who 
adopted IR-8 in 1967 indicated expected high yield as the single 
most important factor for the adoption. Of the 45 non-adopters, one 
third indicated that the most important single factor for not planting 
IR-8 was the landlord's decision against the variety.
In other words, if the tenants planted IR-8, it  was mainly 
because they were convinced of its yield performance and less likely 
because the landlord forced them to do so. Earlier discussions on 
decision-making regarding farm matters indicated that the ap­
plication of compulsion from the landlord in the adoption of IR-8 by 
the tenant was not very likely. However, the element of naivete 
about rental implications of increased yield could not be ruled out 
since at the time of Pal's study, only 51 percent of the 74 share 
tenants had heard about the land reform program. This community is 
located in Laguna province which was not a high priority land reform 
area and was not proclaimed till late 1969.
A more direct study of the landlord's role in the early adoption 
of IR-8, the first HYV released in June-July 1966, was made by 
Huke and Duncan in Gapan, Nueva Ecija.54 According to the 
researchers, the first recipients were six owner-operators and ten 
tenants who received their seeds from three landowners who lived in 
the poblacion or town proper. The landlords indicated that they 
wanted the valuable seeds to be planted on their most productive 
land and cared for by excellent farmers. What is important to note 
here is the fact that these landowners live also in Gapan and 
therefore are more likely to be managing landlords, since their farms 
are located very near their place of residence. As such, increased 
yields are not likely to be unknown to the landlord and could be an 
inhibiting factor in shifting to leasehold because of increased rentals.
However, this is more inferential than empirical. Huke and 
Duncan found negativethough not statistically significant relationships 
between percentages of IR-8 adopters and proportion o f farmers on
leasehold. Apparently, adoption of I R-8 had not been enhanced by 
conversion to leasehold. The consistently negative correlation coef­
ficients even indicate the contrary. The researchers'explanation for 
this pattern is that "leasehold operators are seldom able to acquire 
loans for fertilizer, pesticides and other agricultural inputs from the 
Rural Banks and are almost never extended credit by their landlords 
who, because of fixed rental, no longer have anything to gain from 
improved yields. In contrast, those farmers in land reform areas who 
have chosen to remain on a share tenancy arrangement are those 
working with progressive landowners. In such situation capital 
expenses for agricultural inputs are shared equally and credit is 
extended with little  or no interest by the landlord. His pro fit comes 
from improved yields." Worthy of mention here is the fact that 
owner-operators in this study did not exhibit a higher rate of 
adoption than share tenants or lessees.
The innovative, facilitative and supportive role of the landlord 
in increasing rice production was recognized in a series of Seminars 
on Rice Production for landlords which were conducted in 1965 at 
the University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture. The main 
rationale for this undertaking was the assumption that "the landlord 
is a strong force in influencing tenants' or even non-tenants' 
acceptance and adoption of recommended practices in rice produc­
tion." The objective was to bring to the landlords' attention the 
technical soundness and economic implications of the new rice tech­
nology which had been developed through research. They were 
regarded as effective links in the implementation of changes in rice 
production both as extension agents to the tenants and as providers 
of capital w ith which to implement changes. A follow-up study 
found positive response to the seminars. Landlords initiated field 
trials of new rice varieties and demonstration of recommended 
cultural practices. They were now willing to adopt new methods and 
some even went to the extent o f offering token gratuities to the 
extension workers from the College of Agriculture because of their 
concern for the welfare of their farms and their tenants. Absentee 
landlords who attended the seminar instructed the tenants to 
cooperate with the extension workers on whatever improved 
practices were recommended. After all, these landlords who resided 
far from their farms usually left the management of their farms 
to the tenants?5
55>Ligaya N. Palang, Landlord Seminar on Rice Production. Farm and Home 
Development Office, U.P. College of Agriculture, Dec. 1965.
Mostly due to hindsight rather than foresight, an intriguing 
question arises. In the long run, is the tenant better o ff w ith a 
progressive managing landlord or with a big absentee landlord — 
whose life and livelihood interests are not tied to the land? For 
reasons o f relative naivete as to what goes on the farm, geographic 
distance from the tenant, less personalistic relations with the tenants 
and existence of alternative sources of income besides the land, the 
big absentee landlord has probably contributed to the realization of 
at least the first phase of land reform goals. For some idea of lease 
rentals paid by lessees in relation to yields, data from Gapan, Nueva 
Ecija (an area declared land reform in 1964) are presented (Table 
6.30). The rental rates followed the yield trends with lessees in the 
rainfed barrio paying the highest rental. Except for the “ tungro 
season," the average lessee was paying less than 25 percent of the 
average yields. Although the yields were much higher in San Nicolas 
than in the two other villages, the yield rentals were low relative to 
the average yield obtained in the place. While this was a definite 
advantage to the lessees, the percentage of farmers on leasehold in 
San Nicolas was almost half only of the rainfed village. San Nicolas 
was also the village immediately adjoining the town proper where 
some of the landlords resided.
One wonders whether the presence of progressive managing 
landlords who have smaller landholdings has inhibited the shift to 
leasehold precisely because of success in increasing productivity 
on the part of their share tenants. Doubtless this contributes to a 
larger share on the part of both landlord and tenant and enhanced 
dependence on each other. It might also be in such cases where 
landlords would tend to exercise persuasion through offers of 
additional share or privilege in order to keep their tenants from 
shifting to leasehold. Furthermore, known high yields have con­
sequent implication for high lease rentals. On the other hand, the 
high rate of leasehold in Mahipon was attributed to large landholdings 
with several tenants but owned by absentee landlords. According 
to the extension worker who was a resident in the barrio for rr ore 
than five years, this combination of factors had encouraged the 
shift to leasehold. Several tenants together had less embarrassment 
in approaching their landlord w ith whom they had not developed 
close personal ties because of geographic distance. For their part, 
the absentee landlords who hardly knew what was going on 
their farm anyway found it much more advantageous to have fixed 
lease rental.
Table 6.30. Lease rentals paid by lessees to landlords (3 barrios 
of Gapan, Nueva Ecija as of 1971).
Rental in 
cavans per 
ha.
Mahipon
(Rainfed)
Malimba ( Ir r i­
gated two crops 
b u t n o t very 
effective)
San Nicolas 
(Irrigated  
two crops)
Total
4.1 - 6 14
— P e r  c e n t  — 
26 15
6.1 - 8 36 21 23 29
8.1 - 10 33 37 54 39
10.1 - 12 14 11 15 13
12.1 - 14 3 5 8 4
Total 100 100 100 100
No. of lessees 36 19 13 68
Percent of farmers
in leasehold 46 23 24 35
No. of farmers
studied N = 72 N = 66 N = 55 N = 193
Ave. y ie ld  per ha in cavans 
Wet season
pre-HYV 36 46 53.8
Wet season
1970-71 43.1 48.0 78.6
Wet season*
1971-72 13.2 7.1 36.6
*A  serious outbreak of "tungro" disease affected yields. 
Data were obtained from R. T. Herrera, op. c i t ,
In addition to land reform, the other issue raised about rice 
farming and the new rice technology is that of the large farmer 
being benefited more than the small one in terms of productivity. 
So far, available data from the Philippines either before or after 
land reform point to the contrary. Tables 6.29, 6.31 and 6.32 all 
indicate a negative relationship between productivity per hectare 
and farm size. Bernal, Ruttan, Sandoval and Gaon found the yields 
per hectare o f riceland to be higher in smaller than in larger 
farm-operating units. This is so regardless of tenure status, irrigated 
or rainfed areas and whether before or after land reform. Barker, et
Table 6.31. Relationship between farm size, tenure and productivity 
on rice-producing farms in the Philippines, 1962.
Size o f  farm  
in  hectares
Share tenants 
Yield in 44-k ilo  cavans per ha. F u ll Owners
0 .6 - 0.9 27.8 33.4
1 .0 - 1.4 35.6 27.5
1 .5 - 1.9 39.3 27.5
2 .0 -  2.9 37.9 26.6
3 .0 -  3.9 36.2 28.7
4 .0 - 4.9 35.6 28.1
5 .0 -  5.9 35.9 25.5
10.0 - 14.9 38.4 25.5
Source: V. W. Ruttan, Tenure and Productivity of Philippine Rice Producing Farms, 
Dept, of Agric. Econ., University of Minnesota, Nov. 20, 1965.
a/.56 also reported inastudy of 513 farms that small irrigated farms 
consistently gave higher yields than large ones although there were 
no differences in the rate of adoption of nitrogen input among farm 
size groups. The rate of mechanization was found to be higher on 
larger farms. One question which Barker, et al. raised was the 
possibility of more fertile soil on the smaller farms, but in their study 
such information was not available and therefore the question 
remains unanswered.
The higher productivity of smaller farms is supportive of 
land reform measures which aim to remedy the very unequal 
distribution of landholdings, but a satisfactory explanation for the 
occurrence of the phenomenon is yet to be found. What are the 
constraints on increased productivity on larger farms? Is the rice 
farm by its very nature less conducive to successful management on a 
large scale?
G. Land Reform in the New Society
On October 21, 1972 President Marcos issued under Martial Law 
Decree No. 27 which provided for the Emancipation o f the Tenant 
from the Bondage o f the Soil, Transferring to Them the Ownership
Farm size
Irrigated Non irrigated
1963-65 1967-68 1968-69 1963-65 1967-68 1968-69
Less than 1.0 ha. 55.2 47.5 57.3 50.2 50.0 49.5
1 .0 - 1.9 51.4 55.7 57.6 48.1 53.3 52.9
2 .0 -2 .9 46.2 59.4 54.3 43.7 53.9 48.5
3.0 - 3.9 42.6 54.4 52.6 45.9 45.1 42.8
4.0 - 4.9 50.5 54.0 50.5 44.5 46.6 50.1
5 .0 -5 .9 44.5 46.5 51.9 43.5 50.4 44.0
6.0 - 6.9 44.5 45.5 48.7 43.5 39.8 47.9
7.0 and above 44.5 45.5 48.7 43.5 46.8 44.3
All farms 47.6 51.3 52.1 46.7 49.6 48.5
Data were adapted from P. R. Sandoval and B. V . Gaon, op. c i t .  Tables 12b, 13b, 
and 14b.
o f the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism 
Therefore. This decree applies to tenant farmers of private agricul­
tural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of 
sharecrop or lease-tenancy whether classified as landed estate or not. 
Among the provisions of this Decree are:
1. The tenant farmer whether in land classified as landed estate 
or not, shall be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family-size 
farm of five hectares if not irrigated and three hectares if  irrigated.
2. In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more 
than seven (7) hectares if  such landowner is cultivating such area or 
will now cultivate it.
3. For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be 
transferred to the tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree, the value of 
the land shall be equivalent to two and one-half (2 1/2) times the 
average harvest of three normal crop years immediately preceding the 
promulgation of this Decree.
4. The total cost of the land, including interest at the rate of 
six (6) percentum per annum, shall be paid by the tenant in fifteen 
(15) years of fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations.
In the case of default, the amortizations due shall be paid by 
the farmers' cooperative of which the defaulting tenant-farmer is a 
member, w ith the cooperative having a right of recourse against him.
5. The government shall guarantee such amortizations with 
shares o f stock in government-owned and government-controlled 
corporations.
6. No title  to the land owned by the tenant-farmers under this 
Decree shall be actually issued to a tenant-farmer unless and until the 
tenant-farmer has become a full-fledged member of a duly recog­
nized farmers' cooperative.
7. Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land 
Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable except 
by hereditary succession or to the government in accordance with 
the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reforms and 
other existing laws and regulations.
Again, as crucial to the earlier Land Reform Code as to 
Presidential Decree No. 27 is the average harvest o f three normal 
crop years immediately preceding the promulgation of the Decree. 
Just as before, this average figure used for determining lease rentals 
w ill now be the basis for establishing the value of the land. Therefore, 
yields are of critical importance. After the transfer of landownership 
to the tenant has taken place, it  would be worth watching what 
impact this w ill have on productivity. So far, only one study 
conducted in 1967 among 37 owner-operators and 63 share tenants 
in Pampanga and Bataan has consistently shown significant 
differences in performance between owner-operators and share 
tenants, w ith the former using more fertilizer, chemicals and other 
costs, more labor input and higher yields and net returns than share 
tenants. This trend was observed not only among the users of HYV 
but also among users of other seedboard varieties and even local 
varieties.57 These findings are the only unequivocal evidence in 
support o f landownership as a positive factor in productivity as 
exhibited by use of more purchased inputs, application of more labor 
and consequent higher yields per hectare. One hopes that this type of 
evidence w ill manifest itself more frequently, continuously and 
consistently.
In the rhetoric focused on "the rich are getting richer, and the 
poor getting poorer," the assessment of benefits from increased 
productivity is based on comparisons between landlord and tenant, 
tenant and lessee and large and small farms. On the part of the 
farmer, however, the incentives for adopting the new technology 
which are more clearly identifiable are based on comparisons
57 i r r i . Agricultural Economics Annual Report, 1967.
between pre-and post-HYV. Table 6.33 shows that although the shar­
ing of output from local varieties to HYV hardly changed as regards 
proportions accruing to different claimants of the produce, there had 
been dramatic increases from pre- to post-HYV as far as actual shares 
were concerned. Everyone had more as a consequence of the increase 
in the size of the pie. The share that went to operating capital 
received the largest increase, followed by hired labor, tenant, and 
landowner. If the operating capital came from the landowner, then 
obviously he would get that much more. If institutionalized sources of 
credit had been more effective and more widely utilized, then this 
would have resulted in greater employment of credit personnel, 
perhaps more farm management technicians, etc. If the farmers had 
been able to capitalize their own farm operations, their share of the 
produce would have expanded. This situation was not very prevalent 
however. Although the percent share of the tenant had declined from 
35 to 32 percent in 1966 and 1969, what accrued to him increased 
65 percent because of the increase in yield while the landlord's 
receipts increased only 55 percent. Even the hired laborer increased 
his actual receipts by 86 percent as a consequence of the HYV's.
With the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 27, other problems 
arose besides that of determining the amount of amortizations based 
on 2 1/2 times the average harvest o f three normal crop years 
preceding the promulgation o f the Decree. This yield determination 
is not likely to take place at the individual farm level where landlord 
and tenant can haggle about what constitutes a normal harvest. The 
likelihood is that it w ill be established at a community or area level
Table 6.33. Share of output going to specified claimants 
based on records of 42 farms shifting from 
local varieties in 1966 to H YV in 1969 
Laguna, wet season.
1966 1969
Increase from  
1966 to 1969
r % r % %
Operating capital 69 7 147 9 113
Hired labor 183 18 341 20 86
Tenant 348 35 540 32 65
Landowner 393 40 648 39 55
Total 993 100 1676 100
Source: Agricultural Economics Annual Report for 1970, IRR I.
which has as yet to be specified. There is a likelihood, therefore, that 
the rates for irrigated and rainfed lands would differ. In this case, 
landlords whose lands happen to be located where irrigation systems 
currently exist w ill receive higher compensation for their land. On 
the other hand, rainfed lands w ill have lower amortizations. It w ill be 
an advantage to the tenant if public irrigation facilities are 
subsequently provided after he becomes an amortizing owner.
The second problem area which surfaced immediately is not 
entirely unanticipated if  one were aware of some data from Bernal's 
study presented earlier in this review regarding the size distribution 
of landholdings. With the provision of the retention clause, the 
landowners desire to t ill his own land became manifest. A few days 
after P.D. 27 was issued, there was an order prohibiting the ejection 
of tenants. How then can retention and non-ejection go together? 
The compromise solution was status quo on whatever the landlord- 
tenant arrangements were before P.D. 27 (presumably leasehold). 
But this does not solve the problem because even in the survey of 
nine pilot municipalities located in areas of high land reform priority 
due to large landholdings, 88.5 percent of the landowners and 39 
percent of the area are in landholdings o f below 7 hectares. (Table 
6.34). The proportion o f small landholdings in other areas will, 
therefore, be higher. Because the government had also made a com­
mitment to strengthen the middle class besides emancipating the
Table 6.34. Distribution of landowners and area of rice 
and corn tenanted landholdings by size ot 
holding in nine pilot municipalities, *1973.
Size o f  hold ing  
in  ha
Percentage o f  
landowners
Percentage o f  
area
24.0 and above 2.3 35.6
12.0 - 23.9 3.4 13.0
7 .0 -1 1 .9 5.8 12.3
Below 7.0 88.5 39.1
5 .0 -  6.9 6.0 8.1
3 .0 -  4.9 15.2 11.0
Below 3.0 67.3 20.0
Total 100.0 100.0
•Calamba and Bifian in Laguna; Bongabon, Zaragoza and Guimba in Nueva Ecija; 
Pototan and Dingle, in Iloilo; Plaridel, in Bulacan; and San Mateo, in Isabela.
Source of data; Department of Agrarian Reform.
tenant, the retention clause posed a dilemma. Could we have both? 
The 1970 estimate made by the Department of Agrarian Reform was 
about one million rice and corn tenants cultivating 1,767,200 hectares 
of land (Table 6.35). A t an average of 3 hectares per owner based on 
the preceding table, there were approximately 589,066 landowners 
more than 60 percent of whom were small.
Based on the requirement that all landowners submit sworn 
declaration of landholdings by June 30, 1973, Prosterman proposed 
a system for a revised retention lim it which he summarized in the 
following manner:
"A  seven-hectare retention area w ill give total or substantial 
exemption to over 90 percent of the landlords, but w ill confer 
benefits on only about 25 percent of the tenants. A variable 
exemption, ranging from about 1.5 to 3.0 hectares, and fixed on a 
province-by-province basis after the landlord's declarations are sub­
mitted, will still give total or substantial exemption to 66% to 75% of 
the landlords but w ill confer benefits on 70% or more of the tenants. 
The size of the exemption and the benefits conferred on tenants, w ill 
be closely comparable to those of the major land reform programs of 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan." Prosterman argues that if the 
seven-hectare retention area is preserved, " i t  is mathematically 
inevitable that land reform will be destroyed."58
The new Agrarian Reform Program promises more funds. 
Before Martial Law, the largest authorized appropriation was P270 
million in 1964. For the fiscal year 1972-73, the program of 
expenditures was ^327,838 million; P813 million for 1973-74 and 
fM ,093,355 million for 1974-75 (Tables 6.36 to 6.38). The bulk of 
the expenditures was expected to be tor roads, bridges, irrigation, and 
for production credit requirements. All of these could be expected to 
have positive effects on productivity, although actual outcomes 
remain to be seen. Two major areas of program implementation are:
(1) Operation Land Transfer which includes identification of 
rice and corn tenants and their respective landowners, mapping of 
the corresponding parcels of farm land and the distribution of 
Certificates of Land Transfer. These documents simply restate the 
terms provided for in P.D. No. 27 whereby the tenant is deemed to 
be the owner of a parcel of land described in the certificate which is 
going to be paid for in 15 equal annual amortizations at a cost as fixed
^Mem orandum from R. L. Prosterman dated April 19, 1973 on "Revising the 
Approach to the Retention Limit."
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by the authorities concerned at 6 percent annual rate of interest. In 
addition, the tenant agrees to join a Samahang Nayon (Barrio 
Association) in his locality. Although the Decree provided for 
family-sized farms of 3 hectares of irrigated and 5 hectares if  rainfed, 
in practice the parcels being transferred to the tenants are the actual 
size of the plots which they are presently cultivating w ithout any 
adjustments to meet the definition of family-sized farms. This, in a 
way, minimizes the disruptions in the existing system. Otherwise, it  
would not be feasible to implement land reform with the defined 
family-sized farms w ithout massive openings of new settlements. At 
present the average farm size cultivated by tenants is less than two 
hectares (1.767).
(2) The second major feature of the new program is the 
organization of barrio associations which is being undertaken by the 
Department of Local Governments and Cooperative Development. 
These barrio associations are supposed to serve the following 
functions:
1. Means o f facilitating land transfer under the land reform program. The 
Barrio Association will assist government workers in determining the 
owners and tillers of the land, the area of farms, production during past 
years and other essential information pertinent to the consummation of 
the mandatory sale contract between owner and tiller. The Barrio 
Association w ill also serve as a provisional guarantor of the installment 
payments of amortizing owners in the absence of a full-fledged 
cooperative in the area. In the event of default, the Barrio Association 
will have the power to take recourse on the offender.
2. Channel fo r essential services provided to farmers. The Barrio Asso­
ciation w ill serve as vital link between the sources of services and the 
barrio people. Agricultural extension workers from government and 
private agencies w ill work through the Barrio Association in disseminat­
ing technical information. The Barrio Association can also help 
agriculture credit technicians process loans of farmer members, thereby 
facilitating the process and reducing administrative costs.
The Barrio Association w ill also serve as a delivery point in areas 
where supplies have to be brought to the barrio fo r individual farmers. A t 
harvest time, the Barrio Association w ill serve as an assembly point of 
the produce of farmers intended for the payment of loans, installment 
on the land, irrigation fees or fo r outright sale to agencies which w ill 
pick up the produce from the barrio.
Income-producing projects being carried out on a p ilo t scale can 
also be undertaken through the Association.
3. A means o f capita/ build-up and savings. A key economic function of
the Association is to encourage continuous savings. The ultimate 
objective then of the Barrio Association is to be able to accumulate 
funds which are intended for specific purposes. Every member of the 
Association will be required to participate in a savings program. Every 
farmer provided a loan by the rural bank or ACA w ill have a forced 
savings of 5 percent of the loan. These savings w ill serve as the reserve 
funds of the farmer, the capitalization of a full-fledged cooperative 
organized among members of Barrio Associations or as source of 
payment for shares of stock of rural banks.
4. A means o f undertaking effective and continuous cooperative education 
among its members. The Barrio Association represents the stage where 
cooperative concepts and practices are learned in a meaningful, con­
crete way. This training is crucial if the members of the organization are 
to eventually form themselves into a full-fledged cooperative. A syste­
matic program of cooperative education employing various methods 
and materials will therefore be carried out among the members o f the 
Association.
5. An exercise in format organization and self-government. Through the 
Association, the barrio people are educated in the dynamics of group 
action. The Association w ill help identify or crystallize leadership in 
the barrio and w ill enable this leadership to establish necessary 
relationship with the rest of the people. Members w ill learn their rights 
and duties, either as individuals or as part of a specialized group in the 
organization, such as in a committee. Leaders, in turn, w ill be able to 
exercise their talents and realize their responsibilities as officers. This 
whole process w ill strengthen community consciousness or be­
longingness and w ill foster self-reliance.
6. A transition step towards a more formaI economic institution. One or 
more Barrio Associations can initiate the organization of a full-fledged 
cooperative at the multi-barrio or municipal level, provided these 
associations have satisfactorily achieved the basic purpose for which 
they were organized and are able to meet given requirements. The 
capital accumulated by Barrio Association members w ill serve as the 
initial capital of the cooperative which can centralize all economic 
activities of the barrio-based organizations such as area-wide production 
activities, supply distribution, marketing of products, savings and loans, 
and any other desired activity that the cooperative is capable of 
undertaking.
A nationwide survey conducted by the Department of Agrarian 
Reform in April 1973 found that only half of the 772 farmers in the 
sample were aware of P.D. 27. However, those who were aware 
thought the program would be beneficial to them. Although they 
were aware that the land which would be transferred to them would
have to be paid, only about 30 percent had some notion of how the 
amortization would be determined. The widespread desire to own 
land was expressed by negative responses to the question: "Do you 
have farmer friends who do not want to become owners of the land 
they t i l l ? "  However, in Eastern Visayas, Western and Northern 
Mindanao the positive replies were about 19 and 15 percent, 
respectively. Lack of operating capital was expected as the main 
problem. Landlord opposition to the program was also reported by 
the farmer-respondents. Only 117 of them said their landlords were 
in favor. Negative reactions were found regardless of size of holdings.
Perhaps, there is something to the speculation that the willing­
ness of bigger landlords to shift to leasehold earlier might be due to
their transfer stage. Now that it is really on hand, parting with their 
land has become difficu lt.
R. P. de los Reyes challenges the assumption that to be a land­
owner is the average farmer's desire. Citing the 1971 IPC study in 
Nueva Ecija, she points out that only a small m inority of farmers 
seriously wanted farm ownership. Their 1973 data also seem to in­
dicate reservations about becoming amortizing owners. Again, the 
problem of capital, especially after successive bad harvests, is the 
most frequent reason cited.59
It appears that the desire to own land per se would be prevalent 
but the desire to be an amortizing owner is a different matter. Some 
people w ill interpret this as an attitude of dependence and sub­
servience as a consequence of feudalistic experiences. Although this is 
an explanation, it is not a very acceptable one.
From the point of view of the tenant, the risks involved in 
embarking on amortization are very great indeed. As a share tenant, 
he has an established exchange relationship with the landlord and 
although there are no registered formal contractual papers, the 
chances of his being ejected or of losing his right to cultivate the land 
on account of unpaid loans are indeed very slim. Linder the proposed 
amortizing scheme, a series of bad harvests and inability to pay his 
indebtedness could lead to loss of the land. The insecurities on his 
side are, therefore, not inconsequential and the reluctance of some 
tenants to fu lly  embrace their "emancipation" is understable. In the 
past, the risks had always been shared with the landlord, now the 
risks are theirs alone.
The lag between legal expectations for reform and the actual 
changes in tenure status is evident in the data from Table 6.39. The 
percentage of tenant farms remaining as share tenants was about two- 
thirds in 1970 (Bureau of Agricultural Economics) and one-third in 
1972, as reported by the Department of Agrarian Reform. What is 
worth noting is the high percentage of share-tenancy residuals in 
some regions such as the llocos, Eastern Visayas and Northern Min­
danao. These regions have had low priority and low level implementa­
tion as shown in Table 6.6 using data in 1967. But whatever set of 
figures we take, the reality of land reform lies in the personal con­
tracts and compromises between landlord and tenant. Whether it is a 
sharing, lease or amortizing arrangement, the agreed-upon payment 
whether in cash or in kind is a fundamental element which is based 
on yields which are, in turn, affected by technology either positively 
or negatively.
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Credit, Cooperatives and 
Other Organizational Components  
of Rice Production
Rice farming and its accompanying tenancy system has often 
been characterized as an unending cycle of indebtedness. One such 
impassioned description comes from Ladrido:
"The small farmers that compose the bulk of the farm 
population have not played a significant role in Philippine agri­
cultural development because their productive capacities have been 
curtailed by debts, which in most cases, are held over from previous 
generations and perhaps carried over into the next. The onerous 
nature of the credit conditions involved which virtually keeps the 
debt running for long periods beyond redemption constitutes the 
danger of rural indebtedness. Wallowing in debt, the small farmer 
realizes that he has lost control of his land and the price and free 
disposal of his crops. The burden of his debt has gnawed at the 
meager income of the farmer, keeping agricultural progress and 
prosperity and ultimately the social and economic development of
the country from moving forward."1
Ironically, however, the study in which these introductory 
statements appeared dealt mainly w ith large farmers who use 
credit for farm mechanization purposes. They are far from the type 
of farmers whose sad plight he has described with great sympathy.
Because credit has been tagged as a major problem, develop­
ment programs aimed at improving the life of the rice farmer have 
always included attempts to get them organized in some form usually 
with a focus on credit as one of its important functions. Credit and 
organization assume even greater significance because both are 
regarded as vital factors in the income distribution and productivity 
objectives of development. In view of the several and repeated efforts
1Eugenio P. Ladrido, An Economic Evaluation of the CB:IBRD Farm Mechanization 
Lending Program. ACCI -  Dept, of Rural Banks, Central Bank, 1969.
to solve the credit problem via institutional and organizational 
means, this paper w ill review the following:
(1) The role of credit in the adoption of new rice technology
(2) Credit behavior, credit recipients and sources of credit
(3) Credit and tenure status
(4) Experiences with rice farmers' organizations
A. Credit and the Adoption of New Rice Technology
With the introduction of new technology and its accompanying 
package of purchased inputs, credit for production purposes has 
assumed an important role. While before, credit was regarded as a 
resource needed to meet crisis and emergency situations, the 
definition of a progressive farmer has shifted away from "absence of 
debts" to one who has good harvest and good income from farming 
and one who adopts modern farming practices.2 The latter requires 
additional financial outlay for production purposes but with the 
promise of higher yields. In other words, there is more risk-taking 
involved with the greater investments in rice production. To meet 
these new requirements, credit has to be resorted to. Studies done in 
the 1950's and 1960's report a high percentage of farmers using 
short-term credit. For example, de Guzman, from a 1955 country­
wide survey of 5,144 farmers over f if ty  percent of whom were rice 
farmers, found that 74 percent used at least one form of credit.3 
Gapud reported that over 90 percent of farmers in his 1958 Nueva 
Ecija study had short-term loans.4 The Philippine Statistical Survey of 
Households in 1961 which looked into borrowing practices showed 
that 45.2 percent obtained loans of some kind.5 In 1968, a study in 
36 Laguna barrios found 80 percent of rice farmers borrowing for 
production.6 A 1972 study of Nueva Ecija farmers reported about 
two-thirds being indebted.7
^G. T. Castillo, e t al., The Green Revolution at the Village Level, op. cit.
^Leopoldo de Guzman, An Economic Analysis of the Methods of Farm Financing 
Used on 5,144 Farms, Philippine A gricu ltu ris t, Vol. 41, Jan. 1958, p. 467.
4jose P. Gapud, Financing Lowland Rice Farming in Selected Barrios of Munoz, 
Nueva Ecija, Economic Research Journal, September 1959, pp. 78-79.
5Bureau of Census and Statistics, Borrowing Practices of Farm Households, May 
1961, PSSH B u lle tin  Series No. 12, June 1963, pp. X III-X IV .
6 Farm and Home Development Office, Rural Change in a Philippine Setting, op. cit.
^R. Pahilinga-de los Reyes and Frank Lynch, Keluctant Rebels: Leasehold Converts 
in Nueva Ecija, Philippine Sociological Review, Vol 20, Nos. 1-2, Jan.-April 1972, pp. 7-78.
Based on the results of these studies, the percentage of farmers 
who were indebted for production and/or non-production purposes 
had not changed much from the 1950's to the 1970's. The more 
significant change was in the amount of indebtedness for production 
purposes. Table 7.1 shows the increase not only in the number of 
tenants receiving loans from their landlords but also a corresponding 
increase in the amount borrowed per hectare for production inputs.
Table 7.1. Loans by landlords to tenants on specific items. 
Laguna 1965 vs. 1969 (30 tenants).
Item
1965 1969
Num ber
reporting
Pesos 
per hectare
Number
reporting
Pesos 
per hectare
Fertilizer 17 26.85 23 58.15
Chemicals 9 4.92 23 16.19
Land preparation 0 0 14 102.55
Transplanting 13 33.14 19 50.40
Weeding 4 15.30 8 57.17
Others 1 39.0 10 63.38*
’ Mostly fuel for irrigation pumps.
Source: Randolph Barker and V. C. Cordova, "Decision-Making With Respect to the 
Use of Inputs on Laguna Farms." Paper presented for the Seminar-Workshop on the 
Economics of Rice Production in the Philippines, IR R I, Dec. 11-13, 1969.
Data from Herrera's study8 in three Gapan villages in Nueva 
Ecija indicate that 74 percent of the 193 farmers borrowed larger 
amounts for production in 1971 than in 1966; 15 percent said they 
borrowed more then and 11 percent borrowed about the same 
amount. When asked about the ease of repaying credit in 1966 com­
pared to 1971, about 42 percent fe lt that the burden was the same, 
21 percent thought it was more o f a burden then, but 37 percent 
believed that it was easier to repay credit then. The major reason for 
saying that repaying credit in 1966 was more of a burden than in 
1971 was the low yield and low income received at that time. Those 
who fe lt that credit was less of a burden then, than it was in 1971 
gave good yield and lesser amount borrowed as their reasons. Those 
who saw no change in the burden of repaying credit (42 percent) had 
borrowed more but got higher yields, hence the situation was about the 
same for tnem. In response to a question on what they considered as the
biggest problem in rice farming in 1971, 59 percent gave rice disease 
and pests; 51 percent said it was lack of capital for inputs; and 24 
percent indicated water supply as their biggest problem. Although 
lack of capital for inputs was mentioned by more than half of the 
farmers, this does not seem to be synonymous to lack of credit 
because credit was mentioned as a constraint on obtaining higher 
yields by only 26 percent in the wet season 1971 and by 39 percent 
in the dry season (Table 7.2). This was quite an increase, however, 
from the 9 percent in 1966.
Table 7.2. Perceived constraints on obtaining higher yields 
(3 barrios of Gapan, Nueva Ecija).
W e t  S e a s o n  = 193
Mahipon  
1966 1971
Malimba San Nicolas 
1966 1971 1966 1971
Total 
1966 1971
— P e r c e n t  —
1. Obtaining seeds 6 4 17 35 6 27 9 21
2. Obtaining fertilizer
and chemicals 1 4 11 24 — 9 4 12
3. Obtaining credit 1 4 14 45 15 33 9 26
4. Water irrigation 6 20 33 62 33 36 2d 39
5. Disease, insects 1 97 29 91 51 93 25 93
6. Pests (rats) — 4 39 85 78 93 36 57
D r y S e a s o n  (N = 113)
1. Obtaining seeds 5 8 6 10 5 9
2. Obtaining fertilizer
and chemicals 5 6 6 6 5 6
3. Obtaining credit 17 51 14 24 16 39
4. Water irrigation 94 64 48 42 73 54
5. Disease, insects 92 64 82 64 86 64
6. Pests (rats) 99 94 96 80 97 88
Use of Credit for Production (1966) Total
Yes 86 35 35 55
No 14 65 65 45
Wet Season (1971)
Yes 60 71 44 59
No 40 29 56 41
Dry Season (1971)
Yes 94 88 91
No 6 12 9
Apparently, when a person lacks capital, it does not mean that 
he himself does not have the capital or he might have some but not as 
much as he needs or he may not want to invest whatever capital he 
has on rice production. If credit were available, he may not want to bor­
row and not see the need to borrow. Perhaps credit is viewed as a 
constraint only if he wishes to use more but it is not available. Table
7.3 shows that this is the case. Although only 28 percent in the wet 
season and 62 percent in the dry season expressed that they could 
have used more credit if  it were available, as expected there was a 
significant positive relationship between perception of credit as a 
constraint and the wish to use more credit, if it were available. 
Notably, the proportion expressing this desire increased from 28 
percent in the wet season to 62 percent in the dry season. The 
percentage of farmers who actually borrowed for production 
purposes increased from 55 percent in 1966 to 59 percent in 1971 
(wet season) and soared to 91 percent in the dry season of 1971. The 
latter crop came after the tungro infestation when harvests were 
meager, if not nil; therefore, there was little  or no capital to finance 
the dry season crop (Table 7.3). The effect of this is also reflected in 
Table 7.2 which shows that 93 percent of the farmers regarded disease 
and insects as a constraint on obtaining higher yields in the wet
Table 7.3. Credit as a constraint to higher yields 
(193 farmers in 3 Gapan barrios, Nueva Ecija).
Perception of Credit as 
a Constraint to Higher 
Yields
Yes
No
Mahipon
1
99
Malimba
Percent
Pre-HYV (1966)
14
86
San Nicolas
15
85
Total
9
91
Yes
No
4
96
Wet Season 1971
45
55
31
69
26
74
Yes
No
Dry Season 1971 (N = 113)
Could you use more credit if it were available?
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Table 7.3 (Continued)
Wet Season (1971) Dry Season (1971)
3 Barrios 2  Barrios
Yes 98% 62%
No 2% 38%
Perception of Credit as a Constraint and Wish to Use More 
Credit, if Available
Perception of Credit as Constraint
Wish to Use More
Credit Wet Season Dry Season
- P e r c e n t —
Yes No Yes No
Yes 62 16 89 45
No 33 84 1 1 55
100 100 100 100
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. c i t
season of 1971. What is most interesting in this same table is the very 
low proportion of farmers in rainfed Mahipon who perceived 
constraints on rice production except for disease and insects in 1971.
In general, for the three barrios constraints were perceived in the 
wet season of 1971 than the wet season of 1966. Does this mean that it 
was more d ifficu lt to get higher yields in 1971 than in 1966? This 
does not seem to be the case because the answer to a previous question 
asked comparing rice profits in 1970 to 1966 showed that 74 percent 
said they had higher profits on account of higher yields. More 
plausible explanations are the need for more capital to purchase in­
puts in the case of credit constraint; the desire to obtain the latest 
available HYV seeds while before, they always used what they had in 
the field; and the need for better quality and more dependable water 
supply for rice production which had become more salient with the 
advent of new rice varieties. In the case of disease and insect-con- 
straints, because the number of varieties planted were reduced to 
only one or two which happened to be susceptible to tungro, the 
devastation was felt more than during the time when the risks were 
spread because more varieties were being grown. Furthermore, yield 
aspirations and expectations considerably increased because of the 
potential and promise of the new varieties. In order to achieve these
new yield ceilings, much more had to be done. The degree to which 
constraints were fe lt differ with wet and dry season. In general, greater 
constraints were perceived during the dry season, even for 1966. 
However, from 1966 to 1971, there was a decline in perception of 
constraints as far as water, disease, insects and pests were concerned.
Judging from these responses, the physical and biological prob­
lems of rice production are still the major constraints on achieving 
higher yields. Credit, despite all the hue and cry about it, is not as 
salient a constraint as perceived by farmers as water, disease, insects 
and pests.
Table 7.4 provides further evidence that credit is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the adoption of inputs in rice produc­
tion. About 20 percent of 471 farmers did not borrow money but 
used improved varieties, fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides. On 
the other hand, more than three-fourths of those who did not adopt 
these inputs had borrowed money. In other words, credit helps 
facilitate adoption but does not determine it. The lower half of 
Table 7.4 shows a definite positive relationship between cash 
expenses per hectare and the use of new varieties and other inputs. 
This simply means that although farmers are spending more when 
they use inputs they are not necessarily using credit to do so. On the 
other hand, those who are borrowing money are not necessarily using 
it to purchase all the inputs. There is no question, however, that 
farmers are using more production credit than in the 1960's. Among 
the 780 Laguna farmers, the proportion borrowing money increased 
from 78 percent in 1963 to 88 percent in 1968 and the average 
atmount borrowed increased from P355 to F595.9
B. Credit Practices, Credit Receipts and Sources of Credit
Credit to modern man is a contractual arrangement between the 
borrower and the lender with respect to amount borrowed, interest 
rates, security and terms of repayment. However, in a traditional or 
transitional setting, credit carries with it a great deal of personal and 
informal exchange relationships. The interest rates and terms of 
repayments can be as varied as the variety of individual specific 
relationships between borrower and lender. Sanctions for non­
payment are usually informal but not necessarily less effective. Tables 
7.5 and 7.6 show that despite the establishment of formal credit
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institutions such as the ACA, FACOMA, DBP, PNB and rural banks, 
informal sources such as landlords and private moneylenders remain 
important credit sources for rice farmers. Even the studies of 
FACOMA members in 1965-66 and of rural bank borrowers in 1962 
indicate that they too borrowed from informal sources such as 
relatives, friends, landlords and private moneylenders. Although the
Table 7.5. Sources of farm credit (cash and kind) in percent 
of borrower or percent of no. of loans.
Source 1954-55 1957-58 1962 1965-66 1968 1970-71 1971-72
1. FACOMA, ACA, ACCFA 11.0
2. DBP and PNB
3. Rural and Commer­
cial Banks V. 1.0
4. Credit Union, Loan 
Assoc., GSIS, SSS, 
etc.
Total
Institutional
5. Landlords
6. Relatives and 
friends
7. Merchants
8. Private money­
lenders
9. Others, including 
self-finance
Total informal
sources
Total
}
12.0
39.0
6.0
1.0
42.0
78.0
100.0
4.0
4.0
8.0
56.0
8.0
3.0
9.0
16.0 
92.0
5.0 
y  45.6
11.5
62.1
10.3
3.8
23.8
37.9
22.0
3.5
10.0
0.5
36.0
64.0
16.70
2.40
25.0 8.73
6.0 0.11
31.0 27.94
20.0 9.28
13.24
2.05
9.99
1.28
27.56
10.76
25.0 24.46 25.45
37.23
64.0
24.0^ 38.32^
69.0 72.06 73.44
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources of Data:
1. L. P. de Guzman, op. c i t ,  75% of sample were rice farms.
2. Jose P. Gapud, op c i t ,  sample size is 224.
3. Romeo A. Muere, An Economic Evaluation of a Decade of Rural Banking in the 
Philippines in Relation to the Development of Agriculture. Unpublished M. S. Thesis, U.P. 
College of Agriculture, 1965.
4. Adelino Ordono, "Agricultural Credit in Land Reform Areas," Economic 
Research Journal, (March 1967, p. 248.)
5. Farm and Home Development Office,Rural Change in a Philippine Setting, 
op. c i t  Sample size, 470 rice farmers in 36 Laguna barrios.
6. Bureau of Agricultural Economics Farm Indebtedness Surveys.
Note: Some of the data included in the above table were adapted from Leon A. 
Mears and Meliza H. Agabin, Finance and Credit Associated with Rice Marketing in the 
Philippines. School of Economics, IEDR, Discussion Paper No. 71-15, Aug. 17, 1971.
number of borrowers or number of loans which came from informal 
sources was still more than 70 percent in 1971-72, the trend over a 
10-year period as shown in Table 7.6 was an increasing share of the 
total value of loans coming from institutional sources. It increased 
from 38 percent in 1960-61 to 46 percent in 1971-72. Although 
landlords have declined in importance as a credit source, private 
moneylenders remain a major creditor. The land reform program has 
doubtless contributed to the diminishing role of the landlord in 
providing credit.
In his analysis of small-farmer credit in the Philippines, Sacay 
made the following observations:
(1) The agricultural credit system is in the hands of the private 
sector.
(2) "O f the government credit agencies, the Development Bank 
of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank are in no way 
small farmers' banks. In the DBP, the small loans constitute 78 
percent of the number of agricultural loans and 24 percent of the 
value of loans approved from 1965-66 to 1969-70. These loans
Table 7.6. Sources of farm credit in percent of total value of loans.
TOTAL LO ANS IN  CASH A N D  K IN D
BA E Integrated BA E Integrated  
1960/61 FACOMA Members A g ricu ltu ra l A g ricu ltu ra l
Luzon Survey Survey
PSSH 1965/66 Rice Farms O nly
AH Farms Rice Farms 1967/68 1968/69 1970/71 1971/72
1. FACOMA )
ACA ) 1.4
ACCFA )
2. DBP 7.9
3. PNB 17.8
4. Rural and 
commercial 
banks
5. SSS, GSIS and 
other insurance 
companies 1.2
6. Loan assoc, and 
credit unions 1.2
7. Total institu-
tional credit 38.0
36.0
18.0
1.0
13.3
4.6
15.7
13.7 21.10 17.88
1.9 ) 21.00 9.31
26.5 11.02 18.29
0.10
.02 0.20 
42.1 53.04 45.78
TOTAL LO ANS IN  CASH A N D  K IN D
BAE Integrated BAE Integrated  
1960/61 FACOMA Members A g ricu ltu ra l A g ricu ltu ra l
SOURCE Luzon Survey Survey
PSSH 
A ll  Farms
1965/66  
Rice Farms
Rice Farms O nly  
1967/68 1968/69 1970/71 1971/72
8. Landlords 14.8 10.0 25.1 19.6 9.27 8.69
9. Relatives, 
friends or 
neighbors 18.6 8.0 4.8 13.05 17.10
10. Rice/corn miller 
or merchant 7.1 ) 4.0 ) 34.0 ) 29.9 ) )
11. Other merchants 13.0 ) ) ) ) 24.54 ) 28.43
12. Professional
moneylenders 2.2
) ) 
) 21.0 )
)
)
)
)
)
)
13. Others 5.6 ) ) ) ) )
14. Total informal 
external sources 61.5 43.0 59.1 54.3 46.86 54.22
15. No source 
reported 0.1 7.3 3.6 - -
Source: The first four columns were adapted from Leon A. Mears and Meliza Agabin,
op. c i t
1. Philippine Statistics Survey of Households: Bureau of the Census and Statistics, 
Borrow ing Practices o f  Farm Households, May 1961, PSSH Bulletin Series No. 12, June 
1963, p. 247. (This survey excluded loans in kind and purchases on credit with a value less 
than P10 and daily or weekly credit purchases of foodstuffs and other daily needs, 
regardless of value. 58-8% of loans were made by rice farmers.)
2. Rodolfo Matienzo, A Study of Membership of Fourteen Active Rice Farmers 
Cooperative Marketing Associations (FACOMA) in the Central Plain of Luzon, Philippines. 
Unpublished M.S. Thesis, Oregon State University, June 1969, p. 46.
3. Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE) Integrated Agricultural Surveys 1967/68 
and 1968/69. All loans reported were based on samples of 6,230 rice farms in 1967/68 and 
6,946 in 1968/69.
averaged P2,210 while loans over P5,000 averaged P42,430. The 
strict collateral requirements preclude tenants and lessees from using 
the loaning facilities of the bank." In the case of the Philippine 
National Bank, 30 percent of its loans during the past 5 years went 
to agriculture. Of this, 78 percent went to sugar producers. By 1971 
this had increased to 93 percent of all agricultural loans.
(3) Unlike the DBP and PNB, the Agricultural Credit Adminis­
tration is "exclusively preoccupied w ith serving the needs of small
farmers. Funds are continuously pumped into the system with direct 
government appropriations. Its operation is not financially viable due 
to its perpetually poor collection performance.'' Its loans which are 
extended through agricultural cooperatives are given to small farmers 
on a non-collateral basis. For the past 6 years (1966-71), 72 percent 
of the loans were for productipn at the average amount ofP618.00.
(4) Among the private commercial banks, agricultural loans 
mostly for post-harvest activities and relatively stable agro-industrial 
enterprises represent only 6 percent of total credit extended. On the 
other hand, "the rural banking system supplies the main bulk of 
credit to small farmers. Although privately owned, rural banks draw 
heavy financial support from the Central Bank, in addition to 
assistance they receive in the training of their officers and employees. 
Initial paid-up capital is matched on a peso-for-peso basis. The 
rediscounting window of the Central Bank is wide open to rural banks 
at preferred rates of interest. There are 539 such banks, not only a 
few being family-owned. The system, to a certain extent, has channeled 
landlord capital into the banking business, a development considered 
favorable to effecting meaningful land reform. Almost 90 percent of \ 
loans were channeled to agriculture in 1971. About 97 percent of 
agricultural loans were short-term loans for production. A significant 
proportion (42 percent) of these loans financed rice growing. The 
average agricultural loan granted by the rural banks for the period 
1966-71 was PI ,085, an amount somewhat larger than ACA loans 
although significantly below the DBP and PNB average."
(5) Major inequities still remain in the availability and 
distribution of credit. To illustrate this point, Sacay cited the 
following figures from Agricultural Credit Report prepared by the 
A d Hoc Committee to Study the Agricultural Credit System in the 
Philippines, A p ril 15, 1972: Of the total P I0,741 million production 
loans to agriculture (1966-1971), 23.2 percent went to rice and 41.3 
percent went to sugar. Of the total P6,563.5 million marketing loan 
to agriculture, 7.4 percent went to rice, 33.6 percent went to sugar. 
For processing, warehousing and other facilities, P118 million was 
for rice and P309.7 million for sugar. Data on the distribution of 
production credit show that of the total P1,728.4 million, 98.4 
percent went to farms of 10 hectares or more and 1.6 percent went to 
farms of 0.2 up to less than a hectare. Of the 666,740 production 
loans granted, 91.1 percent went to farms of 10 hectares and more and 
only 8.9 percent went to those below 3 hectares, although 72.6
percent of the farmer-recipiems are small (below 3 hectares)."10 The 
agricultural credit bias, therefore, favors sugar producers and the 
larger farmers.
For an idea of the credit distribution (cash loans) for the rice 
production, Tables 7.7 to 7.10 show us the national as well as the 
regional picture. Several observations may be made from these four 
tables.
(1) The proportion of rice farms which obtained credit in cash 
from government sources for production purposes was only 6.6 
percent for 1971 and 5.2 percent for 1972. The tables cited earlier 
indicate proportion of farmer-borrowers who got credit from the 
different sources, hence, the percentages are larger. They do not 
show the percentage of total farms which had been able to borrow. 
This means that regardless of the growth of institutional sources of 
credit, not many farmers borrow or have been able to borrow from 
them.
(2) Central Luzon farmers of all the regions did the most 
borrowing for both cropping seasons. This is understandable because
Table 7.7 Rice production program: credit, number of rice farms 
securing loans by source, by region,
Philippines, July to December, 1971.
Region Number
o f
Rice Farms
Loans from  Gov't. 
Sources 
No. Percent
Loans from  Private 
Sources 
No. Percent
Philippines 1,479,434 96,947 6.6 380,190 25.7
llocos 129,664 4,798 3.7 8,091 6.2
Cagayan Valley 96,618 6,956 7.2 29,101 30.1
Central Luzon 307,088 42,685 13.9 140,769 45.8
Southern.Tagalog 180,675 11,383 6.3 35,521 19.7
Bicol 144,477 9,381 6.5 40,656 28.1
Eastern Visayas 145,296 2,506 2.0 7,600 5.2
Western Visayas 221,817 10,647 4.8 77,414 34.9
Northern & Eastern
Mindanao 89,643 2,600 2.9 15,643 17.4
Southern and Western
Mindanao 164,156 5,581 3.4 25,395 15.5
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
^O rlando J. Sacay, Small Farmer Credit in the Philippines, A ID  Spring Review o f  
Sm all Farmer Credit, March 1973.
Table 7.8. Rice production program: Number and percentage of 
borrowing rice farms which secured loans from 
government sources, by source, by region,
July to December, 1971.
Region Total N o t
Borrowers Rural ACA PNB DBP Specified
No. % Bank — P e r c e n t  —
Philippines 96,947 100 50.6 23.9 12.3 6.7 6.5
llocos 4,798 100 66.7 6.7 13.3 3.3 10.0
Cagayan Valley 6,958 100 69.8 9.3 13.9 4.7 2.3
Central Luzon 42,685 100 41.1 36.7 12.8 2.7 6.7
Southern Tagalog 11,383 1 00 67.9 10.7 8.6 3.6 9.2
Bicol 9,391 100 27.5 34.8 18.8 11.6 7.3
Eastern Visayas 2,906 100 14.5 35.7 14.0 28.6 7.2
Western Visayas 10,647 100 84.0 — 4.4 8.0 3.6
Northern and Eastern
Mindanao 2,600 100 45.4 — 18.2 27.3 9.1
Southern and Western
Mindanao 5,581 100 46.4 18.5 14.0 17.6 3.5
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
Table 7.9. Rice production program : Number of rice farms securing
loans by source, by region, January to June, 1972.
Region Number Loans from  G o v 't Loans from  Private
o f Sources Sources
Rice Farms No. Percent No. Percen
Philippines 829,172 43,190 5.2 182,434 22.0
llocos 34,193 157 0.5 1,265 3.7
Cagayan Valley 116,816 8,574 7.3 29,858 25.6
Central Luzon 73,984 4,269 5.8 32,775 44.3
Southern Luzon 91,107 8,090 8.9 18,823 20.7
Bicol 109,141 8,011 7.3 35,504 32.5
Eastern Visayas 147,635 8,131 2.1 10,884 7.4
Western Visayas 96,826 5,122 5.3 30,403 31.4
Northern and Eastern
Mindanao 69,506 2,815 4.0 7,430 10.7
Southern and Western
Mindanao 89,914 3,021 3.4 15,492 17.2
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
of the region's importance as a rice-growing and as a land reform 
area. On the other hand, llocos and Eastern Visayas registered the 
least borrowing among their farmers. In both areas, rice is not a 
major crop.
Table 7.10. Rice production program: Number and percentage of 
borrowing rice farms which secured loans from 
government sources, by source, by region,
January to June, 1972.
Region
Tota l
borrowers
No. %
Rural
Bank ACA
N o t
PNB DBP specified 
— P e r c e n t
Philippines 43,190 100 56.3 17.8 9.5 7.8 8.4
llocos 157 100 100.0 - - - -
Cagayan Valley 8,574 100 64.5 10.5 15.4 5.8 3.8
Central Luzon 4,369 100 43.6 44.3 4.6 - 7.3
Southern Tagalog 8,090 100 67.4 9.3 4.7 2.3 16.3
Bicol 8,011 100 48.3 31.0 10.3 3.5 6.9
Eastern Visayas 3,131 100 20.0 33.3 19.7 30.3 19.7
Western Visayas 5,123 100 83.9 - 3.0 3.4 9.7
Northern and Eastern 
Mindanao 2,815 100 50.0 _ 7.1 33.7 7.2
Southern and Western 
Mindanao 3,021 100 40.0 20.4 13.3 19.3 6.8
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
(3) In general, more farmers from Luzon than from Visayas 
and Mindanao obtained loans from government sources.
(4) For six of the nine regions, the rural bank was the major 
source of credit. For Central Luzon and Bicol, both the rural bank 
and ACA provided loans. For Eastern Visayas, the ACA and DBP 
provided loans to more farmers than the rural bank and ACA. A 
similar pattern can be observed with the 1972 crop. It is only in East 
Visayas and Northern and Eastern Mindanao where one finds the 
highest proportion of farms borrowing from DBP. Perhaps the 
regional distribution and policies of these lending institutions have as 
much to do with this pattern as anything else.
Because the most significant finding from all these data is the 
very small number of farmers who obtain credit from government 
sources, it is important to know why this is so. Is it unwillingness or 
inability to borrow? A study conducted in 50 Laguna barrios 
provides some clues, although the farmers interviewed were not all 
rice farmers. Table 7.11 reveals that more than 50 percent did not 
borrow for production purposes. About 40 percent of the reasons for 
non-borrowing centered on the problems of borrowing, but 60 percent
Table 7.11. Credit behavior of 1596 farmers and farmers' 
wives from 50 barrios in Laguna.
N  Percent
A. Borrow ing Behavior
1. Farmers who do not borrow for farm purposes 910 57
2. Farmers who borrow from non-official institutions 
like moneylenders, landlords and relatives 351 22
3. Farmers who borrow from official lending 
institutions like banks, credit unions 
and agricultural credit associations 335 2 1
T o t a l 1596 100
Reasons fo r Non-Borrowing o f  920 Farmers 
1. The farmer himself has sufficient capital. 61
2. The farmer has no collateral to offer. 16
3. He is afraid of not being able to repay 
the loan. 12
4. He does not know how to borrow. 2
5. He thinks nobody will lend him. 2
6. He does not borrow out of principle. 1
7. He was turned down in the past and will not 
try again. 1
8. No reasons given. 5
Source o f  Loans fo r Those Who Borrow  from  Non- 
O ffic ia l Ins titu tions (351 Farmers1 
1. Relatives
100
42
2. Local moneylenders 35
3. Merchants 23
Reasons G iven b y  351 Farmers fo r  no t Borrowing  
from  O ffic ia l Lending Institu tions  
1. Tried to get a loan before but was turned 
down
100
4
2. Ignorance of the presence of an official 
lending institution 14
3. Too much trouble and time involved in 
going through the borrowing process 28
4. The terms of the bank are unacceptable to 
the farmers (interest or repayment terms) 10
5. No collateral to offer 36
6. Fear of not being able to repay the loan 8
Table 7.11 Continuation)
N Percent
E. Sources o f  Loans fo r 325  Farmers Who Borrow  
from  O ffic ia l Lending Institu tions  
1. Rural Banks 266 82
2. Commercial Banks 10 3
3. Agricultural Credit Association of
Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Association 49 15
325 100
87% of these borrowers will secure loans 
from these sources again; 13% will not.
F. Reasons Given b y  33  Farmer Borrowers fo r 
N o t Borrow ing Again from  Banks
1. Inability to meet obligations in the past. 60
2. They think it is easier to borrow from 
local moneylenders. 20
3. Interest rate of the bank is too high. 10
4. They do not like to obtain loans anymore. 10
N = 33 100
Source: Paul Meijs, An Evaluation Research of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction 
Movement's Barrio Development Program in Laguna. Asian Social Institute, Manila, January, 
1973.
mentioned sufficiency of capital and, therefore, there was no need to 
borrow.
The question is whether they really had enough capital for 
modern farming or they had enough capital only for subsistence 
farming. The latter does not require much purchased input. As 
expected, local moneylenders, merchants and relatives were the 
non-official sources of credit. The major reasons for not borrowing 
from lending institutions are lack of collateral and too much red 
tape. What needs emphasis is the 14 percent who admitted ignorance 
of the presence of such institutions. This lag in knowledge assumes 
greater significance when one considers that Laguna is a relatively 
well-developed province where a rural bank is found in almost every 
municipality. Relevant to this is the finding from the same study that 
19 percent of the households were able to save. But of the savers, 55 
percent of them kept their savings in piggy banks, closets or with 
relatives. Only 21 percent of the savers deposited their money in the
rural bank. In this regard, the compulsory savings program of the 
barrio associations could really bring about a change in savings 
behavior.
For those farmers who had been able to borrow from 
official lending institutions, notably the rural bank, 87 percent 
expressed willingness to secure loans from them again. The rest had 
been unable to meet obligations, did not want to use credit anymore 
or felt that it was easier to borrow from local moneylenders. In the 
light of findings from this study, the low proportion of farmers from 
the BAEcon data who obtained loans from government sources 
does not necessarily mean they could not borrow. It was entirely 
possible that many of them did not want to borrow. However, the 
proportion borrowing from private sources was four times more than 
those using government sources. This, therefore, tells us that 
institutional constraints were operating.
C. Credit and Tenure Status
Credit has always been regarded as an important function of the 
landlord in a situation of tenancy. When a land reform program is 
embarked upon, alternative sources of credit are usually sought. 
Table 7.12 shows that regardless of tenure status, private money-
Table 7.12 Farmer-borrowers by source of loan and by tenure 
(In percent of total farmer borrowers).
Source o f  loan Owners Lease­
holders
Share
tenants
1) 1970-71 Philippines
ACA/FACOMA 19.1 23.9 8.3
Rural banks 13.3 5.4 6.7
DBP/PNB 7.6 0.0 0.8
Landlords - 7.8 15.9
Private moneylenders 38.2 41.5 39.8
Relatives/friends 21.8 21.5 28.2
2) 1971/72 Philippines
ACA/FACOMA 9.8 24.0 8.0
Rural banks 13.5 6.3 6.2
DBP/PNB 6.8 0.4 0.0
Credit unions 2.5 0.4 0.9
Landlords - 9.7 19.4
Private moneylenders 40.9 38.7 36.6
Relatives/friends 26.5 20.6 28.8
lenders, relatives and friends are the most frequently mentioned 
creditors. As expected, more of the share tenants obtained loans from 
their landlords. Contrary to expectations, lessees were not all cut o ff 
from their landlords. Of the three tenure groups, more owners and 
lessees than share tenants borrowed from institutional sources.
Studies in Nueva Ecija, which is a pilot land reform area, 
provide us with interesting details on credit and tenure status.
(1) Table 7.13 shows very neatly the diminishing role of the 
landlord as a provider of credit as one goes from share tenant, 
lessee-share, lessee, to part-owner. The percentage of farmers 
borrowing from landlords declined from 47 to 7 percent.
(2) Owners and lessees used institutional sources more than the 
share tenants but lessees used private moneylenders more than any 
other tenure group.
(3) Between 65 and 71 percent of the farmers showed indebted­
ness of some kind. Surprisingly, the share tenants had slightly less 
borrowers than the other groups.
(4) Fewer share tenants used production credit but more of 
them reported non-production loans. Owners and part-owners 
borrowed more than the three other groups.
(5) Although the typical image of a rice farmer is that of a 
perpetual debtor, data show that 12 percent of them were creditors. It 
is also noticeable that among the farmer-creditors, there were more 
share tenants and lessees than owners. Even more intriguing is the fact 
that half of the share tenants and lessees who were creditors were not 
debtors, while there were only 12 percent of owners in this situation. 
Farmer-creditors lent predominantly to non-kinsmen which could 
indicate that it could be a “ business" lending rather than a family 
obligation.
(6) Herrera's study in Gapan also showed bigger loans for 
owners than lessees and share tenants. Cooperatives and government 
agencies (formal institutions) were the most common sources for the 
owner and the lessees. The tungro infestation, which affected the 
crop, increased considerably the borrowing during the dry season. 
Practically all the lessees and share tenants obtained cash loans and 
the private moneylender became a more important source. Data for 
1966, wet season 1971 and dry season 1971 show that farmers had 
an increasing perception of credit as a constraint on obtaining higher 
yields. Lessees and lessee-shareholders more than tenants and owners
Table 7.13 Credit practices (702 rice farmers) in Nueva Ecija, 1971.
Owner Part-
owner'
Lessee
Lessee
Share
tenant
Share 
tenan t
Total
— P e r c e n t  —
Source o f  credit
Institutional 60 66 33 41 13 32
Kinsmen 12 11 19 33 20 18
Landlord — 7 20 26 47 28
Other private money­
lenders 37 23 45 18 33 37
N 82 44 285 27 254 702
Percentage in debt
(any kind) 70 69 71 68 65
K in d  o f  loan reported
Production 51 46 49 58 36 45
Non-production 32 32 39 28 48 21
Both 8 10 9 15 9 9
None 30 35 31 32 29 31
A m o u n t borrowed
Production (cash) P1435 625 475 300 400
Non-production (cash) P1080 650 435 585 375
Tenure status o f creditors
Percentage of farmers
who are creditors 14 8 38 6 35 12
Percentage of creditors
who are not debtors 12 22 52 43 51 44
Percentage of creditors
who lend to:
Kinsmen 19 33 36 14 24 28
Non-kinsmen 69 66 59 86 68 66
Both 12 0 4 0 7 6
Source: R. P. delos Reyes and F. Lynch, op. c i t
felt the constraint. They also said that more credit could have been 
used if it were available. Although the lessees felt the credit constraint 
more than the other groups, they used government lending institu­
tions more than the tenants, hence interest rates were lower. How­
ever, in the event of a crop failure, the share tenant had the landlord 
as a more dependable source of financing.
Equally important as borrowing behavior is the phenomenon 
of non-borrowing. Table 7.14 shows that about 30 percent of the 
farmers had no indebtedness of any kind, regardless of tenure status. 
We can assume that those were the self-financed farmers who deserve 
to be examined more intensively. What enabled them to be self-
Table 7.14. Production, credit and tenure status 
(3 Barrios of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, 1971).
Owner-
Share
tenant
Lessee Operator/
Part-owner
Combina­
tion
Total
Use o f  c red it in cash 
Borrower 45 42
Wet Season (1971) 
Percent 
48 27 44
Non-borrower 55 58 52 73 56
Borrower 91 96
D ry Season (1971) 
85 100 92
Non-borrower 9 4 15 0 8
f  1 - 9 9 51
A m o u n t Borrowed (cash). Wet Season 
14 12 50 33
100 -  199 24 17 24 13 21
200 -  299 18 49 24 - 26
300 -  399 8 14 18 25 13
400 -  499 2 6 12 - 5
500+ - - 12 13 2
f  1 - 9 9 15
A m o u n t
4
Borrowed (cash), D ry  Season 
9 11
1 0 0 -1 9 9 15 15 27 38 18
200 -  299 29 46 18 13 31
300 -  399 22 8 - 38 17
400 -  499 14 23 36 13 18
500 + 5 4 9 - 5
Landlord 70-"
Source o f  C redit (Wet Season)
6 -  50 •'* 3 7 '
Bank 2 - 6 - 2
Cooperative - 20 35 13 13
Private moneylenders 18 20 6 - 15
Relatives and friends 10 - 18 - 7
Government agencies - 54 " 35 37 26
100 100 100 100 100
Source o f  C redit (D ry Season)
Landlord 81 8 9 20 50
Bank - - 9 - 1
Cooperative 2 - - 2 5 ' 1
Private moneylenders 10 35 36 2 5 ' 20
Relatives and neighbors - 4 9 13 3
Government agencies 7 53 3 7 ' 17 25
100 100 100 100 100
Formal-■Informal Sources o f  Credit (Wet Season)
Informal 98 26 24 50 60
Formal 2 74 76 50 40
100 100 100 100 100
Credit, Cooperatives and Other Organizational Components 373 
Table 7.14 (Continuation!
Share
tenant
O wner-
Lessee O perator/ 
Part-owner
Combina­
tion
Total
Form al-In form al Sources o f  Credit (D ry  Season)
Informal 91 46 55 62 74
Formal 9 54 45 38 26
100 100 100 100 100
Perception o f  C redit as a Constraint on Obtaining Higher Yields
Pre-HYV 1966 (WetSeason)
Ves 13 5 3 27 9
No 87 95 97 73 91
Wet (1971)
Ves 24 30 18 45 26
No 76 70 82 55 74
D ry  (1971)
Yes 25 63 46 62 39
No 75 37 54 38 61
Could Use More C redit I f  I t  were Available
Wet Season (1971)
Yes 33 25 12 55 28
No 67 75 88 45 72
D ry  Season (1971)
Yes 55 78 54 75 62
No 45 22 46 25 38
Source: R. T. Herrera, op. cit.
financing? Were they the traditional conservative farmers who did 
not use purchased inputs and modern practices or were they the 
very progressive farmers who were able to realize sufficient profit 
from rice-farming as to enable them to be self-financing?
All the writings and studies on credit underscore the usurious 
interest rates and, therefore, moneylenders are regarded as social evils 
to be done away with. This preoccupation w ith usury has given us a 
lopsided picture of credit which needs to be balanced by a discussion 
of interest-free loans. Tables 7.15 and 7.16 show that although past 
studies reported very high average interest rates which were affected 
by extremes of values, there was always an unnoticed proportion of 
no interest loans. Studies report from 12 to 49 percent of loans made
as being interest-free. A significant proportion also report legal rates. 
What needs further investigation is the dynamics and motivations for 
free lending in cash or in kind. Table 7.16 indicates that landlords lend 
free to both lessees and share tenants whether or not they are 
kinsmen. Even non-landlords and non-kinsmen also practice this type 
of lending. Predictably, however, kinsmen even if non-landlords, have 
a greater inclination toward this practice. The cultural and economic 
dimensions of free lending have to be investigated in order to 
provide a more realistic appraisal of rural credit.
Part of the problem in interpreting data on credit is the 
d ifficu lty  or impossibility of distinguishing what the loans were used 
for because in many studies it is not specified. Strictly speaking, if 
we were to consider household indebtedness (short-term or long­
term, cash or kind) for any or all purposes such as consumption,
Table 7.15. Studies indicating no interest or low interest rates on farm loans.
Percent o f  loans
1. Munoz; Nueva Ecija, 1958^
No interest 20
1 — 14% rate 13
Average interest rate 98%
2. Nationwide Survey, 1959^2
No interest 49
1 — 14% rate 25
Average interest rate 28%
3. Nueva Ecija, 1969/70^3
5% 26.8
5 -  14% 38.2
Average interest rate 21.8%
4. Leyte, 1971/7214
No interest (1971) 12
(1972) 16
5. Cotabato, 197215
No interest 27
6. Gapan, Nueva Ecija, 19721®
No interest 31
^  J. P. Gapud. op. cit.
^2l . P. de Guzman, op. cit.
13|pc-BAEcon Socio-Economic Study of Nueva Ecija, CY 1969/70. 
^4T. E. Contado and R. A. Jaime, op. c i t  
1^E. Kimpo, op. c i t  
1®R. T. Herrera, op. c i t
Table 7.16. Interest-free loans extended by landlords, non-landlords' 
kinsmen or non-kinsmen to lessees 
and share tenants.
Production Non-Production
Cash K ind Cash K ind
Percentage of debtors given 
interest-free loans
Landlords (Kinsmen or 
non-kinsmen
Lessees 6 38 12 50
Share-tenants 26 58 38 58
Kinsmen — non-landlords
Lessees 61 80 69 67
Share-tenants 42 75 64 53
Other Individuals
Lessees 12 0 12 33
Share-tenants 34 33 31 29
Source: Romana P. de los Reyes and Frank Lynch, op. cit.
production, education, medical, housing, etc. most, if not all 
households whether rural or urban, farm or non-farm would have 
indebtedness of one sort or another. Therefore, the typical de­
scription of the rice farmer as being perpetually in a state of 
indebtedness, may not really be peculiar to the rice farmer. What 
deserves detailed study are the specific settings and circumstances 
which affect the whys, hows and wherefores of credit.
It is noteworthy that rarely does the rice farmer complain 
about high interest rates as his pressing problem. This is not to 
say that he does not pay high interest, but perhaps from his 
point of view, it is important that he gets credit when he needs 
it even at a high price. Cheap credit which is not available to him 
for one reason or another is actually meaningless. What is usury 
to whom probably depends on how badly one needs the credit 
and how quickly he can obtain it. For someone who gets it when 
he needs it most, there may be no such thing as usury. For some­
one who has viable alternative sources of credit, usury can be both 
illegal and immoral.
Furthermore, in the credit situation, one is not always a 
borrower. He is usually both a borrower and a lender, perhaps not 
always simultaneously, but at different points in time. If one plays
the role of borrower and/or lender instead o f borrower all the time, 
there is some opportunity to even up the score, although admittedly 
some will be net borrowers and some net lenders. Hence, the credit 
phenomenon, especially of the non-formal or non-institutional 
type, has to be viewed in the community rather than individual 
farm or household context. This is underlined even more by the 
fact that despite the existence of credit institutions, majority of 
credit needs are still supplied by informal sources.
D. Experiences With Rice Farmers' Organizations
1. Cooperatives
The promotion of cooperatives in the Philippines started at the 
national level as early as 1952 through Republic Act 281 which 
established an agricultural credit and cooperative financing system to 
assist small farmers in securing liberal credit and to provide the 
effective grouping of farmers into cooperative associations for the 
efficient marketing of their agricultural commodities. From then on, 
the cooperative movement has had its ups and downs. As the 
Bergland report describes it:
“ From 1953-1957 cooperatives were organized in all areas of 
the Philippines and this brought into the field more than 260,000 
farmers, primarily share tenants. These Farmers' Cooperative 
Marketing Associations (FACOMAS) with their warehouses, rice 
mills, and offices were made possible by ACCFA (Agricultural Credit 
Cooperative Financing Administration) financing and did have the 
impact of revolutionary change. It quieted a restless people, lifted up 
rural hopes and brought about a certain measure of political stability. 
It must be recalled that during the years following World War II and 
up until 1953, the plains of Central Luzon were under the grip of 
social upheaval. The armed HUKS were at one time threatening the 
city of Manila."
By 1958, the ACCFA program had collapsed and was 
nearly dormant by 1960. A notable explanation for this collapse 
was that cooperatives were generally considered to be social justice 
and service organizations, not business institutions. Furthermore, the 
program was expanded too rapidly because of political pressure. 
By 1963, the cooperative movement was revived with ACCFA 
rebaptized as ACA (Agricultural Credit Administration). Regarding 
its credit operations, ACA served 12,186 farmers with production
loans in 1963-64. The administrative expense for each farmer served 
was P32.27 or a loss or government expense per farmer of P I2.92. 
The administrative expense was 75 centavos per peso loan and the 
loss from operations for every peso loaned was 30 centavos. Six years 
later, 1969-70, overhead expenses were reduced from 75 centavos 
per peso to 18 centavos per peso. The administrative loss was 
reduced from 30 centavos per peso loaned in 1964 to 5 centavos in
1969-70. In that same year, the ACA released production loans to 
56,482 members of cooperatives for an average overhead expense per 
farmer of P‘14.84. The loss per farmer was reduced from P I2.92 in 
1964 to P3.92. The production loans increased in volume and 
average size from P2,905,000 in 1963-64 with P238 average to 
P30,922,000 in 1969-70 with P547 average loan per borrower.17
Despite all these changes in volume of business and improve­
ment in efficiency of loaning operations, the cooperative movement 
had serious problems. The 1968 Agricultural Cooperative Develop­
ment Committee had this to say on the magnitude of the task:
“ In spite of recent revitalization efforts, the status of agri­
cultural cooperatives had not significantly improved. In the case of 
rice FACOMAS, only 40 percent of 234 were active, 7 percent 
semi-active and the rest were inactive. Membership-wise, only 16 
percent of the members (188,071) of rice FACOMAS were active. 
As of June 30, 1968 only 67 out of 94 active rice FACOMAS ware­
houses had net savings and 23 reflected positive net worth. Although 
there were 152 warehouses owned by the FACOMAS in the 15 
provinces of the first priority area of the Rice and Corn Productivity 
Coordinating Council (RCPCC) w ith a total rated capacity of 
3,857,200 cavans, these warehouses were utilized only up to 38 
percent of this capacity." Among the problems cited in the report 
which underlie this state of affairs were:
(1) Since the FACOMAS in general had been promoted and 
organized chiefly as a medium for channelling liberal credit to 
farmers, the farmer-members of the FACOMAS had become credit- 
oriented. Consequently, most of the farmers looked upon these 
FACOMAS as credit agencies and not as a marketing arm for them. 
Their cooperative activities, therefore, were dependent on the 
availability of the loan funds from ACA.
17Philip L. Bergland, Terminal Report, June 1965 to June 1971, Agricultural 
Cooperative Development.
(2) Because of this misconception regarding the principal 
purpose of the FACOMA, most of the members did not market their 
produce through it. As a result, the FACOMA was unable to generate 
a sufficient volume of business to make it an economically viable
institution.
(3) Farmers were reluctant to join or support the FACOMAS 
because most of them had impaired capital. In the meantime, these 
FACOMAS continued to operate and incur losses. Under these 
conditions, the agricultural cooperative movement had failed to 
attract new members and had alienated the support of a number of
the old members.
(4) Many FACOMAS did not have adequate facilities to 
perform the marketing functions which would enable them to serve 
their members effectively.
(5) There had been no concerted and sustained education and 
information campaign before and after the organization of their 
cooperative.
(6) The arrangement they had whereby the Agricultural Pro­
ductivity Commission (the national extension service) promoted and 
organized while the ACA regulated agricultural cooperative gave rise 
to a vague delineation of activities in the matter of supervision.
(7) ACA resources at the time were insufficient to meet the 
credit requirements of farmers and cooperatives.18
A report from ACA dated June 30, 1970 showed a total of 668 
cooperatives under the FACOMA. The total number of members was 
367,122, the active members of which numbered 108,652. This was 
only 29.59 percent of the total number.
All of these reports indicate the low degree of farmer 
participation in cooperatives and, therefore, this approach to rural 
development has yet to prove itself on a substantial scale.
Warner and Hefferman, in their study of voluntary farm 
organizations in the United States, provide some explanatory 
proposition for differential participation which has relevance to 
farmers' associations and cooperatives in any country. Their pro­
position is: The greater the degree o f benefit-participation con­
tingency, the greater w ill be the participation. That is, the more that 
a member obtaining benefit from an organization is dependent on his
18vicente U. Quintana, Report of the Agricultural Cooperative Development
Committee to Exec. Sec. Rafael Salas. Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Institute,
College, Laguna, Sept. 20, 1968.
participating in the organization, the more he w ill take part. This 
concept of benefit-participation contingency is an aspect of exchange 
between the benefits an individual receives from the organization and 
the contributions he makes to it. The three broad categories of 
benefit-contingency in organizations are:
(1) Benefits that have no contingency. These are public goods 
available to members and non-members alike. What would motivate a 
rational self-interested man to participate in and support an associa­
tion whose only benefits were available to everyone? Some other 
benefits must be present besides the obtaining of these benefits.
(2) Benefits which have a moderate contingency. These are 
system rewards which are available only to members but are not very 
dependent upon the amount of participation or contribution to the 
organization. Benefits of this kind, for example, might motivate the 
individual to become and remain a member, but what would induce 
him to greater activity than the minimum needed to remain in the 
organizaiion?
(3) Benefits with a high degree of contingency. These are 
individual rewards available only to members and, furthermore, only 
to each member in relation to his participation in or contribution to 
the organization. If these benefits are sufficiently valuable, the costs 
low enough and the alternatives less attractive, individual rewards can 
motivate a great deal of membership participation and support. What 
is worth-while mentioning with respect to the results of their study 
of 191 voluntary organizations is not only the fact that their 
proposition was empirically supported but that "even in the 
organizations with high contingency the average percent attendance 
was less than two-thirds of the membership while the average 
percentage involvement in the meetings and affairs of the group was 
less than one-fourth."19
Another explanation for the viability or lack of viability of the 
FACOMAS is offered by Wheelock and Janolino who examined the 
effect of institutional and infrastructural environment. Using the 
status of FACOMAS as their dependent variable, they operationally 
defined them as (1) registered with the Agricultural Credit Adminis­
tration (ACA) and the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) 
between 1952-1967; and (2) reactivated, which means continuously 
active FACOMA credit facilities for each of 3 years 1967-68,
1% .  Keith Warner and Wm. D. Hefferman, "The Benefit-Participation Contingency 
in Voluntary Farm Organizations," Rural Sociology, Vol. 32, June 1967, pp. 139-153.
1968-69, and 1969-70. From the 15 first-priority rice growing 
provinces, 182 towns w ith 1,250-30,000 hectares of irrigated 
lowland rice were included in their analysis.20
The data in Table 7.17 are interpreted by Wheelock and Jano-
lino as follows:
"Irrigation as an index of risk in rice production is curvilinearly 
related to FACOMA status. . . Towns w ithout irrigation. . .  seldom 
have registered a FACOMA. Only 25 percent of the no-irrigation 
towns (0-2%) which have FACOMAS have reactivated their credit 
facility. However, towns having an intermediate amount of irrigation 
are more likely to have an active FACOMA loaning facility.
Table 7.17. Municipalities with FACOMAS which have reactivated 
rice-production credit facilities for 1967-70 by percentages 
of the main crop of paddy which is irrigated.
Percentage o f  main crop paddy which is irrigated
Towns w ith 0-2 2.1-10 10.1-30 30.1-60 60.1-90 90.1-100 Tota l
An inactive .or semi­
active FACOMA  
(1967-70) 75% 67% 57% 37% 66% 70% 111
A reactivated FACOMA
credit facility 
(1967-70) 25% 33% 43% 63% 34% 30% 71
Total number of 
towns 32 21 30 35 41 23 182
Percentage irrigated second crop
Towns w ith 0% 0.1-3.0% 3.1-24% 24.1-100% Tota l number
Inactive or semi­
active FACOMA 69% 50% 52% 79% 111
A reactivated FACOMA
credit facility 
(1967-70) 31% 50% 48% 21% 71
Total number of 
towns 36 60 44 42 182
Source: G. C. Wheelock and H. Janolino, op. cit.
20Gerald C. Wheelock and Hilarion Janolino, Effect of Institutional and Infra­
structural Environment Upon a Program of Institution Building: The Palay Farmers 
Cooperative Marketing Association (FACOMA); A Technical Data Report and Preliminary 
Analysis. U.P. at Los Banos. Sept. 1970.
Sixty-three percent of the FACOMA towns with 30.1-60 percent 
irrigation have reactivated their loan facilities.
Finally, towns with nearly full irrigation coverage are more 
likely to be those with inactive FACOMAS. Conservative private 
capital is already concentrated in these low-risk, rice producing areas. 
Only 34 percent of the FACOMA towns with more than 60 percent 
irrigation have reactivated their FACOMAS. This same general 
relationship can be observed with respect to the percentage of main 
crop irrigated for the second crop. Towns where rice-production risks 
are low are the same towns in which conservative private capital w ill 
be concentrated. A government rice-production credit scheme with 
its more cumbersome administration is not a highly valued or scarce 
resource in these towns. On the other hand, in towns where risks in 
rice production are intermediate, private capital is scarce and the 
FACOMA credit resource is more highly valued. The FACOMA is 
more likely to be active in these towns. Finally, where the risk is the 
greatest, modern rice production cannot be chanced, and a pro­
duction credit scheme cannot survive."
The role of risk in the use of credit among debtors and its 
provision by creditors is illustrated in the case of small but promising 
farmers' associations which were organized around the need for 
irrigation water. The ingredients present in six farmers' associations 
analyzed were:
(1) Membership .came mainly from contiguous areas serviced 
by the same irrigation water source. In the absence or inadequacy of 
water from the National Irrigation Administration, farmers operating 
contiguous areas jo in tly  borrowed money to purchase and install 
irrigation pumps. Repayment of loans was assessed on the basis of 
farm size operated by individual farmer members.
(2) The stimulus for getting organized came from agricultural 
technicians whose expertise traced low productivity to the water 
shortage and saw the development potentials with the advent of 
irrigation pumps. This was a risky venture, considering the costs 
involved and the poverty of the farmers. Therefore, their loan 
application had to be supported by project feasibility studies 
prepared with the assistance of the agricultural technicians.
(3) The rural banks would not have granted the loans if the 
technicians had not interceded in behalf of the farmers. But this was 
not a matter of smooth interpersonal relations but rather a business 
risk calculation on the part of the bankers. With the presence and
assurance of the technicians that the production process and the 
application of the loans would be adequately and expertly super­
vised, the probability of increasing production and then of repaying 
the loan is considerably enhanced. The risks of the banker in 
providing the loan are, therefore, reduced.
(4) The farmers would not have taken the risk in borrowing such a 
big amount of money if they had not been assured by the technicians 
of their presence and assistance over a long period of time. In other 
words, this was not a crash program but a long-term commitment on 
the part of those who were responsible for initiating these village- 
level development projects. They provided much of the management 
and supervision required.
(5) Not everyone was invited to join the farmers' association. 
Membership was limited to 18, 19, 33, 28 and 15. An important 
criterion was the matter of contiguity of farm areas to be serviced by 
the irrigation water. In the case of one association, the neighboring 
farmers who were skeptical before of all these moves to organize 
finally saw the light when the irrigation water started flowing. They 
then expressed a desire to join the original 19 members but the latter 
were not enthusiastic about getting them in because as the leader put 
it: "Even among nineteen of us, we already have problems in 
working together. How much more when we add 7 or 9? " 21
The experience with these farmers' associations which centered 
on irrigation and credit problems illustrates a three-way risk 
reduction scheme with the farmers, the extension worker and the 
rural banker. Without the technician, the bank would not lend 
money, especially to farmers who have no collateral; w ithout the 
extension worker, farmers are reluctant to venture into substantial 
credit agreements, particularly for relatively long-term irrigation 
investment. So, with the extension worker's faith in the production 
technology, in his own competence and in the eagerness of the 
farmers to improve their lot, he serves as a guarantor both to the 
farmers and to the bank.
Other versions of the three-way risk-production scheme are 
found in the "selda," "damayan," compact farm, etc. The 
"selda" means cell or unit composed of 10 to 20 farmers required to 
t ill 1 to 3 hectares at a maximum so that the farms can be well
Delia A. Imperial, "Group Action for Rural Development: Insights from Nine 
Farmers. Associations," Farm and Flome Development Office, College of Agriculture, 1971 
and P. S. Fajardo, "The UPCA/SEARCA Progress Report No. 5, July 1 to Sept. 30, 1971."
attended to. A unit may cover 20 to 40 hectares. The members act as 
one body and each is responsible to and for one another. Each one 
sees to it that the farm of each is attended to. The debt of one is the 
debt of all. In choosing the site for the selda, presence of 
irrigation, adjacent farms and farmers' willingness to work hard and 
improve conditions are the bases. The members sign a contract to 
follow technician's recommendations, do away with vices, etc. and 
the landlord must agree with the sharing system under land reform. 
As a group, the selda members can borrow money from the rural 
bank anytime without collateral. They can also block-sell their crop 
to a dealer contacted by the rural ban« so they can get a better price. 
Close technical supervision of the production process is regarded as 
desirable by both the farmers and the bank. 22
A slightly different version of the selda is the "damayan" 
defined by Salvador as a group of farmers preferably composed of 
people related by blood or marriage and living in one compact area. 
It is headed by a regional leader respected by everyone in his area. It 
also has a treasurer who handles all the production reports and an 
information officer who disseminates modern farming techniques 
among its members. The damayan concept is based on the theory that 
people who know each other well and who work for the same cause 
will help one another. It makes possible a supervised credit scheme 
which involves a triangular marketing agreement involving the 
damayan, the rural bank and the marketing agent. The rural bank 
finances the farmers, the farmers raise the crops and the marketing 
agent sells the products at prevailing market prices. Cash sales are 
turned over to the bank against which farmers' loans are deducted. 
The net profits go to the farmers. Since the well-thought out-farm 
plans serves as the only collateral, the rural bank owns whatever 
is produced and the damayan cannot dispose of its products; other­
wise, it w ill be liable for estafa. Faith on the damayan is based on the 
assumption that ''men who borrow together watch each other 
because they will suffer together if anyone appropriates part of the 
produce for private use or sells it for individual p ro fit."23
A third version is the compact farm which is an organized unit
2 2 R. p, Victorio, op. c i t
23Florante C. Salvador, Senior Agricultural Credit Examiner, Department of Rural 
Banks, Central Bank of the Philippines. Greenfields, Vol. 2, Nov. 2, 1973, pp. 20-22.
of small farms with contiguous areas. Compact farms may 
vary in size and operating details but certain principles are common 
to all: (1) single management by a democratically elected farmer- 
member; (2) assumption of jo int and several liability for supervised 
production credit from institutional sources; (3) controlled move­
ment of produce and efficient marketing to insure collection of loans 
and increased profits to producers. Compact farms may or may not 
pool labor and other resources. They are mainly used as conduit for 
supervised credit. As such, they rely heavily on technical services 
provided by extension workers. The latter are indispensable in the 
preparation of the farm production plan which is the basis for 
granting the loans. Their technical assistance is also counted upon 
to improve the production process which is of considerable 
concern to the lending institutions.24
The fourth variation is the Moshav-style multipurpose coopera­
tive located in a small barrio of 111 families, 92 of which are farming 
and 19 are non-farming. This cooperative is characterized by small 
size, contiguous fields and residence in the barrio. The latter is a 
prerequisite for membership but its distinctive characteristic is the 
presence of Israeli technicians who provide technical advice and 
leadership. Because of this special arrangement, doubts have been 
expressed as to the transferability of the approach. De los Reyes, et 
at. also raise questions about the availability and quality of leadership 
for these cooperative ventures at the village level. They consider the 
problem of coming up w ith a class of leaders who can sufficiently 
identify with farmers and have sufficient authority to effect the goals 
of cooperatives as a serious one. They believe that the farmer-leader, 
although chosen by farmers themselves, w ill get direction from farm 
management technicians and other government personnel. As he 
develops close working relationships with them, his identification 
with farmers is likely to decrease because government workers have 
also been observed to identify away from farmers as evidenced in 
their manner of dressing, assumption of title  "M r.” , carrying of 
attache cases and other symbols of office.25
Although the dearth of leadership for cooperatives is a valid 
issue, one wonders to what extent ability to identify with farmers as
^Camarines Sur Interagency Survey Team Report on the Province of Camarines Sur 
and the Lower Bicol River Basin, September 1972.
2 5 r .  p. de los Reyes, M. Mangahas and F. J. Murray, op. cit.
a leadership quality is validly reflected in similarity of dress and 
trappings of everyday life rather than in performance of functions 
which enhance farmers' interest. As a, matter of fact, a farmer-leader 
will have to learn to relate himself to the urban-elite, to government 
personnel and to the world outside his community in order to more 
effectively promote the interests of co-farmers.
The other problem encountered in the organization of seldas is 
the d ifficu lty  in some provinces of finding farmers who cultivate 
adjacent farms and who also reside in the same community. Where 
farming area and place of residence are not in the same community, 
communication between farmers who belong to the same selda, 
which is organized on the basis of adjacent farms, is hard to achieve. 
If the loans are granted to a jo int liability group using contiguity of 
farms as a criterion but farmers live in different communities, the 
co-guarantor requirement may not be easy to enforce. Moreover, the 
selda may not be a meaningful social group to its members when 
they do not reside in the same place and, therefore, may not have 
much social interaction.
One feature, however, of farmers' organizations in the past is 
that members tend to be those who have higher education, higher 
economic status, higher social status in the barrio, greater use of 
printed media, radio ownership, number of visits to agricultural 
schools and experiment stations and also have higher y ie ld .26 
Furthermore, only a very small proportion of farmers belong to 
farmers' organizations. When innovations are introduced through 
these farmers' associations, the members have an advantage which 
non-members do not have. This is also the case with credit made 
available only to members.
Considering all the shortcomings of credit institutions and 
farmers' organizations cited by Bergland, Quintana, Wheelock and 
Janolino, Imperial, Contado, de los Reyes, et al., the New Society's 
Cooperative Development Strategy for Rural Development embodies 
measures designed to remedy past weaknesses. Warner and Heffer- 
man's benefit-participation contingency is also provided for. The fo l­
lowing features have been emphasized in the new program:
(1) A gradual learning process in cooperative development 
passing through a barrio association stage before being organized into 
a full-fledged cooperative. Only after meeting given requirements
2&Tito E< Contado, "Factors Associated With the Active Participation of Rice 
Farmers in the Local Farmers' Club," d0. c i t
could one or more barrio-associations (Samahang Nayon) sponsor the 
organization of such a cooperative.
(2) A mandatory requirement under the land reform program 
that no land title  may be issued to any farmer unless he is a member 
of a recognized cooperative.
(3) Strict requirements for membership although it is open to 
lessees, amortizing owner-cultivators and owner-cultivators. They 
have to: complete a prescribed pre-membership training course; 
pledge to adopt improved farming practices; comply with a savings 
program; pay the required membership fee; and comply with Barrio 
Association's organizational agreement.
(4) A compulsory savings program to generate capital. Members 
are required to deposit with rural banks: five percent of what they 
borrow; the equivalent of one cavan of rice per hectare at harvest 
time as Barrio Guaranty Fund which w ill be used for payments of 
amortization of farmers who might default; and P5 per month orP60 
a year for members who do not borrow. The savings of Barrio 
Associations will be used to buy into the equity of established rural 
banks.
(5) Shift of credit source from the landlord to the rural bank as 
a result of the land reform program. Unless the farmers belong to the 
Barrio Association, it w ill be d ifficu lt for him to obtain credit from 
the rural bank, since he has no collateral. Both credit and the 
issuance of a land title  are contingent on his membership in the 
barrio association.
(6) Adoption of improved farming practices as prerequisite to 
membership. This is a step toward increased productivity which 
ultimately determines whether or not loans can be repayed. A 
necessary corollary to this requirement is the provision of technical 
assistance from government and other agencies.
(7) Central Bank guarantees of up to 85 percent agricultural 
loans. This is designed to encourage more vigorous lending on the part 
of rural banks.
(8) An education, information and organizational program 
which includes sophisticated motivational strategies, communication 
techniques and monitoring devices.
(9) Discipline under martial law to prevent repetition of earlier 
experiences with cooperatives such as non-repayment of loans and 
less dedicated government workers.
(10) Seldas and damayans as nuclei of barrio associations.
These small production units could be valuable training grounds for 
prospective leaders of cooperatives.
In general, the new cooperative development strategy has all the 
necessary ingredients for success. It has credit, technical assistance, 
education and information, risk reduction for both farmers and 
lenders, opportunities for leadership development, savings and capital 
accumulation and the possibility of applying negative sanctions when 
needed. As the Department of Local Government and Community 
Development put it: "The Barrio Association is educational, 
mandatory, disciplinary and designed for redistribution of wealth. It 
is a vital component of the land reform program."
At the moment, the most controversial provision is the compul­
sory savings which are intended for the purchase of rural bank equity. 
If this intention is carried through, the Barrio Associations will 
control the rural banks within a few years. The Central Bank's 
projections of these savings amount to M 5 .4  million for 1974, 
■P55.4 million for 1975, M O  million for 1976, and’P ^ g  m illion for 
1977, or a total of M 99 .8  million in the next four years. Since 
owners of rural banks are mostly landlords who w ill be affected by 
the land reform program, the rural bank is an alternative investment 
for them. Will the barrio associations be allowed to buy as much 
equity as they could in the rural bank?
2. Irrigation Associations
Besides credit, irrigation is another component of rice produc­
tion around which farmers are organized to some greater or lesser 
degree. Because irrigation by its very nature seldom belongs to a 
single individual, the use, non-use or misuse of irrigation water affect 
a group or a community of farmers over a small or wide area 
depending on the size of the irrigation system. This "social" or 
"group commodity" characteristic of irrigation has made it  an 
interesting subject for study by both physical and social scientists. 
The effect of physical factors on farmer attitudes and behavior is 
fascinatingly evident in a number of irrigation studies. For example, 
Wickham's comparison of farmers' attitudes toward irrigation be­
tween those whose fields were located along the first half of the 
irrigation canal and those along the second half shows that farmers 
farther away from the water source (second half of the canal) had 
lower proportion reporting profit from rice farming due to irrigation 
(89 percent for those along the first half and 55 percent only for 
those in the second half of the canal). The latter also reported more
conflicts over water and as expected, more of them evaluated water 
supply as inadequate. Incidentally, their subjective estimates of water 
adequacy correlated very closely with actual measurements made. 
Contrary to expectations, those who were farther away from the 
water source were more inclined to think that irrigation fees charged 
were reasonable. They were more willing to participate in more 
intensive scheduling of water and to pay higher fees for supplemental 
irrigation (Table 7.18). Even more intriguing was the higher coopera­
tion score and greater willingness to share with the NIA the 
responsibility for cleaning farm ditches among farmers who judged 
their irrigation water as highly inadequate (Table 7.19). The effect of 
water inadequacy on adoption of recommended practices and 
on yield is also clearly shown in the difference between those with 
highly inadequate and moderately inadequate water. Surprisingly 
those with adequate water reported lower adoption scores and lower 
yields than those with moderately adequate water.
In general, Wickham's findings show that farmers who are 
relatively more "deprived" of water realize its value more than those
Table 7.18. Farmers' attitudes toward irrigation and location 
of their farms relative to water source.
F irst ha lf Second hah
o f  canal o f  canal
— P e r c e n t  —
P ro fit due to irrigation
Yes, wet season only 7 ....
Yes, both seasons 89 55
Yes, dry season only — 5
Yes, wet season only (1 crop/yr.) 3 24
No profit _ 10
Don't know 1 6
100 100
N = 71 62
Reported con flic ts  over water
No conflicts 89 76
Conflicts 2 1 24
100 100
Reasonableness o f  irrigation
fees charged
Reasonable 22 48
Too high 78 52
100 0 100
o
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Table 7.18 (Continuation)
First ha lf 
o f  canal
Second h a lf 
o f  canal
4. Willingness to  partic ipate in more
intensive scheduling o f  water
Willing 85 97
Not willing _15 3
100 100
5. Evaluation o f  water adequacy
Adequate or better 80 59
Highly or moderately inadequate 20 41
100 100
6. Willingness to pay higher fees
fo r supplemental irrigation
Willing 38 73
Not willing 62 27
100 100
Source: G. Y . Wickham, op. c i t
Table 7.19. Farmers' judgment of water adequacy in relation to 
yield adoption, cooperation and attitudes toward 
cleaning farm ditches.
H igh ly Moderately Adequate
inadequate inadequate and up
1. Reason fo r water shortage 
Insufficient water in whole 
system 55
— P e r c e n t  — 
56 48
Poor distribution 45 44 48
Both _ _ 4--- ----
100 100 100
2. Yield  
0 - 1 . 8 40 7 6
1.8 - 2 . 6 21 25 38
2 . 6 - 3 . 5 21 32 28
3.5 - 4 . 4 13 24 16
4.4 -  5.3 5 4 8
5 .3 - 6 .2 - 4 2
Over 6.2 _ 4 _2——■ ---
100 100 100
H igh ly M oderately Adequate
inadequate inadequate and up
3. A do p tio n  score 
High 
Medium
Low
4. Cooperation score 
High cooperation 
Medium cooperation 
Low cooperation
5. A ttitudes  toward cleaning 
farm ditches
N IA  responsibility 
Farmer responsibility 
Both
Source: G. Y. Wickham, op. c i t
who have enough and are more inclined to cooperate, pay fees, and 
participate in efforts to improve the distribution of water either in 
matters of scheduling or cleaning ditches. Apparently, where a water 
problem exists, there is a reason to participate or cooperate. Where 
water supply is adequate, water is taken for granted and is not 
perceived as a problem. Therefore, even the normal irrigation fees 
charged are regarded as too high. Farmers' preference for individual 
rather than group-oriented activities is revealed in Table 7.20. Even for 
ditch-cleaning and pump use, 56 and 44 percent, respectively, 
preferred to perform the activity individually. The case of water 
scheduling, for example, is one activity which requires a group 
orientation, especially where water supply has to be shared but only 
27 percent felt it should be a group undertaking. The same thing 
holds for water control which is impossible to carry out without 
regard for the group which is affected by the same water supply. This 
“ individualistic" inclination of the farmer is contrary to the roman­
ticized image of Philippine rural community as bayanihan (mutual 
help) society. This mutual help behavior is manifested very much in 
funerals, weddings, baptisms, house-moving, crisis, and emergencies
39 64 47
45 25 39
16 11 14
100 100 100
60 47 32
8 21 31
32 32 37
100 100 100
38 63 71
25 33 23
_37 _ 4  _ 6
100 100 100
Table 7.20. Farmers' attitudes toward selected group-oriented 
activities (133 farmers from Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, 
and Laguna, 1971).
Ind iv idua lly Group
Unw illing  
to do Tota l
1. Ditch cleaning 56
— P e r c e n t  — 
42 2 100
2. Water scheduling 71 27 2 100
3. Water control 60 32 8 100
4. Fee payment 93 5 2 100
5. Pump use 44 50 6 100
Total N = 133
Source: Gekee Wickham, op. c i t
but sustained collective action for continuing development activities 
remains to be realized. Onkingco's studies of 15 communal irrigation 
systems, for example, found minimal existence of a sense of 
communal responsibility and the virtual absence of established 
operational procedures for maintaining and managing the system and 
distributing water. In only two out of 15 communal systems was the 
existence of a farmers' association mentioned.
To manage the irrigation systems, three types of modus operandi 
have been identified:
(1) By tradition or inheritance, someone is assigned the 
honorary position of being in charge of the irrigation system, and 
people look up to him for leadership.
(2) Where there are constant disputes among the farmers 
themselves over water use, they seek the assistance of an authority 
figure outside their group, that is, a policeman, a mayor, or a 
landlord, to help allocate water and assign maintenance functions to 
different farmers within the irrigation area.
(3) The person in the worst position with respect to water 
supply takes the initiative in calling the farmers together for the 
periodic cleaning of canals, water distribution, and so on. On an ad 
hoc basis whenever absolutely necessary, farmers can be mobilized 
for group action but an organization for sustained, regular and 
systematic management is hard to find in these communal irrigation
systems. The most provocative insight from Ongkingco's studies is 
the case of one system which had a farmers' association before the 
repair and improvement on the system was made. With the advent of 
good water supply, the farmers' association became inactive; they 
stopped paying fees and the association had no more funds.27
The phenomenon of water shortage as an inducement for 
farmer cooperation and organization is evident in the researches 
of Wickham, Ongkingco, Cruz,28 Robinson,29 Coward,30 and Le­
wis.31
Coward, however, provides a more purely sociological inter­
pretation of the situation. As he points out: "The scope, form and 
content of the interaction between ditchtenders and water users in 
these irrigation systems suggests a pattern of integration that is 
authoritarian, has minimal farmer participation, and is coincidental 
with high levels of uncertainty and frustration. It is a pattern of 
integration better suited for operating and maintaining the system at 
some present level than for developing the system and improving 
efficiency and equity in operations. As long as the water user is 
inhibited from being more directly involved in water distribution 
decisions, the system will lack feedback information for improve­
ment and development."
Furthermore, he considers smooth interpersonal relations (S-l-R) 
as a major institutional factor which permeates the relationships 
between ditchtenders and water users. Coward regards smooth 
interpersonal relations, defined as getting along with others in a 
respectful manner, as a very pervasive institution which influences 
the interaction between ditchtenders and water users. The "d itch ­
tenders attempt to create SIR with water users so they w ill fo llow  
his directions." On the other hand, where there is considerable 
uncertainty about how much water will be available during any
27petronio Ongkingco, Organization and Operation of 15 Communal Irrigation 
Systems in the Philippines in Water Management in  Philippine Irriga tion  Systems: Research 
and Operations. IRRI ,  1973.
28pecjerico A. Cruz, The Pinagbayanan Farmers' Association and Its Operation.
29David M. Robinson, Making an Irrigation Association a Vehicle for Development: 
Preliminary Observations on a Group of Philippine Rice Farmers.
30e . Walter Coward, Jr., Institutional and Social Organizational Factors Affecting
Irrigation: Their Application to a Specific Case. Papers on Water Management in Philippine  
Irriga tion  Systems: Research and Operations. IRRI ,  1973.
crop period, the users exert effort to establish SIR with the 
ditchtender in order to reduce uncertainty about the delivery of 
water to his farm. These patterns of SIR between farmer and 
ditchtenders are mechanisms for minimizing conflicts due to the uncer­
tainty as to the delivery of water. Therefore, water shortage is again the 
focal po in t fo r the interaction. If water supply were adequate and 
its delivery were dependable, one would expect such SIR behavior 
to be considerably diminished, based on evidences from the other 
studies cited. The physical factors in irrigation, therefore, deserve 
to  be scrutinized side by side w ith the institutional factors in 
order to more fu lly  comprehend the behavior patterns exhibited by 
farmers.
Lewis, in his comparative study of "zanjeras" or irrigation 
societies in llocos Norte and Isabela, noted the difference in climatic 
and topographical conditions and how these have influenced the 
behavior of llocano farmers in both areas. He found that rainfall in 
llocos Norte is less evenly distributed and has a long dry season. 
Isabela, in the Cagayan Valley on the other hand, has normally less 
rainfall but more evenly distributed and at no time is precipitation 
absent. Rice is a major crop in llocos but it is of no commercial 
significance. In contrast, Isabela is a wealthier agricultural province 
with commercial farming and even the smallest towns have in­
dications of urbanization and commercialization. As Lewis observed, 
the irrigation society functioned very well in llocos Norte but in 
Isabela, it seemed to "suffer from the relative wealth" of the 
Cagayan Valley. However, his conclusions are cautious: "The specific 
geographic correlates related to the emergence of cooperative 
irrigation societies in llocos Norte can at least only be suggested. The 
fact that such irrigation societies are hardly viable in Isabela is, in 
part, related to the different geographic factors which confront 
llocanos in the upper Cagayan Valley. The situation in Isabela 
suggests that the special character of the llocano, once he is 
established in a less demanding situation, becomes moderated by the 
more general imperatives of Philippine culture. In a sense, the 
difference between the llocanos in llocos Norte and the llocanos in 
Isabela can be reduced to the rational considerations behind and the 
resultant changes in behavior. In llocos Norte, the range of behavior 
is very often limited to economic matters and in a large proportion 
of families involves a relatively low level of subsistence. Isabela 
permits more than a continuous nagging concern w ith mere survival.
Some of the llocano virtues of necessity have not been maintained or 
have been less enthusiastically pursued in Isabela."32
The llocanos who have been proverbially known for their 
cooperative spirit have had cooperative irrigation societies for a long, 
long time. A report on them is available as early as 1914 but 
obviously, these societies had been in existence especially in llocos 
Norte long before this date. As to their reason for being, Christie 
observed that all the irrigation in llocos Norte comes from rivers and 
springs.
All the irrigation done in this province depends on gravity. No 
pumps, water wheels or other mechanical devices are in use. It is of 
interest to know how the foregoing works and others similar to them 
have been built and are maintained. No very large landed estates are 
found in this province. Even the few landholdings of comparatively 
large extent are almost invariably divided into several parcels 
separated from each other. Hence, it is but seldom that any man 
finds it to his interest to build irrigation works of any considerable 
size for the use of his land. Therefore, the necessary feed canals and 
other works for bringing water from the rivers to the land must be 
built by cooperation if they are to be built at all. This state of things 
has given rise to a large number of irrigation societies. They are of 
interest to a student of the llocano people for two reasons: namely, 
their importance to the agriculture of the region and their indication 
of the capacity of the people for cooperative e ffo rt."33
Because of the critical role which irrigation societies perform 
"the members are bound together by a written agreement which 
prescribes the organization of the body and the field of its 
operations, defines the duties of its members and provides penalties 
for disobedience which range from a small fine to expulsion from the 
society and confiscation of a member's share in the irrigated land." 
Case studies reported in 1972 illustrate how long these irrigation 
societies have endured. Ongkingco describes two systems both of 
which have limited water supply during the dry season and, 
therefore, water has to be rationed and delivered accordingly to the 
supply from the source and the needs of the crop. When problems
33H. Lewis, op. cit.
33Emerson B. Christie, "Notes on Irrigation and Cooperative Irrigation Societies in 
llocos Norte," The Philippine Journal o f  Science Vol. IX, No. 2, April, 1914, pp. 99-113.
arise in drawing water from the system, the farmers organize 
themselves to discuss possible remedy. They offer their services to do 
the work rather than wait for the irrigation office to do the job.
All of these studies done on irrigation associations by different 
researchers independently from each other and in different places 
illustrate that in rice farming, necessity or the need for water is the 
mother o f organization. The llocano's long-standing tradition of 
irrigation cooperative societies is a response to their environment 
which has been very much incorporated into their way of life. The 
llocano, even if uprooted, brings some of these cultural patterns with 
him although as Lewis pointed out, the cooperative society tended to 
"suffer from the relative wealth”  of Isabela.
Hackenberg,34 however, presents a picturesque description of 
how a rice village responds to the increasing demands placed on its 
resources. He begins by challenging the usual picture of a rice village 
as "a closed corporate community with involution as a dominant 
process," structurally characterized by "subsistence agriculture, con­
trol of land by kin groups, village endogamy, isolated, resistant to 
change, outside the market and wage economy." Involution is 
described as "the capacity of villages dependent upon wet rice 
agriculture to accommodate increasing population by intensification 
of cultivation, i.e., by absorbing increased members of cultivators 
on a unit of land." Hackenberg argues that if structural rigidity were 
characteristic of the village, then it would dissolve, disintegrate or 
deteriorate with the combined effects of population growth and 
declining crop yields. He offers to offset this gloomy programs by 
introducing the observation that some agricultural communities have 
the cybernetic potential for self-transformation which enables it to 
deal adaptively with a changing environment. Farming villages in 
Davao have demonstrated a capacity for structural change through 
a form of selective autonomous migration which he calls adaptive 
radiation.
Hackenberg presents two case illustrations of such a pheno­
menon, the Cebuano corn cultivators from Argao and the llocano 
rice cultivators. In the first case, the primary contributor to the 
migration stream is soil depletion because 90 percent of the total soil 
cover in Cebu is suffering from various degrees of erosion and on 
more than a third of the island, all of the top soil has been removed.
3 4 Robert A. Hackenberg, The Cybernetic Village: Adaptive Radiation as a Social 
Process, Publication No. 134. Institute of Behavioral Sciences, University of Colorado.
With population pressure on hillside farms and diminishing pro­
ductivity, the owner-operators moved to the lowland villages and farm 
as tenants in small rice or coconut fields supplemented by income 
from upland corn at average yields of 4 to 5 cavans per hectare per 
crop for three crops year. As the land prices along the coast went up, 
upland corn dropped and some other occupations like milk.fish 
ponds, handicraft, and home textile manufacturing were resorted to. 
However, since 1918 migration became an alternative. This was 
possible through a transfer of heirship rights to the owned land in 
exchange for the price of resettlement in Mindanao. Obviously, those 
who were landless or whose lands had become worthless did not have 
the opportunity to migrate to Mindanao. This migration meant 
economic security. In Cebu the areas they were cultivating ranged 
from .5 to 5-6 hectares while in Davao, they cultivated between 2-3 
to 15-16 hectares. Yields were also higher in Davao.
Unlike in Cebu, Davao's ecological stress is not soil depletion, for 
little  of its land has been removed from cultivation and rice yields in 
the area tend to be higiier than the national average. The population 
stability of the region is attributed by Hackenberg to their irrigation 
societies called zanjeras which perform the labor essential to 
production of wet rice. The communal labor organization of zanjera 
handles 50 to 100 hectares with about 50 farmer-operators. The 
procedure is for the zanjera to make a labor assessment of a number 
of days per month against its membership and assign the tasks which 
must be performed (diversion dam construction, canal maintenance, 
bridge and road construction). Those who do not contribute labor 
are fined an equivalent sum and others are hired to take their place. 
Fields are not owned communally but are worked communally, as 
farm sizes diminish through inheritance and as the number of parcels 
per farm increases, the distance between them becomes greater. An 
heir acquires fragments w ithin the domains of a number of zanjeras 
and each parcel carries w ith it an obligation to that association. To 
solve this problem of fragmentation and decreasing farm size, several 
measures are resorted to: (1) combining owner-operator with 
tenancy; (2) planting of cash-producing, dry-season crops; (3) heavy 
investment in children's education, thus permitting them to secure 
government employment; (4) seasonal migratory labor in all parts of 
Luzon,- and (5) agricultural resettlement through migration. How­
ever, only landowners of one-half hectare or more are apt to 
consider resettlement in Mindanao.
The process of adaptive radiation described by Hackenberg
becomes even more intriguing because the llocano migrants brought 
with them their irrigation associations. The first zanjera in Davao was 
founded by 18 llocanos who found their 10-hectare field lots 
interspersed with corn grown by Cebuanos and Boholanos. In 
exchange for a right of way, they gave free irrigation water fo r one 
hectare. With this one hectare, Cebuanos started to plant rice as they 
saw it done by the llocanos. Having learned how to grow rice, the 
Visayans asked for fu ll membership in the zanjera which the llocanos 
accepted in view of their need for additional labor to improve roads 
and maintain ditches. In 1963 the number of zanjeras increased to 16 
with 632 members farming an average of 7.3 hectares. The 16 were 
merged into a Federated River Association with responsibility for 
evaluating and apportioning water supply during the dry season. This 
federation was also large enough to function as a farmers' coop­
erative marketing association for purposes of government price 
support and other functions. This community coalition was sustained 
by the threat of water shortage which an individual alone was unable 
to meet. As a matter of fact, irrigation and education were their two 
means of upward social mobility, and social control was achieved 
through a value premise of “ we are all equal here." Because of the 
desire to preserve this premise of equality, tenancy was avoided. 
Instead, mechanization and hired farm labor were utilized.
Since expansion of landholdings was also destructive of the 
egalitarian principle, the need to improve income was achieved 
through increased crop yields in fields which were approximately 
of equal size. This was done through crop diversification, double­
cropping and use of high-yielding varieties. It was said that the IR-8 
seed kits when distributed earliter were not sufficient to meet the 
demand. They were also trying to grow a third crop which was 
unheard of in the area. Japanese tractors were also beginning to 
appear.
One wonders at this point why the Filipinos have to look to the 
kibbutz and the moshav of Israel and to the farmer's associations of 
Taiwan for models of farmers' organization when something truly 
indigenous is available right in llocandia and its extensions in 
Mindanao. In interpreting this phenomenon, however, it is important 
to look at both the socio-cultural and the environmental variables 
which interact to shape farmers' organizational behavior.
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